The National Aerospace Initiative (NAI) was conceived as a joint effort between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to sustain the aerospace leadership of the United States through the acceleration of selected aerospace technologies: hypersonic flight, access to space, and space technologies. The Air Force became concerned about the NAI's possible consequences on Air Force programs and budget if NAI program decisions differed from Air Force priorities. To examine this issue, it asked the NRC for an independent review of the NAI. This report presents the results of that assessment. It focuses on three questions asked by the Air Force: is NAI technically feasible in the time frame laid out; is it financially feasible over that period; and is it operationally relevant.
NASA created the University Leadership Initiative (ULI) to engage creative and innovative minds in the academic arena to identify significant aeronautics and aviation research challenges and define their unique approach to their solution. The ULI was started in 2015 as part of the larger University Innovation Project, with the goal of seeking new, innovative ideas that can support the U.S. aviation community and NASA's long-term aeronautics research goals, as established by its Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate. Assessing NASA's University Leadership Initiative reviews the ULI and makes recommendations to enhance program's impact to benefit students, faculty, industry, and the U.S. public.
The Committee for the Review of NASA's Pioneering Revolutionary Technology (PRT) Program and its three supporting panels were charged by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) with assessing the overall scientific and technical quality of the PRT program and its component programs, along with their associated elements and individual research tasks. Major issues addressed in the review include (1) research portfolios, (2) research plans, (3) technical community connections, (4) methodologies, and (5) overall capabilities. As reflected in the organization of the report, a two-pronged assessment was developed. Each panel provided a detailed assessment of the program under its purview, which was refined and updated over the course of the review. The committee, composed mainly of representatives from each panel, integrated and evaluated the panel results and provided top-level advice on issues cutting across the entire PRT program.
The National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies was asked by NASA and the Office of Management and Budget to perform an assessment of NASA's Aerospace Technology Enterprise. The first such review, which began in early 2002, examined Pioneering Revolutionary Technology (now known as Mission and Science Measurement Technology). The assessment presented here, of the Aeronautics Technology Programs, began in early 2003 and is the second in the review series. The Aeronautics Technology Programs has three components: the Vehicle Systems Program, the Airspace Systems Program, and the Aviation Safety Program. To conduct this review, the NRC established three panels, one for each of the component programs. The NRC also established a parent committee, consisting of the chairman and a subset of members from each panel. The committee and panels comprised a cross-section of experts from industry, academia, and government and included senior-level managers and researchers in the aeronautics field. Biographical information on the committee and panel members is found in Appendix A. Review of NASA's Aerospace Technology Enterprise: An Assessment of NASA's Aeronautics Technology Programs contains the committee's assessment of the Aeronautics Technology Programs. Chapter 1 presents a top-level assessment, and Chapters 2 through 4 provide the assessments of the Vehicle Systems Program, the Airspace Systems Program, and the Aviation Safety Program, respectively.
NASA is a global leader in aeronautics research and development â€" fostering advances in aviation safety and emissions, propulsion technology, and many other areas. And the agency's Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) has played a vital role in the U.S. aeronautics industry. In recent years, the directorate's leaders and experts outside the agency have sought ways to speed innovative uses of ARMD's research results. But the directorate faces management challenges that make it difficult for such applications to succeed â€" or to occur at all. This report from the National Academies' National Research Council, offers the agency guidance on how to manage the transfer of technology to external users, as well as implement flexible personnel and financial-management practices. The report also points out problems that stem from a lack of agreement on ARMD's future direction and several years of federal budget cuts.
In 2006, the NRC published a Decadal Survey of Civil Aeronautics: Foundation for the Future, which set out six strategic objectives for the next decade of civil aeronautics research and technology. To determine how NASA is implementing the decadal survey, Congress mandated in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Act of 2005 that the NRC carry out a review of those efforts. Among other things, this report presents an assessment of how well NASA's research portfolio is addressing the recommendations and high priority R&T challenges identified in the Decadal Survey; how well NASA's aeronautic research portfolio is addressing the aeronautics research requirements; and whether the nation will have the skilled workforce and research facilities to meet the first two items.
In the five decades since NASA was created, the agency has sustained its legacy from the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA) in playing a major role in U.S. aeronautics research and has contributed substantially to United States preeminence in civil and military aviation. This preeminence has contributed significantly to the overall economy and balance of trade of the United States through the sales of aircraft throughout the world. NASA's contributions have included advanced flight control systems, de-icing devices, thrust-vectoring systems, wing fuselage drag reduction configurations, aircraft noise reduction, advanced transonic airfoil and winglet designs, and flight systems. Each of these contributions was successfully demonstrated through NASA flight research programs. Equally important, the aircraft industry would not have adopted these and similar advances without NASA flight demonstration on full-scale aircraft flying in an environment identical to that which the aircraft are to operate-in other words, flight research. Flight research is a tool, not a conclusion. It often informs simulation and modeling and wind tunnel testing. Aeronautics research does not follow a linear path from simulation to wind tunnels to flying an aircraft. The loss of flight research capabilities at NASA has therefore hindered the agency's ability to make progress throughout its aeronautics program by removing a primary tool for research. Recapturing NASA's Aeronautics Flight Research Capabilities discusses the motivation for NASA to pursue flight research, addressing the aspects of the committee's task such as identifying the challenges where research program success can be achieved most effectively through flight research. The report contains three case studies chosen to illustrate the state of NASA ARMD. These include the ERA program and the Fundamental Research Program's hypersonics and supersonics projects. Following these case studies, the report describes issues with the NASA ARMD organization and management and offers solutions. In addition, the chapter discusses current impediments to progress, including demonstrating relevancy to stakeholders, leadership, and the lack of focus relative to available resources. Recapturing NASA's Aeronautics Flight Research Capabilities concludes that the type and sophistication of flight research currently being conducted by NASA today is relatively low and that the agency's overall progress in aeronautics is severely constrained by its inability to actually advance its research projects to the flight research stage, a step that is vital to bridging the confidence gap. NASA has spent much effort protecting existing research projects conducted at low levels, but it has not been able to pursue most of these projects to the point where they actually produce anything useful. Without the ability to actually take flight, NASA's aeronautics research cannot progress, cannot make new discoveries, and cannot contribute to U.S. aerospace preeminence.
The National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies was asked by NASA and the Office of Management and Budget to perform an assessment of NASA's Aerospace Technology Enterprise. The first such review, which began in early 2002, examined Pioneering Revolutionary Technology (now known as Mission and Science Measurement Technology). The assessment presented here, of the Aeronautics Technology Programs, began in early 2003 and is the second in the review series. The Aeronautics Technology Programs has three components: the Vehicle Systems Program, the Airspace Systems Program, and the Aviation Safety Program. To conduct this review, the NRC established three panels, one for each of the component programs. The NRC also established a parent committee, consisting of the chairman and a subset of members from each panel. The committee and panels comprised a cross-section of experts from industry, academia, and government and included senior-level managers and researchers in the aeronautics field. Biographical information on the committee and panel members is found in Appendix A. Review of NASA's Aerospace Technology Enterprise: An Assessment of NASA's Aeronautics Technology Programs contains the committee's assessment of the Aeronautics Technology Programs. Chapter 1 presents a top-level assessment, and Chapters 2 through 4 provide the assessments of the Vehicle Systems Program, the Airspace Systems Program, and the Aviation Safety Program, respectively.
As civil space policies and programs have evolved, the geopolitical environment has changed dramatically. Although the U.S. space program was originally driven in large part by competition with the Soviet Union, the nation now finds itself in a post-Cold War world in which many nations have established, or are aspiring to develop, independent space capabilities. Furthermore discoveries from developments in the first 50 years of the space age have led to an explosion of scientific and engineering knowledge and practical applications of space technology. The private sector has also been developing, fielding, and expanding the commercial use of space-based technology and systems. Recognizing the new national and international context for space activities, America's Future in Space is meant to advise the nation on key goals and critical issues in 21st century U.S. civil space policy.
The NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts (NIAC) was formed in 1998 to provide an independent source of advanced aeronautical and space concepts that could dramatically impact how NASA develops and conducts its missions. Until the program's termination in August 2007, NIAC provided an independent open forum, a high-level point of entry to NASA for an external community of innovators, and an external capability for analysis and definition of advanced aeronautics and space concepts to complement the advanced concept activities conducted within NASA. Throughout its 9-year existence, NIAC inspired an atmosphere for innovation that stretched the imagination and encouraged creativity. As requested by Congress, this volume reviews the effectiveness of NIAC and makes recommendations concerning the importance of such a program to NASA and to the nation as a whole, including the proper role of NASA and the federal government in fostering scientific innovation and creativity and in developing advanced concepts for future systems. Key findings and recommendations include that in order to achieve its mission, NASA must have, and is currently lacking, a mechanism to investigate visionary, far-reaching advanced concepts. Therefore, a NIAC-like entity should be reestablished to fill this gap.
The Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) announced by President George W. Bush in 2004 sets NASA and the nation on a bold path to return to the Moon and one day put a human on Mars. The long-term endeavor represented by the VSE is, however, subject to the constraints imposed by annual funding. Given that the VSE may take tens of years to implement, a significant issue is whether NASA and the United States will have the workforce needed to achieve that vision. The issues range from short-term concerns about the current workforce's skills for overseeing the development of new spacecraft and launch vehicles for the VSE to long-term issues regarding the training, recruiting, and retaining of scientists and engineers in-house as well as in industry and academia. Asked to explore science and technology (S&T) workforce needs to achieve the nation's long-term space exploration, the Committee on Meeting the Workforce Needs for the National Vision for Space Exploration concluded that in the short term, NASA does not possess the requisite in-house personnel with the experience in human spaceflight systems development needed to implement the VSE. But the committee acknowledges that NASA is cognizant of this fact and has taken steps to correct it, primarily by seeking to recruit highly skilled personnel from outside NASA, including persons from industry and retirees. For the long term, NASA has to ask if it is attracting and developing the talent it will need to execute a mission to return to the Moon, and the agency must identify what it needs to do to attract and develop a world-class workforce to explore other worlds. A major challenge for NASA is reorienting its human spaceflight workforce from the operation of current vehicles to the development of new vehicles at least throughout the next decade, as well as starting operations with new rockets and new spacecraft. The committee emphasizes further that when evaluating its future workforce requirements, NASA has to consider not only programs for students, but also training opportunities for its current employees. NASA's training programs at the agency's various field centers, which are focused on NASA's civil service talent, require support to prevent the agency's internal skill base from withering. Furthermore, NASA faces the risk that, if it fails to nurture its own internal workforce, skilled personnel will be attracted to other government agencies and industry. Building a Better NASA Workforce: Meeting the Workforce Needs for the National Vision for Space Exploration explains the findings and recommendations of the committee.
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