Political scientists have long classified systems of government as parliamentary or presidential, two-party or multiparty, and so on. But such distinctions often fail to provide useful insights. For example, how are we to compare the United States, a presidential bicameral regime with two weak parties, to Denmark, a parliamentary unicameral regime with many strong parties? Veto Players advances an important, new understanding of how governments are structured. The real distinctions between political systems, contends George Tsebelis, are to be found in the extent to which they afford political actors veto power over policy choices. Drawing richly on game theory, he develops a scheme by which governments can thus be classified. He shows why an increase in the number of "veto players," or an increase in their ideological distance from each other, increases policy stability, impeding significant departures from the status quo. Policy stability affects a series of other key characteristics of polities, argues the author. For example, it leads to high judicial and bureaucratic independence, as well as high government instability (in parliamentary systems). The propositions derived from the theoretical framework Tsebelis develops in the first part of the book are tested in the second part with various data sets from advanced industrialized countries, as well as analysis of legislation in the European Union. Representing the first consistent and consequential theory of comparative politics, Veto Players will be welcomed by students and scholars as a defining text of the discipline. From the preface to the Italian edition: ? "Tsebelis has produced what is today the most original theory for the understanding of the dynamics of contemporary regimes. . . . This book promises to remain a lasting contribution to political analysis."--Gianfranco Pasquino, Professor of Political Science, University of Bologna
Clearly written and easily understood by the nonspecialist, Nested Games provides a systematic, empirically accurate, and theoretically coherent account of apparently irrational political actions.
This volume sets out with a discussion of the Dutch project of improving democracy and ends with a discussion of the Robot revolution. It contains contributions such as Peter Brouwer and Klaas Staal, The Future Viability of the Dutch Democracy; Hannu Nurmi, Remarks on “The Future Viability of the Dutch Democracy;” George Tsebelis and Jesse M. Crosson, Can the Dutch Electoral System be Improved Upon? Ryan Kendall, Decomposing Democracy: A Comment on “The Future Viability of the Dutch Democracy;” Peter Emerson, Can Rights Be Wrong? Towards a Less Majoritarian More Inclusive Democracy; Jan Oreský and Prokop Čech, Alternative Voting, Alternative Outcomes: 2018 Presidential Election in the Czech Republic; G. M. Peter Swann, Stalemate by Design? How Binary Voting Caused the Brexit Impasse of 2019; Florian Follert, Improving the Relationship between Citizens and Politicians; Sascha Kurz, Which Criteria Qualify Power Indices for Applications? - A Comment on “The Story of the Poor Public Good Index;” Matthias Weber, Thoughts on Voting Power and the Public Good Index; Claude Hillinger, The Case of Utilitarian Voting Christian Klamler, Utilitarian Voting - Some Empirical Evidence; Chris Hudson, Robots: Present and Future; and Bruce Morley, Robots Are Coming. Review of “John Hudson, The Robot Revolution: Understanding the Social and Economic Impact”
This book examines some fifty countries to ascertain how the chambers of bicameral legislatures interact when they produce legislation. An understanding of this interaction is essential because otherwise legislative behaviour in each chamber may be unintelligible or incorrectly interpreted. The book employs cooperative game theoretic models to establish that bicameral legislatures, when compared with unicameral legislatures, increase the stability of the status quo and reduce intercameral differences to one privileged dimension of conflict. Non-cooperative game theoretic models are used to investigate the significance of a series of insitutional devices used to resolve intercameral conflict where a bill is introduced, which chamber has the final word, how many times a bill can shuttle between chambers, and whether conference committees are called. Empirical evidence, mainly from the French Republic, is used to evaluate the arguments.
Political scientists have long classified systems of government as parliamentary or presidential, two-party or multiparty, and so on. But such distinctions often fail to provide useful insights. For example, how are we to compare the United States, a presidential bicameral regime with two weak parties, to Denmark, a parliamentary unicameral regime with many strong parties? Veto Players advances an important, new understanding of how governments are structured. The real distinctions between political systems, contends George Tsebelis, are to be found in the extent to which they afford political actors veto power over policy choices. Drawing richly on game theory, he develops a scheme by which governments can thus be classified. He shows why an increase in the number of "veto players," or an increase in their ideological distance from each other, increases policy stability, impeding significant departures from the status quo. Policy stability affects a series of other key characteristics of polities, argues the author. For example, it leads to high judicial and bureaucratic independence, as well as high government instability (in parliamentary systems). The propositions derived from the theoretical framework Tsebelis develops in the first part of the book are tested in the second part with various data sets from advanced industrialized countries, as well as analysis of legislation in the European Union. Representing the first consistent and consequential theory of comparative politics, Veto Players will be welcomed by students and scholars as a defining text of the discipline. From the preface to the Italian edition: ? "Tsebelis has produced what is today the most original theory for the understanding of the dynamics of contemporary regimes. . . . This book promises to remain a lasting contribution to political analysis."--Gianfranco Pasquino, Professor of Political Science, University of Bologna
This original and insightful book considers the ways in which public law, which emphasises legality (the Demos), and economics, a science oriented towards the markets (the Agora), intertwine. Throughout, George Dellis argues that the concepts of legality and efficiency should not be perceived separately.
In this book, the authors assert that representative institutions such as legislatures face a 'diversity paradox': when the size of a minority group increases beyond mere 'tokenism' in representative institutions, it tends to create an unintended backlash toward the minority group's members that emanates from both majority and fellow minority group members. The inclusion of minority group voices in representative institutions is critical in a wide range of political decisions, ranging from legislative gender quotas in the new Iraqi constitution to attempts in the U.S. to increase minority representation through redistricting.
The book's primary aim is to determine whether Canada and the United States have become more similar as their economies have become more integrated and their societies more diverse. The authors conclude that, although powerful economic and social pressures clearly constrain national governments and lead to convergence in some areas, distinctive cultural and political processes preserve room for distinctive national responses to important problems of the late twentieth century. Authors include Keith Banting, Paul Boothe (University of Alberta), Marsha Chandler (University of Toronto), George Hoberg, Robert Howse (University of Toronto), Christopher Manfredi (McGill University), George Perlin (Queen's University), Douglas Purvis (Queen's University), Richard Simeon, and Elaine Willis (consultant, Toronto).
The use of filibusters in the U.S. Senate by small numbers of members to prevent legislative action apparently desired by a majority of the members--as evidenced by the battles over civil rights legislation in the 1950s and 1960s--is legendary. Similar situations have existed in other legislative bodies over time. The fear that they will at some time be in the minority has inhibited actions by the majority groups to control the right of minority groups to block legislative action. And yet from time to time the majority in a legislative body has forced a change in the rules to control the rights of the minority. When does the majority seek to limit minority rights to obstruct legislation? Douglas Dion, in a unique study, develops a formal model to set out the conditions under which majorities will limit minority rights. He finds that when majorities are small, they will be more cohesive. This majority cohesion leads to minority obstruction, which in turn leads to majority efforts to force procedural change to control the ability of the minority to obstruct legislation. Dion then tests his findings in a rich consideration of historical cases from the nineteenth-century U.S. House of Representatives, the nineteenth- and twentieth-century U.S. Senate, the British House of Commons, and an account of the Austro-Hungarian Parliament written by Mark Twain. Turning the Legislative Thumbscrew is a work that combines formal analysis with extensive historical evidence to address an important problem in democratic theory. Specialists in legislative politics and American political development, as well as those more broadly interested in the relationship between democratic theory and institutional structure, will find the work of great interest. Douglas Dion is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan.
Between Fragmentation and Democracy explores the phenomenon of the fragmentation of international law and global governance following the proliferation of international institutions with overlapping jurisdictions and ambiguous boundaries. The authors argue that this problem has the potential to sabotage the evolution of a more democratic and egalitarian system and identify the structural reasons for the failure of global institutions to protect the interests of politically weaker constituencies. This book offers a comprehensive understanding of how new global sources of democratic deficits increasingly deprive individuals and collectives of the capacity to protect their interests and shape their opportunities. It also considers the role of the courts in mitigating the effects of globalization and the struggle to define and redefine institutions and entitlements. This book is an important resource for scholars of international law and international politics, as well as for public lawyers, political scientists, and those interested in judicial reform.
How organized resistance to new fossil fuel infrastructure became a political force, and how this might affect the transition to renewable energy. Organized resistance to new fossil fuel infrastructure, particularly conflicts over pipelines, has become a formidable political force in North America. In this book, George Hoberg examines whether such place-based environmental movements are effective ways of promoting climate action, if they might inadvertently feed resistance to the development of renewable energy infrastructure, and what other, more innovative processes of decision-making would encourage the acceptance of clean energy systems. Focusing on a series of conflicts over new oil sands pipelines, Hoberg investigates activists’ strategy of blocking fossil fuel infrastructure, often in alliance with Indigenous groups, and examines the political and environmental outcomes of these actions. After discussing the oil sands policy regime and the relevant political institutions in Canada and the United States, Hoberg analyzes in detail four anti-pipeline campaigns, examining the controversies over the Keystone XL, the most well-known of these movements and the first one to use infrastructure resistance as a core strategy; the Northern Gateway pipeline; the Trans Mountain pipeline; and the Energy East pipeline. He then considers the “resistance dilemma”: the potential of place-based activism to threaten the much-needed transition to renewable energy. He examines several episodes of resistance to clean energy infrastructure in eastern Canada and the United States. Finally, Hoberg describes some innovative processes of energy decision-making, including strategic environment assessment, and cumulative impact assessment, looking at cases in British Columbia and Lower Alberta.
Greece's New Political Economy traces the course of Greece from a postwar developmental state to its current participation in the Euro-zone. Taking an innovative comparative approach, George Pagoulatos examines the political economy of financial interventionism and liberalization, banking politics, relations between the government and central bank, the winners and losers of financial reform, the effects of globalization and EMU and the implications of the new economic role of the state. This book will be an indispensable reference work for anyone seeking to understand the Greek political economy in the light of major contemporary debates.
Can coercive foreign policy destabilize autocratic regimes? Can democracy be promoted from abroad? This book examines how foreign policy tools such as aid, economic sanctions, human rights shaming and prosecutions, and military intervention influence the survival of autocratic regimes. Foreign pressure destabilizes autocracies through three mechanisms: limiting the regime's capacity to maintain support; undermining its repressive capacity; and altering the expected utility of stepping down for political elites. Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival distinguishes between three types of autocracies: personalist rule, party-based regimes, and military dictatorships. These distinct institutional settings influence the dictators' strategies for surviving in power as well as the propensity with which their leaders are punished after a regime transition. Consequently, the influence of foreign pressure varies across autocratic regime types. Further, the authors show that when foreign coercion destabilizes an autocracy, this does not always lead to democratic regime change because different regimes breakdown in distinct ways. While democratization is often equated with the demise of autocratic rule, it is just one possible outcome after an autocratic regime collapses. Many times, instead of democratization, externally-induced regime collapse means that a new dictatorship replaces the old one. This theory is tested against an extensive analysis of all dictatorships since 1946, and historical cases which trace the causal process in instances where foreign policy tools helped oust dictatorships. Oxford Studies in Democratization is a series for scholars and students of comparative politics and related disciplines. Volumes concentrate on the comparative study of the democratization process that accompanied the decline and termination of the cold war. The geographical focus of the series is primarily Latin America, the Caribbean, Southern and Eastern Europe, and relevant experiences in Africa and Asia. The series editor is Laurence Whitehead, Senior Research Fellow, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
German-Greek Yearbook of Political Economy, Volume 1/2018 Introduction to the Volume George Tridimas, When the Greeks Loved the Germans: The Political Economy of King Otto’s Reign Korinna Schönhärl, Why invest in Greece? Gerson von Bleichröder and the Greek loan of 1889 Konstantinos Pilpilidis, A Tale of Two States: Explaining Constitutional Choice in Germany and Greece Athanasios Gromitsaris, On Some Aspects of Administrative Justice in Post-Revolutionary Greece and their Relevance Today Barbara Klose-Ullmann, Medea on Stage: Child Murderess or Abandoned Wife? Emmanouil-Marios L. Economou and Nicholas Kyriazis, Ancient Greek Achaeans, Modern Germans and EU Integration: An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Federations Anja Pütz, The Athena of Dornach: A Bronze Statuette Unearthed in Munich’s Neighborhood Heinz D. Kurz, Marx on Aristotle and the Problem of the ‘Common Third’: A Sra ffi an perspective Konstantinos Koulaouzidis, ARS COMBINATORIA v2.5 or: The 64 Ways of Order Information: Conference Program
This book offers a distinctive moral defense of capitalism. Unlike most such defenses, this book avoids the summoning of concepts and ideas drawn from the modern philosophical tradition that arose out of the 17th–18th century Enlightenment. It rejects the idea of supporting capitalism on the grounds of self-ownership, human dignity, property rights, social utility, or a social contract. Confidence in the power of human reason to demonstrate any of these notions has waned since the Enlightenment, and justifiably so. Capitalism stands in desperate need of different philosophic foundations. This book’s thesis is that capitalism can be more sturdily defended on a pre-modern basis. Adopting the ancient Roman philosopher Cicero as a guide, this book acknowledges the limits of human reason. It applies the ancient skepticism that Cicero represents, a school of thought that teaches us to be content with probabilities and to focus upon the practical dimensions of human existence. Philosophical inquiry is best directed to the task of identifying the means of securing both life and the good life for human beings. As such, this book stresses the overriding importance of maintaining social co-operation and advancing human excellence. It argues that capitalism satisfies both these imperatives.
George Tsebelis’ veto players approach has become a prominent theory to analyze various research questions in political science. Studies that apply veto player theory deal with the impact of institutions and partisan preferences of legislative activity and policy outcomes. It is used to measure the degree of policy change and, thus, reform capacity in national and international political systems. This volume contains the analysis of leading scholars in the field on these topics and more recent developments regarding theoretical and empirical progress in the area of political reform-making. The contributions come from research areas of political science where veto player theory plays a significant role, including, positive political theory, legislative behavior and legislative decision-making in national and supra-national political systems, policy making and government formation. The contributors to this book add to the current scholarly and public debate on the role of veto players, making it of interest to scholars in political science and policy studies as well as policymakers worldwide.
This book addressees a timely and fundamental problematic: the gap between the aims that people attempt to realize democratically and the law and administrative practices that actually result. The chapters explain the realities that administration poses for democratic theory. Topics include the political value of accountability, the antinomic character of political values, the relation between ultimate ends and the intermediate ends that are sought by constitutions, and a reconsideration of the meaning of the rule of law itself. The essays are inspired by the demystifying realism of Max Weber and Hans Kelsen, including explications of their views on law, constitutions, and the rule of law. The book will be of interest to social and political theorists, philosophers of law, and legal theorists, and for discussions of democratic theory, the administrative state, constitutionalism, and justice, as well as to readers of Weber and Kelsen.
This book examines some fifty countries to ascertain how the chambers of bicameral legislatures interact when they produce legislation. An understanding of this interaction is essential because otherwise legislative behaviour in each chamber may be unintelligible or incorrectly interpreted. The book employs cooperative game theoretic models to establish that bicameral legislatures, when compared with unicameral legislatures, increase the stability of the status quo and reduce intercameral differences to one privileged dimension of conflict. Non-cooperative game theoretic models are used to investigate the significance of a series of insitutional devices used to resolve intercameral conflict where a bill is introduced, which chamber has the final word, how many times a bill can shuttle between chambers, and whether conference committees are called. Empirical evidence, mainly from the French Republic, is used to evaluate the arguments.
Clearly written and easily understood by the nonspecialist, Nested Games provides a systematic, empirically accurate, and theoretically coherent account of apparently irrational political actions.
For decades the European Union tried changing its institutions, but achieved only unsatisfying political compromises and modest, incremental treaty revisions. In late 2009, however, the EU was successfully reformed through the Treaty of Lisbon. Reforming the European Union examines how political leaders ratified this treaty against all odds and shows how this victory involved all stages of treaty reform negotiations--from the initial proposal to referendums in several European countries. The authors emphasize the strategic role of political leadership and domestic politics, and they use state-of-the-art methodology, applying a comprehensive data set for actors' reform preferences. They look at how political leaders reacted to apparent failures of the process by recreating or changing the rules of the game. While domestic actors played a significant role in the process, their influence over the outcome was limited as leaders ignored negative referendums and plowed ahead with intended reforms. The book's empirical analyses shed light on critical episodes: strategic agenda setting during the European Convention, the choice of ratification instrument, intergovernmental bargaining dynamics, and the reaction of the German Council presidency to the negative referendums in France, the Netherlands, and Ireland.
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