Diane Kunz describes here how the United States employed economic diplomacy to affect relations among states during the Suez Crisis of 1956-57. Using political and financial archival material from the United States and Great Britain, and drawing from personal interviews with many of the key players, Kunz focuses on how economic diplomacy determined the course of events during the crisis from start to finish. In doing so, she provides both an excellent case study of the role of economic sanctions in international relations and a solid treatment of the American use of such sanctions against a Middle Eastern country. The crisis was prompted by the Eisenhower administration's decision not to fund the Aswan High Dam, triggering the takeover of the Suez Canal Company by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Responding to events, the American government imposed economic sanctions against Great Britain, France, Egypt, and Israel, with varying degrees of success. Because of its weakened financial position and misguided decisions, Kunz says, the government of British Prime Minister Anthony Eden proved most vulnerable to these tactics. Indeed, American economic pressure caused the British government to withdraw its troops ignominiously from Egypt. France, on the other hand, had borrowed sufficiently prior to the crisis to be able to withstand American pressure. For Israel, Kunz says, the threat of sanctions symbolized the Eisenhower administration's wrath. Israel could forego American funds, but, dependent on the goodwill of a great power for survival, it could not take a stand that would completely alienate the United States. Only Egypt proved immune to financial warfare. Kunz also illuminates the general diplomacy of the Suez crisis. The American government was determined neither to alienate moderate Arab opinion nor to become too closely intertwined with Israel. As such, this account has significant lessons for American policy. Originally published in 1991. A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.
Until now, the history of the Cold War has been written as a series of diplomatic & military events. When communism finally collapsed in 1989, it was suddenly obvious that economics had played a major role in the war. Western economic policy was the key to the Cold War, even more central & important than military might. Since WW2 economic diplomacy has become the chief engine of global politics & prosperity. Here, Kunz offers a definitive history of 50 years of American economic diplomacy. She argues the controversial thesis that America's economic & security policies worked hand-in-glove, with presidents from Truman to Reagan building a nation both prosperous & strong while helping America's allies to achieve similar strengths.
Although the foreign policy decisions made by Kennedy and Johnson determined the final form of postwar diplomacy and laid the foundation for the tumultuous worldwide political changes of the last five years, until now no book has examined American diplomacy during 1960s as a whole. During his presidency, Kennedy concentrated on foreign policy. The president and his staff feared that communism had taken the offensive internationally and that the U.S. was in danger of losing the confrontation, particularly in the developing world. While Johnson attempted to focus on domestic issues, foreign issues nevertheless loomed large. Consequently, the contributors to this volume argue, all aspects of American foreign policy during that decade must be viewed through the prism of the fight against communism. The chapters, which were commissioned for this book by the editor, examine the major subjects and themes of this period in a way that provides new insight to students and general readers alike. Each chapter also contains brief notes and a bibliographic sketch.
This book, originally published in 1987 sets the British political and financial crisis of 1931 in an international context by concentrating on the bankers who were primarily responsible for leading the fight to protect sterling in a world context. 1931 marks the point at which the near-autonomy which bankers had achieved during the 1920s began to decline and 1931 was thus the last attempt of important groups to return Britain to the Edwardian era. The reasons for their failure to do this are still pertinent in today's international financial climate and this study provides a definitive account of an eciting episode in British politics.
Diane Kunz describes here how the United States employed economic diplomacy to affect relations among states during the Suez Crisis of 1956-57. Using political and financial archival material from the United States and Great Britain, and drawing from personal interviews with many of the key players, Kunz focuses on how economic diplomacy determined the course of events during the crisis from start to finish. In doing so, she provides both an excellent case study of the role of economic sanctions in international relations and a solid treatment of the American use of such sanctions against a Middle Eastern country. The crisis was prompted by the Eisenhower administration's decision not to fund the Aswan High Dam, triggering the takeover of the Suez Canal Company by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Responding to events, the American government imposed economic sanctions against Great Britain, France, Egypt, and Israel, with varying degrees of success. Because of its weakened financial position and misguided decisions, Kunz says, the government of British Prime Minister Anthony Eden proved most vulnerable to these tactics. Indeed, American economic pressure caused the British government to withdraw its troops ignominiously from Egypt. France, on the other hand, had borrowed sufficiently prior to the crisis to be able to withstand American pressure. For Israel, Kunz says, the threat of sanctions symbolized the Eisenhower administration's wrath. Israel could forego American funds, but, dependent on the goodwill of a great power for survival, it could not take a stand that would completely alienate the United States. Only Egypt proved immune to financial warfare. Kunz also illuminates the general diplomacy of the Suez crisis. The American government was determined neither to alienate moderate Arab opinion nor to become too closely intertwined with Israel. As such, this account has significant lessons for American policy. Originally published in 1991. A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.
This work provides a how-to guide that aims to explain different psychic abilities and provides exercises for developing each ability. Stories of psychic occurrences, contributed by over 70 women, covers crystal gazing, telepathy, psychic healing, automatic writing and more.
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