Annotation. The European Constitutional Convention offers a historical opportunity to rethink and to improve the governance and organization of the European Union. At stake is Europe's political architecture: the form that government takes and the allocation of responsibilities between the member states and supranational bodies. Many reform proposals have already been offered to the Convention. This Report provides a method for evaluating those options, developing an analytical framework derived from recent developments in the theory of positive political economy. On this basis the authors conclude that a presidential system of governance is likely to be best adapted to Europe -- and specifically to the need to expand the competency of the EU in the areas of internal and external security (Europe's Second and Third Pillars). In a full-blown presidential system, the Commission would have well-defined executive powers, specified by the Council, and a president elected by the citizens of Europe. The European executive would be subject to checks and balances by both the Council and the European Parliament. But political realism excludes adopting such a solution in the short run. The authors therefore propose an evolutionary strategy: the election of the Commission president by a college of country representatives appointed in the short run by national parliaments, leaving the option open to individual countries to allocate their votes for the presidency via universal suffrage. This solution would preserve the option of moving to a fully-fledged presidential model sometime in the future, while providing enhanced democratic legitimacy from the start. In general, the Constitution should be long on principles and general rules and short on details so as to allow Europe's governance to evolve within an unchanged Constitution. Book jacket.
Established in 1983, the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) is the only European economics research network, linking over 550 academic researchers based in more than 20 countries. CEPR research addresses key European and global policy issues, ranging from global financial crises to international trade policy; from the economic transformation of Central and Eastern Europe to European competition policy. We are the market leaders for research on all aspects of European integration. CEPR research has consistently influenced policy by orienting researchers to address policy-relevant questions, and by encouraging key decision-makers to focus on the results of this research when discussing and formulating policy. The success of this approach has become increasingly apparent in recent years, as both practical examples and explicit acknowledgements from politicians, officials and journalists can testify. The Policy Paper series was launched by CEPR in 1999 to provide a forum for the analysis of important policy issues by leading researchers. The series aims to identify key policy issues; apply the best and most up-to-date research to help understand these issues; and to explore the implications of this research for the design and conduct of policy. Book jacket.
Abstract: "Enforcement more than regulations, laws-on-the-books, or voluntary codes is key to effective corporate governance, at least in transition and developing countries. Corporate governance and enforcement mechanisms are intimately linked as they affect firms' ability to commit to their stakeholders, in particular to external investors. Berglof and Claessens provide a framework for understanding these links and how they are shaped by countries' institutional contexts. When the general enforcement environment is weak and specific enforcement mechanisms function poorly, as in many developing and transition countries, few of the traditional corporate governance mechanisms are effective. The principal consequence in these countries is a large blockholder, but there are important potential costs to this mechanism. A range of private and public enforcement 'tools' can help reduce these costs and reinforce other supplementary corporate governance mechanisms. The limited empirical evidence suggests that private tools are more effective than public forms of enforcement in the typical environment of most developing and transition countries. However, public enforcement is necessary regardless, and private enforcement mechanisms often require public laws to function. Furthermore, in some countries at least, bottom-up, private-led tools preceded and even shaped public laws. Political economy constraints resulting from the intermingling of business and politics, however, often prevent improvements in the general enforcement environment, and adoption and implementation of public laws in these countries. This paper a product of the Global Corporate Governance Forum, Corporate Governance Department is part of a larger effort in the department to help improve the understanding of corporate governance reform in developing countries"--World Bank web site.
Closely held companies (those with the potential to go public, family firms, partnerships and private equity) have particular governance problems. This book examines what constitutes good governance in these companies, how control is gained, and how the closely held firm can stimulate growth and extend innovation.
An analysis of the challenges facing Russia's economy ten years after the transition, based on recent research and data. Can Russia's recent burst of economic growth be sustained? Taking a comprehensive look at the economic and political regime shift from Yeltsin to Putin, this book explores the key challenges facing the Russian economy: to narrow the productivity gap between Russian and Western firms and industries; to attract more domestic and foreign investment; and, underlying these goals, to implement the judicial, administrative, social, and banking reforms necessary to future growth. Written by a team of researchers from the Center for Economic and Financial Research—a Moscow-based independent think tank—the book draws on a wealth of new research and data. The authors emphasize the need to strengthen the protection of property rights, restructure the banking sector, and reduce government officials' powers to intervene arbitrarily in private businesses. They also stress the importance of enhancing human capital—through educational reform and by reducing barriers to citizens' geographical and sectoral mobility. Considering political institutions, the authors examine the promise and risks of the centralization of power around President Putin. Finally, they discuss the likely impact of Russia's greater integration into the world economy, notably through its potential membership in the World Trade Organization.
By serving as a conduit for knowledge spillovers, entrepreneurship is the missing link between investments in new knowledge and economic growth. The knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship provides not just an explanation of why entrepreneurship has become more prevalent as the factor of knowledge has emerged as a crucial source for comparative advantage, but also why entrepreneurship plays a vital role in generating economic growth. Entrepreneurship is an important mechanism permeating the knowledge filter to facilitate the spill over of knowledge and ultimately generate economic growth.
The evolution of partnership forms is stimulated by powerful economic forces that can lead to widespread prosperity and wealth creation for a society. Given the importance of closely held firms in the United States and Europe, The Evolution of Legal Business Forms in Europe and the United States argues that partnership law should trouble itself less with historical and descriptive arguments about the legal rules and structure of the partnership form and focus much more on the new analytical apparatus of the economics of organizational form as well the fundamental economic learning that informs the debates on limited liability, partnership rules regarding management and control, conflict resolution and fiduciary duties. Introducing and extending the best available theories from law and economics, particularly those from the theory of the firm, This book?s analysis demonstrates that the patterns of European partnership law and its recent history are best understood from an economic and comparative law perspective. By examining the economic theories of the firm and the economics of organization choice, The Evolution of Legal Business Forms in Europe and the United States conceives partnership-type business forms as contractual entities. The key feature of the modern partnership form is that partners have significant flexibility and power to limit their liability, transfer all of their rights, and to freely exit the firm. Another key feature of partnership law is the insight that lawmakers should provide the rules and enforcement mechanisms to regulate the important relationships within the partnership. This book applies an efficiency test to determine which sets of default rules are likely to resolve the main problems in partnerships. Having identified partnership law with the economic theory of organization, The Evolution of Legal Business Forms in Europe and the United States then goes to argue that most of partnership law is directed at offering bundles of legal rules for different types of firms. Lawmakers should promote partnership rules that attract investors and can be expected to be efficient if they allow entrepreneurs to freely select the bundle of rules that best match their priorities. In a modern vision of partnership law, lawmakers promote economic welfare through creating non-mandatory rules that allow multiple businesses to switch to a favourable business form without significant costs. Jurisdictions plagued by falling incorporations and low levels of small and medium business activity, should abandon the mandatory and standardized framework and the `lock in? effect that it promotes, and focus on the mechanisms of legal evolution and rules that tend to mimic the market. This innovation work will have ramifications felt across European jurisdictions, and will be debated by a large audience of policymakers and academic lawyers involved in law reform. Moreover, the book will receive serious attention from students of law and economics, as well as practising lawyers involved in resolving complex issues of organizational law. Review (s) ?Vermeulen?s work makes a significant contribution to the dialogue between legal scholars and policy makers from Europe and the United States on the matter of business entity law reform. The volume is ambitious in scope, thoughtful in approach, and accurate in result. It shows a well-read and nuanced view of the recent American partnership law reform debates. He moves with assurance between different systems of law and analysis, and has a confident sense of what his diverse readers need to know to come to the ultimate discussion with a common sense of the issues and alternatives at hand. Vermeulen?s work should serve as a starting point for a robust discussion among scholars and policy makers.?
Abstract: "Enforcement more than regulations, laws-on-the-books, or voluntary codes is key to effective corporate governance, at least in transition and developing countries. Corporate governance and enforcement mechanisms are intimately linked as they affect firms' ability to commit to their stakeholders, in particular to external investors. Berglof and Claessens provide a framework for understanding these links and how they are shaped by countries' institutional contexts. When the general enforcement environment is weak and specific enforcement mechanisms function poorly, as in many developing and transition countries, few of the traditional corporate governance mechanisms are effective. The principal consequence in these countries is a large blockholder, but there are important potential costs to this mechanism. A range of private and public enforcement 'tools' can help reduce these costs and reinforce other supplementary corporate governance mechanisms. The limited empirical evidence suggests that private tools are more effective than public forms of enforcement in the typical environment of most developing and transition countries. However, public enforcement is necessary regardless, and private enforcement mechanisms often require public laws to function. Furthermore, in some countries at least, bottom-up, private-led tools preceded and even shaped public laws. Political economy constraints resulting from the intermingling of business and politics, however, often prevent improvements in the general enforcement environment, and adoption and implementation of public laws in these countries. This paper a product of the Global Corporate Governance Forum, Corporate Governance Department is part of a larger effort in the department to help improve the understanding of corporate governance reform in developing countries"--World Bank web site.
An analysis of the challenges facing Russia's economy ten years after the transition, based on recent research and data. Can Russia's recent burst of economic growth be sustained? Taking a comprehensive look at the economic and political regime shift from Yeltsin to Putin, this book explores the key challenges facing the Russian economy: to narrow the productivity gap between Russian and Western firms and industries; to attract more domestic and foreign investment; and, underlying these goals, to implement the judicial, administrative, social, and banking reforms necessary to future growth. Written by a team of researchers from the Center for Economic and Financial Research—a Moscow-based independent think tank—the book draws on a wealth of new research and data. The authors emphasize the need to strengthen the protection of property rights, restructure the banking sector, and reduce government officials' powers to intervene arbitrarily in private businesses. They also stress the importance of enhancing human capital—through educational reform and by reducing barriers to citizens' geographical and sectoral mobility. Considering political institutions, the authors examine the promise and risks of the centralization of power around President Putin. Finally, they discuss the likely impact of Russia's greater integration into the world economy, notably through its potential membership in the World Trade Organization.
Annotation. The European Constitutional Convention offers a historical opportunity to rethink and to improve the governance and organization of the European Union. At stake is Europe's political architecture: the form that government takes and the allocation of responsibilities between the member states and supranational bodies. Many reform proposals have already been offered to the Convention. This Report provides a method for evaluating those options, developing an analytical framework derived from recent developments in the theory of positive political economy. On this basis the authors conclude that a presidential system of governance is likely to be best adapted to Europe -- and specifically to the need to expand the competency of the EU in the areas of internal and external security (Europe's Second and Third Pillars). In a full-blown presidential system, the Commission would have well-defined executive powers, specified by the Council, and a president elected by the citizens of Europe. The European executive would be subject to checks and balances by both the Council and the European Parliament. But political realism excludes adopting such a solution in the short run. The authors therefore propose an evolutionary strategy: the election of the Commission president by a college of country representatives appointed in the short run by national parliaments, leaving the option open to individual countries to allocate their votes for the presidency via universal suffrage. This solution would preserve the option of moving to a fully-fledged presidential model sometime in the future, while providing enhanced democratic legitimacy from the start. In general, the Constitution should be long on principles and general rules and short on details so as to allow Europe's governance to evolve within an unchanged Constitution. Book jacket.
Established in 1983, the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) is the only European economics research network, linking over 550 academic researchers based in more than 20 countries. CEPR research addresses key European and global policy issues, ranging from global financial crises to international trade policy; from the economic transformation of Central and Eastern Europe to European competition policy. We are the market leaders for research on all aspects of European integration. CEPR research has consistently influenced policy by orienting researchers to address policy-relevant questions, and by encouraging key decision-makers to focus on the results of this research when discussing and formulating policy. The success of this approach has become increasingly apparent in recent years, as both practical examples and explicit acknowledgements from politicians, officials and journalists can testify. The Policy Paper series was launched by CEPR in 1999 to provide a forum for the analysis of important policy issues by leading researchers. The series aims to identify key policy issues; apply the best and most up-to-date research to help understand these issues; and to explore the implications of this research for the design and conduct of policy. Book jacket.
This will help us customize your experience to showcase the most relevant content to your age group
Please select from below
Login
Not registered?
Sign up
Already registered?
Success – Your message will goes here
We'd love to hear from you!
Thank you for visiting our website. Would you like to provide feedback on how we could improve your experience?
This site does not use any third party cookies with one exception — it uses cookies from Google to deliver its services and to analyze traffic.Learn More.