Book's by Committee on the Future of the U.S. Aerospace Infrastructure and Aerospace Engineering Disciplines to Meet the Needs of the Air Force and the Department of Defense
The Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition requested that the National Research Council (NRC) review the Air Force's planned acquisition programs to determine if, given its scale, the highly talented scientific, technical, and engineering personnel base could be maintained, to identify issues affecting the engineering and science work force, and to identify issues affecting the aerospace industry's leadership in technology development, innovation, and product quality, as well as its ability to support Air Force missions.
The Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition requested that the National Research Council (NRC) review the Air Force's planned acquisition programs to determine if, given its scale, the highly talented scientific, technical, and engineering personnel base could be maintained, to identify issues affecting the engineering and science work force, and to identify issues affecting the aerospace industry's leadership in technology development, innovation, and product quality, as well as its ability to support Air Force missions.
In January 2006, the President announced a new civilian space policy focusing on exploration. As part of its preparations to implement that policy, NASA asked the NRC to explore long-range science and technology workforce needs to achieve the space exploration vision, identify obstacles to filling those needs, and put forward solutions to those obstacles. As part of the study, the NRC held a workshop to identify important factors affecting NASA's future workforce and its capacity to implement the exploration vision. This interim report presents a summary of the highlights of that workshop and an initial set of findings. The report provides a review of the workforce implications of NASA's plans, an assessment of science and technology workforce demographics, an analysis of factors affecting the aerospace workforce for both NASA and the relevant aerospace industry, and preliminary findings and recommendations. A final report is scheduled for completion in early 2007.
The National Aerospace Initiative (NAI) was conceived as a joint effort between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to sustain the aerospace leadership of the United States through the acceleration of selected aerospace technologies: hypersonic flight, access to space, and space technologies. The Air Force became concerned about the NAI's possible consequences on Air Force programs and budget if NAI program decisions differed from Air Force priorities. To examine this issue, it asked the NRC for an independent review of the NAI. This report presents the results of that assessment. It focuses on three questions asked by the Air Force: is NAI technically feasible in the time frame laid out; is it financially feasible over that period; and is it operationally relevant.
In February 2009, the commercial communications satellite Iridium 33 collided with the Russian military communications satellite Cosmos 2251. The collision, which was not the first recorded between two satellites in orbit-but the most recent and alarming-produced thousands of pieces of debris, only a small percentage of which could be tracked by sensors located around the world. In early 2007, China tested a kinetic anti-satellite weapon against one of its own satellites, which also generated substantial amounts of space debris. These collisions highlighted the importance of maintaining accurate knowledge, and the associated uncertainty, of the orbit of each object in space. These data are needed to predict close approaches of space objects and to compute the probability of collision so that owners/operators can decide whether or not to make a collision avoidance maneuver by a spacecraft with such capability. The space object catalog currently contains more than 20,000 objects, and when the planned space fence radar becomes operational this number is expected to exceed 100,000. A key task is to determine if objects might come closer to each other, an event known as "conjunction," and the probability that they might collide. The U.S. Air Force is the primary U.S. government organization tasked with maintaining the space object catalog and data on all space objects. This is a complicated task, involving collecting data from a multitude of different sensors-many of which were not specifically designed to track orbiting objects-and fusing the tracking data along with other data, such as data from atmospheric models, to provide predictions of where objects will be in the future. The Committee for the Assessment of the U.S. Air Force's Astrodynamic Standards collected data and heard from numerous people involved in developing and maintaining the current astrodynamics standards for the Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), as well as representatives of the user community, such as NASA and commercial satellite owners and operators. Preventing collisions of space objects, regardless of their ownership, is in the national security interested of the United States. Continuing Kepler's Quest makes recommendations to the AFSPC in order for it to create and expand research programs, design and develop hardware and software, as well as determine which organizations to work with to achieve its goals.
A Summary of the Workshop to Identify the Gaps and Possible Directions for NASA's Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Programs summarizes the two-day workshop held on March 9-10, 2011, where various stakeholders presented diverse perspectives on matters concerning NASA Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) programs, NASA mission operators, the role and relationships of NASA MMOD programs to other federal agencies, MMOD and the commercial industry, and orbital debris retrieval and removal. The report assesses NASA's existing efforts, policies, and organizations with regard to orbital debris and micrometeoroids by creating advisory dialogue on potential opportunities for program enhancement and maintenance practices.
The Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) announced by President George W. Bush in 2004 sets NASA and the nation on a bold path to return to the Moon and one day put a human on Mars. The long-term endeavor represented by the VSE is, however, subject to the constraints imposed by annual funding. Given that the VSE may take tens of years to implement, a significant issue is whether NASA and the United States will have the workforce needed to achieve that vision. The issues range from short-term concerns about the current workforce's skills for overseeing the development of new spacecraft and launch vehicles for the VSE to long-term issues regarding the training, recruiting, and retaining of scientists and engineers in-house as well as in industry and academia. Asked to explore science and technology (S&T) workforce needs to achieve the nation's long-term space exploration, the Committee on Meeting the Workforce Needs for the National Vision for Space Exploration concluded that in the short term, NASA does not possess the requisite in-house personnel with the experience in human spaceflight systems development needed to implement the VSE. But the committee acknowledges that NASA is cognizant of this fact and has taken steps to correct it, primarily by seeking to recruit highly skilled personnel from outside NASA, including persons from industry and retirees. For the long term, NASA has to ask if it is attracting and developing the talent it will need to execute a mission to return to the Moon, and the agency must identify what it needs to do to attract and develop a world-class workforce to explore other worlds. A major challenge for NASA is reorienting its human spaceflight workforce from the operation of current vehicles to the development of new vehicles at least throughout the next decade, as well as starting operations with new rockets and new spacecraft. The committee emphasizes further that when evaluating its future workforce requirements, NASA has to consider not only programs for students, but also training opportunities for its current employees. NASA's training programs at the agency's various field centers, which are focused on NASA's civil service talent, require support to prevent the agency's internal skill base from withering. Furthermore, NASA faces the risk that, if it fails to nurture its own internal workforce, skilled personnel will be attracted to other government agencies and industry. Building a Better NASA Workforce: Meeting the Workforce Needs for the National Vision for Space Exploration explains the findings and recommendations of the committee.
Under mandate of Section 253, Study and Report on Effectiveness of Air Force Science and Technology Program Changes, of the Fiscal Year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act, the U.S. Air Force contracted with the National Research Council (NRC) to conduct the present study. In response, the NRC established the Committee on Review of the Effectiveness of Air Force Science and Technology Program Changes-composed of academics, active and retired industry executives, former Air Force and Department of Defense (DoD) civilian executives, and retired general officers with acquisition and science and technology (S&T) backgrounds. The committee was to review the effectiveness of the Air Force S&T program and, in particular, the actions that the Air Force has taken to improve the management of the program in recent years in response to concerns voiced in numerous study reports and by Congress. The committee's principal charter was to assess whether, as a whole, the changes put in place by the Air Force since 1999 are sufficient to assure that adequate technology will be available to ensure U.S. military superiority. The committee conducted four open meetings to collect information from the Air Force and its Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), the U.S Navy, the U.S. Army, and DoD. A great many factors influence any judgment of the S&T program's sufficiency in supporting future warfighter needs; these factors include threat assessment, budget constraints, technology opportunities, workforce, and program content. Given the relatively short time available for this study and considering the detailed reviews conducted annually by the SAB, the technical content of the S&T program was necessarily beyond the committee's purview. Rather, the committee focused on S&T management, including areas that have been studied many times, in depth, by previous advisory groups. Besides addressing technical content, those prior studies and congressional concerns highlighted four overarching S&T issues: advocacy and visibility, planning, workforce, and investment levels. In response, the Air Force instituted changes in S&T management. The NRC is requested to conduct a study to determine how changes to the Air Force science and technology program implemented during the past two years affect the future capabilities of the Air Force. Effectiveness of Air Force Science and Technology Program Changes reviews and assess whether such changes as a whole are sufficient to ensure the following: A. That concerns about the management of the science and technology program that have been raised by the Congress, the Defense Science Board, the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, and the Air Force Association have been adequately addressed. B. That appropriate and sufficient technology is available to ensure the military superiority of the United States and counter future high-risk threats. C. That the science and technology investments are balanced to meet near-, mid-, and long-term needs of the Air Force. D. That the Air Force organizational structure provides for a sufficiently senior level advocate of science and technology to ensure an ongoing, effective presence of the science and technology community during the budget and planning process. This report also assess the specific changes to the Air Force science and technology program as whether the biannual science and technology summits provide sufficient visibility into, and understanding and appreciation of, the value of the science and technology program to the senior level of Air Force budget and policy decision makers.
Cities and Their Vital Systems asks basic questions about the longevity, utility, and nature of urban infrastructures; analyzes how they grow, interact, and change; and asks how, when, and at what cost they should be replaced. Among the topics discussed are problems arising from increasing air travel and airport congestion; the adequacy of water supplies and waste treatment; the impact of new technologies on construction; urban real estate values; and the field of "telematics," the combination of computers and telecommunications that makes money machines and national newspapers possible.
The Air Force requires technical skills and expertise across the entire range of activities and processes associated with the development, fielding, and employment of air, space, and cyber operational capabilities. The growing complexity of both traditional and emerging missions is placing new demands on education, training, career development, system acquisition, platform sustainment, and development of operational systems. While in the past the Air Force's technologically intensive mission has been highly attractive to individuals educated in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) disciplines, force reductions, ongoing military operations, and budget pressures are creating new challenges for attracting and managing personnel with the needed technical skills. Assessments of recent development and acquisition process failures have identified a loss of technical competence within the Air Force (that is, in house or organic competence, as opposed to contractor support) as an underlying problem. These challenges come at a time of increased competition for technical graduates who are U.S. citizens, an aging industry and government workforce, and consolidations of the industrial base that supports military systems. In response to a request from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Science, Technology, and Engineering, the National Research Council conducted five fact-finding meetings at which senior Air Force commanders in the science and engineering, acquisition, test, operations, and logistics domains provided assessments of the adequacy of the current workforce in terms of quality and quantity.
The ability of the United States Air Force (USAF) to keep its aircraft operating at an acceptable operational tempo, in wartime and in peacetime, has been important to the Air Force since its inception. This is a much larger issue for the Air Force today, having effectively been at war for 20 years, with its aircraft becoming increasingly more expensive to operate and maintain and with military budgets certain to further decrease. The enormously complex Air Force weapon system sustainment enterprise is currently constrained on many sides by laws, policies, regulations and procedures, relationships, and organizational issues emanating from Congress, the Department of Defense (DoD), and the Air Force itself. Against the back-drop of these stark realities, the Air Force requested the National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies, under the auspices of the Air Force Studies Board to conduct and in-depth assessment of current and future Air Force weapon system sustainment initiatives and recommended future courses of action for consideration by the Air Force. Examination of the U.S. Air Force's Aircraft Sustainment Needs in the Future and Its Strategy to Meet Those Needs addresses the following topics: Assess current sustainment investments, infrastructure, and processes for adequacy in sustaining aging legacy systems and their support equipment. Determine if any modifications in policy are required and, if so, identify them and make recommendations for changes in Air Force regulations, policies, and strategies to accomplish the sustainment goals of the Air Force. Determine if any modifications in technology efforts are required and, if so, identify them and make recommendations regarding the technology efforts that should be pursued because they could make positive impacts on the sustainment of the current and future systems and equipment of the Air Force. Determine if the Air Logistics Centers have the necessary resources (funding, manpower, skill sets, and technologies) and are equipped and organized to sustain legacy systems and equipment and the Air Force of tomorrow. Identify and make recommendations regarding incorporating sustainability into future aircraft designs.
A key technical issue for future Air Force systems is to improve their ability to survive. Increased use of stealth technology is proposed by many to be the major element in efforts to enhance survivability for future systems. Others, however, suggest that the high cost and maintenance required of stealth technology make increased speed potentially more productive. To help address this issue, the Air Force asked the NRC to investigate combinations of speed and stealth that would provide U.S. aircraft with a high survival capability in the 2018 period, and to identify changes in R&D plans to enable such aircraft. This report presents a review of stealth technology development; a discussion of possible future missions and threats; an analysis of the technical feasibility for achieving various levels of stealth and different speeds by 2018 and of relevant near-term R&D needs and priorities; and observations about the utility of speed and stealth trade-offs against evolving threats.
Under mandate of Section 253, Study and Report on Effectiveness of Air Force Science and Technology Program Changes, of the Fiscal Year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act, the U.S. Air Force contracted with the National Research Council (NRC) to conduct the present study. In response, the NRC established the Committee on Review of the Effectiveness of Air Force Science and Technology Program Changes-composed of academics, active and retired industry executives, former Air Force and Department of Defense (DoD) civilian executives, and retired general officers with acquisition and science and technology (S&T) backgrounds. The committee was to review the effectiveness of the Air Force S&T program and, in particular, the actions that the Air Force has taken to improve the management of the program in recent years in response to concerns voiced in numerous study reports and by Congress. The committee's principal charter was to assess whether, as a whole, the changes put in place by the Air Force since 1999 are sufficient to assure that adequate technology will be available to ensure U.S. military superiority. The committee conducted four open meetings to collect information from the Air Force and its Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), the U.S Navy, the U.S. Army, and DoD. A great many factors influence any judgment of the S&T program's sufficiency in supporting future warfighter needs; these factors include threat assessment, budget constraints, technology opportunities, workforce, and program content. Given the relatively short time available for this study and considering the detailed reviews conducted annually by the SAB, the technical content of the S&T program was necessarily beyond the committee's purview. Rather, the committee focused on S&T management, including areas that have been studied many times, in depth, by previous advisory groups. Besides addressing technical content, those prior studies and congressional concerns highlighted four overarching S&T issues: advocacy and visibility, planning, workforce, and investment levels. In response, the Air Force instituted changes in S&T management. The NRC is requested to conduct a study to determine how changes to the Air Force science and technology program implemented during the past two years affect the future capabilities of the Air Force. Effectiveness of Air Force Science and Technology Program Changes reviews and assess whether such changes as a whole are sufficient to ensure the following: A. That concerns about the management of the science and technology program that have been raised by the Congress, the Defense Science Board, the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, and the Air Force Association have been adequately addressed. B. That appropriate and sufficient technology is available to ensure the military superiority of the United States and counter future high-risk threats. C. That the science and technology investments are balanced to meet near-, mid-, and long-term needs of the Air Force. D. That the Air Force organizational structure provides for a sufficiently senior level advocate of science and technology to ensure an ongoing, effective presence of the science and technology community during the budget and planning process. This report also assess the specific changes to the Air Force science and technology program as whether the biannual science and technology summits provide sufficient visibility into, and understanding and appreciation of, the value of the science and technology program to the senior level of Air Force budget and policy decision makers.
The Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) announced by President George W. Bush in 2004 sets NASA and the nation on a bold path to return to the Moon and one day put a human on Mars. The long-term endeavor represented by the VSE is, however, subject to the constraints imposed by annual funding. Given that the VSE may take tens of years to implement, a significant issue is whether NASA and the United States will have the workforce needed to achieve that vision. The issues range from short-term concerns about the current workforce's skills for overseeing the development of new spacecraft and launch vehicles for the VSE to long-term issues regarding the training, recruiting, and retaining of scientists and engineers in-house as well as in industry and academia. Asked to explore science and technology (S&T) workforce needs to achieve the nation's long-term space exploration, the Committee on Meeting the Workforce Needs for the National Vision for Space Exploration concluded that in the short term, NASA does not possess the requisite in-house personnel with the experience in human spaceflight systems development needed to implement the VSE. But the committee acknowledges that NASA is cognizant of this fact and has taken steps to correct it, primarily by seeking to recruit highly skilled personnel from outside NASA, including persons from industry and retirees. For the long term, NASA has to ask if it is attracting and developing the talent it will need to execute a mission to return to the Moon, and the agency must identify what it needs to do to attract and develop a world-class workforce to explore other worlds. A major challenge for NASA is reorienting its human spaceflight workforce from the operation of current vehicles to the development of new vehicles at least throughout the next decade, as well as starting operations with new rockets and new spacecraft. The committee emphasizes further that when evaluating its future workforce requirements, NASA has to consider not only programs for students, but also training opportunities for its current employees. NASA's training programs at the agency's various field centers, which are focused on NASA's civil service talent, require support to prevent the agency's internal skill base from withering. Furthermore, NASA faces the risk that, if it fails to nurture its own internal workforce, skilled personnel will be attracted to other government agencies and industry. Building a Better NASA Workforce: Meeting the Workforce Needs for the National Vision for Space Exploration explains the findings and recommendations of the committee.
The National Aerospace Initiative (NAI) was conceived as a joint effort between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to sustain the aerospace leadership of the United States through the acceleration of selected aerospace technologies: hypersonic flight, access to space, and space technologies. The Air Force became concerned about the NAI's possible consequences on Air Force programs and budget if NAI program decisions differed from Air Force priorities. To examine this issue, it asked the NRC for an independent review of the NAI. This report presents the results of that assessment. It focuses on three questions asked by the Air Force: is NAI technically feasible in the time frame laid out; is it financially feasible over that period; and is it operationally relevant.
Overall Air Force weapon system sustainment (WSS) costs are growing at more than 4 percent per year, while budgets have remained essentially flat. The cost growth is due partly to aging of the aircraft fleet, and partly to the cost of supporting higher-performance aircraft and new capabilities provided by more complex and sophisticated systems, such as the latest intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. Furthermore, the expectation for the foreseeable future is that sustainment budgets are likely to decrease, so that the gap between budgets and sustainment needs will likely continue to grow wider. Most observers accept that the Air Force will have to adopt new approaches to WSS if it is going to address this problem and remain capable of carrying out its missions. In this context, the original intent of this 3-day workshop was to focus on ways that science and technology (S&T) could help the Air Force reduce sustainment costs. However, as the workshop evolved, the discussions focused more and more on Air Force leadership, management authority, and culture as the more critical factors that need to change in order to solve sustainment problems. Many participants felt that while S&T investments could certainly help-particularly if applied in the early stages ("to the left") of the product life cycle-adopting a transformational management approach that defines the user-driven goals of the enterprise, empowers people to achieve them, and holds them accountable, down to the shop level. Several workshop participants urged Air Force leaders to start the process now, even though it will take years to percolate down through the entire organization. These sustainment concerns are not new and have been studied extensively, including recent reports from the National Research Council's Air Force Studies Board and the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board.
The development and application of technology has been an essential part of U.S. airpower, leading to a century of air supremacy. But that developmental path has rarely been straight, and it has never been smooth. Only the extraordinary efforts of exceptional leadership - in the Air Forces and the wider Department of Defense, in science and in industry - have made the triumphs of military airpower possible. Development Planning provides recommendations to improve development planning for near-term acquisition projects, concepts not quite ready for acquisition, corporate strategic plans, and training of acquisition personnel. This report reviews past uses of development planning by the Air Force, and offers an organizational construct that will help the Air Force across its core functions. Developmental planning, used properly by experienced practitioners, can provide the Air Force leadership with a tool to answer the critical question, Over the next 20 years in 5-year increments, what capability gaps will the Air Force have that must be filled? Development planning will also provide for development of the workforce skills needed to think strategically and to defectively define and close the capability gap. This report describes what development planning could be and should be for the Air Force.
Prepared at the request of NASA, Aeronautical Technologies for the Twenty-First Century presents steps to help prevent the erosion of U.S. dominance in the global aeronautics market. The book recommends the immediate expansion of research on advanced aircraft that travel at subsonic speeds and research on designs that will meet expected future demands for supersonic and short-haul aircraft, including helicopters, commuter aircraft, "tiltrotor," and other advanced vehicle designs. These recommendations are intended to address the needs of improved aircraft performance, greater capacity to handle passengers and cargo, lower cost and increased convenience of air travel, greater aircraft and air traffic management system safety, and reduced environmental impacts.
In the five decades since NASA was created, the agency has sustained its legacy from the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA) in playing a major role in U.S. aeronautics research and has contributed substantially to United States preeminence in civil and military aviation. This preeminence has contributed significantly to the overall economy and balance of trade of the United States through the sales of aircraft throughout the world. NASA's contributions have included advanced flight control systems, de-icing devices, thrust-vectoring systems, wing fuselage drag reduction configurations, aircraft noise reduction, advanced transonic airfoil and winglet designs, and flight systems. Each of these contributions was successfully demonstrated through NASA flight research programs. Equally important, the aircraft industry would not have adopted these and similar advances without NASA flight demonstration on full-scale aircraft flying in an environment identical to that which the aircraft are to operate-in other words, flight research. Flight research is a tool, not a conclusion. It often informs simulation and modeling and wind tunnel testing. Aeronautics research does not follow a linear path from simulation to wind tunnels to flying an aircraft. The loss of flight research capabilities at NASA has therefore hindered the agency's ability to make progress throughout its aeronautics program by removing a primary tool for research. Recapturing NASA's Aeronautics Flight Research Capabilities discusses the motivation for NASA to pursue flight research, addressing the aspects of the committee's task such as identifying the challenges where research program success can be achieved most effectively through flight research. The report contains three case studies chosen to illustrate the state of NASA ARMD. These include the ERA program and the Fundamental Research Program's hypersonics and supersonics projects. Following these case studies, the report describes issues with the NASA ARMD organization and management and offers solutions. In addition, the chapter discusses current impediments to progress, including demonstrating relevancy to stakeholders, leadership, and the lack of focus relative to available resources. Recapturing NASA's Aeronautics Flight Research Capabilities concludes that the type and sophistication of flight research currently being conducted by NASA today is relatively low and that the agency's overall progress in aeronautics is severely constrained by its inability to actually advance its research projects to the flight research stage, a step that is vital to bridging the confidence gap. NASA has spent much effort protecting existing research projects conducted at low levels, but it has not been able to pursue most of these projects to the point where they actually produce anything useful. Without the ability to actually take flight, NASA's aeronautics research cannot progress, cannot make new discoveries, and cannot contribute to U.S. aerospace preeminence.
From the days of biplanes and open cockpits, the air forces of the United States have relied on the mastery of technology. From design to operation, a project can stretch to 20 years and more, with continuous increases in cost. Much of the delay and cost growth afflicting modern United States Air Force (USAF) programs is rooted in the incorporation of advanced technology into major systems acquisition. Leaders in the Air Force responsible for science and technology and acquisition are trying to determine the optimal way to utilize existing policies, processes, and resources to properly document and execute pre-program of record technology development efforts, including opportunities to facilitate the rapid acquisition of revolutionary capabilities and the more deliberate acquisition of evolutionary capabilities. Evaluation of U.S. Air Force Preacquisition Technology Development responds to this need with an examination of the current state of Air Force technology development and the environment in which technology is acquired. The book considers best practices from both government and industry to distill appropriate recommendations that can be implemented within the USAF.
The Department of Defense (DoD) is the largest consumer of energy in the federal government. In turn, the U.S. Air Force is the largest consumer of energy in the DoD, with a total annual energy expenditure of around $10 billion. Approximately 84 percent of Air Force energy use involves liquid fuel consumed in aviation whereas approximately 12 percent is energy (primarily electricity) used in facilities on the ground. This workshop was concerned primarily with opportunities to reduce energy consumption within Air Force facilities that employ energy intensive industrial processes-for example, assembly/disassembly, painting, metal working, and operation of radar facilities-such as those that occur in the maintenance depots and testing facilities. Air Force efforts to reduce energy consumption are driven largely by external goals and mandates derived from Congressional legislation and executive orders. To date, these goals and mandates have targeted the energy used at the building or facility level rather than in specific industrial processes. In response to a request from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Energy and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Science, Technology, and Engineering, the National Research Council, under the auspices of the Air Force Studies Board, formed the Committee on Energy Reduction at U.S. Air Force Facilities Using Industrial Processes: A Workshop. The terms of reference called for a committee to plan and convene one 3 day public workshop to discuss: (1) what are the current industrial processes that are least efficient and most cost ineffective? (2) what are best practices in comparable facilities for comparable processes to achieve energy efficiency? (3) what are the potential applications for the best practices to be found in comparable facilities for comparable processes to achieve energy efficiency? (4) what are constraints and considerations that might limit applicability to Air Force facilities and processes over the next ten year implementation time frame? (5) what are the costs and paybacks from implementation of the best practices? (6) what will be a proposed resulting scheme of priorities for study and implementation of the identified best practices? (7) what does a holistic representation of energy and water consumption look like within operations and maintenance?
In 2015, the Air Force Studies Board conducted a workshop, consisting of two data-gathering sessions, to review current research practices employed by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR). Improving the Air Force Scientific Discovery Mission summarizes the presentations and discussions of these two sessions. This report explores the unique drivers associated with management of a 6.1 basic research portfolio in the Department of Defense and investigates current and future practices that may further the effective and efficient management of basic research on behalf of the Air Force
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