Making the case that we can use nuclear power to combat climate change even as we reduce the risks of nuclear terror. Humanity faces two existential threats: nuclear annihilation and catastrophic climate change. Both have human origins, and both are linked to the use of nuclear energy. Inherent in the use of atomic fission is the risk that the technology and materials can be diverted to terrorists or hostile nations and used to make nuclear weapons. The key question is whether we can use nuclear energy to reduce the threat of climate change without increasing the risk that nuclear weapons will be used. In Double Jeopardy, Daniel Poneman argues that the world needs an “all-of-the-above” energy policy, one that advances the goal of decarbonizing the environment through all available means—including nuclear power. Poneman makes a compelling case that we can enhance the ability of nuclear power to combat climate change even as we reduce the risks of nuclear terror. Doing so will require well-crafted laws and policies, implemented with an ethos of constant vigilance and embedded in a culture that weaves safety and security goals into the fabric of our nuclear programs. This will enable government and industry to work together to maximize energy and climate benefits while minimizing safety and security risks.
A decade before being proclaimed part of the "axis of evil," North Korea raised alarms in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo as the pace of its clandestine nuclear weapons program mounted. When confronted by evidence of its deception in 1993, Pyongyang abruptly announced its intention to become the first nation ever to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, defying its earlier commitments to submit its nuclear activities to full international inspections. U.S. intelligence had revealed evidence of a robust plutonium production program. Unconstrained, North Korea's nuclear factory would soon be capable of building about thirty Nagasaki-sized nuclear weapons annually. The resulting arsenal would directly threaten the security of the United States and its allies, while tempting cash-starved North Korea to export its deadly wares to America's most bitter adversaries. In Go ing Critical, three former U.S. officials who played key roles in the nuclear crisis trace the intense efforts that led North Korea to freeze—and pledge ultimately to dismantle—its dangerous plutonium production program under international inspection, while the storm clouds of a second Korean War gathered. Drawing on international government documents, memoranda, cables, and notes, the authors chronicle the complex web of diplomacy--from Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing to Geneva, Moscow, and Vienna and back again—that led to the negotiation of the 1994 Agreed Framework intended to resolve this nuclear standoff. They also explore the challenge of weaving together the military, economic, and diplomatic instruments employed to persuade North Korea to accept significant constraints on its nuclear activities, while deterring rather than provoking a violent North Korean response. Some ten years after these intense negotiations, the Agreed Framework lies abandoned. North Korea claims to possess some nuclear weapons, while threatening to produce even more. The story of the 1994 confrontatio
Nuclear Power in the Developing World (1982) explores the issue of nuclear power policies in developing countries. The sharp oil price rises of the 1970s attracted widespread attention to nuclear power as an alternative energy source, while some developing countries began attaining the technological ability to develop nuclear weapons programmes. While the search for energy should not be thwarted, the quest for nuclear weapons should not be promoted. The tension between these two goals has often led to confused export policies in the nuclear supplier nations. The author attacks this confusion at its source by examining first-hand the motives which drive nuclear policies in the developing world. He explores how security and economic objectives, domestic policies and foreign influence shape nuclear policies, enriching his analysis with examples from South American, African and Asian experiences. This volume also takes into account those without active nuclear programmes, to better understand how such programmes are born. This approach demonstrates that countries such as India, Pakistan and Argentina entertain different priorities from countries such as Brazil, Taiwan and the Philippines in promoting nuclear power.
Why does North Korea routinely turn to provocation to achieve foreign policy goals? Are the actions of the volatile Kim regime predictable, based on logical responses to the conditions faced by North Korea? This book, an examination of the "Hermit Kingdom" over the past 50 years, explains why the Democratic People's Republic of Korea uses hostility and coercion as instruments of foreign policy. Using three case studies and quantitative analysis of more than 2,000 conflict events, the author explores the relationship between North Korea's societal conditions and its propensity for external conflict. These findings are considered in light of diversionary theory, the idea that leaders use external conflict to divert attention from domestic affairs. Analyzing the actions of an isolated state such as North Korea provides a template for conflict scholarship in general.
Proliferation of WMD technologies is by no means a new concern for the international community. Indeed, since the signing of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1968, tremendous energies have been expended upon diplomatic efforts to create a web of treaties and international organisations regulating the production and stockpiling of WMD sensitive materials within states, as well as their spread through the increasingly globalised channels of international trade to other states and non-state actors. However, the intervention in 2003 by Western powers in Iraq has served as an illustration of the importance of greater understanding of and attention to this area of law, as disagreements over its content and application have once again lead to a potentially destabilising armed intervention by members of the United Nations into the sovereign territory of another member state. Other ongoing disputes between states regarding the character of obligations assumed under non-proliferation treaty instruments, and the effect of international organisations' decisions in this area, form some of the most contentious and potentially destabilising issues of foreign policy concern for many states. This book provides a comprehensive analysis of international law and organisations in the area of WMD proliferation. It will serve both as a reference for understanding the law as it currently exists in its political and economic context, as well as an analysis of areas in which amendments to existing law and organisations are needed.
Making the case that we can use nuclear power to combat climate change even as we reduce the risks of nuclear terror. Humanity faces two existential threats: nuclear annihilation and catastrophic climate change. Both have human origins, and both are linked to the use of nuclear energy. Inherent in the use of atomic fission is the risk that the technology and materials can be diverted to terrorists or hostile nations and used to make nuclear weapons. The key question is whether we can use nuclear energy to reduce the threat of climate change without increasing the risk that nuclear weapons will be used. In Double Jeopardy, Daniel Poneman argues that the world needs an “all-of-the-above” energy policy, one that advances the goal of decarbonizing the environment through all available means—including nuclear power. Poneman makes a compelling case that we can enhance the ability of nuclear power to combat climate change even as we reduce the risks of nuclear terror. Doing so will require well-crafted laws and policies, implemented with an ethos of constant vigilance and embedded in a culture that weaves safety and security goals into the fabric of our nuclear programs. This will enable government and industry to work together to maximize energy and climate benefits while minimizing safety and security risks.
Making the case that we can use nuclear power to combat climate change even as we reduce the risks of nuclear terror. Humanity faces two existential threats: nuclear annihilation and catastrophic climate change. Both have human origins, and both are linked to the use of nuclear energy. Inherent in the use of atomic fission is the risk that the technology and materials can be diverted to terrorists or hostile nations and used to make nuclear weapons. The key question is whether we can use nuclear energy to reduce the threat of climate change without increasing the risk that nuclear weapons will be used. In Double Jeopardy, Daniel Poneman argues that the world needs an “all-of-the-above” energy policy, one that advances the goal of decarbonizing the environment through all available means—including nuclear power. Poneman makes a compelling case that we can enhance the ability of nuclear power to combat climate change even as we reduce the risks of nuclear terror. Doing so will require well-crafted laws and policies, implemented with an ethos of constant vigilance and embedded in a culture that weaves safety and security goals into the fabric of our nuclear programs. This will enable government and industry to work together to maximize energy and climate benefits while minimizing safety and security risks.
Nuclear Power in the Developing World (1982) explores the issue of nuclear power policies in developing countries. The sharp oil price rises of the 1970s attracted widespread attention to nuclear power as an alternative energy source, while some developing countries began attaining the technological ability to develop nuclear weapons programmes. While the search for energy should not be thwarted, the quest for nuclear weapons should not be promoted. The tension between these two goals has often led to confused export policies in the nuclear supplier nations. The author attacks this confusion at its source by examining first-hand the motives which drive nuclear policies in the developing world. He explores how security and economic objectives, domestic policies and foreign influence shape nuclear policies, enriching his analysis with examples from South American, African and Asian experiences. This volume also takes into account those without active nuclear programmes, to better understand how such programmes are born. This approach demonstrates that countries such as India, Pakistan and Argentina entertain different priorities from countries such as Brazil, Taiwan and the Philippines in promoting nuclear power.
A decade before being proclaimed part of the "axis of evil," North Korea raised alarms in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo as the pace of its clandestine nuclear weapons program mounted. When confronted by evidence of its deception in 1993, Pyongyang abruptly announced its intention to become the first nation ever to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, defying its earlier commitments to submit its nuclear activities to full international inspections. U.S. intelligence had revealed evidence of a robust plutonium production program. Unconstrained, North Korea's nuclear factory would soon be capable of building about thirty Nagasaki-sized nuclear weapons annually. The resulting arsenal would directly threaten the security of the United States and its allies, while tempting cash-starved North Korea to export its deadly wares to America's most bitter adversaries. In Go ing Critical, three former U.S. officials who played key roles in the nuclear crisis trace the intense efforts that led North Korea to freeze—and pledge ultimately to dismantle—its dangerous plutonium production program under international inspection, while the storm clouds of a second Korean War gathered. Drawing on international government documents, memoranda, cables, and notes, the authors chronicle the complex web of diplomacy--from Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing to Geneva, Moscow, and Vienna and back again—that led to the negotiation of the 1994 Agreed Framework intended to resolve this nuclear standoff. They also explore the challenge of weaving together the military, economic, and diplomatic instruments employed to persuade North Korea to accept significant constraints on its nuclear activities, while deterring rather than provoking a violent North Korean response. Some ten years after these intense negotiations, the Agreed Framework lies abandoned. North Korea claims to possess some nuclear weapons, while threatening to produce even more. The story of the 1994 confrontatio
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