Operation Agreement was launched by the Allies in World War II on the night of September 13-14th, 1942 to hit Axis Air Force bases and depots in North Africa. It was part of a more complex series of other operations, called “Big Party”, intended to cause havoc, panic, disruption and destruction of the Axis logistic organizations, by means of in-depth actions by spoilers, destined to act against airports, logistic centers and the land communication lines of Cyrenaica, between Tobruk and Benghazi. Of all these missions, the most important was Operation “Daffodil”, which involved an attack from the sea on Tobruk, coordinated with the action of a mobile land column coming from the desert on trucks. The enterprise was a real failure and resulted in a crushing defeat of the British and their allies.
The night bombardment of Bari on December 2nd, 1943 was a dramatic action carried out at low altitude by Luftwaffe aircraft, with the aim of attacking the transport ships of an important convoy that was in the port under unloading in the docks, and that had been reported in the morning by the German air reconnaissance. Bari had been reached by British troops on September 11th following the events of Italy’s surrender, and most of the supplies that flowed there were destined for General Montgomery’s 8th Army, and for the US Air Force whose heavy bombers of the 15th Air Force had installed themselves in the airports of Puglia, in particular Foggia, to beat German targets in Germany and the Balkans from the south. On the evening of December 2nd, 105 Junker 88 bombers from six bombing groups took off from the airports of northern Italy and 88 of them attacked the target with disastrous effects for the Allies, success achieved with the loss of two Ju. 88. The attack caused heavy losses to the Anglo-Americans, who had not suffered such a devastating surprise air raid since the Japanese attacked the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941. The ships sunk in Bari, including those of small tonnage, were 21 and another 12 more or less damaged. The wrecks of the sunken ships caused the blockade of the port for three weeks, with the result that the Anglo-Americans had to use the ports of Brindisi and Taranto to land and air supplies, in order not to delay the advance in Italy. Particularly serious and alarming was the sinking by explosion of the ammunition cargo of the American Liberty ship John Harvey, which also carried 2,000 deadly mustard bombs for 1,350 tons, from whose holds leaked a large quantity of chemicals of that deadly toxic gas, which not only contaminated the waters of the port but killed more than 1,000 soldiers and civilians in the area, which represented one of the greatest ecological disasters of all time.
In the run-up to the landing in Sicily on 10 July 1943, code-named Operation ‘Husky’, during the spring of that year the British Intelligence Commands implemented very elaborate measures to confuse the enemy as to the date and destination of the attack. Among other things, in the hope of delaying German reinforcements to Sicily, to reduce the air threat to their invasion convoys and to keep the main naval forces, battleships and cruisers, away from the area of Sicily, false information was artfully provided through agents in neutral nations, such as Portugal and Spain. From the General Staff of the Italian Armed Forces and the German Commands in Italy, the Allied landing operation in Sicily was expected. Benito Mussolini, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, and the Chief of the Supreme Command General Vittorio Ambrosio, despite all the Anglo-American deception manoeuvres to deceive Italians and Germans from the real objective of landing in Sicily, were convinced that the invasion would take place on that large island. Among the deception measures, the most famous and elaborate was Operation ‘Mincemeat’. Glyndwr Michael, a Welshman who died of pulmonary oedema and was found in a morgue was dressed in military uniform under the name of a fictitious ‘Major William Martin of the Royal Marines’. His death was faked as being caused by drowning, which occurred while, with false confidential documents, which indicated Greece and probably Sardinia as targets for a landing, he was in the air on a plane that had crashed into the sea near the Atlantic coast of southern Spain. His corpse, transported by a British submarine, was found by the Spaniards on the Huelva beach. The documents he possessed were passed by the Spanish to German agents, and reached Berlin, who immediately informed Rome. But the plan, which was hailed in Anglo-Saxon countries as an exceptional success that would even have conditioned the outcome of the war in favour of the Allies, diverting the Germans’ attention from reinforcing Sicily, did not go as they believed it would, so much so that they made two fictional and false films about it. The Italian and German commanders in Italy, unlike in Belino who initially believed in that deception, especially Hitler, did not take the bait in that macabre mise-en-scene, as the reader will realise when reading this book.
The battle also known as the Battle of Skerki Bank took place on December 2, 1942, in the Mediterranean Sea near the Tunisian coast. An Italian merchant convoy, escorted by several Royal Navy warships and bound for Libya to resupply Axis troops in North Africa, was attacked by a Royal Navy naval squadron. The Italian convoy consisted of a German steamer, and several Italian motor ships. The British attack squadron in the battle sank the entire convoy-as well as the destroyer Folgore that was part of the escort-without sustaining any immediate damage. The battle was initiated by the Italian commander, Captain Aldo Cocchia, embarked on the Nicoloso da Recco, a Navigatori-class destroyer, who ordered his ships to attack. The Italian ships engaged in the attack launched a salvo of torpedoes to no avail, and the destroyer Folgore, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Ener Bettica, was the first to be hit and sunk. In the combat, 2,200 Italians lost their lives between those embarked on the Thunderbolt and the sailors in the convoy, as well as a large number of infantrymen transported. More specifically, there were 286 Royal Navy casualties. Of the 1,766 soldiers transported from the Aventino and Puccini, mostly infantrymen of the Superga Division, destined for the Tunisian front, only 239 were saved!
Operation Agreement was launched by the Allies in World War II on the night of September 13-14th, 1942 to hit Axis Air Force bases and depots in North Africa. It was part of a more complex series of other operations, called “Big Party”, intended to cause havoc, panic, disruption and destruction of the Axis logistic organizations, by means of in-depth actions by spoilers, destined to act against airports, logistic centers and the land communication lines of Cyrenaica, between Tobruk and Benghazi. Of all these missions, the most important was Operation “Daffodil”, which involved an attack from the sea on Tobruk, coordinated with the action of a mobile land column coming from the desert on trucks. The enterprise was a real failure and resulted in a crushing defeat of the British and their allies.
In the run-up to the landing in Sicily on 10 July 1943, code-named Operation ‘Husky’, during the spring of that year the British Intelligence Commands implemented very elaborate measures to confuse the enemy as to the date and destination of the attack. Among other things, in the hope of delaying German reinforcements to Sicily, to reduce the air threat to their invasion convoys and to keep the main naval forces, battleships and cruisers, away from the area of Sicily, false information was artfully provided through agents in neutral nations, such as Portugal and Spain. From the General Staff of the Italian Armed Forces and the German Commands in Italy, the Allied landing operation in Sicily was expected. Benito Mussolini, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, and the Chief of the Supreme Command General Vittorio Ambrosio, despite all the Anglo-American deception manoeuvres to deceive Italians and Germans from the real objective of landing in Sicily, were convinced that the invasion would take place on that large island. Among the deception measures, the most famous and elaborate was Operation ‘Mincemeat’. Glyndwr Michael, a Welshman who died of pulmonary oedema and was found in a morgue was dressed in military uniform under the name of a fictitious ‘Major William Martin of the Royal Marines’. His death was faked as being caused by drowning, which occurred while, with false confidential documents, which indicated Greece and probably Sardinia as targets for a landing, he was in the air on a plane that had crashed into the sea near the Atlantic coast of southern Spain. His corpse, transported by a British submarine, was found by the Spaniards on the Huelva beach. The documents he possessed were passed by the Spanish to German agents, and reached Berlin, who immediately informed Rome. But the plan, which was hailed in Anglo-Saxon countries as an exceptional success that would even have conditioned the outcome of the war in favour of the Allies, diverting the Germans’ attention from reinforcing Sicily, did not go as they believed it would, so much so that they made two fictional and false films about it. The Italian and German commanders in Italy, unlike in Belino who initially believed in that deception, especially Hitler, did not take the bait in that macabre mise-en-scene, as the reader will realise when reading this book.
The night bombardment of Bari on December 2nd, 1943 was a dramatic action carried out at low altitude by Luftwaffe aircraft, with the aim of attacking the transport ships of an important convoy that was in the port under unloading in the docks, and that had been reported in the morning by the German air reconnaissance. Bari had been reached by British troops on September 11th following the events of Italy’s surrender, and most of the supplies that flowed there were destined for General Montgomery’s 8th Army, and for the US Air Force whose heavy bombers of the 15th Air Force had installed themselves in the airports of Puglia, in particular Foggia, to beat German targets in Germany and the Balkans from the south. On the evening of December 2nd, 105 Junker 88 bombers from six bombing groups took off from the airports of northern Italy and 88 of them attacked the target with disastrous effects for the Allies, success achieved with the loss of two Ju. 88. The attack caused heavy losses to the Anglo-Americans, who had not suffered such a devastating surprise air raid since the Japanese attacked the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941. The ships sunk in Bari, including those of small tonnage, were 21 and another 12 more or less damaged. The wrecks of the sunken ships caused the blockade of the port for three weeks, with the result that the Anglo-Americans had to use the ports of Brindisi and Taranto to land and air supplies, in order not to delay the advance in Italy. Particularly serious and alarming was the sinking by explosion of the ammunition cargo of the American Liberty ship John Harvey, which also carried 2,000 deadly mustard bombs for 1,350 tons, from whose holds leaked a large quantity of chemicals of that deadly toxic gas, which not only contaminated the waters of the port but killed more than 1,000 soldiers and civilians in the area, which represented one of the greatest ecological disasters of all time.
The battle also known as the Battle of Skerki Bank took place on December 2, 1942, in the Mediterranean Sea near the Tunisian coast. An Italian merchant convoy, escorted by several Royal Navy warships and bound for Libya to resupply Axis troops in North Africa, was attacked by a Royal Navy naval squadron. The Italian convoy consisted of a German steamer, and several Italian motor ships. The British attack squadron in the battle sank the entire convoy-as well as the destroyer Folgore that was part of the escort-without sustaining any immediate damage. The battle was initiated by the Italian commander, Captain Aldo Cocchia, embarked on the Nicoloso da Recco, a Navigatori-class destroyer, who ordered his ships to attack. The Italian ships engaged in the attack launched a salvo of torpedoes to no avail, and the destroyer Folgore, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Ener Bettica, was the first to be hit and sunk. In the combat, 2,200 Italians lost their lives between those embarked on the Thunderbolt and the sailors in the convoy, as well as a large number of infantrymen transported. More specifically, there were 286 Royal Navy casualties. Of the 1,766 soldiers transported from the Aventino and Puccini, mostly infantrymen of the Superga Division, destined for the Tunisian front, only 239 were saved!
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