Russian conservatism is making a forceful return after a century of experimenting with socialism and liberalism. Conservatism is about managing change by ensuring that modernization evolves organically by building on the past. Conservatism has a natural attraction for Russia as its thousand-year long history is largely characterized by revolutionary change - the destructive process of uprooting the past to give way to modernity. Navigating towards gradual and organic modernization has been a key struggle ever since the Mongols invaded in the early 13th century and decoupled Russia from Europe and the arteries of international trade. Russian history has consisted of avoiding revolutions that are either caused by falling behind on modernization or making great leaps forward that disrupts socio-economic and political traditions. Russian conservatives are now tasked with harmonizing the conservative ideas of the 19th century with the revolutionary changes that shaped Russia in the 20th century. The rise of Asia now provides new opportunities as it enables Russia to overcome its fixation on the West and develop a unique Russian path towards modernization that harmonizes its Eurasian geography and history.
How do think tanks influence Western policies toward Russia? The influence of think tanks in Washington has grown immensely over the past decades in terms of producing research papers, engaging with the media, and having their staff enter government. The ideal purpose and appeal of think tanks is their ability to function as a bridge between academics, the media, the public, and decision-makers. Political decision-makers are expected to be experts across a wide area of governance which becomes increasingly difficult as the world becomes more complex. Acquiring advice and enhancing competencies through cooperation with scholars at universities can be challenging as academics tend to focus on narrow research questions that take place within a wider discussion of theory and method. Think tanks respond to this challenge as institutions that provide focused research studies and policy papers to address specific and current challenges. The negative aspect of think tanks is the power they wield, from controlling information to functioning as a waiting room for politicians out of office. Information is power, and a think tanks business model has been established that sells political influence in Washington and manufactures consent among the public. The military-industrial complex is the dominant donor to think tanks, which results in a bias toward military solutions and perpetuating conflict. Russia remains a leading adversary of the West and has sustained Washington’s exorbitant military spending over many decades. Think tanks accordingly have a great incentive to push for a confrontational posture towards Russia as they operate in an industry where conflicts are profitable and peace produces losses A mutually acceptable post-Cold War settlement threatened the revenue of one of the largest and most influential industries in the US, which was reversed as a result of NATO expansion and renewed tensions with Russia. This book explores how the think tanks function, and how their growing role has influenced US policies toward Russia.
Why and how will the fourth industrial revolution impact great power politics? Here, Glenn Diesen utilizes a neoclassical approach to great power politics to assess how far the development of AI, national and localized technological ecosystems and cyber-warfare will affect great power politics in the next century. The reliance of modern economies on technological advances, Diesen argues, also compels states to intervene radically in economics and the lives of citizens, as automation radically alters the economies of tomorrow. A groundbreaking attempt to contextualize the fourth industrial revolution, and analyse its effects on politics and international relations.
This book defines Russophobia as the irrational fear of Russia, a key theme in the study of propaganda in the West as Russia has throughout history been assigned a diametrically opposite identity as the “Other.” Propaganda is the science of convincing an audience without appealing to reason. The West and Russia have been juxtaposed as Western versus Eastern, European versus Asiatic, civilized versus barbaric, modern versus backward, liberal versus autocratic, and even good versus evil. During the Cold War, ideological dividing lines fell naturally by casting the debate as capitalism versus communism, democracy versus totalitarianism, and Christianity versus atheism. After the Cold War, anti-Russian propaganda aims to filter all political questions through the simplistic binary stereotype of democracy versus authoritarianism, which provides little if any heuristic value to understand the complexities of relations. A key feature of propaganda against the inferior “Other” is both contemptuous derision and panic-stricken fear of the threat to civilization. Russia has therefore throughout history been allowed to play one of two roles—either an apprentice of Western civilization by accepting the subordinate role as the student and political object, or a threat that must be contained or defeated. While propaganda has the positive effect of promoting unity and mobilizing resources toward rational and strategic objectives, it can also have the negative effect of creating irrational decision-making and obstructing a workable peace.
Moscow has progressively replaced geopolitics with geoeconomics as power is recognised to derive from the state’s ability to establish a privileged position in strategic markets and transportation corridors. The objective is to bridge the vast Eurasian continent to reposition Russia from the periphery of Europe and Asia to the centre of a new constellation. Moscow’s ‘Greater Europe’ ambition of the previous decades produced a failed Western-centric foreign policy culminating in excessive dependence on the West. Instead of constructing Gorbachev’s ‘Common European Home’, the ‘leaning-to-one-side’ approach deprived Russia of the market value and leverage needed to negotiate a more favourable and inclusive Europe. Eurasian integration offers Russia the opportunity to address this ‘overreliance’ on the West by using the Russia’s position as a Eurasian state to advance its influence in Europe. Offering an account steeped in Russian economic statecraft and power politics, this book offers a rare glimpse into the dominant narratives of Russian strategic culture. It explains how the country’s outlook adjusts to the ongoing realignment towards Asia while engaging in a parallel assessment of Russia’s interactions with other significant actors. The author offers discussion both on Russian responses and adaptations to the current power transition and the ways in which the economic initiatives promoted by Moscow in its project for a ‘Greater Eurasia’ reflect the entrepreneurial foreign policy strategy of the country.
What explains the rise of populist movements across the West and their affinity towards Russia? UKIP’s Brexit victory, Trump’s triumph, and the successive elections and referendums in Europe were united by a repudiation of the liberal international order. These new political forces envision the struggle to reproduce and advance Western civilisation to be fought along a patriotism–cosmopolitanism or nationalism–globalism battlefield, in which Russia becomes a partner rather than an adversary. Armed with neomodernism and geoeconomics, Russia has inadvertently taken on a central role in the decay of Western civilisation. This book explores the cooperation and competition between Western and Russian civilisation and the rise of anti-establishment political forces both contesting the international liberal order and expressing the desire for closer relations with Russia. Diesen proposes that Western civilisation has reached a critical juncture as modern society (gesellschaft) has overwhelmed and exhausted the traditional community (gemeinschaft) and shows the causes for the decay of Western civilisation and the subsequent impact on cooperation and conflict with Russia. The author also considers whether Russia’s international conservativism is authentic and can negate the West’s decadence, or if it is merely a shrewd strategy by a rival civilisation also in decay. This volume will be of interest to scholars of international relations, political science, security studies, international political economy, and Russian studies.
Five hundred years of Western hegemony has ended, while the global majority’s aspiration for a world order based on multipolarity and sovereign equality is rising. This incisive book addresses the demise of liberal hegemony, though pointing out that a multipolar Westphalian world order has not yet taken shape, leaving the world in a period of interregnum. A legal vacuum has emerged, in which the conflicting sides are competing to define the future order. NATO expansionism was an important component of liberal hegemony as it was intended to cement the collective hegemony of the West as the foundation for a liberal democratic peace. Instead, it dismantled the pan-European security architecture and set Europe on the path to war without the possibility of a course correction. Ukraine as a divided country in a divided Europe has been a crucial pawn in the great power competition between NATO and Russia for the past three decades. The war in Ukraine is a symptom of the collapsing world order. The war revealed the dysfunction of liberal hegemony in terms of both power and legitimacy, and it sparked a proxy war between the West and Russia instead of ensuring peace, the source of its legitimacy. The proxy war, unprecedented sanctions, and efforts to isolate Russia in the wider world contributed to the demise of liberal hegemony as opposed to its revival. Much of the world responded to the war by intensifying their transition to a Eurasian world order that rejects hegemony and liberal universalism. The economic architecture is being reorganised as the world diversifies away from excessive reliance on Western technologies, industries, transportation corridors, banks, payment systems, insurance systems, and currencies. Universalism based on Western values is replaced by civilisational distinctiveness, sovereign inequality is swapped with sovereign equality, socialising inferiors is replaced by negotiations, and the rules-based international order is discarded in favour of international law. A Westphalian world order is reasserting itself, although with Eurasian characteristics. The West’s defeat of Russia would restore the unipolar world order while a Russian victory would cement a multipolar one. The international system is now at its most dangerous as the prospect of compromise is absent, meaning the winner will take all. Both NATO under US direction and Russia are therefore prepared to take great risks and escalate, making nuclear wan increasingly likely.
Will the increased economic connectivity across the Eurasian supercontinent transform Europe into the western peninsula of Greater Eurasia? The unipolar era entailed the US organising the two other major economic regions of the world, Europe and Asia, under US leadership. The rise of “the rest”, primarily Asia with China at the centre, has ended the unipolar era and even 500-years of Western dominance. China and Russia are leading efforts to integrate Europe and Asia into one large region. The Greater Eurasian region is constructed with three categories of economic connectivity – strategic industries built on new and disruptive technologies; physical connectivity with bimodal transportation corridors; and financial connectivity with new development banks, trading currencies and payments systems. China strives for geoeconomic leadership by replacing the US leadership position, while Russia endeavours to reposition itself from the dual periphery of Europe and Asia to the centre of a grand Eurasian geoeconomic constellation. Europe, positioned between the trans-Atlantic region and Greater Eurasia, has to adapt to the new international distribution of power to preserve its strategic autonomy.
Do the EU and NATO threaten Russian security? The book explores the rise of these exclusive ‘inter-democratic’ security institutions after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the ensuing effects on relations with Russia. Two competing theories are tested to explore whether these institutions aggravate or mitigate the security dilemma with Russia. These institutions can be theorised to promote security as a positive-sum game through European integration and democracy promotion, or pursue collective hegemony with ideologically uncompromising bloc-politics. Glenn Diesen argues that a European security architecture that demotes the largest state on the continent to an object of security inevitably results in ‘European integration’ becoming a zero-sum geopolitical project that has set the West on a collision course with Russia.
Why and how will the fourth industrial revolution impact great power politics? Here, Glenn Diesen utilizes a neoclassical approach to great power politics to assess how far the development of AI, national and localized technological ecosystems and cyber-warfare will affect great power politics in the next century. The reliance of modern economies on technological advances, Diesen argues, also compels states to intervene radically in economics and the lives of citizens, as automation radically alters the economies of tomorrow. A groundbreaking attempt to contextualize the fourth industrial revolution, and analyse its effects on politics and international relations.
Russian conservatism is making a forceful return after a century of experimenting with socialism and liberalism. Conservatism is about managing change by ensuring that modernization evolves organically by building on the past. Conservatism has a natural attraction for Russia as its thousand-year long history is largely characterized by revolutionary change - the destructive process of uprooting the past to give way to modernity. Navigating towards gradual and organic modernization has been a key struggle ever since the Mongols invaded in the early 13th century and decoupled Russia from Europe and the arteries of international trade. Russian history has consisted of avoiding revolutions that are either caused by falling behind on modernization or making great leaps forward that disrupts socio-economic and political traditions. Russian conservatives are now tasked with harmonizing the conservative ideas of the 19th century with the revolutionary changes that shaped Russia in the 20th century. The rise of Asia now provides new opportunities as it enables Russia to overcome its fixation on the West and develop a unique Russian path towards modernization that harmonizes its Eurasian geography and history.
Do the EU and NATO threaten Russian security? The book explores the rise of these exclusive ’inter-democratic’ security institutions after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the ensuing effects on relations with Russia. Two competing theories are tested to explore whether these institutions aggravate or mitigate the security dilemma with Russia. These institutions can be theorised to promote security as a positive-sum game through European integration and democracy promotion, or pursue collective hegemony with ideologically uncompromising bloc-politics. Glenn Diesen argues that a European security architecture that demotes the largest state on the continent to an object of security inevitably results in ’European integration’ becoming a zero-sum geopolitical project that has set the West on a collision course with Russia.
Will the increased economic connectivity across the Eurasian supercontinent transform Europe into the western peninsula of Greater Eurasia? The unipolar era entailed the US organising the two other major economic regions of the world, Europe and Asia, under US leadership. The rise of “the rest”, primarily Asia with China at the centre, has ended the unipolar era and even 500-years of Western dominance. China and Russia are leading efforts to integrate Europe and Asia into one large region. The Greater Eurasian region is constructed with three categories of economic connectivity – strategic industries built on new and disruptive technologies; physical connectivity with bimodal transportation corridors; and financial connectivity with new development banks, trading currencies and payments systems. China strives for geoeconomic leadership by replacing the US leadership position, while Russia endeavours to reposition itself from the dual periphery of Europe and Asia to the centre of a grand Eurasian geoeconomic constellation. Europe, positioned between the trans-Atlantic region and Greater Eurasia, has to adapt to the new international distribution of power to preserve its strategic autonomy.
In order to establish a model for the investigation of 'incomplete L1 acquisition' - the phenomenon whereby a bilingual speaker incompletely acquires the socially non-dominant language - the author offers a description and analysis of the speech of ten elderly speakers of Yiddish who acquired Yiddish as an L1 simultaneously with English but have not used the language since childhood. Of central interest is the question of whether the divergent forms in the data are the result of L1 attrition - the loss of knowledge once possessed - or incomplete L1 acquisition - lack of initial acquisition of the forms reflecting in the data 'fossilized' divergent child language. Bringing together certain disparate theoretical ideas, the author accepts Chomskyan notions of innateness and the language faculty while also considering the role of input in social/sociolinguistic terms. Specifically, issues such as 'linguistic identity' and patterns of use are shown to affect the quality of acquisition in bilingual situations. Through comparison with the speech of 'native' Yiddish adults, and mono- and bilingual German and Dutch children, a linguistic rule (present perfect) is isolated and shown to be due to incomplete L1 acquisition and not L1 attrition. In short, the study offers an account of what occurs when the child's innate inclination to organize linguistic input into a mature linguistic system collides with insurmountable social and sociolinguistic hindrances to 'normal' acquisition. Die Monographie erarbeitet einen theoretischen Rahmen für die Untersuchung von unvollständigem Erstspracherwerb am Beispiel des Jiddischen. Die Analyse konzentriert sich auf das Sprachverhalten älterer Menschen, die Jiddisch gleichzeitig mit Englisch erwarben und die jiddische Sprache seit der Kindheit nicht mehr verwendeten. Im Zentrum steht die Frage, ob ungrammatische Formen im untersuchten Material auf den Verlust ursprünglich gekannter Formen oder auf den unvollständigen Erstspracherwerb zurückzuführen sind. Die Untersuchung macht die Annahme der letztgenannten Möglichkeit wahrscheinlich.
What explains the rise of populist movements across the West and their affinity towards Russia? UKIP’s Brexit victory, Trump’s triumph, and the successive elections and referendums in Europe were united by a repudiation of the liberal international order. These new political forces envision the struggle to reproduce and advance Western civilisation to be fought along a patriotism–cosmopolitanism or nationalism–globalism battlefield, in which Russia becomes a partner rather than an adversary. Armed with neomodernism and geoeconomics, Russia has inadvertently taken on a central role in the decay of Western civilisation. This book explores the cooperation and competition between Western and Russian civilisation and the rise of anti-establishment political forces both contesting the international liberal order and expressing the desire for closer relations with Russia. Diesen proposes that Western civilisation has reached a critical juncture as modern society (gesellschaft) has overwhelmed and exhausted the traditional community (gemeinschaft) and shows the causes for the decay of Western civilisation and the subsequent impact on cooperation and conflict with Russia. The author also considers whether Russia’s international conservativism is authentic and can negate the West’s decadence, or if it is merely a shrewd strategy by a rival civilisation also in decay. This volume will be of interest to scholars of international relations, political science, security studies, international political economy, and Russian studies.
Zombie Movies is an essential purchase for all those who love (or fear) horror cinema’s most popular and terrifying creation. This thorough and authoritative yet uproarious guide • reviews and rates nearly 300 zombie films—from Bela Lugosi’s White Zombie (1932) to George A. Romero’s Diary of the Dead (2008) • traces the evolution of the zombie over the decades, from voodoo slave to brain-eating undead to raging infected • lays out what makes a zombie a zombie, as opposed to a ghost, ghoul, vampire, mummy, pod person, rabid sicko, or Frankenstein’s monster • includes a detailed and chilling journal from the filming of Land of the Dead • lists the oddest and most gruesome things ever seen in undead cinema • covers not only mainstream American movies but also small independent productions, Spanish and Italian exploitation pictures, and bizarre offerings from Japan and Hong Kong • provides a detailed rundown of the 25 greatest zombie films ever made • features in-depth interviews with actors, directors, makeup effects wizards, and other zombie experts For serious fans and casual moviegoers alike, Zombie Movies will provide plenty of informative and entertaining brain food.
Byzantine Media Subjects invites readers into a world replete with images—icons, frescoes, and mosaics filling places of worship, politics, and community. Glenn Peers asks readers to think themselves into a world where representation reigned and humans followed, and indeed were formed. Interrogating the fundamental role of representation in the making of the Byzantine human, Peers argues that Byzantine culture was (already) posthuman. The Byzantine experience reveals the extent to which media like icons, manuscripts, music, animals, and mirrors fundamentally determine humans. In the Byzantine world, representation as such was deeply persuasive, even coercive; it had the power to affect human relationships, produce conflict, and form self-perception. Media studies has made its subject the modern world, but this book argues for media having made historical subjects. Here, it is shown that media long ago also made Byzantine humans, defining them, molding them, mediating their relationship to time, to nature, to God, and to themselves.
How do think tanks influence Western policies toward Russia? The influence of think tanks in Washington has grown immensely over the past decades in terms of producing research papers, engaging with the media, and having their staff enter government. The ideal purpose and appeal of think tanks is their ability to function as a bridge between academics, the media, the public, and decision-makers. Political decision-makers are expected to be experts across a wide area of governance which becomes increasingly difficult as the world becomes more complex. Acquiring advice and enhancing competencies through cooperation with scholars at universities can be challenging as academics tend to focus on narrow research questions that take place within a wider discussion of theory and method. Think tanks respond to this challenge as institutions that provide focused research studies and policy papers to address specific and current challenges. The negative aspect of think tanks is the power they wield, from controlling information to functioning as a waiting room for politicians out of office. Information is power, and a think tanks business model has been established that sells political influence in Washington and manufactures consent among the public. The military-industrial complex is the dominant donor to think tanks, which results in a bias toward military solutions and perpetuating conflict. Russia remains a leading adversary of the West and has sustained Washington’s exorbitant military spending over many decades. Think tanks accordingly have a great incentive to push for a confrontational posture towards Russia as they operate in an industry where conflicts are profitable and peace produces losses A mutually acceptable post-Cold War settlement threatened the revenue of one of the largest and most influential industries in the US, which was reversed as a result of NATO expansion and renewed tensions with Russia. This book explores how the think tanks function, and how their growing role has influenced US policies toward Russia.
This study examines the sociocultural context of Bern's ten Reformation plays, authored by Niklaus Manuel and Hans von Rute, and argues that Protestant theater was instrumental in creating cultural community among an urban populace estranged from Catholic tradition.
This book stands at the intersection of recent work in historiography and the study of political culture in the early Middle Ages. It takes the autograph manuscript of a tenth-century monk, Richer, as a point of entry into the author's world, and asks how he and his contemporaries in the religious and intellectual community of Reims engaged in Frankish politics. By shifting focus from the events and actors that typically occupy centre stage in political theatre to the writing of history and its authors, it offers a sustained reflection on the relationship between politics and history. As a case study it aims, ultimately, to articulate new possibilities for the study of early medieval politics and, at the same time, to provide a model for a type of historical inquiry in which the development of questions and the exploration of possibilities stand more prominent than the conclusions drawn from them.
Moscow has progressively replaced geopolitics with geoeconomics as power is recognised to derive from the state’s ability to establish a privileged position in strategic markets and transportation corridors. The objective is to bridge the vast Eurasian continent to reposition Russia from the periphery of Europe and Asia to the centre of a new constellation. Moscow’s ‘Greater Europe’ ambition of the previous decades produced a failed Western-centric foreign policy culminating in excessive dependence on the West. Instead of constructing Gorbachev’s ‘Common European Home’, the ‘leaning-to-one-side’ approach deprived Russia of the market value and leverage needed to negotiate a more favourable and inclusive Europe. Eurasian integration offers Russia the opportunity to address this ‘overreliance’ on the West by using the Russia’s position as a Eurasian state to advance its influence in Europe. Offering an account steeped in Russian economic statecraft and power politics, this book offers a rare glimpse into the dominant narratives of Russian strategic culture. It explains how the country’s outlook adjusts to the ongoing realignment towards Asia while engaging in a parallel assessment of Russia’s interactions with other significant actors. The author offers discussion both on Russian responses and adaptations to the current power transition and the ways in which the economic initiatives promoted by Moscow in its project for a ‘Greater Eurasia’ reflect the entrepreneurial foreign policy strategy of the country.
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