One of the very few accounts in English of German idealism, this ambitious work advances and revises our understanding of both the history and the thought of the classical period of German philosophy. As he traces the structure and evolution of idealism as a doctrine, Frederick Beiser exposes a strong objective, or realist, strain running from Kant to Hegel and identifies the crucial role of the early romantics--Hölderlin, Schlegel, and Novalis--as the founders of absolute idealism. Traditionally, German idealism is understood as a radical form of subjectivism that expands the powers of the self to encompass the entire world. But Beiser reveals a different--in fact, opposite--impulse: an attempt to limit the powers of the subject. Between Kant and Hegel he finds a movement away from cosmic subjectivity and toward greater realism and naturalism, with one form of idealism succeeding another as each proved an inadequate basis for explaining the reality of the external world and the place of the self in nature. Thus German idealism emerges here not as a radical development of the Cartesian tradition of philosophy, but as the first important break with that tradition. Table of Contents: Introduction 1. Realism in German Idealism 2. Exorcising the Spirit 3. The Critique of Foundationalism 4. The Troublesome Hegelian Legacy 5. The Taxonomy of German Idealism I. KANT'S CRITIQUE OF IDEALISM Introduction: Kant and the Problem of Subjectivism 1. The Clash of Interpretations 2. Method and Results 3. Contemporary Kant Scholarship 1. Idealism in the Precritical Years 1. The Idealist Challenge 2. The First Refutation of Idealism 3. Idealist Dreams and Visions 4. The Critique of Idealism in the Inaugural Dissertation 5. Skeptical Ambivalence 6. David Hume, Transcendental Realist 2. Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism 1. The Case for Subjectivism 2. The First Edition Definitions of Transcendental Idealism 3. Transcendental versus Empirical Idealism 4. Empirical Realism in the Aesthetic 5. Empirical Realism and Empirical Dualism 3. The First Edition Refutation of Skeptical Idealism 1. The Priority of Skeptical Idealism 2. The Critique of the Fourth Paralogism 3. The Proof of the External World 4. A Cartesian Reply 5. Appearances and Spatiality 6. The Ambiguity of Transcendental Idealism 7. The Coherence of Transcendental Idealism 4. The First Edition Refutation of Dogmatic Idealism 1. The Missing Refutation 2. Kant's Interpretation of Leibniz 3. The Dispute in the Aesthetic 4. Dogmatic Idealism in the Antinomies 5. Kant and Berkeley 1. The Göttingen Review 2. Kant's Reaction 3. Berkeleyianism in the First Edition of the Kritik 4. The Argument of the Prolegomena 5. Kant's Interpretation of Berkeley 6. The Small but Real Differences? 6. The Second Edition Refutation of Problematic Idealism 1. The Problem of Interpretation 2. Kant's Motives 3. The Question of Kant's Realism 4. Realism in the Refutation 5. The New Strategy 6. The Argument of the Refutation 7. Outer vis-à -vis Inner Sense 8. Kant's Refutations in the Reflexionen, 1788-93 7. Kant and the Way of Ideas 1. The Theory of Ideas 2. Loyalty and Apostasy 3. The Transcendental versus the Subjective 4. The Question of Consistency 5. The Doctrine of Inner Sense 6. Kantian Self-Knowledge and the Cartesian Tradition 8. The Transcendental Subject 1. Persistent Subjectivism 2. Eliminating the Transcendental Subject 3. The Criteria of Subjectivity 4. The Subjectivity of the Transcendental 5. Restoring the Transcendental Subject 9. The Status of the Transcendental 1. The Problematic Status of the Categories 2. The Metaphysial Interpretation 3. The Psychological Interpretation 4. The Logical Interpretation 5. The Ineliminable Psychological Dimension 6. Problems of Transcendental Psychology 7. Transcendental Psychology and Transcendental Idealism 10. Kant's Idealism in the Opus postumum 1. Kant's Peruke 2. The Gap in the Critical System 3. The Transition Program and Its Implications 4. The Transition and Refutation 5. The Selbstsetzungslehre 6. Appearance of Appearance: Continuity with Critical Doctrines 7. Appearance of Appearance: Its Novelty 8. The Thing-in-Itself II. FICHTE'S CRITIQUE OF SUBJECTIVISM Introduction: The Interpretation of Fichte's Idealism 1. Fichte and the Subjectivist Tradition 1. The Challenge of Subjectivism 2. Early Critique of Reinhold 3. The Discovery of Desire 4. The Primacy of Practical Reason 5. Fichte's Foundationalism? 2. The Battle against Skepticism 1. First Doubts 2. The Aenesidemus Review 3. Maimon's Skepticism 4. The Official Response 5. The Final Line of Defense 3. Criticism versus Dogmatism 1. The Transformation of the Kantian Problematic 2. The Two Systems 3. The Refutation of Dogmatism 4. Fichte and the Thing-in-Itself 4. Freedom and Subjectivity 1. The Meaning of Freedom 2. The Theory of Subjectivity 3. Woes of the Absolute Ego 4. The Two Egos 5. Knowledge of Freedom 1. The Break with Kant 2. A Philosophy of Striving 3. The Origins of Intellectual Intuition 4. The Meaning of Intellectual Intuition 5. Fichte versus Kant on Intellectual Intuition 6. Self-Knowledge and Freedom 7. Faith in Freedom 6. Critical Idealism 1. Problems of Idealism 2. The Role of Striving 3. The Synthesis of Idealism and Realism 4. Reintroducing and Reinterpreting the Thing-in-Itself 7. The Refutation of Idealism 1. Later Arguments against Idealism 2. The Fichtean versus Kantian Refutation 3. Problems of Exposition 4. The Deduction of the External World 8. The Structure of Intersubjectivity 1. Kant versus Fichte on the Problem of Other Minds 2. First Reflections 3. The Argument for Intersubjectivity 4. The Normative Structure of Intersubjectivity III. ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 1. Absolute Idealism: General Introduction 1. The Dramatis Personae 2. The Meaning of Absolute Idealism 3. Absolute versus Critical Idealism 4. The Break with Critical Idealism 5. Intellectual Sources 6. The Rehabilitation of Metaphysics 7. The Aesthetics of Absolute Idealism 2. Hölderlin and Absolute Idealism 1. Philosophy versus Poetry 2. Sources of Absolute Idealism 3. The Critique of Fichte 4. Aesthetic Sense 5. The Concept of Nature 6. Philosophy in Literature 3. Novalis' Magical Idealism 1. Novalis and the Idealist Tradition 2. Fichte Studies 3. Fichte in Novalis' Idealism 4. The Elements of Magical Idealism 5. Syncriticism 6. Models of Knowledge 4. Friedrich Schlegel's Absolute Idealism 1. Philosophy, History, and Poetry 2. The Break with Fichte 3. An Antifoundationalist Epistemology 4. Romanticism and Absolute Idealism 5. The Mystical 6. Lectures on Transcendental Idealism IV. SCHELLING AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM Introduction: The Troublesome Schellingian Legacy 1. The Path toward Absolute Idealism 1. The Fichte-Schelling Alliance 2. Early Fault Lines 3. An Independent Standpoint 4. The First Quarrel 2. The Development of Naturphilosophie 1. The Claims of Naturphilosophie 2. The Early Fichtean Phase 3. The First Decisive Step 4. The Priority of Naturphilosophie 3. Schelling's Break with Fichte 1. Background 2. The Dispute Begins 3. Schelling States His Case 4. A Botched Reconciliation 5. Persistent Hopes 6. The Irresolvable Differences 4. Problems, Methods, and Concepts of Naturphilosophie 1. Absolute Idealism and Naturphilosophie 2. The Problematic of Naturphilosophie 3. Rethinking Matter 4. Nature as Organism 5. Regulative or Constitutive? 6. The Methodology of Naturphilosophie 5. Theory of Life and Matter 1. The Spinozism of Physics 2. The Dynamic Construction of Matter 3. The Theory of Life 4. Irritability, Sensibility, and World Soul 5. The Mental and Physical as Potencies 6. Schelling's Absolute Idealism 1. The Blinding Light of 1801 2. Objective Idealism 3. The Kantian-Fichtean Interpretation 4. The Interpretation of Subject-Object Identity 7. The Dark Night of the Absolute 1. The Dark Parmenidian Vision 2. The Dilemma of Absolute Knowledge 3. Rethinking the Absolute 4. The Fall 8. Absolute Knowledge 1. In Defense of Speculation 2. The Strategy for the Defense 3. Intellectual Intuition 4. Fichte versus Schelling on Intellectual Intuition 5. Art versus Philosophy 6. The Method of Construction 7. Head over Heels into the Absolute? 8. The Paradox of Absolute Knowledge Notes Bibliography Index Reviews of this book: [A] magnificent new book...That Beiser manages to keep the reader afloat as he steers through such deep and turbulent waters deserves the highest praise. Expository writing of unfailing lucidity is supported by reference to an unrivalled range of sources...I learned something from this book on almost every page...For anyone at all seriously interested in the topic this is now the place to start. --Michael Rosen, Times Literary Supplement
This is the first history in English of German historicism, the intellectual tradition which holds that history is the key to understanding all human values, beliefs and actions. Beiser surveys the key thinkers from the mid-18th to the early 20th century and illuminates the sources and reasons for this revolution in modern thought.
Neo-Kantianism was an important movement in German philosophy of the late 19th century: Frederick Beiser traces its development back to the late 18th century, and explains its rise as a response to three major developments in German culture: the collapse of speculative idealism; the materialism controversy; and the identity crisis of philosophy.
Frederick C. Beiser presents the first book to be written on two of the most important idealist philosophers in Germany after Hegel: Adolf Trendelenburg and Rudolf Lotze. Beiser addresses every aspect of their philosophy— logic, metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics—and traces their intellectual development from their youth until their death.
Philosophy of Life explores the intellectual movement called Lebensphilosophie, which flourished in Germany from 1870 until 1920. Author Frederick C. Beiser focuses on its most prominent members: Friedrich Nietzsche, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Georg Simmel. Lebensphilosophie appeared at a critical movement in Western culture; it was a response to several important cultural developments of the late 19th century: atheism, relativism, historicism and pessimism. The Lebensphilosophen believed that meaning of life had to be found in life itself and denied the relevance of any transcendent realm of meaning. To affirm the value of life, they reacted against Schopenhauer's pessimism; they proclaimed that the joys of life outweighed its sorrows, and that there is an infinite value in living life to its fullest. They developed a radical individualist ethic, which proclaimed the value of individual self-realization above all other goods. As part of this radical individualism, they disputed the existence of absolute moral values; and by insisting on the historicity of life, they affirmed the relativity of all values. This was the first intellectual movement in the Western tradition to develop an entirely secular and humanist conception of life. Many of its doctrines are familiar to students of Nietzsche; but readers will find that he was only one of an entire intellectual movement.
The Early Romantics met resistance from artists and academics alike in part because they defied the conventional wisdom that philosophy and the arts must be kept separate. Indeed, as the literary component of Romanticism has been studied and celebrated in recent years, its philosophical aspect has receded from view. This book, by one of the most respected scholars of the Romantic era, offers an explanation of Romanticism that not only restores but enhances understanding of the movement's origins, development, aims, and accomplishments--and of its continuing relevance. Poetry is in fact the general ideal of the Romantics, Frederick Beiser tells us, but only if poetry is understood not just narrowly as poems but more broadly as things made by humans. Seen in this way, poetry becomes a revolutionary ideal that demanded--and still demands--that we transform not only literature and criticism but all the arts and sciences, that we break down the barriers between art and life, so that the world itself becomes "romanticized." Romanticism, in the view Beiser opens to us, does not conform to the contemporary division of labor in our universities and colleges; it requires a multifaceted approach of just the sort outlined in this book.
This book is an intellectual biography of Johann Friedrich, who was one of the most famous philosophers in early 19th century Germany. Herbart was trained in the German idealist tradition under Fichte, but he eventually broke with Fichte and major idealist doctrines. His own philosophy was opposed to the idealist tradition in important respects: he defended a dualism between the factual and normative; he was an ontological pluralist rather than monist; and he accepted crucial Kantian dualisms that had been rejected by the idealists (viz. the dualism between essence and existence, reason and sensibility). While Herbart still retained elements of idealism, he was more realistic than his idealistic counterparts, maintaining that elements of the sensible manifold were given rather than posited by the mind. Herbart was also an important forerunner of analytic philosophy, first in breaking with the idealist tradition, and second in insisting that the proper method of philosophy is the analysis of concepts rather than speculation about the universe as a whole"--
Philosophy of Life explores the intellectual movement called Lebensphilosophie, which flourished in Germany from 1870 until 1920. Author Frederick C. Beiser focuses on its most prominent members: Friedrich Nietzsche, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Georg Simmel. Lebensphilosophie appeared at a critical movement in Western culture; it was a response to several important cultural developments of the late 19th century: atheism, relativism, historicism and pessimism. The Lebensphilosophen believed that meaning of life had to be found in life itself and denied the relevance of any transcendent realm of meaning. To affirm the value of life, they reacted against Schopenhauer's pessimism; they proclaimed that the joys of life outweighed its sorrows, and that there is an infinite value in living life to its fullest. They developed a radical individualist ethic, which proclaimed the value of individual self-realization above all other goods. As part of this radical individualism, they disputed the existence of absolute moral values; and by insisting on the historicity of life, they affirmed the relativity of all values. This was the first intellectual movement in the Western tradition to develop an entirely secular and humanist conception of life. Many of its doctrines are familiar to students of Nietzsche; but readers will find that he was only one of an entire intellectual movement.
In Early German Positivism, Frederick C. Beiser explores a much neglected or forgotten period of the history of philosophy: the history of German positivism from 1860 to 1907. Almost all studies of positivism revolve around the Vienna Circle. Instead, this study covers positivism even before the first Vienna circle (1907). Beiser delves into figures almost completely forgotten in the German and Anglo-American worlds: Theodor Gomperz (1832-1912), Eugen Dühring (1833-1921), Ernst Laas (1837-1885), and Friedrich Jodl (1849-1914); he also examines Ernst Mach (1838-1916) and Richard Avenarius (1843-1896), who are much better known but contemporaries of these thinkers. Several positivist themes unite these thinkers: rejection of the synthetic a priori; opposition to pessimism; a philosophy of monism, naturalism and historicism; and the belief that the highest good can be achieved only under the guidance of science. Early German Positivism aims to place positivism in a wider intellectual context, which goes back to the Enlightenment and the opposition to the Christian tradition.
David Friedrich Strauss is a central figure in 19th century intellectual history. The first major source for the loss of faith in Christianity in Germany, his work Das Leben Jesu was the most scandalous publication in Germany during his time. His book was a critique of the claims to historical truth of the New Testament, which had been the mainstay of Protestantism since the Reformation. As the father of unbelief, his critique of Christianity preceded that of Nietzsche, Marx, Feuerbach, and Schopenhauer. His views imposed a harsh fate upon him - he was persecuted for his beliefs by religious and political authorities and was denied employment in the university and government, forcing him to live as a free-lance writer. He led a wandering and isolated life as an outcast. Here, Frederick C. Beiser studies the intellectual development of Strauss and recounts his fate, which began in faith as a young man but finally ended in unbelief.
This study restores and enhances the philosophical aspect of early German Romanticism, offering an understanding of the movement's origins, development, aims and accomplishments.
Neo-Kantianism was an important movement in German philosophy of the late 19th century: Frederick Beiser traces its development back to the late 18th century, and explains its rise as a response to three major developments in German culture: the collapse of speculative idealism; the materialism controversy; and the identity crisis of philosophy.
Histories of German philosophy in the nineteenth century typically focus on its first half—when Hegel, idealism, and Romanticism dominated. By contrast, the remainder of the century, after Hegel's death, has been relatively neglected because it has been seen as a period of stagnation and decline. But Frederick Beiser argues that the second half of the century was in fact one of the most revolutionary periods in modern philosophy because the nature of philosophy itself was up for grabs and the very absence of certainty led to creativity and the start of a new era. In this innovative concise history of German philosophy from 1840 to 1900, Beiser focuses not on themes or individual thinkers but rather on the period’s five great debates: the identity crisis of philosophy, the materialism controversy, the methods and limits of history, the pessimism controversy, and the Ignorabimusstreit. Schopenhauer and Wilhelm Dilthey play important roles in these controversies but so do many neglected figures, including Ludwig Büchner, Eugen Dühring, Eduard von Hartmann, Julius Fraunstaedt, Hermann Lotze, Adolf Trendelenburg, and two women, Agnes Taubert and Olga Pluemacher, who have been completely forgotten in histories of philosophy. The result is a wide-ranging, original, and surprising new account of German philosophy in the critical period between Hegel and the twentieth century.
The Sovereignty of Reason is a survey of the rule of faith controversy in seventeenth-century England. It examines the arguments by which reason eventually became the sovereign standard of truth in religion and politics, and how it triumphed over its rivals: Scripture, inspiration, and apostolic tradition. Frederick Beiser argues that the main threat to the authority of reason in seventeenth-century England came not only from dissident groups but chiefly from the Protestant theology of the Church of England. The triumph of reason was the result of a new theology rather than the development of natural philosophy, which upheld the orthodox Protestant dualism between the heavenly and earthly. Rationalism arose from a break with the traditional Protestant answers to problems of salvation, ecclesiastical polity, and the true faith. Although the early English rationalists were not able to defend all their claims on behalf of reason, they developed a moral and pragmatic defense of reason that is still of interest today. Beiser's book is a detailed examination of some neglected figures of early modern philosophy, who were crucial in the development of modern rationalism. There are chapters devoted to Richard Hooker, the Great Tew Circle, the Cambridge Platonists, the early ethical rationalists, and the free-thinkers John Toland and Anthony Collins. Originally published in 1996. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
One of the very few accounts in English of German idealism, this ambitious work advances and revises our understanding of both the history and the thought of the classical period of German philosophy. As he traces the structure and evolution of idealism as a doctrine, Frederick Beiser exposes a strong objective, or realist, strain running from Kant to Hegel and identifies the crucial role of the early romantics--Hölderlin, Schlegel, and Novalis--as the founders of absolute idealism. Traditionally, German idealism is understood as a radical form of subjectivism that expands the powers of the self to encompass the entire world. But Beiser reveals a different--in fact, opposite--impulse: an attempt to limit the powers of the subject. Between Kant and Hegel he finds a movement away from cosmic subjectivity and toward greater realism and naturalism, with one form of idealism succeeding another as each proved an inadequate basis for explaining the reality of the external world and the place of the self in nature. Thus German idealism emerges here not as a radical development of the Cartesian tradition of philosophy, but as the first important break with that tradition. Table of Contents: Introduction 1. Realism in German Idealism 2. Exorcising the Spirit 3. The Critique of Foundationalism 4. The Troublesome Hegelian Legacy 5. The Taxonomy of German Idealism I. KANT'S CRITIQUE OF IDEALISM Introduction: Kant and the Problem of Subjectivism 1. The Clash of Interpretations 2. Method and Results 3. Contemporary Kant Scholarship 1. Idealism in the Precritical Years 1. The Idealist Challenge 2. The First Refutation of Idealism 3. Idealist Dreams and Visions 4. The Critique of Idealism in the Inaugural Dissertation 5. Skeptical Ambivalence 6. David Hume, Transcendental Realist 2. Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism 1. The Case for Subjectivism 2. The First Edition Definitions of Transcendental Idealism 3. Transcendental versus Empirical Idealism 4. Empirical Realism in the Aesthetic 5. Empirical Realism and Empirical Dualism 3. The First Edition Refutation of Skeptical Idealism 1. The Priority of Skeptical Idealism 2. The Critique of the Fourth Paralogism 3. The Proof of the External World 4. A Cartesian Reply 5. Appearances and Spatiality 6. The Ambiguity of Transcendental Idealism 7. The Coherence of Transcendental Idealism 4. The First Edition Refutation of Dogmatic Idealism 1. The Missing Refutation 2. Kant's Interpretation of Leibniz 3. The Dispute in the Aesthetic 4. Dogmatic Idealism in the Antinomies 5. Kant and Berkeley 1. The Göttingen Review 2. Kant's Reaction 3. Berkeleyianism in the First Edition of the Kritik 4. The Argument of the Prolegomena 5. Kant's Interpretation of Berkeley 6. The Small but Real Differences? 6. The Second Edition Refutation of Problematic Idealism 1. The Problem of Interpretation 2. Kant's Motives 3. The Question of Kant's Realism 4. Realism in the Refutation 5. The New Strategy 6. The Argument of the Refutation 7. Outer vis-à -vis Inner Sense 8. Kant's Refutations in the Reflexionen, 1788-93 7. Kant and the Way of Ideas 1. The Theory of Ideas 2. Loyalty and Apostasy 3. The Transcendental versus the Subjective 4. The Question of Consistency 5. The Doctrine of Inner Sense 6. Kantian Self-Knowledge and the Cartesian Tradition 8. The Transcendental Subject 1. Persistent Subjectivism 2. Eliminating the Transcendental Subject 3. The Criteria of Subjectivity 4. The Subjectivity of the Transcendental 5. Restoring the Transcendental Subject 9. The Status of the Transcendental 1. The Problematic Status of the Categories 2. The Metaphysial Interpretation 3. The Psychological Interpretation 4. The Logical Interpretation 5. The Ineliminable Psychological Dimension 6. Problems of Transcendental Psychology 7. Transcendental Psychology and Transcendental Idealism 10. Kant's Idealism in the Opus postumum 1. Kant's Peruke 2. The Gap in the Critical System 3. The Transition Program and Its Implications 4. The Transition and Refutation 5. The Selbstsetzungslehre 6. Appearance of Appearance: Continuity with Critical Doctrines 7. Appearance of Appearance: Its Novelty 8. The Thing-in-Itself II. FICHTE'S CRITIQUE OF SUBJECTIVISM Introduction: The Interpretation of Fichte's Idealism 1. Fichte and the Subjectivist Tradition 1. The Challenge of Subjectivism 2. Early Critique of Reinhold 3. The Discovery of Desire 4. The Primacy of Practical Reason 5. Fichte's Foundationalism? 2. The Battle against Skepticism 1. First Doubts 2. The Aenesidemus Review 3. Maimon's Skepticism 4. The Official Response 5. The Final Line of Defense 3. Criticism versus Dogmatism 1. The Transformation of the Kantian Problematic 2. The Two Systems 3. The Refutation of Dogmatism 4. Fichte and the Thing-in-Itself 4. Freedom and Subjectivity 1. The Meaning of Freedom 2. The Theory of Subjectivity 3. Woes of the Absolute Ego 4. The Two Egos 5. Knowledge of Freedom 1. The Break with Kant 2. A Philosophy of Striving 3. The Origins of Intellectual Intuition 4. The Meaning of Intellectual Intuition 5. Fichte versus Kant on Intellectual Intuition 6. Self-Knowledge and Freedom 7. Faith in Freedom 6. Critical Idealism 1. Problems of Idealism 2. The Role of Striving 3. The Synthesis of Idealism and Realism 4. Reintroducing and Reinterpreting the Thing-in-Itself 7. The Refutation of Idealism 1. Later Arguments against Idealism 2. The Fichtean versus Kantian Refutation 3. Problems of Exposition 4. The Deduction of the External World 8. The Structure of Intersubjectivity 1. Kant versus Fichte on the Problem of Other Minds 2. First Reflections 3. The Argument for Intersubjectivity 4. The Normative Structure of Intersubjectivity III. ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 1. Absolute Idealism: General Introduction 1. The Dramatis Personae 2. The Meaning of Absolute Idealism 3. Absolute versus Critical Idealism 4. The Break with Critical Idealism 5. Intellectual Sources 6. The Rehabilitation of Metaphysics 7. The Aesthetics of Absolute Idealism 2. Hölderlin and Absolute Idealism 1. Philosophy versus Poetry 2. Sources of Absolute Idealism 3. The Critique of Fichte 4. Aesthetic Sense 5. The Concept of Nature 6. Philosophy in Literature 3. Novalis' Magical Idealism 1. Novalis and the Idealist Tradition 2. Fichte Studies 3. Fichte in Novalis' Idealism 4. The Elements of Magical Idealism 5. Syncriticism 6. Models of Knowledge 4. Friedrich Schlegel's Absolute Idealism 1. Philosophy, History, and Poetry 2. The Break with Fichte 3. An Antifoundationalist Epistemology 4. Romanticism and Absolute Idealism 5. The Mystical 6. Lectures on Transcendental Idealism IV. SCHELLING AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM Introduction: The Troublesome Schellingian Legacy 1. The Path toward Absolute Idealism 1. The Fichte-Schelling Alliance 2. Early Fault Lines 3. An Independent Standpoint 4. The First Quarrel 2. The Development of Naturphilosophie 1. The Claims of Naturphilosophie 2. The Early Fichtean Phase 3. The First Decisive Step 4. The Priority of Naturphilosophie 3. Schelling's Break with Fichte 1. Background 2. The Dispute Begins 3. Schelling States His Case 4. A Botched Reconciliation 5. Persistent Hopes 6. The Irresolvable Differences 4. Problems, Methods, and Concepts of Naturphilosophie 1. Absolute Idealism and Naturphilosophie 2. The Problematic of Naturphilosophie 3. Rethinking Matter 4. Nature as Organism 5. Regulative or Constitutive? 6. The Methodology of Naturphilosophie 5. Theory of Life and Matter 1. The Spinozism of Physics 2. The Dynamic Construction of Matter 3. The Theory of Life 4. Irritability, Sensibility, and World Soul 5. The Mental and Physical as Potencies 6. Schelling's Absolute Idealism 1. The Blinding Light of 1801 2. Objective Idealism 3. The Kantian-Fichtean Interpretation 4. The Interpretation of Subject-Object Identity 7. The Dark Night of the Absolute 1. The Dark Parmenidian Vision 2. The Dilemma of Absolute Knowledge 3. Rethinking the Absolute 4. The Fall 8. Absolute Knowledge 1. In Defense of Speculation 2. The Strategy for the Defense 3. Intellectual Intuition 4. Fichte versus Schelling on Intellectual Intuition 5. Art versus Philosophy 6. The Method of Construction 7. Head over Heels into the Absolute? 8. The Paradox of Absolute Knowledge Notes Bibliography Index Reviews of this book: [A] magnificent new book...That Beiser manages to keep the reader afloat as he steers through such deep and turbulent waters deserves the highest praise. Expository writing of unfailing lucidity is supported by reference to an unrivalled range of sources...I learned something from this book on almost every page...For anyone at all seriously interested in the topic this is now the place to start. --Michael Rosen, Times Literary Supplement
Weltschmerz is a study of the pessimism that dominated German philosophy in the second half of the nineteenth century. Pessimism was essentially the theory that life is not worth living. This theory was introduced into German philosophy by Schopenhauer, whose philosophy became very fashionable in the 1860s. Frederick C. Beiser examines the intense and long controversy that arose from Schopenhauer's pessimism, which changed the agenda of philosophy in Germany away from the logic of the sciences and toward an examination of the value of life. He examines the major defenders of pessimism (Philipp Mainländer, Eduard von Hartmann and Julius Bahnsen) and its chief critics, especially Eugen Dühring and the neo-Kantians. The pessimism dispute of the second half of the century has been largely ignored in secondary literature and this book is a first attempt since the 1880s to re-examine it and to analyze the important philosophical issues raised by it. The dispute concerned the most fundamental philosophical issue of them all: whether life is worth living.
Frederick C. Beiser presents the first book to be written on two of the most important idealist philosophers in Germany after Hegel: Adolf Trendelenburg and Rudolf Lotze. Beiser addresses every aspect of their philosophy— logic, metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics—and traces their intellectual development from their youth until their death.
The Fate of Reason is the first general history devoted to the period between Kant and Fichte, one of the most revolutionary and fertile in modern philosophy. The philosophers of this time broke with the two central tenets of the modem Cartesian tradition: the authority of reason and the primacy of epistemology. They also witnessed the decline of the Aufkldrung, the completion of Kant's philosophy, and the beginnings of post-Kantian idealism. Thanks to Beiser we can newly appreciate the influence of Kant's critics on the development of his philosophy. Beiser brings the controversies, and the personalities who engaged in them, to life and tells a story that has uncanny parallels with the debates of the present.
This book is the first complete intellectual biography of Hermann Cohen (1842-1918) and the only work to cover all his major philosophical and Jewish writings. Frederick C. Beiser pays special attention to all phases of Cohen's intellectual development, its breaks and its continuities, throughout seven decades. The guiding goal behind Cohen's intellectual career, he argues, was the development of a radical rationalism, one committed to defending the rights of unending enquiry and unlimited criticism. Cohen's philosophy was therefore an attempt to defend and revive the Enlightenment belief in the authority of reason; his critical idealism an attempt to justify this belief and to establish a purely rational worldview. According to this interpretation, Cohen's thought is resolutely opposed to any form of irrationalism or mysticism because these would impose arbitrary and artificial limits on criticism and enquiry. It is therefore critical of those interpretations which see Cohen's philosophy as a species of proto-existentialism (Rosenzweig) or Jewish mysticism (Adelmann and Köhnke). Hermann Cohen: An Intellectual Biography attempts to unify the two sides of Cohen's thought, his philosophy and his Judaism. Maintaining that Cohen's Judaism was not a limit to his radical rationalism but a consistent development of it, Beiser contends that his religion was one of reason. He concludes that most critical interpretations have failed to appreciate the philosophical depth and sophistication of his Judaism, a religion which committed the believer to the unending search for truth and the striving to achieve the cosmopolitan ideals of reason.
This is the first history in English of German historicism, the intellectual tradition which holds that history is the key to understanding all human values, beliefs and actions. Beiser surveys the key thinkers from the mid-18th to the early 20th century and illuminates the sources and reasons for this revolution in modern thought.
After a long struggle, Jewish emancipation was formally completed in Germany in 1871, when Wilhelm I abolished religious discrimination across the entire Reich. Yet the very same decade witnessed a new wave of antisemitism, one more vicious and virulent than anything before. At its centre was what is known as ‘The Berlin Antisemitism Controversy’. How can this rise of antisemitism be explained when further liberal reform was expected? Can it help us understand the tide of antisemitism that was to engulf Germany fifty years later? In this outstanding book by a leading scholar of German philosophy, Frederick C. Beiser argues that to understand modern antisemitism we must go back in history. Beginning with the background of the controversy and examining the most important antisemitic thinkers of the 1870s and 1880s, he brilliantly analyses the beginnings of modern antisemitism in Germany. Beiser challenges received scholarship that the rise of antisemitism was caused by a failure of the Jews to assimilate and criticises the view, held by Hannah Arendt, that antisemitism was at its peak when Jews were perceived to be powerless and had lost their roles in government and finance. He argues instead that it was fuelled by a fear of Jewish domination that took multiple forms. Exploring antisemitism from both a historical and philosophical perspective, he situates antisemitism in relation to such fundamental questions as the conditions for citizenship in the modern state, what is meant by nationality and what role religion should play in the state. He also vividly and expertly analyses the writings and arguments of those involved in the antisemitism crisis of the 1870s, including Wilhelm Marr, Constantin Frantz and Adolf Treitschke and thinkers who are here examined in English for the first time. The Berlin Antisemitism Controversy sheds much-needed light on an episode whose shockwaves resonate today. It is a superb account of a crucial period of not only German but also European and Jewish history and essential reading for anyone interested in the causes and roots of antisemitism in Germany and beyond.
In Early German Positivism, Frederick C. Beiser explores a much neglected or forgotten period of the history of philosophy: the history of German positivism from 1860 to 1907. Almost all studies of positivism revolve around the Vienna Circle. Instead, this study covers positivism even before the first Vienna circle (1907). Beiser delves into figures almost completely forgotten in the German and Anglo-American worlds: Theodor Gomperz (1832-1912), Eugen Dühring (1833-1921), Ernst Laas (1837-1885), and Friedrich Jodl (1849-1914); he also examines Ernst Mach (1838-1916) and Richard Avenarius (1843-1896), who are much better known but contemporaries of these thinkers. Several positivist themes unite these thinkers: rejection of the synthetic a priori; opposition to pessimism; a philosophy of monism, naturalism and historicism; and the belief that the highest good can be achieved only under the guidance of science. Early German Positivism aims to place positivism in a wider intellectual context, which goes back to the Enlightenment and the opposition to the Christian tradition.
This book is an intellectual biography of Johann Friedrich, who was one of the most famous philosophers in early 19th century Germany. Herbart was trained in the German idealist tradition under Fichte, but he eventually broke with Fichte and major idealist doctrines. His own philosophy was opposed to the idealist tradition in important respects: he defended a dualism between the factual and normative; he was an ontological pluralist rather than monist; and he accepted crucial Kantian dualisms that had been rejected by the idealists (viz. the dualism between essence and existence, reason and sensibility). While Herbart still retained elements of idealism, he was more realistic than his idealistic counterparts, maintaining that elements of the sensible manifold were given rather than posited by the mind. Herbart was also an important forerunner of analytic philosophy, first in breaking with the idealist tradition, and second in insisting that the proper method of philosophy is the analysis of concepts rather than speculation about the universe as a whole"--
Histories of German philosophy in the nineteenth century typically focus on its first half—when Hegel, idealism, and Romanticism dominated. By contrast, the remainder of the century, after Hegel's death, has been relatively neglected because it has been seen as a period of stagnation and decline. But Frederick Beiser argues that the second half of the century was in fact one of the most revolutionary periods in modern philosophy because the nature of philosophy itself was up for grabs and the very absence of certainty led to creativity and the start of a new era. In this innovative concise history of German philosophy from 1840 to 1900, Beiser focuses not on themes or individual thinkers but rather on the period’s five great debates: the identity crisis of philosophy, the materialism controversy, the methods and limits of history, the pessimism controversy, and the Ignorabimusstreit. Schopenhauer and Wilhelm Dilthey play important roles in these controversies but so do many neglected figures, including Ludwig Büchner, Eugen Dühring, Eduard von Hartmann, Julius Fraunstaedt, Hermann Lotze, Adolf Trendelenburg, and two women, Agnes Taubert and Olga Pluemacher, who have been completely forgotten in histories of philosophy. The result is a wide-ranging, original, and surprising new account of German philosophy in the critical period between Hegel and the twentieth century.
Diotima's Children is a re-examination of the rationalist tradition of aesthetics which prevailed in Germany in the late seventeenth and eighteenth century. It is partly an historical survey of the central figures and themes of this tradition But it is also a philosophical defense of some of its leading ideas, viz., that beauty plays an integral role in life, that aesthetic pleasure is the perception of perfection, that aesthetic rules are inevitable and valuable. It shows that the criticisms of Kant and Nietzsche of this tradition are largely unfounded. The rationalist tradition deserves re-examination because it is of great historical significance, marking the beginning of modern aesthetics, art criticism, and art history.
David Friedrich Strauss is a central figure in 19th century intellectual history. The first major source for the loss of faith in Christianity in Germany, his work Das Leben Jesu was the most scandalous publication in Germany during his time. His book was a critique of the claims to historical truth of the New Testament, which had been the mainstay of Protestantism since the Reformation. As the father of unbelief, his critique of Christianity preceded that of Nietzsche, Marx, Feuerbach, and Schopenhauer. His views imposed a harsh fate upon him - he was persecuted for his beliefs by religious and political authorities and was denied employment in the university and government, forcing him to live as a free-lance writer. He led a wandering and isolated life as an outcast. Here, Frederick C. Beiser studies the intellectual development of Strauss and recounts his fate, which began in faith as a young man but finally ended in unbelief.
After a long struggle, Jewish emancipation was formally completed in Germany in 1871, when Wilhelm I abolished religious discrimination across the entire Reich. Yet the very same decade witnessed a new wave of antisemitism, one more vicious and virulent than anything before. At its centre was what is known as ‘The Berlin Antisemitism Controversy’. How can this rise of antisemitism be explained when further liberal reform was expected? Can it help us understand the tide of antisemitism that was to engulf Germany fifty years later? In this outstanding book by a leading scholar of German philosophy, Frederick C. Beiser argues that to understand modern antisemitism we must go back in history. Beginning with the background of the controversy and examining the most important antisemitic thinkers of the 1870s and 1880s, he brilliantly analyses the beginnings of modern antisemitism in Germany. Beiser challenges received scholarship that the rise of antisemitism was caused by a failure of the Jews to assimilate and criticises the view, held by Hannah Arendt, that antisemitism was at its peak when Jews were perceived to be powerless and had lost their roles in government and finance. He argues instead that it was fuelled by a fear of Jewish domination that took multiple forms. Exploring antisemitism from both a historical and philosophical perspective, he situates antisemitism in relation to such fundamental questions as the conditions for citizenship in the modern state, what is meant by nationality and what role religion should play in the state. He also vividly and expertly analyses the writings and arguments of those involved in the antisemitism crisis of the 1870s, including Wilhelm Marr, Constantin Frantz and Adolf Treitschke and thinkers who are here examined in English for the first time. The Berlin Antisemitism Controversy sheds much-needed light on an episode whose shockwaves resonate today. It is a superb account of a crucial period of not only German but also European and Jewish history and essential reading for anyone interested in the causes and roots of antisemitism in Germany and beyond.
Frederick C. Beiser presents a study of the pessimism that dominated German philosophy from the 1860s to c. 1900: the theory that life is not worth living. He explores its major defenders and chief critics, and examines how the theory redirected German philosophy away from the logic of the sciences and toward an examination of the value of life.
In this introduction, Beiser covers every major aspect of Hegel's thought. Placing him in the historical context of nineteenth century Germany, the author clarifies the insights and originality of Hegel's philosophy.
This book is the first complete intellectual biography of Hermann Cohen (1842-1918) and the only work to cover all his major philosophical and Jewish writings. Frederick C. Beiser pays special attention to all phases of Cohen's intellectual development, its breaks and its continuities, throughout seven decades. The guiding goal behind Cohen's intellectual career, he argues, was the development of a radical rationalism, one committed to defending the rights of unending enquiry and unlimited criticism. Cohen's philosophy was therefore an attempt to defend and revive the Enlightenment belief in the authority of reason; his critical idealism an attempt to justify this belief and to establish a purely rational worldview. According to this interpretation, Cohen's thought is resolutely opposed to any form of irrationalism or mysticism because these would impose arbitrary and artificial limits on criticism and enquiry. It is therefore critical of those interpretations which see Cohen's philosophy as a species of proto-existentialism (Rosenzweig) or Jewish mysticism (Adelmann and Kohnke). Hermann Cohen: An Intellectual Biography attempts to unify the two sides of Cohen's thought, his philosophy and his Judaism. Maintaining that Cohen's Judaism was not a limit to his radical rationalism but a consistent development of it, Beiser contends that his religion was one of reason. He concludes that most critical interpretations have failed to appreciate the philosophical depth and sophistication of his Judaism, a religion which committed the believer to the unending search for truth and the striving to achieve the cosmopolitan ideals of reason.
The Fate of Reason is the first general history devoted to the period between Kant and Fichte, one of the most revolutionary and fertile in modern philosophy. The philosophers of this time broke with the two central tenets of the modem Cartesian tradition: the authority of reason and the primacy of epistemology. They also witnessed the decline of the Aufkldrung, the completion of Kant's philosophy, and the beginnings of post-Kantian idealism. Thanks to Beiser we can newly appreciate the influence of Kant's critics on the development of his philosophy. Beiser brings the controversies, and the personalities who engaged in them, to life and tells a story that has uncanny parallels with the debates of the present.
Frederick Beiser presents this study of Friedrich von Schiller, rehabilitating him as a philosopher worthy of serious attention, showing, in particular, that Schiller's engagement with Kant is far more subtle and rewarding than is often portrayed.
The Sovereignty of Reason is a survey of the rule of faith controversy in seventeenth-century England. It examines the arguments by which reason eventually became the sovereign standard of truth in religion and politics, and how it triumphed over its rivals: Scripture, inspiration, and apostolic tradition. Frederick Beiser argues that the main threat to the authority of reason in seventeenth-century England came not only from dissident groups but chiefly from the Protestant theology of the Church of England. The triumph of reason was the result of a new theology rather than the development of natural philosophy, which upheld the orthodox Protestant dualism between the heavenly and earthly. Rationalism arose from a break with the traditional Protestant answers to problems of salvation, ecclesiastical polity, and the true faith. Although the early English rationalists were not able to defend all their claims on behalf of reason, they developed a moral and pragmatic defense of reason that is still of interest today. Beiser's book is a detailed examination of some neglected figures of early modern philosophy, who were crucial in the development of modern rationalism. There are chapters devoted to Richard Hooker, the Great Tew Circle, the Cambridge Platonists, the early ethical rationalists, and the free-thinkers John Toland and Anthony Collins. Originally published in 1996. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
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