Since its launch in 1995, the majority of personal data held in the Schengen Information System (SIS) concerns third-country nationals to be refused entry to the Schengen territory. This study reveals why the use of the SIS (and the second generation SIS or SIS II) entails a risk to the protection of human rights such as the right to privacy and the right to data protection, but also the freedom of movement of persons and the principle of non-discrimination. This study describes the implementation of the SIS in respectively France, Germany, and the Netherlands and the available legal remedies in both data protection and immigration law. On the basis of three general principles of European law, minimum standards are developed for effective remedies for individuals registered in the SIS, but also other databases such as Eurodac or the Visa Information System.
Describes the case of Mr. and Mrs. Moon, leaders of the Unification Church recorded by the German authorities in the Schengen Information System database, between 1995 and 2007.
Since its launch in 1995, the majority of personal data held in the Schengen Information System (SIS) concerns third-country nationals to be refused entry to the Schengen territory. This study reveals why the use of the SIS (and the second generation SIS or SIS II) entails a risk to the protection of human rights such as the right to privacy and the right to data protection, but also the freedom of movement of persons and the principle of non-discrimination. This study describes the implementation of the SIS in respectively France, Germany, and the Netherlands and the available legal remedies in both data protection and immigration law. On the basis of three general principles of European law, minimum standards are developed for effective remedies for individuals registered in the SIS, but also other databases such as Eurodac or the Visa Information System.
Describes the case of Mr. and Mrs. Moon, leaders of the Unification Church recorded by the German authorities in the Schengen Information System database, between 1995 and 2007.
The European Commission presented the 'EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) system' in 2007 as a tool in the fight against terrorism and organised crime. One of the proposed instruments of this system is the Framework Decision on the use of PNR, which provides for the storage and exchange of passenger data between EU member states and between member states and non-EU countries. Current Council proposals make clear that the passenger data may also be used to investigate other (serious) crimes or to prevent illegal immigration, which raises both practical and legal concerns. This Working Document by Evelien Brouwer looks at the legal rights implications of the EU PNR system, focusing in particular on international human rights standards. It is to be hoped that, when preparing the so-called 'Stockholm programme', including a new multiannual programme for policies in the field of freedom, security and justice, both the EU institutions and member states will take these standards sufficiently into account.--Publisher description.
In February 2011, the European Commission published a proposal for a new Directive on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crimes. This proposal replaces an earlier draft of 2007 for a Framework Decision on the use of PNR data for law enforcement purposes. The new proposal does not seem to allay the earlier concerns of important stakeholders with regard to the 2007 proposal. Its content contradicts not only important principles of data protection as described by the Commission in November 2010, but also the principle of proportionality underlying EU law. This paper examines the extended purpose and (lack of) added value of this proposal. It also considers its relation to the Directive on advanced passenger information and PNR agreements between the EU and third countries, the lack of harmonisation and the consequences for the fundamental rights of individuals.
This paper examines the EU counterterrorism policy responses to the attacks in Paris, 7-9 January 2015. It provides an overview of the main EU-level initiatives that have been put forward in the weeks following the events and that will be discussed in the informal European Council meeting of 12 February 2015. The paper argues that a majority of these proposals predated the Paris shootings and had until that point proved contentious as regards their efficacy, legitimacy and lawfulness. A case in point is the EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) proposal. The paper finds that EU counterterrorism policy responses to the Paris events raise two fundamental challenges: A first challenge is to the freedom of movement, Schengen and Union citizenship. The priority given to the expansion in the use of large-scale surveillance and systematic monitoring of all travellers including EU citizens stands in contravention of Schengen and the free movement principle. A second challenge concerns EU democratic rule of law. Current pressures calling for an urgent adoption of measures like the EU PNR challenge the scrutiny roles held by the European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the European Union on counterterrorism measures in a post-Lisbon Treaty setting. The paper proposes that the EU adopts a new European Agenda on Security and Liberty based on an EU security (criminal justice-led) cooperation model firmly anchored in current EU legal principles and rule of law standards. This model would call for 'less is more' concerning the use, processing and retention of data by police and intelligence communities, and it would instead pursue better and more accurate use of data that would meet the quality standards of evidence in criminal judicial proceedings.
What is happening to the Schengen borders? Is Schengen in 'crisis'? This paper examines the state of play in the Schengen system in light of the developments during 2015. It critically examines the assertion that Schengen is 'in crisis' and seeks to set the record straight on what has been happening to the intra-Schengen border-free and common external borders system. The paper argues that Schengen is here to stay and that reports about the reintroduction of internal border checks are exaggerated as they are in full compliance with the EU rule of law model laid down in the Schengen Borders Code and subject to scrutiny by the European Commission. It also examines the legal challenges inherent to police checks within the internal border areas as having an equivalent effect to border checks as well as the newly adopted proposal for a European Border and Coast Guard system. The analysis shows that the most far-reaching challenge to the current and future configurations of EU border policies relates to ensuring that they are in full compliance with fundamental human rights obligations to refugees, effective accountability and independent monitoring of the implementation of EU legal standards. This should be accompanied by a transparent and informed discussion on which 'Schengen' and which 'common European Border and Coast Guard Agency' we exactly want within current democratic rule of law and fundamental rights remits.
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