It was during the Depression, with the Republican regime in disarray, that Franklin D. Roosevelt came into office with a mandate to change the role of government. His was one of the presidencies—like Jefferson's, Jackson's, and Lincoln's before his, and Reagan's after—that transformed the political system. But what of the successors of such transformative figures, those members and supporters of the new regime who are expected to carry forward the policies and politics of those they replace? It is these "heir apparent" presidents, impossibly tasked with backward-looking progress, that Donald Zinman considers in this incisive look at the curious trajectories of political power. An heir apparent president, in Zinman's analysis, can be successful but will struggle to get credit for his achievements. He must contend with the consequences of his predecessor's policies while facing a stronger opposition and sitting atop an increasingly weakened and divided party. And he will invariably alternate between three approaches to leadership: continuity, expansion, and correction. Looking in depth at James Madison, Martin Van Buren, Ulysses S. Grant (an heir apparent as the first genuine Republican to succeed Lincoln), Harry S. Truman, and George H. W. Bush, Zinman reveals how these successors of regime-changing presidents at times suffered for diverging from their predecessors' perceived policies. At times these presidents also suffered from the consequences of the policies themselves or simply from changing political circumstances. What they rarely did, as becomes painfully clear, is succeed at substantially changing the policies and politics that they inherited. It is a perilous and often thankless business, as The Heir Apparent Presidency makes abundantly clear, to follow and lead at once. Tracing the ways in which heir apparent presidents have met this challenge, this book offers rare and valuable insight into the movement of political time, and the shaping of political order.
It was during the Depression, with the Republican regime in disarray, that Franklin D. Roosevelt came into office with a mandate to change the role of government. His was one of the presidencies—like Jefferson's, Jackson's, and Lincoln's before his, and Reagan's after—that transformed the political system. But what of the successors of such transformative figures, those members and supporters of the new regime who are expected to carry forward the policies and politics of those they replace? It is these "heir apparent" presidents, impossibly tasked with backward-looking progress, that Donald Zinman considers in this incisive look at the curious trajectories of political power. An heir apparent president, in Zinman's analysis, can be successful but will struggle to get credit for his achievements. He must contend with the consequences of his predecessor's policies while facing a stronger opposition and sitting atop an increasingly weakened and divided party. And he will invariably alternate between three approaches to leadership: continuity, expansion, and correction. Looking in depth at James Madison, Martin Van Buren, Ulysses S. Grant (an heir apparent as the first genuine Republican to succeed Lincoln), Harry S. Truman, and George H. W. Bush, Zinman reveals how these successors of regime-changing presidents at times suffered for diverging from their predecessors' perceived policies. At times these presidents also suffered from the consequences of the policies themselves or simply from changing political circumstances. What they rarely did, as becomes painfully clear, is succeed at substantially changing the policies and politics that they inherited. It is a perilous and often thankless business, as The Heir Apparent Presidency makes abundantly clear, to follow and lead at once. Tracing the ways in which heir apparent presidents have met this challenge, this book offers rare and valuable insight into the movement of political time, and the shaping of political order.
As the heir apparent to the presidency in 1808, James Madison had a substantial reputation and an impressive list of credentials, including having cofounded the Democratic-Republican party with Thomas Jefferson and serving as Jefferson’s secretary of state. Despite this, Madison’s presidential victory in 1808 was hardly uncontested as he faced internal opposition from supporters of James Monroe and Vice President George Clinton. In 1812, then, it was by no means a sure thing that Madison would secure a second term, and that uncertainty grew substantially after Madison essentially asked Congress for a declaration of war on June 1, 1812, mere months before the election. America’s First Wartime Election focuses on an overlooked moment in political history. The War of 1812 has generated a significant amount of attention, overshadowing the election that took place in the early stages of the conflict. As the United States and Great Britain clashed on the battlefield, President James Madison was challenged by DeWitt Clinton, the nephew of George Clinton, who was the simultaneous mayor of New York City and the lieutenant governor of his state. Clinton held a base of Democratic-Republican support in New York where many in his party opposed the war. Many New Yorkers also resented Virginia’s domination of the presidency going back to George Washington’s tenure. Other Democratic-Republicans supported the war but faulted Madison for his poor preparations and early battlefield setbacks. United in their opposition to the war, Federalists joined forces with Clinton, but the alliance was tardy, disorganized, and awkward. The story of this election is also a tale of weak political parties. The Federalist party had steadily lost strength since the election of Jefferson in 1800, and the Democratic-Republican party was still a young, disjointed, and fractious coalition. In order to sustain the party that he had helped to start, Madison was under pressure not only to secure his reelection but also to successfully conduct the war. While Madison had vulnerabilities, given America’s poor preparation for the war, the fusionist ticket supporting Clinton was poorly positioned to challenge the incumbent president. Political parties in general were still in their infancy, thus complicating efforts to build a coherent alternative to Madison. For a fusion ticket to succeed in elections, strong political parties are necessary, which was not the case in 1812. Red-hot passions over the divisive War of 1812 overlapped with a presidential election that became a referendum on the conflict itself. Momentum is important in politics—a principle that was just as important over 200 years ago as it is today. Written for scholars, students, and the public alike, Donald A. Zinman’s accessible study of this important but often ignored election is another illuminating entry in the University Press of Kansas’s longstanding American Presidential Elections series.
As the heir apparent to the presidency in 1808, James Madison had a substantial reputation and an impressive list of credentials, including having cofounded the Democratic-Republican party with Thomas Jefferson and serving as Jefferson’s secretary of state. Despite this, Madison’s presidential victory in 1808 was hardly uncontested as he faced internal opposition from supporters of James Monroe and Vice President George Clinton. In 1812, then, it was by no means a sure thing that Madison would secure a second term, and that uncertainty grew substantially after Madison essentially asked Congress for a declaration of war on June 1, 1812, mere months before the election. America’s First Wartime Election focuses on an overlooked moment in political history. The War of 1812 has generated a significant amount of attention, overshadowing the election that took place in the early stages of the conflict. As the United States and Great Britain clashed on the battlefield, President James Madison was challenged by DeWitt Clinton, the nephew of George Clinton, who was the simultaneous mayor of New York City and the lieutenant governor of his state. Clinton held a base of Democratic-Republican support in New York where many in his party opposed the war. Many New Yorkers also resented Virginia’s domination of the presidency going back to George Washington’s tenure. Other Democratic-Republicans supported the war but faulted Madison for his poor preparations and early battlefield setbacks. United in their opposition to the war, Federalists joined forces with Clinton, but the alliance was tardy, disorganized, and awkward. The story of this election is also a tale of weak political parties. The Federalist party had steadily lost strength since the election of Jefferson in 1800, and the Democratic-Republican party was still a young, disjointed, and fractious coalition. In order to sustain the party that he had helped to start, Madison was under pressure not only to secure his reelection but also to successfully conduct the war. While Madison had vulnerabilities, given America’s poor preparation for the war, the fusionist ticket supporting Clinton was poorly positioned to challenge the incumbent president. Political parties in general were still in their infancy, thus complicating efforts to build a coherent alternative to Madison. For a fusion ticket to succeed in elections, strong political parties are necessary, which was not the case in 1812. Red-hot passions over the divisive War of 1812 overlapped with a presidential election that became a referendum on the conflict itself. Momentum is important in politics—a principle that was just as important over 200 years ago as it is today. Written for scholars, students, and the public alike, Donald A. Zinman’s accessible study of this important but often ignored election is another illuminating entry in the University Press of Kansas’s longstanding American Presidential Elections series.
This will help us customize your experience to showcase the most relevant content to your age group
Please select from below
Login
Not registered?
Sign up
Already registered?
Success – Your message will goes here
We'd love to hear from you!
Thank you for visiting our website. Would you like to provide feedback on how we could improve your experience?
This site does not use any third party cookies with one exception — it uses cookies from Google to deliver its services and to analyze traffic.Learn More.