Vincere! presents an overview of the counterinsurgency operations carried out by the Italian Royal Army from 1922 to 1941 in Libya and Ethiopia. Based on ten years of study conducted in the Italian archives and on the ground, this volume looks at a period when the Italian Royal Army faced significant new challenges in the conduct of war. Facing new challenges in an atypical theater of war, Italian Royal Army forces learned significant lessons that would shape the conduct of future combat. In the period covered in this work, Italian Royal Army forces had to adapt to new terrain, while modifying their techniques and methods in relation to the local populations and the overall characteristics of the territories in Africa. Moving away from a reliance on heavy, slow battalions formed for the most part by Italian troops, the Italians instead turned to mobile units, lightly armed and composed primarily by African troops who were able to respond quickly to the needs of this kind of war. Men coming from the loyal Eritrean colony, from Somalia, Libya, from the countries on the Red Sea and even from Ethiopia, progressively replaced Italian troops. In Libya, warfighting and counterinsurgency operations were conducted mainly by regular infantry (Libyan battalions, Méharists, Saharian) and cavalry units (Savaris and Spahis), while in Ethiopia, regular and irregular bands were used. Vincere! offers a look at some of the earliest irregular warfare and counterinsurgency operations the modern Italian forces ever conducted. Italian forces faced local populations while conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in what was, for them, a new theater of war. In Libya, the rebellion was quelled in the space of ten years, at an admittedly high price for the regional forces. In Ethiopia, where COIN operations were interrupted by World War II, the available data suggests that military actions, accompanied by a more responsible policy toward the population, would have eventually defeated the insurgency. The use of airpower in Ethiopia made a huge difference, and its lessons were learned long before the French experience in Algeria. The Italians waged counterinsurgency operations over twenty years in two geographically separate theaters, and in two very different operational environments and much of value for current practitioners and scholars can be learned from these different experiences.
In recent decades, militias and sub-national armed groups have played a decisive role in politics and security in the MENA region. Their prominence with local and outside actors in areas where state institutions have collapsed presents multiple policy challenges. Armed groups have access to substantial resources and in some cases enjoy considerable local legitimacy. That makes them formidable but also resilient forces. This is why their suppression – through coercive measures or marginalization – can bring more costs than benefits to already fragile state institutions and exhausted populations. This volume addresses the void in the current debate on subnational armed groups, focusing particularly on the multiple ongoing conflicts and turmoil in the MENA region. It places a particular emphasis on whether armed groups can be integrated into state-building initiatives and whether they can play a constructive role with other key actors.
In Libya and Yemen armed groups play a central role. Pervading weak and contested institutions, they have gradually brought their webs of survival, profit and governance under the state umbrella: warlords have become the new lords of the state. Armed groups control most of the energy revenues, critical infrastructure, smuggling and illicit trafficking. Their leaders are multifaceted: they are simultaneously military commanders, tribal chiefs, politicians and businessmen. Combining comparative analysis and case studies, this Report sheds light on the "economic face" of the armed groups and their power trajectories. How do armed groups build networks of profit and loyalty in the territories they hold? How does clientelism mark a continuity trend with former authoritarian regimes?
Vincere! presents an overview of the counterinsurgency operations carried out by the Italian Royal Army from 1922 to 1941 in Libya and Ethiopia. Based on ten years of study conducted in the Italian archives and on the ground, this volume looks at a period when the Italian Royal Army faced significant new challenges in the conduct of war. Facing new challenges in an atypical theater of war, Italian Royal Army forces learned significant lessons that would shape the conduct of future combat. In the period covered in this work, Italian Royal Army forces had to adapt to new terrain, while modifying their techniques and methods in relation to the local populations and the overall characteristics of the territories in Africa. Moving away from a reliance on heavy, slow battalions formed for the most part by Italian troops, the Italians instead turned to mobile units, lightly armed and composed primarily by African troops who were able to respond quickly to the needs of this kind of war. Men coming from the loyal Eritrean colony, from Somalia, Libya, from the countries on the Red Sea and even from Ethiopia, progressively replaced Italian troops. In Libya, warfighting and counterinsurgency operations were conducted mainly by regular infantry (Libyan battalions, Méharists, Saharian) and cavalry units (Savaris and Spahis), while in Ethiopia, regular and irregular bands were used. Vincere! offers a look at some of the earliest irregular warfare and counterinsurgency operations the modern Italian forces ever conducted. Italian forces faced local populations while conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in what was, for them, a new theater of war. In Libya, the rebellion was quelled in the space of ten years, at an admittedly high price for the regional forces. In Ethiopia, where COIN operations were interrupted by World War II, the available data suggests that military actions, accompanied by a more responsible policy toward the population, would have eventually defeated the insurgency. The use of airpower in Ethiopia made a huge difference, and its lessons were learned long before the French experience in Algeria. The Italians waged counterinsurgency operations over twenty years in two geographically separate theaters, and in two very different operational environments and much of value for current practitioners and scholars can be learned from these different experiences.
In Libya and Yemen armed groups play a central role. Pervading weak and contested institutions, they have gradually brought their webs of survival, profit and governance under the state umbrella: warlords have become the new lords of the state. Armed groups control most of the energy revenues, critical infrastructure, smuggling and illicit trafficking. Their leaders are multifaceted: they are simultaneously military commanders, tribal chiefs, politicians and businessmen. Combining comparative analysis and case studies, this Report sheds light on the "economic face" of the armed groups and their power trajectories. How do armed groups build networks of profit and loyalty in the territories they hold? How does clientelism mark a continuity trend with former authoritarian regimes?
In recent decades, militias and sub-national armed groups have played a decisive role in politics and security in the MENA region. Their prominence with local and outside actors in areas where state institutions have collapsed presents multiple policy challenges. Armed groups have access to substantial resources and in some cases enjoy considerable local legitimacy. That makes them formidable but also resilient forces. This is why their suppression – through coercive measures or marginalization – can bring more costs than benefits to already fragile state institutions and exhausted populations. This volume addresses the void in the current debate on subnational armed groups, focusing particularly on the multiple ongoing conflicts and turmoil in the MENA region. It places a particular emphasis on whether armed groups can be integrated into state-building initiatives and whether they can play a constructive role with other key actors.
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