This book explores the paradox of the ‘security dilemma’ in International Relations, as applied to the post-9/11 context of homeland security. The book's central argument can be summed up by the following counterintuitive thesis: the more security you have, the more security you will need. It argues that enhancing security does not make terrorism more likely, but rather it raises public expectations and amplifies public outrage after subsequent failures. The book contests that this dilemma will continue to shape American, Canadian and British domestic and international security priorities for decades. In exploring the key policy implications resulting from this, the book highlights the difficulty in finding a solution to this paradox, as the most rational and logical policy options are part of the problem. This book will be of interest to students of Homeland Security, Security Studies, US politics, and IR in general.
Arguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence theory are not convincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of empirical tests of rational deterrence theory to illuminate patterns of interaction between rival nuclear powers. He analyses the crisis management techniques used by the United States and the Soviet Union in twenty-eight post-war crises and isolates factors that promote or inhibit escalation of these crises. This "crises"-based data set serves as the basis for identifying patterns of response when one nuclear state is threatened by another. The Future's Back offers new directions for testing that emphasize a more unified approach to theory building and assesses the feasibility of alternative courses of action to prevent escalation of future disputes characterized by nuclear rivalry.
The almost universally accepted explanation for the Iraq War is very clear and consistent - the US decision to attack Saddam Hussein's regime on March 19, 2003 was a product of the ideological agenda, misguided priorities, intentional deceptions and grand strategies of President George W. Bush and prominent 'neoconservatives' and 'unilateralists' on his national security team. Despite the widespread appeal of this version of history, Frank P. Harvey argues that it remains an unsubstantiated assertion and an underdeveloped argument without a logical foundation. His book aims to provide a historically grounded account of the events and strategies which pushed the US-UK coalition towards war. The analysis is based on both factual and counterfactual evidence, combines causal mechanisms derived from multiple levels of analysis and ultimately confirms the role of path dependence and momentum as a much stronger explanation for the sequence of decisions that led to war.
When Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons against his own people in Syria, he clearly crossed President Barack Obama’s "red line." At the time, many argued that the president had to bomb in order to protect America's reputation for toughness, and therefore its credibility, abroad; others countered that concerns regarding reputation were overblown, and that reputations are irrelevant for coercive diplomacy. Whether international reputations matter is the question at the heart of Fighting for Credibility. For skeptics, past actions and reputations have no bearing on an adversary’s assessment of credibility; power and interests alone determine whether a threat is believed. Using a nuanced and sophisticated theory of rational deterrence, Frank P. Harvey and John Mitton argue the opposite: ignoring reputations sidesteps important factors about how adversaries perceive threats. Focusing on cases of asymmetric US encounters with smaller powers since the end of the Cold War including Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Syria, Harvey and Mitton reveal that reputations matter for credibility in international politics. This dynamic and deeply documented study successfully brings reputation back to the table of foreign diplomacy.
Frank P. Harvey mounts a powerful case for American unilateralism. He addresses the relationship between globalization, terrorism, and unilateralism, and provides a systematic explanation for, and defense of, Washington's response to threats of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The final book by Marquette University historian Frank L. Klement (1905-1994), this is a vivid chronological narrative of Wisconsin's role in the pivotal event in American history. In this volume, Klement greatly expanded his 1962 booklet on this topic, adding new material on each of Wisconsin's fifty-three infantry regiments, political and constitutional issues, soldiers voting, women and the war, and Wisconsin's black soldiers.
For undergraduate level World Civilization or World History courses. This comprehensive, accessible survey of world history has been extensively revised to provide an even more global and comparative perspective on the events and processes that have shaped our increasingly interdependent world. Written by leading scholars in their respective fields, Heritage of World Civilizations, 6/e, combines unusually strong and thorough coverage of the unique heritage of Asian, African, Islamic, Western, and American civilizations, while highlighting the role of the world's great religious and philosophical traditions.
This book explores the paradox of the ‘security dilemma’ in International Relations, as applied to the post-9/11 context of homeland security. The book's central argument can be summed up by the following counterintuitive thesis: the more security you have, the more security you will need. It argues that enhancing security does not make terrorism more likely, but rather it raises public expectations and amplifies public outrage after subsequent failures. The book contests that this dilemma will continue to shape American, Canadian and British domestic and international security priorities for decades. In exploring the key policy implications resulting from this, the book highlights the difficulty in finding a solution to this paradox, as the most rational and logical policy options are part of the problem. This book will be of interest to students of Homeland Security, Security Studies, US politics, and IR in general.
The almost universally accepted explanation for the Iraq War is very clear and consistent - the US decision to attack Saddam Hussein's regime on March 19, 2003 was a product of the ideological agenda, misguided priorities, intentional deceptions and grand strategies of President George W. Bush and prominent 'neoconservatives' and 'unilateralists' on his national security team. Despite the widespread appeal of this version of history, Frank P. Harvey argues that it remains an unsubstantiated assertion and an underdeveloped argument without a logical foundation. His book aims to provide a historically grounded account of the events and strategies which pushed the US-UK coalition towards war. The analysis is based on both factual and counterfactual evidence, combines causal mechanisms derived from multiple levels of analysis and ultimately confirms the role of path dependence and momentum as a much stronger explanation for the sequence of decisions that led to war.
When Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons against his own people in Syria, he clearly crossed President Barack Obama’s "red line." At the time, many argued that the president had to bomb in order to protect America's reputation for toughness, and therefore its credibility, abroad; others countered that concerns regarding reputation were overblown, and that reputations are irrelevant for coercive diplomacy. Whether international reputations matter is the question at the heart of Fighting for Credibility. For skeptics, past actions and reputations have no bearing on an adversary’s assessment of credibility; power and interests alone determine whether a threat is believed. Using a nuanced and sophisticated theory of rational deterrence, Frank P. Harvey and John Mitton argue the opposite: ignoring reputations sidesteps important factors about how adversaries perceive threats. Focusing on cases of asymmetric US encounters with smaller powers since the end of the Cold War including Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Syria, Harvey and Mitton reveal that reputations matter for credibility in international politics. This dynamic and deeply documented study successfully brings reputation back to the table of foreign diplomacy.
Arguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence theory are not convincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of empirical tests of rational deterrence theory to illuminate patterns of interaction between rival nuclear powers. He analyses the crisis management techniques used by the United States and the Soviet Union in twenty-eight post-war crises and isolates factors that promote or inhibit escalation of these crises. This "crises"-based data set serves as the basis for identifying patterns of response when one nuclear state is threatened by another. The Future's Back offers new directions for testing that emphasize a more unified approach to theory building and assesses the feasibility of alternative courses of action to prevent escalation of future disputes characterized by nuclear rivalry.
Frank P. Harvey mounts a powerful case for American unilateralism. He addresses the relationship between globalization, terrorism, and unilateralism, and provides a systematic explanation for, and defense of, Washington's response to threats of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
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