Although Iran's secret nuclear fuel cycle program began as early as 1985, the full extent of the program was not publicly disclosed until 2002, when details were released of two previously undeclared nuclear facilities. In 2003, Iran, fearing that the US could turn its attention to regime change in Tehran, secretly approached Washington to negotiate an agreement on the nuclear issue. However, Tehran's overtures were spurned by the US, primarily due to evidence linking senior Al-Qaeda officials residing in Iran to a string of bombings in Saudi Arabia. The US proceeded to launch a campaign to convince the IAEA to adopt a resolution threatening to refer Iran to the UN Security Council for past violations of its IAEA safeguards agreement. To avoid referral to the Security Council, Iran reached an agreement with the EU-3 (the United Kingdom, France and Germany) in October 2003 to resolve its past safeguards violations, and accept more intrusive IAEA inspections. In return, the Europeans agreed to counter US efforts to refer Iran to the Security Council. However, by early 2004, as the American predicament in Iraq worsened, an emboldened Iran began to renege on the October 2003 agreement. The EU-3 responded by threatening to refer Iran to the UN Security Council. As a result, a new agreement was reached in November 2004, in which Iran agreed to restore the full suspension of its enrichment and reprocessing programs. In return, the EU-3 again agreed to block referral to the Security Council. Ultimately, a key factor in determining the success or failure of EU-3/Iran talks will be whether the US is prepared to endorse and support an agreement between them.
The possibility that Iran will acquire a nuclear weapons capability poses a significant threat to the stability of the Middle East and a potential challenge to the long-term viability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Since 2003, diplomatic efforts by the EU-3 (United Kingdom, France and Germany) have succeeded in suspending the sensitive aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme, but prospects for reaching a permanent agreement with the Iranian government are uncertain. If the EU-3 effort collapses, a number of policy options will be given more serious consideration, including sanctions, containment, regime change and military action. This IISS ‘Strategic Dossier’ on Iran’s strategic weapons programmes provides an objective technical assessment of Iran’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons capabilities, as well as its ballistic missile programme. The dossier evaluates what is known and what is not known about these capabilities and projects potential future developments. In addition, the dossier provides a history of democratic efforts over the last three decades, to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability and examines different options for current diplomatic efforts. Each chapter has been written and reviewed by recognised international experts in their respective fields. The IISS does not advocate any particular policy option for dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue. The objective of Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment is to assess, as accurately and dispassionately as possible, Iran’s capabilities and evaluate the pros and cons of different policy options in the order to foster a well-informed policy debate.
The damage that has been done to the transatlantic alliance will not be repaired through grand architectural redesigns or radical new agendas. Instead, the transatlantic partners need to restore their consensus and cooperation on key security challenges with a limited agenda that reflects the essential conservatism of the transatlantic partnership during the Cold War and the 1990s. There will inevitably be big challenges, such as the rise of China, where transatlantic disparities in strategic means and commitments preclude any common alliance undertaking. Yet such limits are nothing new. The absence of a common transatlantic commitment to counter-insurgency in Iraq may cause resentments, but so too did the lack of a common commitment to counter-insurgency in Vietnam. This Adelphi Paper suggests ten propositions for future transatlantic consensus – that is to say, ten security challenges for which the allies should be able to agree on common strategies. These run the gamut from an effective strategy to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability to transatlantic leadership for international cooperation against global warming. If pursued with seriousness and a reasonable degree of transatlantic unity, these propositions could constitute the foundations of an effective partnership. They are, in the authors’ view, the basis for a consensus on the most pressing security challenges of the twenty-first century. The time is right for this kind of serious rededication to alliance purposes. There has already been some effort to repair the damage; moreover, new leaders are in place or coming to the countries that were major protagonists of the transatlantic crisis: Germany, France, Britain and, in 2009, the United States. It is possible that these four new leaders will be better able to put the disputes of the recent past behind them. This extended essay is a guide to the possibilities, and also the limits, of a new start.
The damage that has been done to the transatlantic alliance will not be repaired through grand architectural redesigns or radical new agendas. Instead, the transatlantic partners need to restore their consensus and cooperation on key security challenges with a limited agenda that reflects the essential conservatism of the transatlantic partnership during the Cold War and the 1990s. There will inevitably be big challenges, such as the rise of China, where transatlantic disparities in strategic means and commitments preclude any common alliance undertaking. Yet such limits are nothing new. The absence of a common transatlantic commitment to counter-insurgency in Iraq may cause resentments, but so too did the lack of a common commitment to counter-insurgency in Vietnam. This Adelphi Paper suggests ten propositions for future transatlantic consensus – that is to say, ten security challenges for which the allies should be able to agree on common strategies. These run the gamut from an effective strategy to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability to transatlantic leadership for international cooperation against global warming. If pursued with seriousness and a reasonable degree of transatlantic unity, these propositions could constitute the foundations of an effective partnership. They are, in the authors’ view, the basis for a consensus on the most pressing security challenges of the twenty-first century. The time is right for this kind of serious rededication to alliance purposes. There has already been some effort to repair the damage; moreover, new leaders are in place or coming to the countries that were major protagonists of the transatlantic crisis: Germany, France, Britain and, in 2009, the United States. It is possible that these four new leaders will be better able to put the disputes of the recent past behind them. This extended essay is a guide to the possibilities, and also the limits, of a new start.
The possibility that Iran will acquire a nuclear weapons capability poses a significant threat to the stability of the Middle East and a potential challenge to the long-term viability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Since 2003, diplomatic efforts by the EU-3 (United Kingdom, France and Germany) have succeeded in suspending the sensitive aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme, but prospects for reaching a permanent agreement with the Iranian government are uncertain. If the EU-3 effort collapses, a number of policy options will be given more serious consideration, including sanctions, containment, regime change and military action. This IISS ‘Strategic Dossier’ on Iran’s strategic weapons programmes provides an objective technical assessment of Iran’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons capabilities, as well as its ballistic missile programme. The dossier evaluates what is known and what is not known about these capabilities and projects potential future developments. In addition, the dossier provides a history of democratic efforts over the last three decades, to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability and examines different options for current diplomatic efforts. Each chapter has been written and reviewed by recognised international experts in their respective fields. The IISS does not advocate any particular policy option for dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue. The objective of Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment is to assess, as accurately and dispassionately as possible, Iran’s capabilities and evaluate the pros and cons of different policy options in the order to foster a well-informed policy debate.
Although Iran's secret nuclear fuel cycle program began as early as 1985, the full extent of the program was not publicly disclosed until 2002, when details were released of two previously undeclared nuclear facilities. In 2003, Iran, fearing that the US could turn its attention to regime change in Tehran, secretly approached Washington to negotiate an agreement on the nuclear issue. However, Tehran's overtures were spurned by the US, primarily due to evidence linking senior Al-Qaeda officials residing in Iran to a string of bombings in Saudi Arabia. The US proceeded to launch a campaign to convince the IAEA to adopt a resolution threatening to refer Iran to the UN Security Council for past violations of its IAEA safeguards agreement. To avoid referral to the Security Council, Iran reached an agreement with the EU-3 (the United Kingdom, France and Germany) in October 2003 to resolve its past safeguards violations, and accept more intrusive IAEA inspections. In return, the Europeans agreed to counter US efforts to refer Iran to the Security Council. However, by early 2004, as the American predicament in Iraq worsened, an emboldened Iran began to renege on the October 2003 agreement. The EU-3 responded by threatening to refer Iran to the UN Security Council. As a result, a new agreement was reached in November 2004, in which Iran agreed to restore the full suspension of its enrichment and reprocessing programs. In return, the EU-3 again agreed to block referral to the Security Council. Ultimately, a key factor in determining the success or failure of EU-3/Iran talks will be whether the US is prepared to endorse and support an agreement between them.
Dangerous Thoughts is a collection of Gary Jason’s most popular and provocative articles from newspapers and political magazines, nearly three hundred in all. A few of these were published as far back as the later 1970s, but most of them are of recent vintage. There are eight broad topics the articles cover, and are gathered together in chapters accordingly. The first is school reform, and the critical need for school choice. The second is environmentalism and its negative impact on rational energy policy. The third is demographic change the continuing need for immigrants (legal, and within reasonable limits). The fourth centers around the continuing need for free trade. The fifth is the need for entitlement program reform. The sixth is the need for various political reforms, and the seventh various economic ones. The eighth is the divide between intellectual elites and ordinary citizens. A final chapter includes various miscellaneous pieces.
The landmark text on how to achieve optimal patient outcomes through evidence-based medication therapy Pharmacotherapy: A Pathophysiologic Approach is written to help you advance the quality of patient care through evidence-based medication therapy derived from sound pharmacotherapeutic principles. The scope of this trusted classic goes beyond drug indications and dosages to include the initial selection, proper administration, and monitoring of drugs. You will find everything you need to provide safe, effective drug therapy across the full range of therapeutic categories. This edition is enriched by more than 300 expert contributors, and every chapter has been revised and updated to reflect the latest in evidence-based information and recommendations. Important features such as Key Concepts at the beginning of each chapter, Clinical Presentation tables that summarize disease signs and symptoms, and Clinical Controversies boxes that examine the complicated issues faced by students and clinicians in providing drug therapy make this text an essential learning tool for students, patient-focused pharmacists, and other health care providers. NEW TO THIS EDITION A section on personalized pharmacotherapy appears in most sections All diagnostic flow diagrams, treatment algorithms, dosing guideline recommendations, and monitoring approaches have been updated in full color to clearly distinguish treatment pathways New drug monitoring tables have been added Most of the disease-oriented chapters have incorporated evidence-based treatment guidelines that when available, include ratings of the level of evidence to support the key therapeutic approaches Twenty-four online-only chapters
Thank you for visiting our website. Would you like to provide feedback on how we could improve your experience?
This site does not use any third party cookies with one exception — it uses cookies from Google to deliver its services and to analyze traffic.Learn More.