Byron: The Erotic Liberal explores the relationship between Byron's erotic life and his political commitments, placing his poetry in the context of the work of other aristocratic liberals such as Madame de Stael.
This book examines the negotiations between the USA and the USSR on the limitation of strategic arms during the Cold War, from 1969 to 1979. The negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms, which were concluded in two agreements SALT I and SALT II (with only the first ratified), marked a major change in the history of arms control negotiations. For the first time, in the relatively short history of nuclear weapons and negotiations over nuclear disarmament, the two major nuclear powers had agreed to put limits on the size of their nuclear strategic arms. However, the negotiations between the US and USSR were the easy part of the process. The more difficult part was the negotiations among the Americans. Through the study of a decade of negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms in the Cold War, this book examines the forces that either allowed US presidents and senior officials to pave a path toward a US arms limitation policy, or prevented them from doing so. Most importantly, the book discusses the meaning of these negotiations and agreements on the limitation of strategic arms, and seeks to identify the intention of the negotiators: Were they aiming at making the world a safer place? What was the purpose of the negotiations and agreements within US strategic thinking, both militarily and diplomatically? Were they aimed at improving relations with the Soviet Union, or only at enhancing the strategic balance as one component of the strategic nuclear deterrence between the two powers? This book will be of much interest to students of Cold War history, arms control, US foreign policy and international relations in general.
Originally published in 2005. David Mitchell provides a better understanding of the role presidents play in the decision-making process in terms of their influence on two key steps in the process: deliberation and outcome of policy making. The events that have taken place in relation to the Bush administration's decisions to fight the war on terrorism and invade Iraq highlight how important it is to understand the president's role in formulating policy. This influential study presents an advisory system theory of decision-making to examine cases of presidential policy formulation drawn from the Nixon, Carter, Reagan, Clinton and Bush administrations. Easily accessible to scholars, graduates and advanced undergraduates interested in US foreign policy or foreign policy analysis, presidential studies, and bureaucracy and public administrations scholars, and to practitioners and those with a general interest in International Relations.
Since the advent of the contemporary US national security apparatus in 1947, entrepreneurial public officials have tried to reorient the course of the nation's foreign policy. Acting inside the National Security Council system, some principals and high-ranking officials have worked tirelessly to generate policy change and innovation on the issues they care about. These entrepreneurs attempt to set the foreign policy agenda, frame policy problems and solutions, and orient the decision-making process to convince the president and other decision makers to choose the course they advocate. In National Security Entrepreneurs and the Making of American Foreign Policy Vincent Boucher, Charles-Philippe David, and Karine Prémont develop a new concept to study entrepreneurial behaviour among foreign policy advisers and offer the first comprehensive framework of analysis to answer this crucial question: why do some entrepreneurs succeed in guaranteeing the adoption of novel policies while others fail? They explore case studies of attempts to reorient US foreign policy waged by National Security Council entrepreneurs, examining the key factors enabling success and the main forces preventing the adoption of a preferred option: the entrepreneur's profile, presidential leadership, major players involved in the policy formulation and decision-making processes, the national political context, and the presence or absence of significant opportunities. By carefully analyzing significant diplomatic and military decisions of the Johnson, Nixon, Reagan, and Clinton administrations, and offering a preliminary account of contemporary national security entrepreneurship under presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump, this book makes the case for an agent-based explanation of foreign policy change and continuity.
Never before in the history of mankind have so few people had so much power over so many. The people at the top of the American national security establishment, the President and his principal advisors, the core team at the helm of the National Security Council, are without question the most powerful committee in the history of the world. Yet, in many respects, they are among the least understood. A former senior official in the Clinton Administration himself, David Rothkopf served with and knows personally many of the NSC's key players of the past twenty-five years. In Running the World he pulls back the curtain on this shadowy world to explore its inner workings, its people, their relationships, their contributions and the occasions when they have gone wrong. He traces the group's evolution from the final days of the Second World War to the post-Cold War realities of global terror -- exploring its triumphs, its human dramas and most recently, what many consider to be its breakdown at a time when we needed it most. Drawing on an extraordinary series of insider interviews with policy makers including Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, Henry Kissinger, senior officials of the Bush Administration, and over 130 others, the book offers unprecedented insights into what must change if America is to maintain its unprecedented worldwide leadership in the decades ahead.
A new intellectual history of U.S. foreign policy from the late nineteenth century to the present Worldmaking is a compelling new take on the history of American diplomacy. Rather than retelling the story of realism versus idealism, David Milne suggests that U.S. foreign policy has also been crucially divided between those who view statecraft as an art and those who believe it can aspire to the certainty of science. Worldmaking follows a cast of characters who built on one another’s ideas to create the policies we have today. Woodrow Wilson’s Universalism and moralism led Sigmund Freud to diagnose him with a messiah complex. Walter Lippmann was a syndicated columnist who commanded the attention of leaders as diverse as Theodore Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, and Charles de Gaulle. Paul Wolfowitz was the intellectual architect of the 2003 invasion of Iraq—and an admirer of Wilson’s attempt to “make the world safe for democracy.” Each was engaged in a process of worldmaking, formulating strategies that sought to deploy the nation’s vast military and economic power—or sought to retrench and focus on domestic issues—to shape a world in which the United States would be best positioned to thrive. Tracing American statecraft from the age of steam engines to the age of drones, Milne reveals patterns of worldmaking that have remained impervious to the passage of time. The result is a panoramic history of U.S. foreign policy driven by ideas and by the lives and times of their authors.
The Middle East and the United States brings together scholars and policy experts to provide an empirical and balanced assessment of US policy in the Middle East primarily from the end of World War I to the present. Carefully edited by David W. Lesch and Mark L. Haas, this text provides a broad and authoritative understanding of the United States’ involvement in the Middle East. The sixth edition is significantly revised throughout, including a new part structure and part introductions that provide students with greater context for understanding the history of the United States and the Middle East. The five parts cover the watershed moments and major challenges the United States faces in the Middle East, from the Cold War proxy wars and the Arab-Israeli conflict, to the Gulf wars and the upheaval in the region post-Arab uprisings. Three new chapters-on the Golan negotiations, US-Saudi relations, and the US fight against al-Qa'ida and ISIS-make this the most current and comprehensive book on the United States' involvement in the Middle East
For nearly twenty years, Aaron David Miller has played a central role in U.S. efforts to broker Arab-Israeli peace as an advisor to presidents, secretaries of state, and national security advisors. Without partisanship or finger-pointing, Miller records what went right, what went wrong, and how we got where we are today. Here is a look at the peace process from a place at the negotiation table, filled with behind-the-scenes strategy, colorful anecdotes and equally colorful characters, and new interviews with presidents, secretaries of state, and key Arab and Israeli leaders. Honest, critical, and often controversial, Miller’s insider’s account offers a brilliant new analysis of the problem of Arab-Israeli peace and how it still might be solved.
Japan's endless patience with diplomacy in its conflict with Russia over the Northern Territories; America's decision to commit large-scale military force to Vietnam vs. its ultimate decision to withdraw; and Canada's two abortive flirtations with free trade with the United States in 1911 and 1948 vs. its embrace of free trade in the late 1980s."--Jacket.
Schoenbaum's book is a history of one of the most remarkable liaisons in international experience, a portrait of the special relationship between the last remaining superpower and the tiny Jewish state between the Jordan and the Mediterranean, and a study of how that relationship grew and works. From Truman to Bush, the United States has assured Israel's existence, while providing billions in military and economic support. Over the same period, no U.S. president has ever submitted a formal treaty of alliance to the Senate, or even moved the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. In fact, cross-purposes and mutual doubts have always coexisted with shared values, complementary interests, great expectations, and real achievements. Schoenbaum's book traces Israeli-American relations from their roots in both American and Jewish experience to the risks and opportunities of the current peace process. It also examines the relationship in the perspective of two world wars, the Cold War, the Gulf War, European colonialism and Middle Eastern nationalisms, global policy, and domestic politics in both countries. The result is the story of one of history's oddest international couples, hard-pressed to live together, but unable to live apart.
In Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War, accomplished foreign relations historian David F. Shmitz provides students of US history and the Vietnam era with an up-to-date analysis of Nixon’s Vietnam policy in a brief and accessible book that addresses the main controversies of the Nixon years. President Richard Nixon’s first presidential term oversaw the definitive crucible of the Vietnam War. Nixon came into office seeking the kind of decisive victory that had eluded President Johnson, and went about expanding the war, overtly and covertly, in order to uphold a policy of “containment,” protect America’s credibility, and defy the left’s antiwar movement at home. Tactically, politically, Nixon’s moves made sense. However, by 1971 the president was forced to significantly de-escalate the American presence and seek a negotiated end to the war, which is now accepted as an American defeat, and a resounding failure of American foreign relations. Schmitz addresses the main controversies of Nixon’s Vietnam strategy, and in so doing manages to trace back the ways in which this most calculating and perceptive politician wound up resigning from office a fraud and failure. Finally, the book seeks to place the impact of Nixon’s policies and decisions in the larger context of post-World War II American society, and analyzes the full costs of the Vietnam War that the nation feels to this day.
Discusses the possible reasons behind the failure to achieve peace in the Middle East, focusing on the misguided efforts made by the United States and the common fallacies about the politics of the region.
Divided into two parts, this book talks about two common myths about the American-Israeli patron-client relationship - that arms transfers to Israel have been motivated by American domestic politics rather than national interests and that these arms transfers have come without any political strings attached to them.
Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist David Halberstam chronicles Washington politics and foreign policy in post Cold War America. Evoking the internal conflicts, unchecked egos, and power struggles within the White House, the State Department, and the military, Halberstam shows how the decisions of men who served in the Vietnam War, and those who did not, have shaped America's role in global events. He provides fascinating portraits of those in power—Clinton, Bush, Reagan, Kissinger, James Baker, Dick Cheney, Madeleine Albright, and others—to reveal a stunning view of modern political America.
On Sunday, September 6, 1970, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked four airliners bound from Europe for New York. One, a brand new Pan Am 747, was taken to Cairo and blown up only seconds after its passengers escaped. The attempt to hijack a second plane, an El Al flight, was foiled and the plane landed safely in the UK. Two other planes, one TWA and one Swissair, were directed to the desert floor thirty-five miles northeast of Amman, Jordan, where a twenty-five day hostage drama began. With the additional hijacking of a British airliner, over four hundred and fifty hostages had landed in the Jordanian desert. David Raab was on the TWA flight with his mother and siblings but was separated from them and taken to a refugee camp and then to an apartment in Amman where he was held hostage through a civil war. This is his story.
The Cyprus problem has defeated all attempts to resolve it for more than forty years. From 1996 onwards the UN, with strong support from the US, the UK and other EU members, mounted the most sustained of all the efforts to reach an agreement, so that a reunited Cyprus could join the EU in May 2004. Although it came closer to success than any previous attempt, this one failed too. From his unique position as the former British Special Representative for Cyprus, Lord (formerly Sir David) Hannay tells the story of these negotiations. What results is a revealing first-hand account of a profoundly complex situation, an exceptional reference point for all those interested in the region.
In Oil Money, David M. Wight offers a new framework for understanding the course of Middle East–US relations during the 1970s and 1980s: the transformation of the US global empire by Middle East petrodollars. During these two decades, American, Arab, and Iranian elites reconstituted the primary role of the Middle East within the global system of US power from a supplier of cheap crude oil to a source of abundant petrodollars, the revenues earned from the export of oil. In the 1970s, the United States and allied monarchies, including the House of Pahlavi in Iran and the House of Saud in Saudi Arabia, utilized petrodollars to undertake myriad joint initiatives for mutual economic and geopolitical benefit. These petrodollar projects were often unprecedented in scope and included multibillion-dollar development projects, arms sales, purchases of US Treasury securities, and funds for the mujahedin in Afghanistan. Although petrodollar ties often augmented the power of the United States and its Middle East allies, Wight argues they also fostered economic disruptions and state-sponsored violence that drove many Americans, Arabs, and Iranians to resist Middle East–US interdependence, most dramatically during the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Deftly integrating diplomatic, transnational, economic, and cultural analysis, Wight utilizes extensive declassified records from the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations, the IMF, the World Bank, Saddam Hussein's regime, and private collections to make plain the political economy of US power. Oil Money is an expansive yet judicious investigation of the wide-ranging and contradictory effects of petrodollars on Middle East–US relations and the geopolitics of globalization.
The Vietnam War remains a major point of reference in discussions of U.S. foreign policy and national character. The lessons and legacies of the most divisive event in U.S. history in the twentieth century are hotly debated to this day. Written by a renowned scholar of the conflict, The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War provides students and researchers with the materials to think seriously about the conflict's many paradoxes and ramifications.
This study of US and Soviet aid efforts in India during the Cold War “makes a major contribution towards a necessary discussion of the politics of aid” (Times Higher Education). Debates over foreign aid are often strangely ahistorical. Economists argue about how to make aid work while critics bemoan money wasted on corruption, ignoring the fundamentally political character of aid. The Price of Aid turns the standard debate on its head. By exposing the geopolitical calculus underpinning development assistance, it also exposes its costs. India stood at the center of American and Soviet aid competition throughout the Cold War, as both superpowers saw developmental aid as a way of pursuing their geopolitical goals by economic means. Drawing on recently declassified files from seven countries, David Engerman shows how Indian leaders used Cold War competition to win battles at home, eroding the Indian state in the process. As China spends freely in Africa, the political stakes of foreign aid are rising once again. “A superb, field-changing book . . . A true classic.” —Sunil Amrith
Lebanon's significance to the Middle East and the global arena is greater than its small size suggests - bordering Israel and Syria, it holds a geo-strategic role as the playing field for their competition as well as for their allies, America and Iran. This book examines how American diplomacy has responded to the intersection of local, regional, and international factors in Lebanon. David Hale examines several key episodes in US diplomatic history with Lebanon, starting with the country's independence in 1943, up until the present moment. Crucial events such as the Lebanese Civil War, the Cedar Revolution, and more recently the spillover from the Syrian Civil War, are examined within the context of the respective US government administrations of the time and their foreign policy strategies. Hale asks whether policy-makers had realistic and compelling goals, the right strategy, sufficient means, and capable diplomats in its diplomatic approaches towards Lebanon through the years. Crucially, this study focuses on how, during these critical periods, American diplomacy toward Lebanon had consequences beyond the country itself, and on the narrative lines and lessons for the broader conduct of American foreign policy.
The late Ambassador David Abshire lived a quintessentially American life, one that spanned the Great Depression, World War II and the Cold War. He graduated from West Point, fought in the Korean War, earned a doctorate in history from Georgetown University, and served in government during the Vietnam War. He also co-founded one of the world’s preeminent think tanks in the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Along the way he became a personal adviser to multiple presidents, earning a reputation as one of Washington, D.C.’s truly wise men. All of which makes the warnings contained in these memoirs so topical. Writing near the end of his life, Abshire concludes that our country has lost its sense of strategic direction and common purpose. Our domestic politics have entered an era of hyper-partisanship and gridlock, even as dangerous challenges to U.S. interests gather overseas. America, Abshire concludes, is in deep trouble. In this extraordinary final love letter to his country, Abshire tells his fellow citizens how to reclaim American exceptionalism. That journey begins with rejecting the great incivility that has infected our national discourse. That fundamental lack respect among political partisans has eroded our trust in each other, and faith in our leaders. The only way to recapture them, Abshire argues persuasively, is to reinvigorate a politics of lively, robust debate within a framework of respect and civil behavior. Before it is too late.
Picturing China in the American Press juxtaposes what the ordinary American news reader was shown visually inTime Magazine between 1949 and 1973 with contemporary perspectives on the behind-the-scenes history of the period. Time Magazine is an especially fruitful source for such a visual-historical contrast and comparison because it was China-centric, founded and run by Henry Luce, a man who loved China and was commensurably obsessed with winning China to democracy and Western influence. Picturing China examines in detail major events (the Korean War and Nixon's trip to China), less considerable occurrences (shellings of Straits islands and diplomatic flaps), great personages (Chairman Mao and Henry Kissinger), and the common people and common life of China as seen through the lenses and described by the pens of American reporters, artists, photographers, and editors. Picturing China in the American Press is of great interest to both scholars of communications, Chinese history, China Studies, and journalists.
By the 1980s the concept of internationally recognized human rights was being reinforced by a growing body of international law and by the multiplication of agencies concerned with such matters as torture in Paraguay, slavery in Mauritania, the British use of force in Northern Ireland, and starvation and malnutrition in EastøAfrica and Southeast Asia. No matter how much a national leader might find it more convenient to focus on other matters, some world organization or private group could be counted on to keep the issue of universal human rights alive. Because the subject is particularly timely, David P. Forsythe has revised Human Rights and World Politics, first published in 1983. For this second edition, Forsythe has updated all chapters and completely rewritten the one on U.S. foreign policy to include the second Reagan administration. After a brief history of the evolution of human rights in international law and diplomacy, he surveys human rights standards as developed by the United Nations and other official organizations. Moving from the definitive core of law, Forsythe turns to the interpretation and implementation of rights agreements; the role of private or unofficial organizations such as Amnesty International and the Red Cross; the relationship between civil-political and socio-economic rights; the role of human rights in U.S. foreign policy, particularly under Carter and Reagan; and lobbying in Washington by human-rights interest groups. In all, Forsythe?s exhaustive research and careful analysis bring clarity and concreteness to a subject too often obscured by rhetoric.
Looks at Ball's role as the lone presidential advisor to President Johnson who opposed American military intervention in Vietnam, and summarizes Ball's criticisms of U.S. policy
Between 1973 and 1980, the cost of crude oil rose suddenly and dramatically, precipitating convulsions in international politics. Conventional wisdom holds that international capital markets adjusted automatically and remarkably well: enormous amounts of money flowed into oil-rich states, and efficient markets then placed that new money in cash-poor Third World economies. David Spiro has followed the money trail, and the story he tells contradicts the accepted beliefs. Most of the sudden flush of new oil wealth didn't go to poor oil-importing countries around the globe. Instead, the United States made a deal with Saudi Arabia to sell it U.S. securities in secret, a deal resulting in a substantial portion of Saudi assets being held by the U.S. government. With this arrangement, the U.S. government violated its agreements with allies in the developed world. Spiro argues that American policymakers took this action to prop up otherwise intolerable levels of U.S. public debt. In effect, recycled OPEC wealth subsidized the debt-happy policies of the U.S. government as well as the debt-happy consumption of its citizenry.
The 1973 Yom Kippur War marked a turning point in the "special relationship" between the United States and Israel. While previous U.S. administrations had taken a relatively even hand in the Middle East, the action saw American support of Israel become virtually unconditional. A massive airlift of military hardware to Israel brought the U.S. and the Soviet Union closer to conflict. As the war--just two weeks in duration--played out along the Suez Canal, U.S. Vice President Spiro Agnew was forced to resign amidst bribery allegations. Watergate escalated, resulting in President Nixon's near-breakdown. Despite Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's efforts to supply arms to Israel, he was stymied by resistance in the Department of Defense, which some saw as overly provocative toward the Arabs. Ostensibly a U.S. foreign policy success, the war led directly to the 1974 oil crisis and a permanent rift in U.S.-Arab relations. Drawing on Kissinger's telephone conversations and recently declassified documents, this book tells the story of how the secretary became the chief architect of America's Middle East policy, and how his Cold War strategy played a critical role in the decision to pursue active military involvement.
This work considers Joseph Heller's career and examines each of his novels, including Closing Time. It pursues two complementary tracks: first it explores the evolution of Heller's treatment of human morality; and second, it delineates Heller's artistic developments as a novelist.
The Cold War dominated history for nearly half a century, locking two superpowers in a global rivalry that ended only with the collapse of the Soviet Union. For millennia, the outcomes of war had been determined on the battlefield, but the most decisive moments of the Cold War occurred in the carefully worded exchanges of world leaders meeting face to face. In the shadow of the bomb, the summit meeting offered an opportunity for heads of state to rattle sabers and cross swords without triggering nuclear apocalypse. Drawing on extensive archival material, prizewinning historian David Reynolds describes the outsized personalities who negotiated the course of twentieth-century history: Neville Chamberlain, Adolph Hitler, Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, Nikita Khrushchev, Richard Nixon, Leonid Brezhnev, Jimmy Carter, Anwar Sadat, Menachem Begin, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Ronald Reagan. While these men addressed epochal issues, the outcome of each meeting was often determined more by individual personality than by international politics. Mishandled summits-Munich in 1938 and Yalta in 1945-brought about World War II and the Cold War, respectively. Kennedy's disastrous performance in Vienna in 1961 nearly brought about World War III. But successful summits in Moscow (1972), Camp David (1978), and Geneva (1985) led to dénte, a partial settlement in the Middle East, and a peaceful end to the Cold War. Written with verve and insight, Summits vividly describes the statesmen who stood, if only briefly, on top of the world. By revealing both the promise and the pitfalls of international diplomacy, David Reynolds offers valuable lessons as we find ourselves confronting once again a war without end.
A fresh voice from the 'other America', investigative journalist Amy Goodman exposes corporate cronyism, media spin and the systematic undermining of democracy in George Bush's USA.
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