Brecher explores the controversial diplomacy by which the United States separately brought to a de facto close its War of Independence against the British, leaving its one ally, France, in the lurch. He focuses on the two dominant, ostensibly allied peace negotiators, John Jay and Vergennes. Veteran diplomat and diplomatic history author Frank Brecher follows the chronology of the American War of Independence, alternating between accounts of the conflict as experienced diplomatically and, in less detail, militarily by the Americans and the French, respectively. In doing so, after summarizing in his preface a highly informed and articulate contemporary analysis of the origins of the Revolution from the perspective of the more conservative elements of the American leadership, of whom John Jay was very much a part, Brecher focuses on the particular experiences of Jay and Vergennes, both in their personal lives and in their politial careers. He describes and compares their respective—and quite different—preparations for their historical activities as peace negotiators, and describes the major developments of the conflict itself as they themselves participated in, and analyzed, them. While Vergennes, the French Foreign Minister, for the first time in his career, remained physically stationary in Versailles, Jay, for the first time in his life as well as career, left the New York region to live in Philadelphia, then Madrid, and finally Paris, before returning as Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 1784, after four and a half eventful and personally dramatic years abroad. The lessons each of these two diplomats learned as a result of the crucible through which they had to pass before their very personal—and historically important—encounter in France toward war's end very much affected the negotiating strategies they adopted and the ultimatley paradoxical mixture of both triumph and disappoinment with which they helped bring to a succesful conclusion the military phase of an alliance embarked upon by their two nations some five long years earlier. Brecher presents a provocative view of early American diplomacy that will be of interest to scholars and students alike.
Events since the end of the Cold War have dashed hopes that the demise of the Soviet Union would ease the Arab-Israeli conflict and help bring about a more stable Middle East--the basic goal of American foreign policy toward that region. Far from that, the past two decades have seen an intensification of regional instability and have added further religious fuel to that conflict. Moreover, we have witnessed major new interventions by such non-Arab states in the region as Iran and Turkey. The consequence of all this for the U.S. is that its long-term policy of seeking credible balance in its relations with the contesting countries is being tested as never before, and at the center of the problem is the need to find a peaceful solution to the imbroglio involving Israel and the Palestinians--an essential ingredient in any overall attainment of America's regional aspirations. There is now a renewed focus on such categories of intra-Palestinian issues as were experienced in 1948 at the inception of the State of Israel, e.g., borders, return of refugees, status of Jerusalem, policy at the U.N., etc. It is the purpose of this book to give a fresh reading to these root issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict, mainly in the light of the most recently available primary sources from the U.S., U.K., Israel and the U.N.
Events since the end of the Cold War have dashed hopes that the demise of the Soviet Union would ease the Arab-Israeli conflict and help bring about a more stable Middle East--the basic goal of American foreign policy toward that region. Far from that, the past two decades have seen an intensification of regional instability and have added further religious fuel to that conflict. Moreover, we have witnessed major new interventions by such non-Arab states in the region as Iran and Turkey. The consequence of all this for the U.S. is that its long-term policy of seeking credible balance in its relations with the contesting countries is being tested as never before, and at the center of the problem is the need to find a peaceful solution to the imbroglio involving Israel and the Palestinians--an essential ingredient in any overall attainment of America's regional aspirations. There is now a renewed focus on such categories of intra-Palestinian issues as were experienced in 1948 at the inception of the State of Israel, e.g., borders, return of refugees, status of Jerusalem, policy at the U.N., etc. It is the purpose of this book to give a fresh reading to these root issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict, mainly in the light of the most recently available primary sources from the U.S., U.K., Israel and the U.N.
Brecher explores the controversial diplomacy by which the United States separately brought to a de facto close its War of Independence against the British, leaving its one ally, France, in the lurch. He focuses on the two dominant, ostensibly allied peace negotiators, John Jay and Vergennes. Veteran diplomat and diplomatic history author Frank Brecher follows the chronology of the American War of Independence, alternating between accounts of the conflict as experienced diplomatically and, in less detail, militarily by the Americans and the French, respectively. In doing so, after summarizing in his preface a highly informed and articulate contemporary analysis of the origins of the Revolution from the perspective of the more conservative elements of the American leadership, of whom John Jay was very much a part, Brecher focuses on the particular experiences of Jay and Vergennes, both in their personal lives and in their politial careers. He describes and compares their respective—and quite different—preparations for their historical activities as peace negotiators, and describes the major developments of the conflict itself as they themselves participated in, and analyzed, them. While Vergennes, the French Foreign Minister, for the first time in his career, remained physically stationary in Versailles, Jay, for the first time in his life as well as career, left the New York region to live in Philadelphia, then Madrid, and finally Paris, before returning as Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 1784, after four and a half eventful and personally dramatic years abroad. The lessons each of these two diplomats learned as a result of the crucible through which they had to pass before their very personal—and historically important—encounter in France toward war's end very much affected the negotiating strategies they adopted and the ultimatley paradoxical mixture of both triumph and disappoinment with which they helped bring to a succesful conclusion the military phase of an alliance embarked upon by their two nations some five long years earlier. Brecher presents a provocative view of early American diplomacy that will be of interest to scholars and students alike.
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