George J. Benston, professor of Finance, Accounting, and Economics at Emory University's Goizueta Business School, died unexpectedly in January 2008. He was an impassioned advocate for corporate integrity and a unique scholar; his research interests were as broad as those of any recent academician. His colleagues have selected and organized his most important papers into two volumes. This second volume consists of his publications in the fields of accounting and finance. The editor has selected a broad range of papers from each of the major areas that are representative of Benston's work in th.
Financial services regulation tends to be costly and unsympathetic to consumers. This book examines why that is the case and proposes and regulatory regime that would be more efficient and more responsive to consumer interests.
George J. Benston, professor of Finance, Accounting, and Economics at Emory University's Goizueta Business School, died unexpectedly in January 2008. He was an impassioned advocate for corporate integrity and a unique scholar; his research interests were as broad as those of any recent academician. His colleagues have selected and organized his most important papers into two volumes. This second volume consists of his publications in the fields of accounting and finance. The editor has selected a broad range of papers from each of the major areas that are representative of Benston's work in th.
International accounting standards tend to converge, as do auditing, enforcement and corporate governance, whereas trading of equity shares remains essentially national. The book provides a thorough analysis of what information investors really need, how financial accounting systems developed and their current requirements in major commercial countries, and examines current issues, particularly the benefits and costs a single or multiple accounting standards, the bases for accounting standards, and limitations to accounting disclosure in financial statements.
The latest in a series of studies in banking and international finance. This book deals with all aspects of the Glass-Steagall Act, and the relationship between the commercial banks and the investment banks.
Can the 'invisible hand' handle money? George Selgin challenges the view that government regulation creates monetary order and stability, and instead shows it to be the main source of monetary crisis. The volume is divided into three sections: * Part I refutes conventional wisdom holding that any monetary system lacking government regulation is 'inherently unstable', and looks at the workings of market forces in an otherwise unregulated banking system. * Part II draws on both theory and historical experience to show how various kinds of government interference undermine the inherent efficiency, safety, and stability of a free monetary system. * Part III completes the argument by addressing the popular misconception that a monetary system is unsound unless it delivers a stable output price-level.
A Brookings Institution Press and American Enterprise Institute publication A few years ago, Americans held out their systems of corporate governance and financial disclosure as models to be emulated by the rest of the world. But in late 2001 U.S. policymakers and corporate leaders found themselves facing the largest corporate accounting scandals in American history. The spectacular collapses of Enron and Worldcom—as well as the discovery of accounting irregularities at other large U.S. companies—seemed to call into question the efficacy of the entire system of corporate governance in the United States. In response, Congress quickly enacted a comprehensive package of reform measures in what has come to be known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ followed by making fundamental changes to their listing requirements. The private sector acted as well. Accounting firms—watching in horror as one of their largest, Arthur Andersen, collapsed after a criminal conviction for document shredding—tightened their auditing procedures. Stock analysts and ratings agencies, hit hard by a series of disclosures about their failings, changed their practices as well. Will these reforms be enough? Are some counterproductive? Are other shortcomings in the disclosure system still in need of correction? These are among the questions that George Benston, Michael Bromwich, Robert E. Litan, and Alfred Wagenhofer address in Following the Money. While the authors agree that the U.S. system of corporate disclosure and governance is in need of change, they are concerned that policymakers may be overreacting in some areas and taking actions in others that may prove to be ineffective or even counterproductive. Using the Enron case as a point of departure, the authors argue that the major problem lies not in the accounting and auditing standards themselves, but in the system of enforcing those standards.
The process of selling assests and enterprises to the private sector raises questions about natural monopolies, the efficiency and equity of state-owned versus privately owned enterprises, and industrial policy. This comprehensive analysis of the British privatization program explores these questions both theoretically and empirically.
Banking is now, and always has been, a risky business. The key to success both in operating a bank and in supervising a banking system is appropriate risk management. Yet risk management has become increasingly difficult because of higher and more volatile interest rates, faster and cheaper transfer of funds and information, a movement toward deregulation, and subsidies for many institutions embedded in the flat-rate premium structure of the federal deposit insurance system. In this book five leading bank scholars explore the safety and soundness of the U.S. banking system in an economic environment where the likelihood of failures of individual banks has significantly increased. The book's ten chapters cover: the risks of the failure of individual banks and of the banking system; consequences of bank failure on other banks, financial markets, and economic activity; the role of government deposit insurance; alternative ways of resolving insolvencies; the role of lender of last resort; risk and organizational issues in the expansion of banking activities; market discipline as a means of limiting banking problems and failures; feasibility and desirability of permitting or requiring market-value reporting for financial institutions; risk rated premiums; the effectiveness of supervision and field and remote examinations; the effectiveness of centralization or decentralization of regulation, supervision, and examination in multiple federal and state agencies. George J. Benston is at the University of Rochester, Robert A. Eisenbeis at the University of North Carolina, Paul M. Horvitz at the University of Houston, Edward J. Kane at Ohio State University, and George G. Kaufman at Loyola University. Perspectives on Safe and Sound Banking is copublished with the American Bankers Association and is included in the Regulation of Economic Activity Series, edited by Richard Schmalensee.
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