Examines NATO's Balkan interventions over the entire decade starting with the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1992. Focusing on the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, it traces the record of early transatlantic failures and later successes as once bitterly divided allies were able, finally, to unite around some basic principles. By the time of the Kosovo intervention in spring 1999, the allies agreed on the necessity of taking sides and using military force in conflicts that were complicated, but far from morally opaque. The book concludes with some lessons around which the transatlantic allies might reasonably hope - despite other pressing concerns - to stay engaged and stay united.
The damage that has been done to the transatlantic alliance will not be repaired through grand architectural redesigns or radical new agendas. Instead, the transatlantic partners need to restore their consensus and cooperation on key security challenges with a limited agenda that reflects the essential conservatism of the transatlantic partnership during the Cold War and the 1990s. There will inevitably be big challenges, such as the rise of China, where transatlantic disparities in strategic means and commitments preclude any common alliance undertaking. Yet such limits are nothing new. The absence of a common transatlantic commitment to counter-insurgency in Iraq may cause resentments, but so too did the lack of a common commitment to counter-insurgency in Vietnam. This Adelphi Paper suggests ten propositions for future transatlantic consensus – that is to say, ten security challenges for which the allies should be able to agree on common strategies. These run the gamut from an effective strategy to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability to transatlantic leadership for international cooperation against global warming. If pursued with seriousness and a reasonable degree of transatlantic unity, these propositions could constitute the foundations of an effective partnership. They are, in the authors’ view, the basis for a consensus on the most pressing security challenges of the twenty-first century. The time is right for this kind of serious rededication to alliance purposes. There has already been some effort to repair the damage; moreover, new leaders are in place or coming to the countries that were major protagonists of the transatlantic crisis: Germany, France, Britain and, in 2009, the United States. It is possible that these four new leaders will be better able to put the disputes of the recent past behind them. This extended essay is a guide to the possibilities, and also the limits, of a new start.
Anger and distrust have strained the U.S.-Israeli alliance as the Obama administration and Netanyahu government have clashed over Israeli settlements, convulsions in the Arab world, and negotiating with Iran. Our Separate Ways is an urgent examination of why the alliance has deteriorated and the dangers of its neglect. Powerful demographic, cultural, and strategic currents in Israel and the United States are driving the two countries apart. In America, the once-solid pro-Israel consensus is being corroded by partisan rancor, which also pits conservative Jews against the more liberal Jewish majority. In Israel, surveys of young Jewish citizens reveal a disdain for democracy, and, in some cases, a readiness to curb the civil liberties of non-Jews. Prospects for preserving a liberal Zionism against the pressures for "Greater Israel" are dimming as hopes for a two-state solution fade. The acrimony between President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been a symptom, not cause, of the deeper crisis. If the alliance becomes just a transactional arrangement, then the moral, emotional, and largely intangible bonds that have long tied the two countries together will continue to weaken. Going separate ways at a time of Middle East chaos, and despite profound historical commitment, would be an immense tragedy. The partnership must restore the shared vision that created it.
There have been five central crises in America's post World War II encounter with the Middle East, and the Obama administration now faces a sixth. Iran's progress toward a nuclear weapons capability, and the prospect of Israel launching air strikes to stop it, are ingredients for a conflict that could ruin any residual hopes for fostering peace in the region. The Sixth Crisis explores the fraught linkages between the Iranian nuclear challenge, the increasing likelihood of an Israeli preventive strike, the continuing Israel-Palestine tragedy, and President Barack Obama's efforts to recast America's relations with the world's Muslims. It is the first full account of the situation since Obama took office. The authors, a former senior official on President Clinton's National Security Council Staff and a leading authority on international politics, lay out in clear and accessible detail the technical and political dimensions of Iran's nuclear program, and the ongoing diplomacy to stop it. They show how Israel's panic about Iran's nuclear threat--combined with its policy toward the Palestinians--is undermining Jerusalem's alliance with America. Tehran, meanwhile, is exploiting tensions between Arab regimes fearful of a nuclear Iran and an Arab public that is both angry about the plight of the Palestinians and resentful of Israel's nuclear monopoly in the region. The Sixth Crisis brilliantly illuminates this fateful juncture. The status quo is on an incline to disaster, and the hopes that President Obama has inspired are threatened by the toxic mixture of Israeli-Palestinian stalemate and Iran's nuclear ambitions. The time bomb of Iran's defiance and Israel's panic has the potential to spark a firestorm that would imperil US interests in the Middle East and engulf Obama's presidency. With the outcome of this unfolding crisis far from certain, The Sixth Crisis is required reading not only for policymakers, but also for anyone interested in world politics.
What are the consequences in American society when social and political activism is replaced by pursuit of personal, psychological change? How does such a shift happen? Where is it visible? In wide-ranging case studies, Control and Consolation in American Culture and Politics points out this change in American culture and attributes it to the "rhetoric of therapy." This rhetoric is defined as a pervasive cultural discourse that applies psychotherapy's lexicon - the constructive language of healing, coping, adaptation, and restoration of a previously existing order - to social and political conflict. The purpose of this therapeutic discourse is to encourage people to focus on themselves and their private lives rather than to attempt to reform flawed systems of social and political power. Author Dana L. Cloud focuses on the therapeutic discourse that emerged after the Vietnam War and links its rise to specific political and economic interests. The critical case studies describe in detail not only what the therapeutic style looks like but how and why therapeutic discourses are persuasive.
The Soviet empire entered its steepest decline and fall in the very years that Washington was captivated by the specter of a rising Soviet threat. How did American elites get it so wrong? In this important book, Dana Allin combines a masterful narrative of the Cold War with a fascinating dissection of the fallacies upon which its surreal pessimism was based. He focuses on the so-called "second Cold War" that followed the detente of the early 1970s, and on Europe, which remained the central battlefield and prize of that ideological struggle. By suggesting that Western Europe was on the verge of being neutralized, or "Finlandized, " by Soviet blackmail, American neoconservatives were able to create a picture of Soviet strength and Western weakness that was, in fact, the very reverse of reality. Drawing on a rich variety of sources, Allin analyzes the military, political and economic errors that distorted this picture. His sober and balanced account gives due credit to the uncertainties and complexities of foreign-policy making in a nuclear age. But one conclusion stands out clearly: Given the real balance of power that existed in 1979, recent efforts to give credit to Reagan "toughness" for winning the Cold War are little more than historical caricature.
The damage that has been done to the transatlantic alliance will not be repaired through grand architectural redesigns or radical new agendas. Instead, the transatlantic partners need to restore their consensus and cooperation on key security challenges with a limited agenda that reflects the essential conservatism of the transatlantic partnership during the Cold War and the 1990s. There will inevitably be big challenges, such as the rise of China, where transatlantic disparities in strategic means and commitments preclude any common alliance undertaking. Yet such limits are nothing new. The absence of a common transatlantic commitment to counter-insurgency in Iraq may cause resentments, but so too did the lack of a common commitment to counter-insurgency in Vietnam. This Adelphi Paper suggests ten propositions for future transatlantic consensus – that is to say, ten security challenges for which the allies should be able to agree on common strategies. These run the gamut from an effective strategy to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability to transatlantic leadership for international cooperation against global warming. If pursued with seriousness and a reasonable degree of transatlantic unity, these propositions could constitute the foundations of an effective partnership. They are, in the authors’ view, the basis for a consensus on the most pressing security challenges of the twenty-first century. The time is right for this kind of serious rededication to alliance purposes. There has already been some effort to repair the damage; moreover, new leaders are in place or coming to the countries that were major protagonists of the transatlantic crisis: Germany, France, Britain and, in 2009, the United States. It is possible that these four new leaders will be better able to put the disputes of the recent past behind them. This extended essay is a guide to the possibilities, and also the limits, of a new start.
The Soviet empire entered its steepest decline and fall in the same years Washington was captivated by the specter of a rising Soviet threat. How did American elites get it so wrong? Dana H. Allin combines masterful Cold War narrative with a fascinating dissection of the fallacies of this surreal pessimism.
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