Philosophy of Science: A Unified Approach combines a general introduction to philosophy of science with an integrated survey of all its important subfields. As the book’s subtitle suggests, this excellent overview is guided methodologically by "a unified approach" to philosophy of science: behind the diversity of scientific fields one can recognize a methodological unity of the sciences. This unity is worked out in this book, revealing all the while important differences between subject areas. Structurally, this comprehensive book offers a two-part approach, which makes it an excellent introduction for students new to the field and a useful resource for more advanced students. Each chapter is divided into two sections. The first section assumes no foreknowledge of the subject introduced, and the second section builds upon the first by bringing into the conversation more advanced, complementary topics. Definitions, key propositions, examples and figures overview all of the core material. At the end of every chapter there are selected readings and exercises (with solutions at the end of the book). The book also includes a comprehensive bibliography and an index.
The leading idea of epistemology in the Enlightenment tradition was foundation-theoretic: to reach knowledge, we must not legitimize our beliefs by external authorities, but instead justify them by rational arguments. Recently, the foundation-theoretic ideal of justification has come under attack, the chief criticism being that universal standards of justification are illusory because the problem of a regress of justification is unsolvable. Alternatives to foundation theory (coherentism, externalism, or dogmatism) have been developed that give up central claims of Enlightenment epistemology such as empirical support, cognitive accessibility, or rational justifiability. Optimality Justifications develops a new account of foundation-theoretic epistemology based on the method of optimality justifications. Optimality justifications offer a solution to the regress problem. Rather than striving for a priori demonstrations of reliability, which are impossible, they show that certain epistemic methods are optimal with regard to all accessible alternatives, which is more modestly but provably possible. In particular, optimality justifications can achieve a non-circular justification of deductive, inductive, and abductive reasoning. This volume pursues two goals: a general renewal of foundation-theoretic epistemology based on the account of optimality justifications, and the advancement of methods of optimality justification in important domains of epistemology and the philosophy of science, logic, and cognition. Connected with these goals is the aspiration to develop new ideas for mainstream epistemology, as well as for formal epistemology, philosophy of science, and cognitive science, which are intended to attract researchers, students, and all other readers interested in these fields.
A new approach to Hume's problem of induction that justifies the optimality of induction at the level of meta-induction. Hume's problem of justifying induction has been among epistemology's greatest challenges for centuries. In this book, Gerhard Schurz proposes a new approach to Hume's problem. Acknowledging the force of Hume's arguments against the possibility of a noncircular justification of the reliability of induction, Schurz demonstrates instead the possibility of a noncircular justification of the optimality of induction, or, more precisely, of meta-induction (the application of induction to competing prediction models). Drawing on discoveries in computational learning theory, Schurz demonstrates that a regret-based learning strategy, attractivity-weighted meta-induction, is predictively optimal in all possible worlds among all prediction methods accessible to the epistemic agent. Moreover, the a priori justification of meta-induction generates a noncircular a posteriori justification of object induction. Taken together, these two results provide a noncircular solution to Hume's problem. Schurz discusses the philosophical debate on the problem of induction, addressing all major attempts at a solution to Hume's problem and describing their shortcomings; presents a series of theorems, accompanied by a description of computer simulations illustrating the content of these theorems (with proofs presented in a mathematical appendix); and defends, refines, and applies core insights regarding the optimality of meta-induction, explaining applications in neighboring disciplines including forecasting sciences, cognitive science, social epistemology, and generalized evolution theory. Finally, Schurz generalizes the method of optimality-based justification to a new strategy of justification in epistemology, arguing that optimality justifications can avoid the problems of justificatory circularity and regress.
The leading idea of epistemology in the Enlightenment tradition was foundation-theoretic: to reach knowledge, we must not legitimize our beliefs by external authorities, but instead justify them by rational arguments. Recently, the foundation-theoretic ideal of justification has come under attack, the chief criticism being that universal standards of justification are illusory because the problem of a regress of justification is unsolvable. Alternatives to foundation theory (coherentism, externalism, or dogmatism) have been developed that give up central claims of Enlightenment epistemology such as empirical support, cognitive accessibility, or rational justifiability. Optimality Justifications develops a new account of foundation-theoretic epistemology based on the method of optimality justifications. Optimality justifications offer a solution to the regress problem. Rather than striving for a priori demonstrations of reliability, which are impossible, they show that certain epistemic methods are optimal with regard to all accessible alternatives, which is more modestly but provably possible. In particular, optimality justifications can achieve a non-circular justification of deductive, inductive, and abductive reasoning. This volume pursues two goals: a general renewal of foundation-theoretic epistemology based on the account of optimality justifications, and the advancement of methods of optimality justification in important domains of epistemology and the philosophy of science, logic, and cognition. Connected with these goals is the aspiration to develop new ideas for mainstream epistemology, as well as for formal epistemology, philosophy of science, and cognitive science, which are intended to attract researchers, students, and all other readers interested in these fields.
Philosophy of Science: A Unified Approach combines a general introduction to philosophy of science with an integrated survey of all its important subfields. As the book’s subtitle suggests, this excellent overview is guided methodologically by "a unified approach" to philosophy of science: behind the diversity of scientific fields one can recognize a methodological unity of the sciences. This unity is worked out in this book, revealing all the while important differences between subject areas. Structurally, this comprehensive book offers a two-part approach, which makes it an excellent introduction for students new to the field and a useful resource for more advanced students. Each chapter is divided into two sections. The first section assumes no foreknowledge of the subject introduced, and the second section builds upon the first by bringing into the conversation more advanced, complementary topics. Definitions, key propositions, examples and figures overview all of the core material. At the end of every chapter there are selected readings and exercises (with solutions at the end of the book). The book also includes a comprehensive bibliography and an index.
When confronted by a range of violent actions perpetrated by lone individuals, contemporary society exhibits a constant tendency to react in terms of helpless, even perplexed horror. Seeking explanations for the apparently inexplicable, commentators often hurry to declare the perpetrators as “evil”. This question is not restricted to individuals: history has repeatedly demonstrated how groups and even entire nations can embark on a criminal plan united by the conviction that they were fighting for a good and just cause. Which circumstances occasioned such actions? What was their motivation? Applying a number of historical, scientific and social-scientific approaches to this question, this study produces an integrative portrait of the reasons for human behavior and advances a number of different interpretations for their genesis. The book makes clear the extent to which we live in socially-constructed realities in which we cling for dear life to a range of conceptions and beliefs which can all too easily fall apart in situations of crisis.
By 1540, piracy, with some encouragement from the English and French governments, was thriving in the Caribbean. Much has been written about the pirates who infested that bubbling cauldron, but very little about the hardiest of them all: the ones who crossed the jungles of Central America and sailed through the perilous Straits of Magellan or around Cape Horn to sack the ports of New Spain and capture the Spanish galleons loaded with riches. At least twenty-five expeditions of foreigners reached the Pacific shores of Central America or Mexico during the period covered by Peter Gerhard?s book?from 1575, when John Oxenham left England for those waters, to 1742, when Commodore George Anson sailed against the Spanish fleet in the War of Jenkins? Ear. Pirates of the Pacific brings to life Francis Drake and less civilized English privateers and smugglers, sea-roving Dutchmen like Black Anthony, buccaneers like Henry Morgan, and unnamed but no less vigorous pirates who suffered all manner of hardship for riches and generally died young and poor.
Type Logical Grammar is a framework that emerged from the synthesis of two traditions: Categorial Grammar from formal linguistics and substructural logics from logic. Grammatical composition is conceived as resource conscious logical deduction. Such a grammar is necessarily surface oriented and lexicalistic. The Curry-Howard correspondence supplies an elegant compositional mapping from syntax to semantics. Anaphora does not seem to fit well into this framework. In type logical deductions, each resource is used exactly once. Anaphora, however, is a phenomenon where semantic resources are used more than once. Generally admitting the multiple use of lexical resources is not possible because it would lead to empirical inadequacy and computational intractability. This book develops a hybrid architecture that allows to incorporate anaphora resolution into grammatical deduction while avoiding these consequences. To this end, the grammar logic is enriched with a connective that specifically deals with anaphora. After giving a self-contained introduction into Type Logical Grammar in general, the book discusses the formal properties of this connective. In the sequel, Jäger applies this machinery to numerous linguistic phenomena pertaining to the interaction of pronominal anaphora, VP ellipsis and quantification. In the final chapter, the framework is extended to indefiniteness, specificity and sluicing.
Captivating, well-documented study focuses on piracy among Spain's Pacific coast colonies, ranging from Panama to points north. Colorful narrative traces exploits of Elizabethan pirates, Dutch raiders, mercenary buccaneers, and English privateers and smugglers.
More than 25 years ago, when ultrasound diagnostic methods were first intro duced into gynecology and obstetrics, few of the pioneers of these techniques sus pected what importance sonographic diagnosis was destined to assume. It was soon recognized that the organs of the lesser pelvis could be visualized to much greater advantage by inserting probes into the natural bodily orifices than by abdominal sonography. Full exploitation of the physical properties of ultra sound had to wait, as so often in the history of sonography, for technological ad vances. Endosonography in the form available to us today combines the advantages of endoscopy and sonography. The next light-reflecting surface, once the limit of en doscopy, represents no barrier to ultrasound. A whole range of both diagnostic and therapeutic procedures can be sonographically guided. Blood flow in vessels lying deep in the lesser pelvis can now be measured by means of vaginal duplex sonography.
What is the heritage of our cities? Which are the monuments, places, and spaces in which it accumulates, and by which practices is it formed, handed down, appropriated? Gerhard Vinken takes the readers to twelve cities on three continents and analyses the diverse and contradictory heritage formations that have had a lasting impact on urban life. The vitality of urban heritage, as these vivid and in-depth case studies show, lies in the dynamic and often conflictual processes of social appropriation and interpretation. Covering a diverse range of themes, the book familiarizes the reader with important questions and theories in urban research and heritage studies.
A new approach to Hume's problem of induction that justifies the optimality of induction at the level of meta-induction. Hume's problem of justifying induction has been among epistemology's greatest challenges for centuries. In this book, Gerhard Schurz proposes a new approach to Hume's problem. Acknowledging the force of Hume's arguments against the possibility of a noncircular justification of the reliability of induction, Schurz demonstrates instead the possibility of a noncircular justification of the optimality of induction, or, more precisely, of meta-induction (the application of induction to competing prediction models). Drawing on discoveries in computational learning theory, Schurz demonstrates that a regret-based learning strategy, attractivity-weighted meta-induction, is predictively optimal in all possible worlds among all prediction methods accessible to the epistemic agent. Moreover, the a priori justification of meta-induction generates a noncircular a posteriori justification of object induction. Taken together, these two results provide a noncircular solution to Hume's problem. Schurz discusses the philosophical debate on the problem of induction, addressing all major attempts at a solution to Hume's problem and describing their shortcomings; presents a series of theorems, accompanied by a description of computer simulations illustrating the content of these theorems (with proofs presented in a mathematical appendix); and defends, refines, and applies core insights regarding the optimality of meta-induction, explaining applications in neighboring disciplines including forecasting sciences, cognitive science, social epistemology, and generalized evolution theory. Finally, Schurz generalizes the method of optimality-based justification to a new strategy of justification in epistemology, arguing that optimality justifications can avoid the problems of justificatory circularity and regress.
Representational systems such as language, mind and perhaps even the brain exhibit a structure that is often assumed to be compositional. That is, the semantic value of a complex representation is determined by the semantic value of their parts and the way they are put together. Dating back to the late 19th century, the principle of compositionality has regained wide attention recently. Since the principle has been dealt with very differently across disciplines, the aim of the two volumes is to bring together the diverging approaches. They assemble a collection of original papers that cover the topic of compositionality from virtually all perspectives of interest in the contemporary debate. The well-chosen international list of authors includes psychologists, neuroscientists, computer scientists, linguists, and philosophers.
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