Many physical theories suggest that time does not pass, yet temporality deeply permeates our experience. We perceive change and movement, we are aware of living in the present, of the constant flux of our sensations and thoughts, and of time itself flowing. In Temporal Experience, Torrengo considers the core facts of temporal experience and their interconnections, ultimately defending the atomist dynamic model of temporal experience. The book critically examines prevalent theories of experience of change, succession, and passage of time both in philosophy and psychology. Each chapter contributes to the construction of the atomist dynamic model. Experience of change and movement are explained through mental events that present virtually instantaneous movement and change. Torrengo challenges the common belief in the perception of 'presentness' and proposes an error theory based on narrative cognition. The experience of succession is elucidated through the concept of an overarching phenomenology, arguing against the tendency to overstate the phenomenal continuity of experience. Finally, the experience of the passage of time is approached through the non-representationalist theory of the phenomenal modifier, and the book concludes by discussing the surprising consequences of applying the experiential model defended to the scientific image of our existence in time as a sequence of physical events.
The growing interest in fragmentalism is one of the most exciting trends in philosophy of time and is gradually reshaping the contemporary debate. Providing an extensive interpretation of this view, Samuele Iaquinto and Giuliano Torrengo articulate a novel theory of the passage of time and argue that it is the most effective in vindicating the inherent dynamism of reality. Iaquinto and Torrengo offer the first full-range application of fragmentalism to a number of metaphysical topics, including the open future, causation, the A-theoretic interpretation of special relativity and time travel. The resulting picture, they argue, conveys the potential of a radically new understanding of time.
Many physical theories suggest that time does not pass, yet temporality deeply permeates our experience. We perceive change and movement, we are aware of living in the present, of the constant flux of our sensations and thoughts, and of time itself flowing. In Temporal Experience, Torrengo considers the core facts of temporal experience and their interconnections, ultimately defending the atomist dynamic model of temporal experience. The book critically examines prevalent theories of experience of change, succession, and passage of time both in philosophy and psychology. Each chapter contributes to the construction of the atomist dynamic model. Experience of change and movement are explained through mental events that present virtually instantaneous movement and change. Torrengo challenges the common belief in the perception of 'presentness' and proposes an error theory based on narrative cognition. The experience of succession is elucidated through the concept of an overarching phenomenology, arguing against the tendency to overstate the phenomenal continuity of experience. Finally, the experience of the passage of time is approached through the non-representationalist theory of the phenomenal modifier, and the book concludes by discussing the surprising consequences of applying the experiential model defended to the scientific image of our existence in time as a sequence of physical events.
The growing interest in fragmentalism is one of the most exciting trends in philosophy of time and is gradually reshaping the contemporary debate. Providing an extensive interpretation of this view, Samuele Iaquinto and Giuliano Torrengo articulate a novel theory of the passage of time and argue that it is the most effective in vindicating the inherent dynamism of reality. Iaquinto and Torrengo offer the first full-range application of fragmentalism to a number of metaphysical topics, including the open future, causation, the A-theoretic interpretation of special relativity and time travel. The resulting picture, they argue, conveys the potential of a radically new understanding of time.
According to both ordinary and scientifi c thought, two objects can enter into relation not only simultanously, but also at different times, namely cross-temporally. For instance, we understand comparisons between entities as they are at different times, such as when we say that John is now taller than Michael was three years ago; causally related events are often not simultaneous, and objects of perceptions and perceivers usually have different temporal locations (we see ordinary things as they were a few milliseconds ago, we see the sun as it was eight minutes ago, and so on). However, many philosophers consider cross-temporality deceptive. Relations, according to the “standard view”, can hold only between things existing in the same time. In this book Torrengo defends the opposite view, according to which relations can be cross-temporally instantited and thus cross-temporal talk must be taken seriously. The theory is based on the idea that persisting in time is tantamount to possessing temporal parts at different times, and its central tenet is that persisting entities (objects and events alike) are cross-temporally related by having distinct temporal parts entering into relations.
The growing interest in fragmentalism is one of the most exciting topics in philosophy of time. Providing an extensive interpretation of this theory, Samuele Iaquinto and Giuliano Torrengo offer the first full-range exploration of its applications to research in metaphysics. Comparing contrasting views from those that deny the reality of the flow of time and those which admit it, they reveal how non-standard views about tense is changing the shape of the contemporary debate. In their defense of a framentalist theory of the passage of time, Iaquinto and Torrengo extend it from linear models to branching-time structures and articulate a novel account built on the connection between time and modality. Identifying the impact of fragmentalism on the relation between our selves and our perspective on reality, this much-needed study conveys the potential of a fragmentalist theory for contemporary metaphysics of time and debates about the self and morality."--
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