Contains the technical appendixes for a study that describes American public opinion toward the use of military force in support of the global war on terrorism ... The main document is Eric V. Larson and Bogdan Savych, American public support for U.S. military operations from Mogadishu to Baghdad, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MG-231-A, 2004 [i.e. 2005]"--P. iii.
It is often said that the Vietnam War taught us that the American public is no longer willing to tolerate American casualties in U.S. wars and military operations. There are also two contradictory corollaries: one that the first deaths in a conflict will spark demands for immediate withdrawal, the other that casualties lead to an inexorable demand for "escalation to victory." The truth is far more subtle and sensible. The simplest explanation consistent with the data is that public support for U.S. military operations and public tolerance for casualties are based upon a sensible weighing of benefits and costs that is influenced heavily by consensus (or its absence) among political leaders. When such agreement is missing, even low costs can erode public support for the intervention. In the end, most Americans do not want lives to be sacrificed for any but the most compelling and promising causes, and they rely on their leaders to illuminate just how compelling and promising these causes are.
Although military policy seems focused on overseas threats, defending the homeland is, of course, the ultimate objective. This guide examines emergent threats to the USA homeland such as speciality weapons, cyber attacks and ballistic missiles and delineates the army's responsibilities.
The authors identify the intelligence and analytic requirements associated with each of these two stylized forms of IW and describe a top-down framework, or analytic procedure, that can be used for assessing IW environments. Also included is a list of references to IW-relevant doctrinal publications."--BOOK JACKET.
This report presents the results of a study undertaken at the request of the American Electronics Association and a consortium of high-tech industries. Based on a nine-month survey of 95 firms, representing approximately 40 percent of the sales volume for the computer, semiconductor, hard disk drive, and cellular telephone industries, the authors estimate that direct costs of hardware theft are almost $250 million. Indirect costs (such as lost sales and expensive theft-reduction strategies) and industry losses could push total losses past $5 billion. Industry and consumers share the price of high-tech losses, but firms do not always have the economic incentive to invest in appropriate security measures. Since 1996, hardware theft has declined significantly, and recent security measures adopted by individual firms appear to be very cost-effective. The authors recommend more such investments and suggest that the largest payoff will come from anticipating what products are most vulnerable and devising targeted procedures to protect them. In addition, they recommend strengthening collaborative industry-law enforcement efforts to help track the threat, anticipate targets, and identify and disable stolen property.
The end of the Cold War ushered in an era of profound change in the international arena and hence in the policymaking environment as well. Yet the changes that have characterized the post-Cold War era have often proceeded at different paces and have at times moved in opposing directions, placing unprecedented strain on policymakers seeking to shape a new national security and military strategy. This report describes the challenges policymakers have faced as seen through the lens of the three major force structure reviews that have taken place over the past decade: the 1990 Base Force, the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. The report focuses on the assumptions, decisions, and outcomes associated with these reviews as well as the planning and execution of each. It concludes that all three reviews fell short of fully apprehending the demands of the emerging threat environment, and the budgets that would be needed and afforded, resulting in a growing imbalance between strategy, forces, and resources over the decade. Accordingly, the report recommends that future defense planners adopt an assumption-based approach in which key planning assumptions are continually reassessed with a view toward recognizing--and rapidly responding to--emerging gaps and shortfalls.
Since the end of the Cold War, agreement within the defense community that the United States must be able to project power abroad quickly and effectively has been increasing. From the 1990 Base Force's emphasis on forward presence and crisis response to the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review's strategic tenets of "shape and respond," U.S. defense planning has envisioned the reinforcement of in-theater forces. The most recent (September 2001) Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) gave increased emphasis to deployability, operations in anti-access environments, and protecting bases of operation at home and abroad.
Documents a study whose goals were to develop an understanding of commanders' information requirements for cultural and other "soft" factors in order to improve the effectiveness of combined arms operations, and to develop practical ways for commanders to integrate information and influence operations activities into combined arms planning/assessment in order to increase the usefulness to ground commanders of such operations.
This monograph, part of a larger study of ways to reduce collateral damage undertaken for the U.S. Air Force, analyzes press, public, and leadership reactions to civilian casualty incidents and how these incidents affect media reporting or public support for military operations. It analyzes U.S. and foreign media and public responses to the 1991 Al Firdos bunker bombing, the 1999 Djakovica convoy and Chinese embassy attacks, the 2002 Afghan wedding party attack, and the 2003 Baghdad marketplace explosion.
It is often said that the Vietnam War taught us that the American public is no longer willing to tolerate American casualties in U.S. wars and military operations. There are also two contradictory corollaries: one that the first deaths in a conflict will spark demands for immediate withdrawal, the other that casualties lead to an inexorable demand for "escalation to victory." The truth is far more subtle and sensible. The simplest explanation consistent with the data is that public support for U.S. military operations and public tolerance for casualties are based upon a sensible weighing of benefits and costs that is influenced heavily by consensus (or its absence) among political leaders. When such agreement is missing, even low costs can erode public support for the intervention. In the end, most Americans do not want lives to be sacrificed for any but the most compelling and promising causes, and they rely on their leaders to illuminate just how compelling and promising these causes are.
The United States conducts air operations with other willing NATO allies, including non-NATO members. The objective of this background research for a larger RAND study, Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations, is twofold: (1) to help the U.S. Air Force identify potential interoperability problems that may arise in coalition air operations involving the United States and its NATO allies, as well as non-NATO countries, over the next decade and (2) to suggest solution directions to mitigate those problems. The study focus is on command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C3ISR) systems and out-of-NATO-area operations. The authors present a data-based historical overview of the U.S. experience in coalition operations with NATO allies up to 1999 and seek to provide a deeper understanding of interoperability through the answers to several key questions: For what missions is interoperability required? With which NATO allies is interoperability required? For what capabilities and services is interoperability required? Detailed case-study analyses of coalition operations in Southwest Asia, Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda identify key interoperability challenges and workarounds (short-term solutions) at the strategic, operational, tactical, and technological levels, and provide relevant lessons for meeting these challenges and improving the interoperability of U.S. and NATO air and C3ISR capabilities.
Although military policy seems focused on overseas threats, defending the homeland is, of course, the ultimate objective. This guide examines emergent threats to the USA homeland such as speciality weapons, cyber attacks and ballistic missiles and delineates the army's responsibilities.
Provides an analytic framework and procedure for the intelligence analysis of irregular warfare (IW) environments that can serve as the basis for IW intelligence curriculum development efforts. Defines IW in terms of two stylized situations: population-centric (such as counterinsurgency) and counterterrorism. Provides a detailed review of IW-relevant defense policy and strategy documents and a list of relevant doctrinal publications.
In the years following the landmark United States Supreme Court decision on libel law in New York Times v. Sullivan, the court ruled on a number of additional cases that continued to shape the standards of protected speech. As part of this key series of judgments, the justices explored the contours of the Sullivan ruling and established the definition of “reckless disregard” as it pertains to “actual malice” in the case of St. Amant v. Thompson. While an array of scholarly and legal literature examines Sullivan and some subsequent cases, the St. Amant case—once called “the most important of the recent Supreme Court libel decisions”—has not received the attention it warrants. Eric P. Robinson’s Reckless Disregard corrects this omission with a thorough analysis of the case and its ramifications. The history of St. Amant v. Thompson begins with the contentious 1962 U.S. Senate primary election in Louisiana, between incumbent Russell Long and businessman Philemon “Phil” A. St. Amant. The initial lawsuit stemmed from a televised campaign address in which St. Amant attempted to demonstrate Long’s alleged connections with organized crime and corrupt union officials. Although St. Amant’s claims had no effect on the outcome of the election, a little-noticed statement he made during the address—that money had “passed hands” between Baton Rouge Teamsters leader Ed Partin and East Baton Rouge Parish deputy sheriff Herman A. Thompson—led to a defamation lawsuit that ultimately passed through the legal system to the Supreme Court. A decisive step in the journey toward the robust protections that American courts provide to comments about public officials, public figures, and matters of public interest, St. Amant v. Thompson serves as a significant development in modern American defamation law. Robinson’s study deftly examines the background of the legal proceedings as well as their social and political context. His analysis of how the Supreme Court ruled in this case reveals the justices’ internal deliberations, shedding new light on a judgment that forever changed American libel law.
The authors aim to assist the U.S. Army in understanding "influence operations," capabilities that may allow the United States to effectively influence the attitudes and behavior of particular foreign audiences while minimizing or avoiding combat. The book identifies approaches, methodologies, and tools that may be useful in planning, executing, and assessing influence operations.
Hurricanes Irma and Maria in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) in September 2017 sparked a whole-of-government response involving local, state, federal, civilian, and military responders. From late September through mid-November 2017, U.S. Army North (USARNORTH) was the joint force land component commander for Department of Defense (DoD) support to civilian disaster-response operations in the wake of the two hurricanes. USARNORTH directed RAND Arroyo Center to answer a series of questions about that support, ranging from how well the DoD response fit with the National Response Framework (NRF), doctrine, authorities, and templates to relationships among responding organizations to possible improvements in such things as speed of response and situational awareness (SA). While it is reasonably unlikely that both local and state response capabilities would simultaneously be incapacitated in future such incidents, Puerto Rico and USVI would still be relatively isolated, and a complex catastrophe could again present many of the same challenges. A strategic concept for defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) needs to center on policy decisions on the number, types, and sizes of overlapping incidents that will serve as pacing functions for determining future response capabilities and who will provide them.
This document supplies the technical appendixes for a study that describes American public opinion toward the use of military force in support of the global war on terrorism (GWOT), delineates the sources of support and opposition, and identifies potential fault lines in support.
This report presents the results of a study undertaken at the request of the American Electronics Association and a consortium of high-tech industries. Based on a nine-month survey of 95 firms, representing approximately 40 percent of the sales volume for the computer, semiconductor, hard disk drive, and cellular telephone industries, the authors estimate that direct costs of hardware theft are almost $250 million. Indirect costs (such as lost sales and expensive theft-reduction strategies) and industry losses could push total losses past $5 billion. Industry and consumers share the price of high-tech losses, but firms do not always have the economic incentive to invest in appropriate security measures. Since 1996, hardware theft has declined significantly, and recent security measures adopted by individual firms appear to be very cost-effective. The authors recommend more such investments and suggest that the largest payoff will come from anticipating what products are most vulnerable and devising targeted procedures to protect them. In addition, they recommend strengthening collaborative industry-law enforcement efforts to help track the threat, anticipate targets, and identify and disable stolen property.
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