In July 1956 Egyptian President Gamal Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, causing immediate concern to Britain and France. They already opposed Nasser and were worried at the threat to maritime traffic in the Canal. This book traces the course of subsequent events. Together with Israel, Britain and France hatched a plot to occupy the Canal Zone and overthrow Nasser. Israel attacked Sinai, and Britain and France launched offensives throughout Egypt, but strategic failures overshasdowed tactical success. Finally, Britain, France and Israel bowed to international pressure and withdrew, leaving the Suez Canal, and Egypt, firmly in the hands of President Nasser.
In July 1956 Egyptian President Gamal Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, causing immediate concern to Britain and France. They already opposed Nasser and were worried at the threat to maritime traffic in the Canal. This book traces the course of subsequent events. Together with Israel, Britain and France hatched a plot to occupy the Canal Zone and overthrow Nasser. Israel attacked Sinai, and Britain and France launched offensives throughout Egypt, but strategic failures overshasdowed tactical success. Finally, Britain, France and Israel bowed to international pressure and withdrew, leaving the Suez Canal, and Egypt, firmly in the hands of President Nasser."--Bloomsbury Publishing.
In the mid-1950s, serious Middle Eastern challenges temporarily crippled the Atlantic partnership. In many ways, the 1956 Suez Crisis merely illuminated adverse alliance trends, the most fundamental of which fall into two categories. First, Britain and the United States pursued separate regional strategies. Cold War considerations served as the lodestar by which United States leaders conducted foreign relations. Containing Soviet expansion in any form underpinned American strategic decisions. British objectives entailed additional complexity. In its role as a key Free World state, Britain, like the United States, opposed Communist opportunism. But in Southwest Asia, other factors also influenced British strategy. Foremost among these was a desire to protect what I term the Hashemite-Gulf Arch, a decades-old arrangement of military and economic privileges linking Britain with Iraq, Jordan, and the Gulf sheikhdoms. British dependence on preferential access to Middle Eastern oil made this system a vital national interest. Consequently, London countered any antagonists, Communist or otherwise, threatening the Arch. Problems arose when apparent danger from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Arab nationalism compelled Britain to confront those actors precisely while American leaders strove to forestall their alignment with Moscow. Since Britain and the United States disagreed regarding which objective sustaining containment, or the Hashemite-Gulf Arch enjoyed primacy, confusion ensued. Second, mistrust and faulty alliance communication hindered efforts to bridge strategic differences. Anglo-American leaders all too frequently succumbed to expediency, choosing unilateralism rather than pursuing a time-consuming and difficult search for common ground. Anthony Eden's secret decisions for military operations against Saudi Arabia in 1953 and 1955 are testament to this phenomenon.
In July 1956 Egyptian President Gamal Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, causing immediate concern to Britain and France. They already opposed Nasser and were worried at the threat to maritime traffic in the Canal. This book traces the course of subsequent events. Together with Israel, Britain and France hatched a plot to occupy the Canal Zone and overthrow Nasser. Israel attacked Sinai, and Britain and France launched offensives throughout Egypt, but strategic failures overshasdowed tactical success. Finally, Britain, France and Israel bowed to international pressure and withdrew, leaving the Suez Canal, and Egypt, firmly in the hands of President Nasser.
In this book, artist Derek Balmer looks back on a rewarding double career as painter and photographer, the latter taking him on exotic locations, while for 26 years he was official photographer to Bristol Old Vic. But above all, he says, painting has always been an obsession, an itch, 'that won't go away'. Balmer was part of the exciting 1960s Bristol arts scene, which numbered among its cast list artists, writers Tom Stoppard, ACH Smith and Charles Wood, along with Peter O'Toole and film-maker John Boorman. He wrote for the acclaimed 'Western Daily Press' arts page brilliantly edited by ACH Smith before it was closed down by an unsympathetic management. An early Arnolfini artist, with two one-man shows in the 1960s, he didn't paint full time until he gave up a lucrative photography business in middle age.
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