The Art of Strategy is filled with dozens of accounts from the worlds of business, politics, negotiations, sports, music, movies, and popular culture. Whether discussing strategies for losing weight or becoming a better bargainer, parent, tennis player, or eBay bidder, this entertaining narrative is rich with insight." "Through the lessons contained in the book's pages, you will learn how to outmaneuver rivals, find avenues for cooperation, and become more successful in all your pursuits. And if you want to be fair to your adversaries, share this book with them."--BOOK JACKET.
Sets forth the findings of game theory as a series of basic strategic principles, illustrated with stories of human interaction--in sports, politics, business, and personal life.
How should firms decide whether and when to invest in new capital equipment, additions to their workforce, or the development of new products? Why have traditional economic models of investment failed to explain the behavior of investment spending in the United States and other countries? In this book, Avinash Dixit and Robert Pindyck provide the first detailed exposition of a new theoretical approach to the capital investment decisions of firms, stressing the irreversibility of most investment decisions, and the ongoing uncertainty of the economic environment in which these decisions are made. In so doing, they answer important questions about investment decisions and the behavior of investment spending. This new approach to investment recognizes the option value of waiting for better (but never complete) information. It exploits an analogy with the theory of options in financial markets, which permits a much richer dynamic framework than was possible with the traditional theory of investment. The authors present the new theory in a clear and systematic way, and consolidate, synthesize, and extend the various strands of research that have come out of the theory. Their book shows the importance of the theory for understanding investment behavior of firms; develops the implications of this theory for industry dynamics and for government policy concerning investment; and shows how the theory can be applied to specific industries and to a wide variety of business problems.
How can property rights be protected and contracts be enforced in countries where the rule of law is ineffective or absent? How can firms from advanced market economies do business in such circumstances? In Lawlessness and Economics, Avinash Dixit examines the theory of private institutions that transcend or supplement weak economic governance from the state. In much of the world and through much of history, private mechanisms--such as long-term relationships, arbitration, social networks to disseminate information and norms to impose sanctions, and for-profit enforcement services--have grown up in place of formal, state-governed institutions. Even in countries with strong legal systems, many of these mechanisms continue under the shadow of the law. Numerous case studies and empirical investigations have demonstrated the variety, importance, and merits, and drawbacks of such institutions. This book builds on these studies and constructs a toolkit of theoretical models to analyze them. The models shed new conceptual light on the different modes of governance, and deepen our understanding of the interaction of the alternative institutions with each other and with the government's law. For example, one model explains the limit on the size of social networks and illuminates problems in the transition to more formal legal systems as economies grow beyond this limit. Other models explain why for-profit enforcement is inefficient. The models also help us understand why state law dovetails with some non-state institutions and collides with others. This can help less-developed countries and transition economies devise better processes for the introduction or reform of their formal legal systems.
Building on a base of simple economic theory and elementary linear algebra and calculus, this broad treatment of static and dynamic optimization methods discusses the importance of shadow prices, and reviews functions defined by solutions of optimization problems. Recently revised and expanded, the second edition will be a valuable resource for upper level undergraduate and graduate students.
Games of Strategy is beloved by students and instructors alike for its flexible organization, focus on problem-solving, and engaging and accessible examples from diverse fields, like political science, biology, and business. The completely revised Fifth Edition adds the work of David McAdams, especially in the areas of market design and auction theory, and provides new insights into diverse applications, such as billion-dollar buy-outs, job offer negotiation, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and collusion in the school milk market.
This book aims to widen the understanding of stochastic dynamic choice and equilibrium models. It offers a simplified and heuristic exposition of the theory of Brownian motion and its control or regulation, rendering such methods more accessible to economists who do not require a detailed, mathematical treatment of the subject. The main mathematical ideas are presented in a context which with which economists will be familiar. Using a binomial approach to Brownian motion, the mathematics is reduced to simple algebra, progressing to some equally simple limits. The starting point of the calculus of Brownian motion - 'Ito's Lemma' - emerges by analogy with the economics of risk-aversion. Conditions for the optimal regulation of Brownian motion, including the important, but often mysterious, 'smooth pasting' condition, are derived in a similar way. Each theoretical derivation is illustrated by developing a significant economic application, drawn mainly from recent research in macroeconomics and international economics.
We develop a formula for the market value of debt when the borrower’s repayment capacity varies stochastically, and shortfalls are rolled over. The value of a marginal dollar of nominal claim is an S-shaped function of the ratio of the repayment capacity to the amount of nominal debt. Shifts of this curve are examined in response to changes in the underlying parameters. The calculations bring out some conflicts of interest among lenders of differing degrees of seniority. Most surprisingly, junior creditors gain when the loan is rescheduled on terms more favorable to the debtor.
This volume is a comprehensive collection of critical essays on The Taming of the Shrew, and includes extensive discussions of the play's various printed versions and its theatrical productions. Aspinall has included only those essays that offer the most influential and controversial arguments surrounding the play. The issues discussed include gender, authority, female autonomy and unruliness, courtship and marriage, language and speech, and performance and theatricality.
“I am hard pressed to think of another book that can match the combination of practical insights and reading enjoyment.”—Steven Levitt Game theory means rigorous strategic thinking. It’s the art of anticipating your opponent’s next moves, knowing full well that your rival is trying to do the same thing to you. Though parts of game theory involve simple common sense, much is counterintuitive, and it can only be mastered by developing a new way of seeing the world. Using a diverse array of rich case studies—from pop culture, TV, movies, sports, politics, and history—the authors show how nearly every business and personal interaction has a game-theory component to it. Mastering game theory will make you more successful in business and life, and this lively book is the key to that mastery.
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