U.S. nuclear weapons are aging, with key components reaching the end of their service life. In September 2008, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the National Nuclear Security Admin. (NNSA) began a study of military requirements and design options for extending the B61 bomb¿s service life. The B61 supports the U.S. strategic deterrent and NATO. This report assessed the extent to which DoD and NNSA have: (1) considered the time available to begin producing refurbished bombs when determining the scope of the study; and (2) taken actions to avoid operational gaps in U.S. nuclear weapons commitments to NATO during the life extension program. Includes recommend. Illus. This is a print on demand report.
The Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL) has experienced security lapses protecting information on its unclassified computer network. The unclassified network contains sensitive information. This report: (1) assessed the effectiveness of the security controls LANL has in place to protect information transmitted over its unclassified computer network; (2) assessed whether LANL had implemented an information security program for its unclassified network; and (3) examined expenditures to protect LANL¿s unclassified network from FY 2001 through 2007. The author examined security policies and procedures and reviewed the laboratories' access controls for protecting information on the unclassified network. Includes recommendations. Illustrations.
At its Hanford Site in Washington State, the Dept. of Energy (DoE) is responsible for one of the world¿s biggest cleanup projects: the treatment and disposal of about 56 million gallons of radioactive and hazardous waste, stored in 177 underground tanks. Two decades and several halted efforts later, none of this waste has yet been treated, cleanup costs have grown steadily, and prospective cleanup time frames have lengthened. This report assesses: (1) DoE¿s current tank waste cleanup strategy and key technical, legal, and other uncertainties; (2) the extent to which DoE has analyzed whether this strategy is commensurate with risks from the wastes; and (3) opportunities to reduce tank waste cleanup costs. Includes recommend. Charts and tables.
During the Cold War, the Dept. of Energy (DoE) produced nuclear materials for nuclear weapons at its Savannah River Site (SRS) by dissolving highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel from reactors in a facility known as H-Canyon. DoE planned to end H-Canyon operations in 2007 but now plans to continue H-Canyon operations until 2019 to process additional nuclear material. This report: (1) identifies the types of nuclear materials DoE will process using H-Canyon and its associated costs of operation; (2) determine whether SRS¿s radioactive waste storage tanks and associated nuclear waste facilities are capable of handling the additional waste generated by H-Canyon; and (3) describe H-Canyon¿s compliance with safety and environ. requirements. Illus.
The DHS is responsible for addressing the threat of nuclear smuggling. Radiation detection portal monitors are part of the U.S. defense against such threats. Congress required that funds for new advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) monitors could not be spent until the Sec. of DHS certified that these machines represented a significant increase in operational effectiveness over currently deployed monitors. DHS conducted tests on ASPs to identify areas in which they needed improvement. This report assesses: (1) the degree to which the test report accurately depicts the test results; and (2) the appropriateness of using the test results to determine whether ASPs represent a significant improvement over current radiation detection equipment. Illus.
The American Reinvestment Act of 2009 aims to stimulate the economy, including funding for environmental cleanup projects. The Department of Energy (DoE) receives annual appropriations of $6 billion to support the cleanup of radioactive and hazardous wastes resulting from decades of nuclear weapons research and production. This report examined: (1) how DoE selected projects for funding and developed cost and schedule targets; (2) project status and extent to which projects are achieving these targets; and (3) key challenges faced and efforts to address them. The report reviewed Recovery Act project documentation and performance data for 84 projects at 17 sites, and visited the 4 sites receiving most of the funding. Charts and tables.
In 2006, a Los Alamos Nat. Lab. (LANL) contract employee unlawfully removed classified information from the lab. This was the latest in a series of high-profile security incidents at LANL spanning almost a decade. LANL conducts research on nuclear weapons and other nat. security areas for the Nat. Nuclear Security Admin. This report: (1) identifies LANL¿s major programs and activities and how much they rely on classified resources; (2) identifies initiatives LANL is taking to reduce and consolidate its classified resources and physical footprints and the extent to which these initiatives address earlier security concerns; and (3) determines whether its new mgmt. approaches will sustain security improvements over the long-term. Illustrations.
In April 2009, President Obama announced an international initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within 4 years. Non-proliferation programs administered by the Nat. Nuclear Security Admin. (NNSA) are working to secure nuclear materials in Russia and other countries. This report assessed: (1) U.S. governmentwide efforts to implement the President's 4-year nuclear material security initiative; (2) the status and challenges, if any, of NNSA's nuclear security programs in Russia; and (3) NNSA efforts to secure nuclear materials in countries other than Russia. This report summarizes the findings of the classified report. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand edition of an important, hard-to-find report.
A terrorist's use of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or improvised nuclear device (IND) to release radioactive materials into the environment could have devastating consequences. This report examined: (1) the extent to which the federal government is planning to fulfill its responsibilities to help cities and their states clean up contaminated areas from RDD and IND incidents; (2) what is known about the federal government's capability to effectively clean up these contaminated areas; and (3) suggestions for improving federal preparedness to help cities and states recover from these incidents. The report also discusses recovery activities in the United Kingdom. Includes recommendations. Illustrations.
The Dept. of Energy (DoE) has long suffered from contract and mgmt. oversight weaknesses. Since 1990 DOE contact mgmt. has been on a list of programs at high risk for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. In 2003 DoE¿s Office of Science (Science) unveiled its 20-year plan to acquire and upgrade potentially costly research facilities. In light of DoE¿s history and the potential cost of this ambitious plan, the author was asked to examine Science¿s project mgmt. performance. This report determined: (1) the extent to which Science has managed its projects within cost and schedule targets; (2) the factors affecting project mgmt. performance; and (3) challenges that may affect Science¿s future performance. Aloise reviewed 42 selected Science projects. Includes recommendations. Illustrations.
The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is responsible for addressing the threat of nuclear smuggling. Radiation detection portal monitors are key elements in the nation¿s defenses against such threats. DNDO has sponsored testing to develop new monitors, known as advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) monitors, to replace radiation detection equipment now being used at ports of entry. DNDO expects that ASPs may offer improvements over current-generation portal monitors. This testimony: (1) discusses the principal findings and recommendations from a May 2009 report on ASP testing; and (2) updates those findings based on info. from DNDO officials on the results of testing conducted since the report¿s issuance. Illus.
Concerns have grown that terrorists could use radioactive materials and sealed sources (materials sealed in a capsule) to build a ¿dirty bomb¿ -- a device using conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material. In 2003, it was found that there were weaknesses in the NRC radioactive materials licensing process and recommend. were made for improvement. This report assesses: (1) the progress NRC has made in implementing the recommend.; (2) other steps NRC has taken to improve its ability to track radioactive materials; (3) Customs and Border Protection¿s (CBP) ability to detect radioactive materials at land ports of entry; and (4) CBP¿s ability to verify that such materials are appropriately licensed prior to entering the U.S. Illustrations.
There have been reports on limitations in the mgmt. of U.S. low-level radioactive waste (LLRW). To identify potential approaches to overcome these limitations, the author examined the extent to which other countries have: LLRW inventory databases; timely removal of higher-activity LLRW from waste generator sites; disposition options for all LLRW; & requirements that LLRW generators have financial reserves to cover waste disposition costs, as well as any other approaches that might improve U.S. LLRW mgmt. The author surveyed 18 countries representing leading LLRW generators to identify their mgmt. approaches & to compare them with U.S. survey results & with approaches by LLRW generators, disposal operators, & regulators in the U.S. Ill.
The U.S. has 26 agreements in force for peaceful nuclear cooperation. Under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 these agreements are a prerequisite to certain aspects of U.S. nuclear cooperation with other cooperating partners. This report: (1) quantifies the amount and value of U.S. nuclear exports facilitated by these agreements; (2) assesses U.S. efforts to support the U.S. nuclear industry's ability to compete for sales; and (3) examines U.S. nuclear industry challenges to exporting. To conduct this work, the report reviewed and assessed data collection efforts by U.S. agencies from 1994 through 2008, and interviewed U.S. industry rep. and U.S. and foreign gov't. officials. Includes recommend. A print on demand pub. Charts and tables.
A terrorist¿s use of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or improvised nuclear device (IND) to release radioactive materials (RM) into the environ. could have devastating consequences. This testimony examines: (1) the extent to which fed. agencies are planning to fulfill their responsibilities to assist cities and their states in cleaning up areas contaminated with RM from RDD and IND incidents; (2) what is known about the fed. government¿s capability to effectively cleanup areas contaminated with RM from RDD and IND incidents; and (3) suggestions from gov¿t. emerg. mgmt. officials on ways to improve fed. preparedness to provide assistance to recover from RDD and IND incidents. Also discusses the situation in the United Kingdom.
The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is responsible for addressing the threat of nuclear smuggling. Radiation detection portal monitors are key elements in the nation's defenses against such threats. New monitors, known as advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) monitors, have been tested to replace radiation detection equipment. DNDO expects that ASPs may offer improvements over current-generation portal monitors, particularly the potential to identify as well as detect radioactive material. However, ASPs cost significantly more than current generation portal monitors. This testimony addresses: (1) findings on DNDO's latest round of ASP testing; and (2) lessons from ASP testing that can be applied to other DHS technology investments.
The Dept. of Energy (DoE) oversees contractors that operate more than 200 "high-hazard" nuclear facilities, where an accident could have serious consequences for workers and the public. DoE is charged with regulating the safety of these facilities. A key part of DoE's self-regulation is the Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS), which develops, oversees, and helps enforce nuclear safety policies. This is the only DoE safety office intended to be independent of the program offices, which carry out mission responsibilities. This report examines: (1) the extent to which HSS meets elements of effective independent nuclear safety oversight; and (2) the factors contributing to any identified shortcomings with respect to these elements. Illustrations.
This report is the latest in a series of reports on the uses of and accountability for Recovery Act funds in 16 selected states, certain localities in those jurisdictions, and the District of Columbia. These jurisdictions are estimated to receive about two-thirds of the intergovernmental assistance available through the Recovery Act. This report also responds to a mandate to comment on the jobs estimated in recipient reports. This report collected and analyzed documents and interviewed state and local officials and other Recovery Act award recipients. It also analyzed federal agency guidance and interviewed federal officials. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand edition of an important, hard-to-find report.
The Dept. of Energy (DoE) proposes under the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) to build facilities to begin recycling the nation's commercial spent nuclear fuel. GNEP¿s objectives include reducing radioactive waste disposed of in a geologic repository and mitigating the nuclear proliferation risks of existing recycling technologies. The current GNEP plan favors working with industry to demonstrate the latest commercially available technology in full-scale facilities and to do so in a way that will attract industry investment. This report evaluates the extent to which DoE would address GNEP¿s objectives under: (1) its original engineering-scale approach; and (2) the accelerated approach to building full-scale facilities. Includes recommend. Ill.
The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) enhances and coordinates fed., state, and local efforts to combat nuclear smuggling (NS) abroad and domestically. DNDO is to develop an enhanced global nuclear detection system of radiation detection equip. and interdiction activities. Fed. efforts to combat NS have focused on estab. ports of entry, such as seaports and land border crossings. DNDO has been examining nuclear detection (ND) strategies along other pathways. This testimony discusses the status of efforts to: (1) complete the deployment of radiation detection equip. to scan all cargo entering U.S. at ports of entry; (2) prevent smuggling of nuclear or radiological materials via other critical gaps; and (3) develop a strategic plan for global ND.
The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is responsible for addressing the threat of nuclear smuggling. Radiation detection portal monitors are key elements in the nation's defenses against such threats. New monitors, known as advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) monitors, have been tested to replace radiation detection equipment. DNDO expects that ASPs may offer improvements over current-generation portal monitors, particularly the potential to identify as well as detect radioactive material. However, ASPs cost significantly more than current generation portal monitors. This testimony addresses: (1) findings on DNDO's latest round of ASP testing; and (2) lessons from ASP testing that can be applied to other DHS technology investments.
In 2006, a Los Alamos Nat. Lab. (LANL) contract employee unlawfully removed classified information from the lab. This was the latest in a series of high-profile security incidents at LANL spanning almost a decade. LANL conducts research on nuclear weapons and other nat. security areas for the Nat. Nuclear Security Admin. This report: (1) identifies LANL¿s major programs and activities and how much they rely on classified resources; (2) identifies initiatives LANL is taking to reduce and consolidate its classified resources and physical footprints and the extent to which these initiatives address earlier security concerns; and (3) determines whether its new mgmt. approaches will sustain security improvements over the long-term. Illustrations.
The DHS¿s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is responsible for addressing the threat of nuclear smuggling. Radiation detection portal monitors are key elements in our national defenses against such threats. DNDO has sponsored testing to develop new monitors, known as advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) monitors, to replace radiation detection equipment currently being used at ports of entry. ASPs are currently being tested and a decision on certification is due in Nov. 2008. This testimony addresses: (1) the highlights of a Sept. 2008 report on the life cycle cost estimate to deploy ASPs; and (2) preliminary observations from reviews of the current program of ASP testing. Illustrations.
The Nuclear Regulatory Comm. (NRC) regulates domestic medical, industrial, & research uses of sealed radioactive sources. Those attempting to purchase a sealed source must apply for a license & gain the approval of either NRC or an "agreement state (AS)." To become an AS, a state must demonstrate that its regulatory program is compatible with NRC reg's. & is effective in protecting public health & safety. NRC then transfers portions of its authority to the AS. In 2003, it was reported that weaknesses in NRC's licensing program could allow terrorists to obtain radioactive materials. NRC responded to this issue, incl. issuing guidance to license examiners. This report tests the licensing program using covert investigative methods.
On May 7, 2009, the Government Printing Office (GPO) published a 266-page document on its Web site that provided detailed information on civilian nuclear sites, locations, facilities, and activities in the U.S. At the request of the Speaker of the House, this report determines: (1) which U.S. agencies were responsible for the public release of this information and why the disclosure occurred; and (2) what impact, if any, the release of the information has had on U.S. national security. In performing this work, the report analyzed policies, procedures, and guidance for safeguarding sensitive information and met with officials from four executive branch agencies involved in preparing the document, the White House, the House of Rep., and GPO. Illus.
Clearer Priorities and Greater Use of Innovative Approaches Could Increase the Effectiveness of Technology Transfer at Department of Energy Laboratories
Clearer Priorities and Greater Use of Innovative Approaches Could Increase the Effectiveness of Technology Transfer at Department of Energy Laboratories
The Dept. of Energy (DoE) spends billions of dollars each year at its national labs. on advanced science, energy, and other research. Federal laws and policies have encouraged the transfer of federally developed technologies to private firms, universities, and others to use or commercialize. The Amer. Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 further emphasized the role of such technologies for addressing the nation's energy, economic, and other challenges. This report examined: (1) the nature and extent of technology transfer at DoE's labs.; (2) the extent to which DoE can measure the effectiveness of its technology transfer efforts; and (3) factors affecting, and approaches for improving, DoE's efforts. Charts and tables.
As a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) administers the Stockpile Life Extension Program, whose purpose is to extend, through refurbishment, the operational lives of the weapons in the nuclear stockpile. NNSA encountered significant management problems with its first refurbishment for the W87 warhead. This report assesses the extent to which NNSA and the DoD have effectively managed the refurbishment of two other weapons -- the B61 bomb and the W76 warhead. This report summarizes the findings of a classified report on the refurbishment of the B61 bomb and W76 warhead. Includes recommendations. Illustrations.
Safeguarding nuclear warheads & materials that can be used to make nuclear weapons is a primary nat. security concern of the U.S. Since 1993, the DoE & DoD have worked to improve security at sites housing weapons-usable nuclear material & warheads in Russia & other countries. In 1995, DoE established the Materials Protection, Control, & Accounting program to implement these efforts. The author examined the: (1) progress DoE has made in improving security at nuclear-material sites in Russia & other countries; (2) progress DoE & DoD have made in improving security at Russian nuclear warhead sites; & (3) efforts DoE & DoD have undertaken to ensure the continued effective use of U.S.-funded security upgrades. Illustrations.
U.S. nuclear weapons are aging, with key components reaching the end of their service life. In September 2008, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the National Nuclear Security Admin. (NNSA) began a study of military requirements and design options for extending the B61 bomb¿s service life. The B61 supports the U.S. strategic deterrent and NATO. This report assessed the extent to which DoD and NNSA have: (1) considered the time available to begin producing refurbished bombs when determining the scope of the study; and (2) taken actions to avoid operational gaps in U.S. nuclear weapons commitments to NATO during the life extension program. Includes recommend. Illus. This is a print on demand report.
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