The Department of Defense, through the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives program, is currently in the process of constructing two full-scale pilot plants at the Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado and the Blue Grass Army Depot in Kentucky to destroy the last two remaining inventories of chemical weapons in the U.S. stockpile. These two storage sites together account for about 10 percent of the original U.S. chemical agent stockpile that is in the process of being destroyed in accordance with the international Chemical Weapons Convention treaty. Unlike their predecessors, these facilities will use neutralization technologies to destroy agents contained within rockets, projectiles, and mortar rounds, requiring the use of specially designed equipment. As part of its focus on safe operation of the planned facilities, the Program Manager for Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives asked the National Research Council (NRC) to conduct a study to offer guidance on the application of process safety metrics at the Pueblo Chemical Depot and Blue Grass Army Depot. Process safety is a disciplined framework for managing the integrity of operating systems, processes and personnel handling hazardous substances, and operations by applying good design principles, engineering, and operating practices. Process Safety Metrics at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants discusses the use of leading and lagging process safety metrics that could provide feedback on the effectiveness of controls to mitigate risks and minimize consequences of potential incidents. The book makes several recommendations that will facilitate the development and application of process safety metrics at both sites.
The Department of Defense, through the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives program, is currently in the process of constructing two full-scale pilot plants at the Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado and the Blue Grass Army Depot in Kentucky to destroy the last two remaining inventories of chemical weapons in the U.S. stockpile. These two storage sites together account for about 10 percent of the original U.S. chemical agent stockpile that is in the process of being destroyed in accordance with the international Chemical Weapons Convention treaty. Unlike their predecessors, these facilities will use neutralization technologies to destroy agents contained within rockets, projectiles, and mortar rounds, requiring the use of specially designed equipment. As part of its focus on safe operation of the planned facilities, the Program Manager for Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives asked the National Research Council (NRC) to conduct a study to offer guidance on the application of process safety metrics at the Pueblo Chemical Depot and Blue Grass Army Depot. Process safety is a disciplined framework for managing the integrity of operating systems, processes and personnel handling hazardous substances, and operations by applying good design principles, engineering, and operating practices. Process Safety Metrics at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants discusses the use of leading and lagging process safety metrics that could provide feedback on the effectiveness of controls to mitigate risks and minimize consequences of potential incidents. The book makes several recommendations that will facilitate the development and application of process safety metrics at both sites.
January 2012 saw the completion of the U.S. Army's Chemical Materials Agency's (CMA's) task to destroy 90 percent of the nation's stockpile of chemical weapons. CMA completed destruction of the chemical agents and associated weapons deployed overseas, which were transported to Johnston Atoll, southwest of Hawaii, and demilitarized there. The remaining 10 percent of the nation's chemical weapons stockpile is stored at two continental U.S. depots, in Lexington, Kentucky, and Pueblo, Colorado. Their destruction has been assigned to a separate U.S. Army organization, the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) Element. ACWA is currently constructing the last two chemical weapons disposal facilities, the Pueblo and Blue Grass Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants (denoted PCAPP and BGCAPP), with weapons destruction activities scheduled to start in 2015 and 2020, respectively. ACWA is charged with destroying the mustard agent stockpile at Pueblo and the nerve and mustard agent stockpile at Blue Grass without using the multiple incinerators and furnaces used at the five CMA demilitarization plants that dealt with assembled chemical weapons - munitions containing both chemical agents and explosive/propulsive components. The two ACWA demilitarization facilities are congressionally mandated to employ noncombustion-based chemical neutralization processes to destroy chemical agents. In order to safely operate its disposal plants, CMA developed methods and procedures to monitor chemical agent contamination of both secondary waste materials and plant structural components. ACWA currently plans to adopt these methods and procedures for use at these facilities. The Assessment of Agent Monitoring Strategies for the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants report also develops and describes a half-dozen scenarios involving prospective ACWA secondary waste characterization, process equipment maintenance and changeover activities, and closure agent decontamination challenges, where direct, real-time agent contamination measurements on surfaces or in porous bulk materials might allow more efficient and possibly safer operations if suitable analytical technology is available and affordable.
Assessment of Supercritical Water Oxidation System Testing for the Blue Grass Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant reviews and evaluates the results of the tests conducted on one of the SCWO units to be provided to Blue Grass Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant. The Army Element, Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) is responsible for managing the conduct of destruction operations for the remaining 10 percent of the nation's chemical agent stockpile, stored at the Blue Grass Army Depot (Kentucky) and the Pueblo Chemical Depot (Colorado). Facilities to destroy the agents and their associated munitions are currently being constructed at these sites. The Blue Grass Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant (BGCAPP) will destroy chemical agent and some associated energetic materials by a process of chemical neutralization known as hydrolysis. The resulting chemical waste stream is known as hydrolysate. Among the first-of-a-kind equipment to be installed at BGCAPP are three supercritical water oxidation (SCWO) reactor systems. These particular hydrolysate feeds present unique non-agent-related challenges to subsequent processing via SCWO due to their caustic nature and issues of salt management.This report provides recommendations on SCWO systemization testing inclusive of durability testing and discusses systemization testing objectives and concepts.
The Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant (BGCAPP) is under construction near Richmond, Kentucky, two dispose of one of the two remaining stockpiles of chemical munitions in the United States. The stockpile that BGCAPP will dispose of is stored at the Blue Grass Army Depot (BGAD). BGCAPP is a tenant activity on BGAD. The stockpile stored at BGAD consists of mustard agent loaded in projectiles, and the nerve agents GB and VX loaded into projectiles and M55 rockets. BGCAPP will process the rockets by cutting them, still in their shipping and firing tube (SFT), between the warhead and motor sections of the rocket. The warhead will be processed through BGCAPP. The separated rocket motors that have been monitored for chemical agent and cleared for transportation outside of BGCAPP, the subject of this report, will be disposed of outside of BGCAPP. Any motors found to be contaminated with chemical agent will be processed through BGCAPP and are not addressed in this report. Disposal Options for the Rocket Motors From Nerve Agent Rockets Stored at Blue Grass Army Depot addresses safety in handling the separated rocket motors with special attention to the electrical ignition system, the need for adequate storage space for the motors in order to maintain the planned disposal rate at BGCAPP, thermal and chemical disposal technologies, and on-site and off-site disposal options. On-site is defined as disposal on BGAD, and off-site is defined as disposal by a commercial or government facility outside of BGAD.
In 1993, the United States signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), an international treaty outlawing the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. The chemical weapons stockpiles at five of the U.S. chemical weapons storage sites have now been destroyed. At those sites, the munitions were robotically opened and the chemical agent was removed, collected, and incinerated. One of the remaining sites with chemical weapons stockpiles is the Blue Grass Army Depot near Richmond, Kentucky. In this case, caustic hydrolysis will be used to destroy the agents and energetics, resulting in a secondary waste stream known as hydrolysate. Review Criteria for Successful Treatment of Hydrolysate at the Blue Grass Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant develops criteria for successfully treating the hydrolysate, identifies systemization data that should factor into the criteria/decision process, suggests potential modifications to suggested treatment that would allow continued onsite processing, and assesses waste disposal procedures. This study further examines the possibility of delay or failure of the existing technology and examines possible alternatives to onsite treatment.
In 1996, Congress enacted directing the Department of Defense to assess and demonstrate technology alternatives to incineration for destruction of the chemical weapons stored at Pueblo Chemical and Blue Grass Army Depots. Since then, the National Research Council (NRC) has been carrying out evaluations of candidate technologies including reviews of engineering design studies and demonstration testing. Most recently, the NRC was asked by the Army to evaluate designs for pilot plants at Pueblo and Blue Grass. These pilot plants would use chemical neutralization for destroying the chemical agent and the energetics in the munitions stockpiles of these two depots. This report provides the interim assessment of the Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant (PCAPP) to permit adjustment of any significant problems as soon as possible. The report presents an analysis of the issues about the current PCAPP design and a series of findings and recommendations about ways to reduce concerns with involve the public more heavily in the process.
The Army's ability to meet public and congressional demands to destroy expeditiously all of the U.S. declared chemical weapons would be enhanced by the selection and acquisition of appropriate explosive destruction technologies (EDTs) to augment the main technologies to be used to destroy the chemical weapons currently at the Blue Grass Army Depot (BGAD) in Kentucky and the Pueblo Chemical Depot (PCD) in Colorado. The Army is considering four EDTs for the destruction of chemical weapons: three from private sector vendors, and a fourth, Army-developed explosive destruction system (EDS). This book updates earlier evaluations of these technologies, as well as any other viable detonation technologies, based on several considerations including process maturity, process efficacy, process throughput, process safety, public and regulatory acceptability, and secondary waste issues, among others. It also provides detailed information on each of the requirements at BGAD and PCD and rates each of the existing suitable EDTs plus the Army's EDS with respect to how well it satisfies these requirements.
The United States is in the process of destroying its chemical weapons stockpile. In 1996, Congress mandated that DOD demonstrate and select alternative methods to incineration at the Blue Grass and Pueblo sites. The Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) program was setup to oversee the development of these methods, and pilot plants were established at both sites. One of the new technologies being developed at the Blue Grass pilot plant are metal parts treaters (MPTs) to be used for the empty metal munitions cases. During recent testing, some issues arose with the MPTs that caused the ACWA to request a review by the NRC to investigate and determine their causes. This book presents a discussion of the MPT system; an assessment of the MPT testing activities; an analysis of thermal testing, modeling, and predicted throughput of the MPT; and an examination of the applicability of munitions treatment units under development at Pueblo for the Blue Grass pilot plant.
The U.S. Army Program Manager for Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (PMACWA) is charged with disposing of chemical weapons as stored at two sites: Pueblo, Colorado, and Blue Grass, Kentucky. In accordance with congressional mandates, technologies other than incineration are to be used if they are as safe and as cost effective. The weapons are to be disposed of in compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. Although an element of the U.S. Army, the PMACWA is responsible to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics for completing this mission. This book deals with the expected significant quantities of secondary wastes that will be generated during operations of the facilities and their closure. While there are only estimates for the waste quantities that will be generated, they provide a good basis for planning and developing alternatives for waste disposal while the plants are still in the design phase. Establishing efficient disposal options for the secondary wastes can enable more timely and cost-effective operation and closure of the facilities.
The Chemical Weapons Convention requires, among other things, that the signatories to the conventionâ€"which includes the United Statesâ€"destroy by April 29, 2007, or as soon possible thereafter, any chemical warfare materiel that has been recovered from sites where it has been buried once discovered. For several years the United States and several other countries have been developing and using technologies to dispose of this non-stockpile materiel. To determine whether international efforts have resulted in technologies that would benefit the U.S. program, the U.S. Army asked the NRC to evaluate and compare such technologies to those now used by the United States. This book presents a discussion of factors used in the evaluations, summaries of evaluations of several promising international technologies for processing munitions and for agent-only processing, and summaries of other technologies that are less likely to be of benefit to the U.S. program at this time.
The U.S. Army is in the process of destroying the nation's stockpile of aging chemical weapons stored at eight locations in the continental United States and on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific. Originally, incineration was chosen for the destruction of these stores, but this method has met with public opposition, and Congress directed the Army to develop alternative technologies for destroying the stockpiles in Pueblo, CO and Richmond, KY. To assist the Army in this process, the NRC was asked to evaluate the engineering design study of the three Blue Grass candidates. This book presents an analysis of various issues pertaining to the proposed engineering design package for the Blue Grass facility.
The National Research Council convened a committee of experts to advise the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) on the operation of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), a geologic repository for disposal of defense transuranic (TRU) waste near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The committee was asked to provide recommendations on the following two issues: (1) a research agenda to enhance confidence in the long-term performance of WIPP; and (2) increasing the throughput, efficiency, and cost-benefit without compromising safety of the National TRU Program for characterizing, certifying, packaging, and shipping waste to WIPP. The committee has written this interim report to provide DOE with recommendations on several issues that the committee believes merit immediate consideration and action. In developing this report, the committee has been guided by the principle of "reasonableness" with respect to risks, costs, and the ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) principle. In the committee's judgment, implementing the recommendations contained in this report will contribute to the continued safe operation of WIPP.
The use of hazardous chemicals such as methyl isocyanate can be a significant concern to the residents of communities adjacent to chemical facilities, but is often an integral part of the chemical manufacturing process. In order to ensure that chemical manufacturing takes place in a manner that is safe for workers, members of the local community, and the environment, the philosophy of inherently safer processing can be used to identify opportunities to eliminate or reduce the hazards associated with chemical processing. However, the concepts of inherently safer process analysis have not yet been adopted in all chemical manufacturing plants. The Use and Storage of Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) at Bayer CropScience presents a possible framework to help plant managers choose between alternative processing options-considering factors such as environmental impact and product yield as well as safety- to develop a chemical manufacturing system. In 2008, an explosion at the Bayer CropScience chemical production plant in Institute, West Virginia, resulted in the deaths of two employees, a fire within the production unit, and extensive damage to nearby structures. The accident drew renewed attention to the fact that the Bayer facility manufactured and stores methyl isocyanate, or MIC - a volatile, highly toxic chemical used in the production of carbamate pesticides and the agent responsible for thousands of death in Bhopal, India, in 1984. In the Institute accident, debris from the blast hit the shield surrounding a MIC storage tank, and although the container was not damaged, an investigation by the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board found that the debris could have struck a relief valve vent pipe and cause the release of MIC to the atmosphere. The Board's investigation also highlighted a number of weaknesses in the Bayer facility's emergency response systems. In light of these concerns, the Board requested the National Research Council convene a committee of independent experts to write a report that examines the use and storage of MIC at the Bayer facility. The Use and Storage of Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) at Bayer CropScience also evaluates the analyses on alternative production methods for MIC and carbamate pesticides preformed by Bayer and the previous owners of the facility.
A large number of chemicals are used on land at shore facilities, in the air in combat and reconnaissance aircraft, on seas around the world in surface vessels, and in submarine vessels by the navy and marine corps. Although the chemicals used are for the large part harmless, there is a significant amount of chemicals in use that can be health hazards during specific exposure circumstances. The Navy Environmental Health Center (NEHC) is primarily tasked with assessing these hazards. The NEHC completes its tasks by reviewing toxicological and related data and preparing health-hazard assessments (HHAs) for the different chemicals. Since the NEHC is continually asked to develop these HHAs, the National Research Council (NRC) was asked to assess independently the validity and effectiveness of NEHC's HHA process, in order to determine whether the process as implemented provides the Navy with the best, comprehensive, and defensible evaluations of health hazards and to identify any elements that might require improvement. The task was assigned to the Board on Environmental Studies and Toxicology's Committee on Toxicology's (COT's) Subcommittee on Toxicological hazard and Risk Assessment. Review of the U.S. Navy Environmental Health Center's Health-Hazard Assessment Process presents the subcommittee's report. The report is the work of expertise in general toxicology, inhalation toxicology, epidemiology, neurotoxicology, immunotoxicology, reproductive and developmental toxicology, pharmacology, medicine, risk assessment, and biostatistics. It is based on its review of documents provided by NEHC, presentations by NEHC personnel, and site visits to NEHC in Norfolk, Virginia and an aircraft carrier in San Diego, California.
There is growing concern about the possible use of toxic industrial chemicals or other hazardous chemicals by those seeking to perpetrate acts of terrorism. The U.S. Chemical Security Engagement Program (CSP), funded by the U.S. Department of State and run by Sandia National Laboratories, seeks to develop and facilitate cooperative international activities that promote best practices in chemical security and safe management of toxic chemicals, including: Partnering with host governments, chemical professionals, and industry to assess and fill gaps in chemical security abroad. Providing technical expertise and training to improve best practices in security and safety among chemical professionals and industry. Increasing transparency and accountability for dangerous chemical materials, expertise, and technologies. Providing opportunities for collaboration with the international professional chemical community. The Department of State called on the National Academies to assist in the CSP's efforts to promote chemical safety and security in developing countries.
Between 1942 and 1975, the U.S. Army conducted tests with human subjects to study the effects of a variety of agents, including chemical warfare and biological agents. The potential long-term health effects on the test subjects from their exposures have been evaluated periodically, most recently in a report titled Assessment of Potential Long-Term Health Effects on Army Human Test Subjects of Relevant Biological and Chemical Agents, Drugs, Medications and Substances: Literature Review and Analysis (the Report), which was prepared by a contractor to assist the Army with making determinations about providing medical care to former test subjects. In response to a request by the Army, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine formed a committee that was tasked with examining whether the Report appropriately identified potential long-term health effects from exposure to the test agents and whether an adequate weight-of-evidence approach was used to characterize the strength of the associations between the agents and their potential health effects. The committee was made aware at its first meeting on November 30, 2017, that the Army had already begun to receive applications for medical care and that some determinations may need to be made before the committee's evaluation of the Report was completed. Because of this urgency, the Army developed a process by which applications for medical care will be reviewed, and as a result, the committee was given the additional task of reviewing the Army's Memorandum that describes the approach that will be used by the Army to evaluate agent- and outcome-specific associations. This interim report was prepared to facilitate the Army's deliberations. A review of the Report is presented first, followed by a review of the Memorandum.
The regulation of potentially hazardous substances has become a controversial issue. This volume evaluates past efforts to develop and use risk assessment guidelines, reviews the experience of regulatory agencies with different administrative arrangements for risk assessment, and evaluates various proposals to modify procedures. The book's conclusions and recommendations can be applied across the entire field of environmental health.
A fundamental challenge in past studies evaluating whether health problems experienced by Vietnam veterans might be linked to wartime use of Agent Orange or other herbicides has been a lack of information about the veterans' level of exposure to these herbicides. To address that problem, researchers developed a model to assess the opportunity for herbicide exposure among these veterans. The Utility of Proximity-Based Herbicide Exposure Assessment in Epidemiologic Studies of Vietnam Veterans presents the conclusions and recommendations of an Institute of Medicine committee (IOM) that was convened to provide guidance to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) about the best use of a model to characterize exposure to the troops based on their proximity to herbicide spraying in Vietnam. This book's assessment is guided by four primary considerations: to be clear about what the assessment model does and does not claim to do; to gain understanding of the strengths and limitations of data on herbicide spraying, troop locations, and health outcomes; to consider whether the model locates spraying and troops accurately to consider the potential contributions and pitfalls of using it in epidemiologic studies. Of particular interest in these deliberations were the degree to which exposure classification might be improved if the model were to be used, and the appropriate interpretation of the results of any such studies. In light of the questions that remain concerning herbicide exposure and health among Vietnam veterans and the array of evidence that has thus far been brought to bear on that issue, The Utility of Proximity-Based Herbicide Exposure Assessment in Epidemiologic Studies of Vietnam Veterans concludes that the application of this model offers a constructive approach to extending knowledge about the effects of herbicides on the health of these veterans and merits the initial steps recommended in our report.
Risk assessments are often used by the federal government to estimate the risk the public may face from such things as exposure to a chemical or the potential failure of an engineered structure, and they underlie many regulatory decisions. Last January, the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a draft bulletin for all federal agencies, which included a new definition of risk assessment and proposed standards aimed at improving federal risk assessments. This National Research Council report, written at the request of OMB, evaluates the draft bulletin and supports its overall goals of improving the quality of risk assessments. However, the report concludes that the draft bulletin is "fundamentally flawed" from a scientific and technical standpoint and should be withdrawn. Problems include an overly broad definition of risk assessment in conflict with long-established concepts and practices, and an overly narrow definition of adverse health effects-one that considers only clinically apparent effects to be adverse, ignoring other biological changes that could lead to health effects. The report also criticizes the draft bulletin for focusing mainly on human health risk assessments while neglecting assessments of technology and engineered structures.
From 1972 to 1982, approximately 1,500-2,100 US Air Force Reserve personnel trained and worked on C-123 aircraft that had formerly been used to spray herbicides in Vietnam as part of Operation Ranch Hand. After becoming aware that some of the aircraft on which they had worked had previously served this purpose, some of these AF Reservists applied to the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for compensatory coverage under the Agent Orange Act of 1991. The Act provides health care and disability coverage for health conditions that have been deemed presumptively service-related for herbicide exposure during the Vietnam War. The VA denied the applications on the basis that these veterans were ineligible because as non-Vietnam-era veterans or as Vietnam-era veterans without "boots on the ground" service in Vietnam, they were not covered. However, with the knowledge that some air and wipe samples taken between 1979 and 2009 from some of the C-123s used in Operation Ranch Hand showed the presence of agent orange residues, representatives of the C-123 Veterans Association began a concerted effort to reverse VA's position and obtain coverage. At the request of the VA, Post-Vietnam Dioxin Exposure in Agent Orange-Contaminated C-123 Aircraft evaluates whether or not service in these C-123s could have plausibly resulted in exposures detrimental to the health of these Air Force Reservists. The Institute of Medicine assembled an expert committee to address this question qualitatively, but in a scientific and evidence-based fashion. This report evaluates the reliability of the available information for establishing exposure and addresses and places in context whether any documented residues represent potentially harmful exposure by characterizing the amounts available and the degree to which absorption might be expected. Post-Vietnam Dioxin Exposure rejects the idea that the dioxin residues detected on interior surfaces of the C-123s were immobile and effectively inaccessible to the Reservists as a source of exposure. Accordingly, this report states with confidence that the Air Force Reservists were exposed when working in the Operation Ranch Hand C-123s and so experienced some increase in their risk of a variety of adverse responses.
Research related to chemical warfare agents (CWAs) has historically focused on life threatening battlefield effects caused by high level exposures to the agents, not effects associated with exposures to low concentrations of them. In this report, low level concentrations refers to exposures that may not have any immediate observed health effects, but may produce delayed health effects months or years later. Recently, there has been increased concern about the potential health effects of exposures to CWAs at low concentrations. This report reviews the Department of Defense's (DOD) Research Plan for obtaining toxicologic and other relevant data to assess risk to military personnel. The CWAs of concern include the following nerve and vesicant agents: tabun, sarin, soman, cyclosarin, VX, and sulfur mustard. The report discusses the health effects of exposure to low levels of these agents and provides guidance to DOD on appropriate risk assessment methods for assessing toxicologic risk to military personnel from low-level exposures to CWAs. The report concludes that DOD's Research Plan is well planned and many of the proposed research tasks are likely to provide valuable information to DOD in protecting military personnel.
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