Hard Truths is a groundbreaking new work in whichnoted philosopher Elijah Millgram advances a new approach to truthand its role in our day-to-day reasoning. Takes up the hard truths of real reasoning and draws out theirimplications for logic and metaphysics Introduces and takes issue with prevailing views of thepurpose of truth and the way we reason, including deflationismabout truth, possible worlds treatments of modality, andantipsychologism in philosophy of logic Develops philosophically ambitious ideas in a style accessibleto non-specialists Will make us rethink the place of metaphysics in our dailylives
Philosophers have not appreciated how pervasive and deep division of labor is, and consequently they have not noticed the many intellectual devices deployed in managing it. The Great Endarkenment makes the case that those devices are central pieces of puzzles that have traditionally been on philosophers' agendas.
John Stuart Mill was one of the most important and influential philosophers of the nineteenth century. He was also someone who exemplified a view about the meaning of life that is widespread among both philosophers and nonacademics: that projects are what make your life meaningful, and if a single project is large enough to occupy center stage in it, that is the meaning of your life. His brilliant career notwithstanding, Mill's life was a train wreck; the intellectual energy and philosophical ingenuity which he devoted to figuring out what had gone wrong make him a fascinating object lesson in the view that projects give life meaning. Elijah Millgram argues that what went wrong was the very fact that Mill's life was a project-the tragedy of his life was an almost inevitable consequence of living out this account of the meaning of life. At once a scholarly contribution to the history of an important philosophical figure and an intervention in an ongoing debate within moral philosophy, this book takes on a topic that people outside the academy expect philosophy to address, but which it too rarely does: namely, the meaning of life. It is simultaneously an exercise in biography and a novel reconstruction and reframing of some of the central theories and texts of the philosophical canon. Millgram's work attempts to look at the theory of rationality from an unusual angle by asking: what difference does it make to the shape and progress of someone's life whether he has one or another understanding of practical reasoning-that is, of how one ought to reason about what to do?
Human beings have always been specialists, but over the past two centuries division of labor has become deeper, ubiquitous, and much more fluid. The form it now takes brings in its wake a series of problems that are simultaneously philosophical and practical, having to do with coordinating the activities of experts in different disciplines who do not understand one another. Because these problems are unrecognized, and because we do not have solutions for them, we are on the verge of an age in which decisions that depend on understanding more than one discipline at a time will be made badly. Since so many decisions do require multidisciplinary knowledge, these philosophical problems are urgent. Some of the puzzles that have traditionally been on philosophers' agendas have to do with intellectual devices developed to handle less extreme forms of specialization. Two of these, necessity and the practical `ought', are given extended treatment in Elijah Millgram's The Great Endarkenment. In this collection of essays, both previously published and new, Millgram pays special attention to ways a focus on cognitive function reframes familiar debates in metaethics and metaphysics. Consequences of hyperspecialization for the theory of practical rationality, for our conception of agency, and for ethics are laid out and discussed. An Afterword considers whether and how philosophers can contribute to solving the very pressing problems created by contemporary division of labor. "These always interesting, often brilliant, and contentious essays focus on the question of how we need to reason practically, if we are to flourish, given Millgram's account of our human nature and of the environments that we inhabit. The originality of his thought is matched by his clarity and his wit."--Alasdair MacIntyre, University of Notre Dame
Practical reasoning is not just a matter of determining how to get what you want, but of working out what to want in the first place. In Practical Induction Elijah Millgram argues that experience plays a central role in this process of deciding what is or is not important or worth pursuing. He takes aim at instrumentalism, a view predominant among philosophers today, which holds that the goals of practical reasoning are basic in the sense that they are given by desires that are not themselves the product of practical reasoning. The view Millgram defends is "practical induction," a method of reasoning from experience similar to theoretical induction. What are the practical observations that teach us what to want? Millgram suggests they are pleasant and unpleasant experiences on the basis of which we form practical judgments about particular cases. By generalizing from these judgments--that is, by practical induction--we rationally arrive at our views about what matters. Learning new priorities from experience is necessary if we are to function in a world of ever-changing circumstances. And we need to be able to learn both from our own and from others' experience. It is this, Millgram contends, that explains the cognitive importance of both our capacity for pain and pleasure and our capacity for love. Pleasure's role in cognition is not that of a goal but that of a guide. Love's role in cognition derives from its relation to our trusting the testimony of others about what does and does not matter and about what merits our desire. Itself a pleasure to read, this book is full of inventive arguments and conveys Millgram's bold thesis with elegance and force. It will alter the direction of current debates on practical reasoning.
John Stuart Mill was one of the most important and influential philosophers of the nineteenth century. He was also someone who exemplified a view about the meaning of life that is widespread among both philosophers and nonacademics: that projects are what make your life meaningful, and if a single project is large enough to occupy center stage in it, that is the meaning of your life. His brilliant career notwithstanding, Mill's life was a train wreck; the intellectual energy and philosophical ingenuity which he devoted to figuring out what had gone wrong make him a fascinating object lesson in the view that projects give life meaning. Elijah Millgram argues that what went wrong was the very fact that Mill's life was a project-the tragedy of his life was an almost inevitable consequence of living out this account of the meaning of life. At once a scholarly contribution to the history of an important philosophical figure and an intervention in an ongoing debate within moral philosophy, this book takes on a topic that people outside the academy expect philosophy to address, but which it too rarely does: namely, the meaning of life. It is simultaneously an exercise in biography and a novel reconstruction and reframing of some of the central theories and texts of the philosophical canon. Millgram's work attempts to look at the theory of rationality from an unusual angle by asking: what difference does it make to the shape and progress of someone's life whether he has one or another understanding of practical reasoning-that is, of how one ought to reason about what to do?
Nietzsche did his philosophizing while he was coming apart at the seams. His writing is hard for readers to find their way around because he was all over the place when he produced it. But it's philosophy of coming apart at the seams and being all over the place, and also philosophy as a way of coping with that predicament-which makes it both fascinating and important. Why Didn't Nietzsche Get His Act Together? has three main tasks on its agenda. Nietzsche is hard to make sense of; this is a guide, a book that shows you how to read him for yourself. Second, Nietzsche coped with his disintegrating self by philosophizing, and so this is a work that takes up disunified agency through Nietzsche's own engagement with the topic. Third and finally, Nietzsche managed his fragmenting personality by inventing one after another meaning of life for himself; examining those inventions and the job they did for him is an occasion to ask what a meaning of life is for"--
Human beings have always been specialists, but over the past two centuries division of labor has become deeper, ubiquitous, and much more fluid. The form it now takes brings in its wake a series of problems that are simultaneously philosophical and practical, having to do with coordinating the activities of experts in different disciplines who do not understand one another. Because these problems are unrecognized, and because we do not have solutions for them, we are on the verge of an age in which decisions that depend on understanding more than one discipline at a time will be made poorly. Since so many decisions do require multidisciplinary knowledge, these philosophical problems are urgent. Some of the puzzles that have traditionally been on philosophers' agendas have to do with intellectual devices developed to handle less extreme forms of specialization. Two of these, necessity and the practical `ought', are given extended treatment in Elijah Millgram's The Great Endarkenment. In this collection of essays, both previously published and new, Millgram pays special attention to ways a focus on cognitive function reframes familiar debates in metaethics and metaphysics. Consequences of hyperspecialization for the theory of practical rationality, for our conception of agency, and for ethics are laid out and discussed. An afterword considers whether and how philosophers can contribute to solving the very pressing problems created by contemporary division of labor. "These always interesting, often brilliant, and contentious essays focus on the question of how we need to reason practically, if we are to flourish, given Millgram's account of our human nature and of the environments that we inhabit. The originality of his thought is matched by his clarity and his wit."--Alasdair MacIntyre, University of Notre Dame "The book is a rewarding one--richly argues, whilst being a genuinely good read. The writing is clear, bolding self-assured, and often very funny." -- A.B. Dickerson, Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Nietzsche did his philosophizing while he was coming apart at the seams. His writing is hard for readers to find their way around because he was all over the place when he produced it. But it's philosophy of coming apart at the seams and being all over the place, and also philosophy as a way of coping with that predicament-which makes it both fascinating and important. Why Didn't Nietzsche Get His Act Together? has three main tasks on its agenda. Nietzsche is hard to make sense of; this is a guide, a book that shows you how to read him for yourself. Second, Nietzsche coped with his disintegrating self by philosophizing, and so this is a work that takes up disunified agency through Nietzsche's own engagement with the topic. Third and finally, Nietzsche managed his fragmenting personality by inventing one after another meaning of life for himself; examining those inventions and the job they did for him is an occasion to ask what a meaning of life is for"--
Practical reasoning is not just a matter of determining how to get what you want, but of working out what to want in the first place. In Practical Induction Elijah Millgram argues that experience plays a central role in this process of deciding what is or is not important or worth pursuing. He takes aim at instrumentalism, a view predominant among philosophers today, which holds that the goals of practical reasoning are basic in the sense that they are given by desires that are not themselves the product of practical reasoning. The view Millgram defends is "practical induction," a method of reasoning from experience similar to theoretical induction. What are the practical observations that teach us what to want? Millgram suggests they are pleasant and unpleasant experiences on the basis of which we form practical judgments about particular cases. By generalizing from these judgments--that is, by practical induction--we rationally arrive at our views about what matters. Learning new priorities from experience is necessary if we are to function in a world of ever-changing circumstances. And we need to be able to learn both from our own and from others' experience. It is this, Millgram contends, that explains the cognitive importance of both our capacity for pain and pleasure and our capacity for love. Pleasure's role in cognition is not that of a goal but that of a guide. Love's role in cognition derives from its relation to our trusting the testimony of others about what does and does not matter and about what merits our desire. Itself a pleasure to read, this book is full of inventive arguments and conveys Millgram's bold thesis with elegance and force. It will alter the direction of current debates on practical reasoning.
The "doctors of the law" in the bible knew that certain events had to take place in order to verify the timing of judgment predicted to come at the end of white rule. When Jesus of 2,000 years ago made his appearance in an attempt to save them, those who were familiar with scripture and its timing studied the resurrection and judgment teachings of Jesus, but found that the timing was suspect. Considering that there were a few gaps or events missing from the time, they constantly second guessed him and his disciples. One such incident happened when the disciples were out teaching and were approached by the Jewish Scribes, who rejected their claim, because Elijah was to be raised just before the great and dreadful day of the Lord. When the disciple went back to Jesus to report of their encounter, they asked Jesus, "Why do the Scribes say that Elijah must first come?
For more than a millennium ago, a group of Crusading knights, known as the Knights Templars, discovered a treasure so vast, they considered it too great for one king or Pope to possess. This sacred treasure would become known as the Holy Grail. For hundreds of years, this sacred treasure would be sought after and fought over for many centuries, before it was lost to history. Years before the dissolving of the Templar Order in 1307 A.D., the Knights Templars, led by the renowned grandmaster Hugues de Payens, in an effort to protect the location of the Grail, buried a sacred map within a well-crafted book of parables. A book we know today as The Holy Bible! Welcome to the Elijah Doctrine, the 2nd Chronicle, where the Vail of the holy scriptures will finally be removed! What if everything we've been taught to believe is the greatest deception of the Ages? What if the Holy Bible was designed for the sole purpose of concealing the greatest secret on earth?
This books is a compilation of Elijah Muhammad's table talk questions and answers. The subject content includes the Black Woman's role at home and abroad, the responsibilities of the Blackman, Children, justification of posts, duty, the planets, ministry, and lots more. It was initially transcribed by Sister Anna Karriem and Captain Portia Pasha.
For more than a millennium ago, a group of Crusading knights, known as the Knights Templars, discovered a treasure so vast, they considered it too great for one king or Pope to possess. This sacred treasure would become known as the Holy Grail. For hundreds of years, this sacred treasure would be sought after and fought over for many centuries, before it was lost to history. Years before the dissolving of the Templar Order in 1307 A.D., the Knights Templars, led by the renowned grandmaster Hugues de Payens, in an effort to protect the location of the Grail, buried a sacred map within a well-crafted book of parables. A book we know today as The Holy Bible! Welcome to the Elijah Doctrine, the 2nd Chronicle, where the Vail of the holy scriptures will finally be removed! What if everything we've been taught to believe is the greatest deception of the Ages? What if the Holy Bible was designed for the sole purpose of concealing the greatest secret on earth?
Heaven is great and hell is hot. Choose you this day whom ye shall serve. Why beholdest the beam in other people's lives and not their own? Why shouldest thou considerest to do wrong? When thou hast thee opportunity to do right? Dost thou know I'm a God of Judgement, I still love thee. But I will not always chide with man. I'm coming back soon. What a terrible day that will be if thou knowest me not. Can you imagine Gabriel with his instrument in the end time before Christ comes back. What would you do?
Revelation 10:9 And I went unto the angel, and said unto him, Give me the little book. And he said unto me, Take it, and eat it up; and it shall make thy belly bitter, but it shall be in thy mouth sweet as honey. Revelation 10:10 And I took the little book out of the angel's hand, and ate it up; and it was in my mouth sweet as honey: and as soon as I had eaten it, my belly was bitter. Here is the mystery of God, where He will train an angel to write about the seven thunders in modern times or fear. Fear is the beginning of all wisdom (knowledge), yet we have to reach for, there is nothing to fear but fear itself. How can a book result in my mouth sweet as honey when I speak and my belly was bitter as I tried to swallow my pride and the wisdom made me sicken? He told us to eat of the book as He has told us to eat of His body. A location that does not teach fear is not a valid church location, since fear is the beginning of all wisdom (knowledge). Malachi 3:1 Behold, I will send my messenger, and he shall prepare the way before me: and the LORD, whom ye seek, shall suddenly come to his temple, even the messenger of the covenant, whom ye delight in: behold, he shall come, saith the LORD of hosts. Malachi 3:2 But who may abide the day of his coming? and who shall stand when he appeareth? for he is like a refiner's fire, and like fullers' soap. Malachi 3:3 And he shall sit as a refiner and purifier of silver: and he shall purify the sons of Levi, and purge them as gold and silver, that they may offer unto the LORD an offering in righteousness.
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