Post-conflict economic reconstruction is a critical part of the political economy of peacetime and one of the most important challenges in any peace-building or state-building strategy. After wars end, countries must negotiate a multi-pronged transition to peace: Violence must give way to public security; lawlessness, political exclusion, and violation of human rights must give way to the rule of law and participatory government; ethnic, religious, ideological, or class/caste confrontation must give way to national reconciliation; and ravaged and mismanaged war economies must be reconstructed and transformed into functioning market economies that enable people to earn a decent living. Yet, how can these vitally important tasks each be successfully managed? How should we go about rehabilitating basic services and physical and human infrastructure? Which policies and institutions are necessary to reactivate the economy in the short run and ensure sustainable development in the long run? What steps should countries take to bring about national reconciliation and the consolidation of peace? In all of these cases, unless the political objectives of peacetime prevail at all times, peace will be ephemeral, while policies that pursue purely economic objectives can have tragic consequences. This book argues that any strategy for post-conflict economic reconstruction must be based on five premises and examines specific post-conflict reconstruction experiences to identify not only where these premises have been disregarded, but also where policies have worked, and the specific conditions that have influenced their success and failure.
Combining the insights of a seasoned practitioner with the academic rigor of a meticulous policy and risk analyst, del Castillo discusses the major obstacles to peacebuilding that need to be removed before war-torn countries can move towards peace, stability, and prosperity. As Secretary-General António Guterres assumes leadership in January 2017, a top priority must be to address the bleak peacebuilding record where over half of the countries under UN watch relapse back into conflict within a decade. While policy debate and the academic literature have focused on the security, political, and social aspects of the war-to-peace transition, this book focuses on "the economic transition"—that is, "economic reconstruction" or "the political economy of peace"—which, in the author’s view, is the much-neglected aspect of peacebuilding. The book argues that rebuilding war-torn states effectively has acquired a new sense of urgency since extremist groups increasingly recruit people by providing jobs and services to those deprived of them due to government and economic failures. Based on past lessons and best practices of the last quarter of a century, the author makes recommendations to move forward and improve the record. It will be of great use to students and scholars of peacebuilding, as well as policymakers in national governments, donor countries and international organizations involved in peacebuilding, statebuilding, and development.
Recalling an unforgettable trip throughout Afghanistan in Nowroz 1978, only three weeks before the bloody communist coup d'tat, the author uses places along the way to describe how foreign conquerors, nationalist policies, a variety of ethnicities and religions, and the Silk Route combined to mold present-day Afghanistan. Such places provided the stage for the famous battles of ancient and modern times, as they provided the different livelihoods of the afghan population that still lives mostly from agriculture and livestock production. Gripping accounts on the political and security transitions since 9/11 have not been matched by similar ones on the economic and social ones, which is the purpose of this book. Based on what she saw in a more recent visit in 2011, the author explains to a general audience how misguided economic policies, misplaced priorities, and wasteful aid have led Afghanistan to an infamous record: the country not only relapsed into conflict but became the most aid-dependent country in the world. Muddling through, as in the past, is no longer an option as NATO troops withdraw and aid falls sharply. The author makes a proposal to help the country to move away from the vicious circle of insecurity, aid, drug and food dependency to a virtuous one of genuine investment, rural development, employment opportunities and improved livelihoods. The cost of the Afghan war-in terms of human lives and taxpayers' money-has been outrageous, and taxpayers should demand a debate among all stakeholders on how to move forward.
With public attention increasingly focused on efforts to reconstruct war torn countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, this book looks at the unique set of challenges faced by such countries in the transition to peace. Strategies to promote peace-building, state-building, and economic reconstruction are discussed alongside real world examples.
Combining the insights of a seasoned practitioner with the academic rigor of a meticulous policy and risk analyst, del Castillo discusses the major obstacles to peacebuilding that need to be removed before war-torn countries can move towards peace, stability, and prosperity. As Secretary-General António Guterres assumes leadership in January 2017, a top priority must be to address the bleak peacebuilding record where over half of the countries under UN watch relapse back into conflict within a decade. While policy debate and the academic literature have focused on the security, political, and social aspects of the war-to-peace transition, this book focuses on "the economic transition"—that is, "economic reconstruction" or "the political economy of peace"—which, in the author’s view, is the much-neglected aspect of peacebuilding. The book argues that rebuilding war-torn states effectively has acquired a new sense of urgency since extremist groups increasingly recruit people by providing jobs and services to those deprived of them due to government and economic failures. Based on past lessons and best practices of the last quarter of a century, the author makes recommendations to move forward and improve the record. It will be of great use to students and scholars of peacebuilding, as well as policymakers in national governments, donor countries and international organizations involved in peacebuilding, statebuilding, and development.
Comparing the 1978-82 Uruguayan stabilization with the 1990-94 Mexican experience reveals that exchange rate based stabilization tends to increase the economy’s vulnerability to unexpected shocks. An exchange rate rule, with full capital mobility, can only succeed if compatible financial policies are strictly adhered to--even when severe negative shocks take place--and if reliance on persistent capital inflows is not essential. This requires monetary restraint, even under serious recessionary conditions, and tight fiscal policies to moderate interest rates. The epilogues of both experiences demonstrate that abandoning the exchange rate rule in the wake of a shock, even if inevitable, makes future stabilization more difficult.
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