The Bank of Japan has introduced various unconventional monetary policy tools since the launch of Abenomics in 2013, to achieve the price stability target of 2 percent inflation. In this paper, a forward-looking open-economy general equilibrium model with endogenously determined policy credibility and an effective lower bound is developed for forecasting and policy analysis (FPAS) for Japan. In the model’s baseline scenario, the likelihood of the Bank of Japan reaching its 2 percent inflation target over the medium term is below 40 percent, assuming the absence of other policy reactions aside from monetary policy. The likelihood of achieving the inflation target is even lower under alternative risk scenarios. A positive shock to central bank credibility increases this likelihood, and would require less accommodative macroeconomic policies.
The surge in energy and food prices, which was amplified by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, has prompted a flurry of policy responses by countries during 2022. The aim of these policy responses was to mitigate social and economic impact of higher prices. In this paper we document announcements of policy measures based on the Database of Energy and Food Price Actions (DEFPA), which was developed based on two rounds of survey responses of IMF country teams conducted in March/April and June/July of 2022. The paper also provides discussion on policy trade-offs when considering appropriate policy responses both for countries with strong and weak social safety nets. Key policy message is that providing targeted support to households in the form of cash transfers is the most cost-effective way of alleviating the burden on vulnerable households and have to be preferred over broad-based mechanisms that prevent international prices to pass through to domestic consumers.
Superficial examination of aggregate gross cross-border capital inflow data suggests that there was no substitution between portfolio inflows and bank loans in recent years. However, our novel analysis of disaggregate inflows (both by types of instrument and borrower) shows interesting heterogeneity. There has been substitution of bank loans for portfolio debt securities not only in the case of corporate and sovereign borrowers in advanced countries, but also sovereign borrowers in emerging countries. In the case of corporate borrowers in emerging markets, the relationship corresponds to complementarity across types of gross capital inflows, especially during periods of positive capital gross inflows after the global financial crisis. A large part of these patterns does not seem to be driven by a common phenomenon across countries associated with the global financial cycle, but rather by country-specific factors.
Asia and China made disproportionate contributions to the slowdown of global trade growth in 2015. China’s import growth slowed starkly, driven by both external and domestic factors, including a rebalancing of demand. Econometric results point to weak investment and rebalancing as the main causes of the import slowdown. Spillover effects from China’s rebalancing are estimated for some 60 countries using value-added trade data, and are found to be more negative on Asia and commodity exporters than others.
How does unconventional monetary policy affect corporate capital structure and investment decisions? We study the transmission channel of quantitative easing and its potential diminishing returns on investment from a corporate finance perspective. Using a rich bank-firm matched data of Japanese firms with information on corporate debt and investment, we study how firms adjust their capital structure in response to the changes in term premia. Investment responds positively to a reduction in the term premium on average. However, there is a significant degree of cross-sectional variation in firm response: healthier firms increase capital spending and cash holdings, while financially vulnerable firms take advantage of lower long-term yields to refinance without increasing investment.
Governments face difficult policy trade-offs with record debt levels, tightening monetary policies, and urgent demands, including food and energy crises, the climate agenda, and population aging. Governments need to communicate fiscal plans to reduce debt sustainability risks and promote consistent macroeconomic policies. Many envisage a return to fiscal rules that had been suspended during the pandemic to strengthen credibility. This situation offers an opportunity to rethink fiscal rules and determine how governments can make fiscal policy more agile, including in responding to crises, without undermining fiscal sustainability. A risk-based medium-term fiscal framework that combines standards, rules, and strengthened institutions would strike a better balance between flexibility and credibility.
Three years have passed since the Bank of Japan’s asset purchase program was introduced in 2011, causing a sharp decline in the value of the Japanese Yen. What would be the implications for Japan and Korea’s exporters if the weak Yen is here to stay? We explore this question by examining exporters’ pricing behaviors and volume responses to exchange rate shocks. We find that if the weak Yen persists, it would strengthen Japan’s price competitiveness over time as export prices respond with a lag. We also find that while direct boosts to export demand will be rather limited, a persistently weaker Yen would expand the Japanese exporters’ profits lastingly, which could reinvigorate the ability, particularly of flagship exporting firms, to compete and grow in the global market over time. These findings suggest that the muted price and volume response so far to the sustained weakness of the Yen may mask a more fundamental shift in the relative competitiveness of Japanese and Korean exporters.
China’s trade patterns are evolving. While it started in light manufacturing and the assembly of more sophisticated products as part of global supply chains, China is now moving up the value chain, “onshoring” the production of higher-value-added upstream products and moving into more sophisticated downstream products as well. At the same time, with its wages rising, it has started to exit some lower-end, more labor-intensive sectors. These changes are taking place in the broader context of China’s rebalancing—away from exports and toward domestic demand, and within the latter, away from investment and toward consumption—and as a consequence, demand for some commodity imports is slowing, while consumption imports are slowly rising. The evolution of Chinese trade, investment, and consumption patterns offers opportunities and challenges to low-wage, low-income countries, including China’s neighbors in the Mekong region. Cambodia, Lao P.D.R., Myanmar, and Vietnam (the CLMV) are all open economies that are highly integrated with China. Rebalancing in China may mean less of a role for commodity exports from the region, but at the same time, the CLMV’s low labor costs suggest that manufacturing assembly for export could take off as China becomes less competitive, and as China itself demands more consumption items. Labor costs, however, are only part of the story. The CLMV will need to strengthen their infrastructure, education, governance, and trade regimes, and also run sound macro policies in order to capitalize fully on the opportunities presented by China’s transformation. With such policy efforts, the CLMV could see their trade and integration with global supply chains grow dramatically in the coming years.
During the COVID-19 pandemic and global financial crisis, governments swiftly served as financiers of last resort through large financial support measures (FSMs) such as loan and guarantee programs and equity injections in firms. This Staff Discussion Note argues that such FSMs prevented bankruptcies and attenuated the recession by increasing firms’ liquidity, reducing risk premiums, and boosting confidence. But FSMs also carry large and long-lasting fiscal costs and risks. The note presents recommendations for managing the legacies of the COVID-19 programs and preparing for future crises. Ideally, FSMs should be assessed and included in budget plans, though a balance needs to be struck between speed and scrutiny.
Understanding how markets are connected and shocks are transmitted is an important issue for policymakers and market participants. In this paper, we examine the connectedness of Asian equity markets within the region and vis-à-vis other major global markets. Using time-varying connectedness measures, we address the following questions: (1) How has connectedness in asset returns and volatilities changed over time? Do markets become more connected during crises periods? (2) Which markets are major sources and major recipients of shocks? Has there been a shift in terms of the net shock givers and shock receivers (directional connectedness over time)? Finally, we investigate the connectedness between China’s equity markets and other countries’ equity markets since August 2015 to highlight the growing importance of emerging market economies, particularly China, as sources of shocks.
How do policy communications on future f iscal targets af fect market expectations and beliefs about the future conduct of f iscal policy? In this paper, we develop indicators of f iscal credibility that quantify the degree to which policy announcements anchor expectations, based on the deviation of private expectations f rom official targets, for 41 countries. We find that policy announcements partly re-anchor expectations and that f iscal rules and strong fiscal institutions, as well as a good policy track record, contribute to magnifying this effect, thereby improving fiscal credibility. Conversely, empirical analysis suggests that markets reward credibility with more favorable sovereign financing conditions.
In this paper, we investigate how negative interest rate policy (NIRP) introduced in January 2016 by the Bank of Japan (BoJ) affected Japanese banks' lending and risk taking behavior. The BoJ's announcement was an unexpected surprise to the market and was followed by a sharp drop in equity prices of Japanese financial firms. We exploit the cross-sectional variation in the change of share prices on the day of the announcement to measure banks' differential exposure to NIRP. We show that more exposed banks increased their credit and took on more risk compared to banks that were less exposed to negative rates.
Singapore is one of the world’s most open economies, with the size of its trade reaching about 350 percent of its GDP. With the rise of highly diversified cross-border production networks, Singapore has come to play an integral role in the global supply chain with heavy reliance on foreign contents in its exports and production. It has also successfully moved up the value chain, exporting goods with high sophistication and economic complexity. Against this backdrop, in this paper, using disaggregate industry/product level trade data, we revisit Singapore’s export elasticities and find that growing participation in global production chains and rising export complexity are important determinants.
Nominal wage growth in most advanced economies remains markedly lower than it was before the Great Recession of 2008–09. This paper finds that the bulk of the wage slowdown is accounted for by labor market slack, inflation expectations, and trend productivity growth. In particular, there appears to be greater slack than meets the eye. Involuntary part-time employment appears to have weakened wage growth even in economies where headline unemployment rates are now at, or below, their averages in the years leading up to the recession.
We study the cyclical properties of sales, regular price changes and average prices paid by consumers ("effective" prices) in a dataset containing prices and quantities sold for numerous retailers across a variety of U.S. metropolitan areas. Both the frequency and size of sales fall when local unemployment rates rise and yet the inflation rate for effective prices paid by consumers declines significantly with higher unemployment. This discrepancy can be reconciled by consumers reallocating their expenditures across retailers, a feature of the data which we document and quantify. We propose a simple model with household shopping effort and store-switching consistent with these stylized facts and document its implications for business cycles and policymakers.
In this paper, we examine how economic shocks affect the distribution of household inflation expectations. We show that the dynamics of households' expected inflation distributions are driven by three distinctive functional shocks, which influence the expected inflation distribution through disagreement, level shift and ambiguity. Linking these functional shocks to economic shocks, we find that contractionary monetary shocks increase the average level of inflation expectation with anchoring effects, with a reduction in disagreement and an increase in the share of households expecting future inflation to be between 2 to 4 percent. Such anchoring effects are not observed when the high inflation periods prior to the Volcker disinflation are included. Expansionary government spending shocks have inflationary effects on both short and medium-run inflation expectations, while an increase in personal income tax shocks is inflationary for mediumrun. A surprise increase in gasoline prices increases the level of inflation expectations, but lowers the share of households with 2 percent inflation expectations.
Product scope adjustment is a key mechanism through which multi-product firms achieve efficient resource allocations. In this paper, we take a novel perspective to study firms’ product scope adjustment behavior through the lens of asset pricing. Using a unique panel scanner data set containing detailed information on products, matched with the financial information of their manufacturers, we find that multi-product firms with higher product turnover have lower financial risks and lower risk premia. To understand this channel, we propose a stylized model with a time-dependent (Calvo-type) product turnover rate to highlight the ’risk absorption channel’ of product scope adjustment. In response to an economy-wide shock, a firm that can adjust its product scope more flexibly shows lower excess equity returns and lower asset volatility.
Advanced economies made available more than 5 trillion USD through government-supported credit guarantee and direct loan programs to provide lifelines to firms in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. Notwithstanding the unprecedented scale of credit made available, an in-depth analysis of the fiscal consequences is missing, and the costs of these programs are not recognized in a transparent way. In this paper, we fill in an important aspect of the fiscal picture by estimating the subsidies that were provided by the largest credit guarantee programs introduced in 2020 in seven advanced economies. We estimate the subsidies on a fair value basis that provides a consistent and comprehensive upfront measure of cost. We explain the logic behind applying a fair value framework in a government context and compare it to alternative approaches. For the programs that we examine, total credit extended totaled 1.7 trillion USD. The subsidy element (cash-equivalent subsidy) is estimated to be 67 percent of loan principal on average (37 percent, excluding the US PPP), with a wide range across programs, from 12 to 100 percent. The variation is explained by differences across programs including eligibility criteria, loan terms, compensation to lenders, and other program design choices.
We study the role of financial frictions in explaining the sharp and persistent productivity growth slowdown in advanced economies after the 2008 global financial crisis. Using a rich cross-country, firm-level data set and exploiting quasi-experimental variation in firm-level exposure to the crisis, we find that the combination of pre-existing firm-level financial fragilities and tightening credit conditions made an important contribution to the post-crisis productivity slowdown. Specifically: (i) firms that entered the crisis with weaker balance sheets experienced decline in total factor productivity growth relative to their less vulnerable counterparts after the crisis; (ii) this decline was larger for firms located in countries where credit conditions tightened more; (iii) financially fragile firms cut back on intangible capital investment compared to more resilient firms, which is one plausible way through which financial frictions undermined productivity. All of these effects are highly persistent and quantitatively large—possibly accounting on average for about a third of the post-crisis slowdown in within-firm total factor productivity growth. Furthermore, our results are not driven by more vulnerable firms being less productive or having experienced slower productivity growth before the crisis, or differing from less vulnerable firms along other dimensions.
Asian countries have high demand for U.S. dollars and are sensitive to U.S. dollar funding costs. An important, but often overlooked, component of these costs is the basis spread in the cross-currency swap market that emerges when there are deviations from covered interest parity (CIP). CIP deviations mean that investors need to pay a premium to borrow U.S. dollars or other currencies on a hedged basis via cross-currency swap markets. These deviations can be explained by regulatory changes since the global financial crisis, which have limited arbitrage opportunities and country-specific factors that contribute to a mismatch in the demand and supply of U.S. dollars. We find that an increase in the basis spread tightens financial conditions in net debtor countries, while easing financial conditions in net creditor countries. The main reason is that net debtor countries are, in general, unable to substitute smoothly to other domestic funding channels. Policies that promote reliable alternative funding sources, such as long-term corporate bond market or stable long-term investors, including a “hedging counterpart of last resort,” can help stabilize financial intermediation when U.S. dollar funding markets come under stress.
Productivity growth in Japan, as in most advanced economies, has moderated. This paper finds supportive evidence for the important role of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in explaining Japan’s modest productivity growth. Results show a substantial dispersion in firm-level productivity growth across sectors and even across firms within the same sector. SMEs, on average, exhibit lower productivity growth than non-SMEs in Japan, with smaller and older SMEs showing particularly low productivity growth. Estimates suggest that boosting productivity growth in all of the worst-performing SMEs could improve overall productivity growth by up to 1.8 percentage points. The SME credit guarantee system, SME financing constraints, demographic factors, and lack of intangible capital investment are discussed as contributors to the slow productivity growth of Japan’s small and old SMEs.
Fiscal policy has a crucial role in lessening the impact on the most vulnerable households. Governments must balance by ensuring access to energy and food, normalizing fiscal policy after unprecedented support in 2020, and promoting green transformation.
Governments face difficult policy trade-offs with record debt levels, tightening monetary policies, and urgent demands, including food and energy crises, the climate agenda, and population aging. Governments need to communicate fiscal plans to reduce debt sustainability risks and promote consistent macroeconomic policies. Many envisage a return to fiscal rules that had been suspended during the pandemic to strengthen credibility. This situation offers an opportunity to rethink fiscal rules and determine how governments can make fiscal policy more agile, including in responding to crises, without undermining fiscal sustainability. A risk-based medium-term fiscal framework that combines standards, rules, and strengthened institutions would strike a better balance between flexibility and credibility.
During the COVID-19 pandemic and global financial crisis, governments swiftly served as financiers of last resort through large financial support measures (FSMs) such as loan and guarantee programs and equity injections in firms. This Staff Discussion Note argues that such FSMs prevented bankruptcies and attenuated the recession by increasing firms’ liquidity, reducing risk premiums, and boosting confidence. But FSMs also carry large and long-lasting fiscal costs and risks. The note presents recommendations for managing the legacies of the COVID-19 programs and preparing for future crises. Ideally, FSMs should be assessed and included in budget plans, though a balance needs to be struck between speed and scrutiny.
The Bank of Japan has introduced various unconventional monetary policy tools since the launch of Abenomics in 2013, to achieve the price stability target of 2 percent inflation. In this paper, a forward-looking open-economy general equilibrium model with endogenously determined policy credibility and an effective lower bound is developed for forecasting and policy analysis (FPAS) for Japan. In the model’s baseline scenario, the likelihood of the Bank of Japan reaching its 2 percent inflation target over the medium term is below 40 percent, assuming the absence of other policy reactions aside from monetary policy. The likelihood of achieving the inflation target is even lower under alternative risk scenarios. A positive shock to central bank credibility increases this likelihood, and would require less accommodative macroeconomic policies.
Fiscal policy has a crucial role in lessening the impact on the most vulnerable households. Governments must balance by ensuring access to energy and food, normalizing fiscal policy after unprecedented support in 2020, and promoting green transformation.
How do policy communications on future f iscal targets af fect market expectations and beliefs about the future conduct of f iscal policy? In this paper, we develop indicators of f iscal credibility that quantify the degree to which policy announcements anchor expectations, based on the deviation of private expectations f rom official targets, for 41 countries. We find that policy announcements partly re-anchor expectations and that f iscal rules and strong fiscal institutions, as well as a good policy track record, contribute to magnifying this effect, thereby improving fiscal credibility. Conversely, empirical analysis suggests that markets reward credibility with more favorable sovereign financing conditions.
China’s trade patterns are evolving. While it started in light manufacturing and the assembly of more sophisticated products as part of global supply chains, China is now moving up the value chain, “onshoring” the production of higher-value-added upstream products and moving into more sophisticated downstream products as well. At the same time, with its wages rising, it has started to exit some lower-end, more labor-intensive sectors. These changes are taking place in the broader context of China’s rebalancing—away from exports and toward domestic demand, and within the latter, away from investment and toward consumption—and as a consequence, demand for some commodity imports is slowing, while consumption imports are slowly rising. The evolution of Chinese trade, investment, and consumption patterns offers opportunities and challenges to low-wage, low-income countries, including China’s neighbors in the Mekong region. Cambodia, Lao P.D.R., Myanmar, and Vietnam (the CLMV) are all open economies that are highly integrated with China. Rebalancing in China may mean less of a role for commodity exports from the region, but at the same time, the CLMV’s low labor costs suggest that manufacturing assembly for export could take off as China becomes less competitive, and as China itself demands more consumption items. Labor costs, however, are only part of the story. The CLMV will need to strengthen their infrastructure, education, governance, and trade regimes, and also run sound macro policies in order to capitalize fully on the opportunities presented by China’s transformation. With such policy efforts, the CLMV could see their trade and integration with global supply chains grow dramatically in the coming years.
Productivity growth in Japan, as in most advanced economies, has moderated. This paper finds supportive evidence for the important role of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in explaining Japan’s modest productivity growth. Results show a substantial dispersion in firm-level productivity growth across sectors and even across firms within the same sector. SMEs, on average, exhibit lower productivity growth than non-SMEs in Japan, with smaller and older SMEs showing particularly low productivity growth. Estimates suggest that boosting productivity growth in all of the worst-performing SMEs could improve overall productivity growth by up to 1.8 percentage points. The SME credit guarantee system, SME financing constraints, demographic factors, and lack of intangible capital investment are discussed as contributors to the slow productivity growth of Japan’s small and old SMEs.
Asian countries have high demand for U.S. dollars and are sensitive to U.S. dollar funding costs. An important, but often overlooked, component of these costs is the basis spread in the cross-currency swap market that emerges when there are deviations from covered interest parity (CIP). CIP deviations mean that investors need to pay a premium to borrow U.S. dollars or other currencies on a hedged basis via cross-currency swap markets. These deviations can be explained by regulatory changes since the global financial crisis, which have limited arbitrage opportunities and country-specific factors that contribute to a mismatch in the demand and supply of U.S. dollars. We find that an increase in the basis spread tightens financial conditions in net debtor countries, while easing financial conditions in net creditor countries. The main reason is that net debtor countries are, in general, unable to substitute smoothly to other domestic funding channels. Policies that promote reliable alternative funding sources, such as long-term corporate bond market or stable long-term investors, including a “hedging counterpart of last resort,” can help stabilize financial intermediation when U.S. dollar funding markets come under stress.
We study the cyclical properties of sales, regular price changes and average prices paid by consumers ("effective" prices) in a dataset containing prices and quantities sold for numerous retailers across a variety of U.S. metropolitan areas. Both the frequency and size of sales fall when local unemployment rates rise and yet the inflation rate for effective prices paid by consumers declines significantly with higher unemployment. This discrepancy can be reconciled by consumers reallocating their expenditures across retailers, a feature of the data which we document and quantify. We propose a simple model with household shopping effort and store-switching consistent with these stylized facts and document its implications for business cycles and policymakers.
In this paper, we examine how economic shocks affect the distribution of household inflation expectations. We show that the dynamics of households' expected inflation distributions are driven by three distinctive functional shocks, which influence the expected inflation distribution through disagreement, level shift and ambiguity. Linking these functional shocks to economic shocks, we find that contractionary monetary shocks increase the average level of inflation expectation with anchoring effects, with a reduction in disagreement and an increase in the share of households expecting future inflation to be between 2 to 4 percent. Such anchoring effects are not observed when the high inflation periods prior to the Volcker disinflation are included. Expansionary government spending shocks have inflationary effects on both short and medium-run inflation expectations, while an increase in personal income tax shocks is inflationary for mediumrun. A surprise increase in gasoline prices increases the level of inflation expectations, but lowers the share of households with 2 percent inflation expectations.
Nominal wage growth in most advanced economies remains markedly lower than it was before the Great Recession of 2008–09. This paper finds that the bulk of the wage slowdown is accounted for by labor market slack, inflation expectations, and trend productivity growth. In particular, there appears to be greater slack than meets the eye. Involuntary part-time employment appears to have weakened wage growth even in economies where headline unemployment rates are now at, or below, their averages in the years leading up to the recession.
Three years have passed since the Bank of Japan’s asset purchase program was introduced in 2011, causing a sharp decline in the value of the Japanese Yen. What would be the implications for Japan and Korea’s exporters if the weak Yen is here to stay? We explore this question by examining exporters’ pricing behaviors and volume responses to exchange rate shocks. We find that if the weak Yen persists, it would strengthen Japan’s price competitiveness over time as export prices respond with a lag. We also find that while direct boosts to export demand will be rather limited, a persistently weaker Yen would expand the Japanese exporters’ profits lastingly, which could reinvigorate the ability, particularly of flagship exporting firms, to compete and grow in the global market over time. These findings suggest that the muted price and volume response so far to the sustained weakness of the Yen may mask a more fundamental shift in the relative competitiveness of Japanese and Korean exporters.
In this paper, we investigate how negative interest rate policy (NIRP) introduced in January 2016 by the Bank of Japan (BoJ) affected Japanese banks' lending and risk taking behavior. The BoJ's announcement was an unexpected surprise to the market and was followed by a sharp drop in equity prices of Japanese financial firms. We exploit the cross-sectional variation in the change of share prices on the day of the announcement to measure banks' differential exposure to NIRP. We show that more exposed banks increased their credit and took on more risk compared to banks that were less exposed to negative rates.
We study the role of financial frictions in explaining the sharp and persistent productivity growth slowdown in advanced economies after the 2008 global financial crisis. Using a rich cross-country, firm-level data set and exploiting quasi-experimental variation in firm-level exposure to the crisis, we find that the combination of pre-existing firm-level financial fragilities and tightening credit conditions made an important contribution to the post-crisis productivity slowdown. Specifically: (i) firms that entered the crisis with weaker balance sheets experienced decline in total factor productivity growth relative to their less vulnerable counterparts after the crisis; (ii) this decline was larger for firms located in countries where credit conditions tightened more; (iii) financially fragile firms cut back on intangible capital investment compared to more resilient firms, which is one plausible way through which financial frictions undermined productivity. All of these effects are highly persistent and quantitatively large—possibly accounting on average for about a third of the post-crisis slowdown in within-firm total factor productivity growth. Furthermore, our results are not driven by more vulnerable firms being less productive or having experienced slower productivity growth before the crisis, or differing from less vulnerable firms along other dimensions.
Three years have passed since the Bank of Japan's asset purchase program was introduced in 2011, causing a sharp decline in the value of the Japanese Yen. What would be the implications for Japan and Korea's exporters if the weak Yen is here to stay? We explore this question by examining exporters' pricing behaviors and volume responses to exchange rate shocks. We find that if the weak Yen persists, it would strengthen Japan's price competitiveness over time as export prices respond with a lag. We also find that while direct boosts to export demand will be rather limited, a persistently weaker.
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