Supported in large part by evidence released after the collapse of the Soviet Union, this book follows the career of the Red Army from its birth in 1918 as the designated vanguard of world revolution to its affiliation in 1941 with 'the citadel of capitalism', the United States.
Contains 92 illustrations and 45 maps of the Russian Campaign. A brilliant modern history of the German invasion of Russia to their bloody crushing defeat by the re-invigorated Russian forces at the siege of Stalingrad. During 1942, the Axis advance reached its high tide on all fronts and began to ebb. Nowhere was this more true than on the Eastern Front in the Soviet Union. After receiving a disastrous setback on the approaches to Moscow in the winter of 1941-1942, the German armies recovered sufficiently to embark on a sweeping summer offensive that carried them to the Volga River at Stalingrad and deep into the Caucasus Mountains. The Soviet armies suffered severe defeats in the spring and summer of 1942 but recovered to stop the German advances in October and encircle and begin the destruction of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad in November and December. This volume describes the course of events from the Soviet December 1941 counteroffensive at Moscow to the Stalingrad offensive in late 1942 with particular attention to the interval from January through October 1942, which has been regarded as a hiatus between the two major battles but which in actuality constituted the period in which the German fortunes slid into irreversible decline and the Soviet forces acquired the means and capabilities that eventually brought them victory. These were the months of decision in the East.
With scarcely an interlude, the German-Soviet conflict in World War II lasted for 3 years, 10 months, and 16 days. The conflict seesawed across eastern and central Europe between the Elbe and the Volga, the Alps, and the Caucasus. The total number of troops continuously engaged averaged between 8 and 9 million, and the losses were appalling. Wehrmacht losses numbered between 3 and 3.5 million. Deaths on the Soviet side reached more than 12 million, about 47 percent of the grand total of soldiers of all nations killed in World War II. The war and the occupation cost theSoviet Union some 7 million civilians and Germany about 1.5 million. The losses, civilian and military, of Finland, the Baltic States, and eastern and southeastern European countries added millions more.The great struggle completely unhinged the traditional European balance of power. The war consolidated the Soviet regime in Russia, and enabled it to impose the Communist system on its neighbours, Finland excepted, and on the Soviet occupation zone in Germany. The victory made the Soviet Union the second-ranking world power.This book follows the conflict from Stalingrad to Berlin. Topics include strategy and tactics, partisan and psychological warfare, coalition warfare, and manpower and production problems faced by both countries, but by the Germans in particular.With a new introduction by Emmy AwardTM winning historian Bob Carruthers and numerous rare illustrations this powerful book makes for a welcome addition to any Second World War library.
The U.S. Army War College, in cooperation with the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), the U.S. Naval War College, and the Atlantic Council of the United States, cosponsored a symposium in late F%ebruary 1997 to examine the topic, ̀1National Defense into the 21st Century: Defining the Issues.'1 The purpose of this symposium was to relate the national interests of the United States to its long-term military requirements and to define those challenges which will face the Department of Defense, as well as those issues most pertinent to each of the military services. This symposium was a sincere effort by individuals from the various services, the Army1s and the Navy1s premier professional military education institutions, AUSA, and the Atlantic Council to search for a common under- standing of the difficult issues facing all the services jointly and each of them individually. Over a period of two days, through four panels and three special addresses, the presenters and more than 100 attendees engaged in an enlightening and productive exchange of ideas and points of view. What follows is a report on the four individual panels and the comments of the Honorable John D. White, the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Major General Mark K. Hamilton, U.S. Army, Vice Director for F%orce Structure, Resources, and Assessment on the Joint Staff; and retired U.S. Army General Andrew J. Goodpaster, Chairman of the Atlantic Council of the United States. General Jack N. Merritt, U.S. Army, Retired, opened the symposium by describing its goals and agenda.
Supported by evidence released after the collapse of the Soviet Union, this book follows the career of the Red Army from its birth in 1918 as the vanguard of world revolution to its affiliation in 1941 with 'the citadel of capitalism', the USA.
Contains 72 illustrations and 42 maps of the Russian Campaign. After the disasters of the Stalingrad Campaign in the Russian winters of 1942-3, the German Wehrmacht was on the defensive under increasing Soviet pressure; this volume sets out to show how did the Russians manage to push the formerly all-conquering German soldiers back from Russian soil to the ruins of Berlin. Save for the introduction of nuclear weapons, the Soviet victory over Germany was the most fateful development of World War II. Both wrought changes and raised problems that have constantly preoccupied the world in the more than twenty years since the war ended. The purpose of this volume is to investigate one aspect of the Soviet victory-how the war was won on the battlefield. The author sought, in following the march of the Soviet and German armies from Stalingrad to Berlin, to depict the war as it was and to describe the manner in which the Soviet Union emerged as the predominant military power in Europe.
Tilford exposes the generals' tunnel-vision. . . . He demolishes the myth that the 1972 'Christmas bombing' brought Hanoi to its knees . . . . His controversial thesis is that the bombing of the North and the interdiction campaign against the Ho Chi Minh Trail were in no way decisive and that USAF leadership obtusely failed to perceive that North Vietnam, an agricultural nation, was simply not susceptible to strategic bombing."--Publishers Weekly ". . . . hard hitting study on the failure of American air power in the Vietnam War . . . . The acute intellectual content of the book and the author's engaging writing style make the book easy to recommend."--Armed Forces Journal International
[Includes 23 maps and 31 illustrations] This volume describes two campaigns that the Germans conducted in their Northern Theater of Operations. The first they launched, on 9 April 1940, against Denmark and Norway. The second they conducted out of Finland in partnership with the Finns against the Soviet Union. The latter campaign began on 22 June 1941 and ended in the winter of 1944-45 after the Finnish Government had sued for peace. The scene of these campaigns by the end of 1941 stretched from the North Sea to the Arctic Ocean and from Bergen on the west coast of Norway, to Petrozavodsk, the former capital of the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic. It faced east into the Soviet Union on a 700-mile-long front, and west on a 1,300-mile sea frontier. Hitler regarded this theater as the keystone of his empire, and, after 1941, maintained in it two armies totaling over a half million men. In spite of its vast area and the effort and worry which Hitler lavished on it, the Northern Theater throughout most of the war constituted something of a military backwater. The major operations which took place in the theater were overshadowed by events on other fronts, and public attention focused on the theaters in which the strategically decisive operations were expected to take place. Remoteness, German security measures, and the Russians’ well-known penchant for secrecy combined to keep information concerning the Northern Theater down to a mere trickle, much of that inaccurate. Since the war, through official and private publications, a great deal more has become known. The present volume is based in the main on the greatest remaining source of unexploited information, the captured German military and naval records. In addition a number of the participants on the German side have very generously contributed from their personal knowledge and experience.
Contains 72 illustrations and 42 maps of the Russian Campaign. After the disasters of the Stalingrad Campaign in the Russian winters of 1942-3, the German Wehrmacht was on the defensive under increasing Soviet pressure; this volume sets out to show how did the Russians manage to push the formerly all-conquering German soldiers back from Russian soil to the ruins of Berlin. Save for the introduction of nuclear weapons, the Soviet victory over Germany was the most fateful development of World War II. Both wrought changes and raised problems that have constantly preoccupied the world in the more than twenty years since the war ended. The purpose of this volume is to investigate one aspect of the Soviet victory-how the war was won on the battlefield. The author sought, in following the march of the Soviet and German armies from Stalingrad to Berlin, to depict the war as it was and to describe the manner in which the Soviet Union emerged as the predominant military power in Europe.
Contains 92 illustrations and 45 maps of the Russian Campaign. A brilliant modern history of the German invasion of Russia to their bloody crushing defeat by the re-invigorated Russian forces at the siege of Stalingrad. During 1942, the Axis advance reached its high tide on all fronts and began to ebb. Nowhere was this more true than on the Eastern Front in the Soviet Union. After receiving a disastrous setback on the approaches to Moscow in the winter of 1941-1942, the German armies recovered sufficiently to embark on a sweeping summer offensive that carried them to the Volga River at Stalingrad and deep into the Caucasus Mountains. The Soviet armies suffered severe defeats in the spring and summer of 1942 but recovered to stop the German advances in October and encircle and begin the destruction of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad in November and December. This volume describes the course of events from the Soviet December 1941 counteroffensive at Moscow to the Stalingrad offensive in late 1942 with particular attention to the interval from January through October 1942, which has been regarded as a hiatus between the two major battles but which in actuality constituted the period in which the German fortunes slid into irreversible decline and the Soviet forces acquired the means and capabilities that eventually brought them victory. These were the months of decision in the East.
Army Historical Series. CMH Pub. 30-5-1. Describes the German-Soviet conflict in World War II and the events that resulted in the Soviet Union becoming a dominant military power in Europe. Frist published in 1968. Illustrated.
Army Historical Series. CMH Pub. 30-5. Describes the German-Soviet conflict in World War 2 and the events that resulted in the Soviet Union becoming a dominant military power in Europe
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