Limited force is different than war: different in scope, strategic purpose, and ethical permissions and restraints. No-fly zones, limited strikes, Special Forces raids, and drone strikes outside 'hot' battlefield have been at the nexus of the moral and strategic debates about just war since the fall of the Berlin Wall but, with the exception of drones, these aspects of the modern arsenal have remained largely undertheorized. Just and Unjust Uses of Limited Force fills that gap by revisiting the major wars animating contemporary just war scholarship (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, the drone 'wars', and Libya) through the lens of limited force and drawing insights from the just war tradition. Looking at these contemporary examples, the book teases out an ethical account of force-short-of-war. It covers the deliberation about whether to use limited force (jus ad vim), restraints that govern its use (jus in vi), when to stop (jus ex vi), and the after-use context (jus post vim). While these moral categories parallel to some extent their just war counterparts of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, jus post bellum, and jus ex bello, the book illustrates how they can be reimagined and recalibrated in a limited force context, while also introducing new principles specific to the dilemmas associated with escalation and risk. As the argument unfolds, the reader will be presented with a view of limited force as a moral alternative to war, exposed to a series of dilemmas regarding when and how limited force is used, and provided with a more precise and morally enriched vocabulary to talk about limited force and the responsibilities its use entails.
Where is the boundary line between civilization and barbarism drawn? When is the Other really Other, and thus no longer deserving of rights? Daniel R. Brunstetter expertly examines the place of inequality within the liberal thread of modernity by turning to the intellectual history surrounding the European discovery of the New World, and the notion of the human that emerged from the intellectual debates about the rights of the Indians.
Limited force is different than war: different in scope, strategic purpose, and ethical permissions and restraints. No-fly zones, limited strikes, Special Forces raids, and drone strikes outside 'hot' battlefield have been at the nexus of the moral and strategic debates about just war since the fall of the Berlin Wall but, with the exception of drones, these aspects of the modern arsenal have remained largely undertheorized. Just and Unjust Uses of Limited Force fills that gap by revisiting the major wars animating contemporary just war scholarship (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, the drone 'wars', and Libya) through the lens of limited force and drawing insights from the just war tradition. Looking at these contemporary examples, the book teases out an ethical account of force-short-of-war. It covers the deliberation about whether to use limited force (jus ad vim), restraints that govern its use (jus in vi), when to stop (jus ex vi), and the after-use context (jus post vim). While these moral categories parallel to some extent their just war counterparts of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, jus post bellum, and jus ex bello, the book illustrates how they can be reimagined and recalibrated in a limited force context, while also introducing new principles specific to the dilemmas associated with escalation and risk. As the argument unfolds, the reader will be presented with a view of limited force as a moral alternative to war, exposed to a series of dilemmas regarding when and how limited force is used, and provided with a more precise and morally enriched vocabulary to talk about limited force and the responsibilities its use entails.
Politics today is marked by tension between claims of universal human rights and diversity. From the war on terror to immigration, one of the major challenges facing liberalism is to understand the scope of equality in a world in which certain peoples are perceived to reject and/or violently resist democratic principles. This book revisits Europe’s initial encounter with the Native Americans of the New World to shed light on how the West’s initial defense of so-called ‘barbarians’ has influenced the way we think about diversity today, and elucidate the arguments of exclusion that unconsciously permeate the moral world we live in. In doing so, Daniel R. Brunstetter traces Bartolomé de Las Casas’s oft heralded defense of the Native Americans in the sixteenth century through the French Enlightenment. While this defense has been rightly lauded as an early example of human rights discourse, tracing Las Casas’s arguments into the eighteenth century shows how his view of equality enabled arguments legitimizing the annihilation by ‘just’ war of those perceived to be ‘barbarians’. This philosophical narrative can be useful when thinking about concepts such as just war, multiculturalism, and immigration, or any area in which politics confronts radical difference.
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