The Department of Defense (DOD) spends over $300 billion each year to develop, produce, field and sustain weapons systems (the U.S. Air Force over $100 billion per year). DOD and Air Force acquisitions programs often experience large cost overruns and schedule delays leading to a loss in confidence in the defense acquisition system and the people who work in it. Part of the DOD and Air Force response to these problems has been to increase the number of program and technical reviews that acquisition programs must undergo. This book looks specifically at the reviews that U.S. Air Force acquisition programs are required to undergo and poses a key question: Can changes in the number, content, or sequence of reviews help Air Force program managers more successfully execute their programs? This book concludes that, unless they do it better than they are now, Air Force and DOD attempts to address poor acquisition program performance with additional reviews will fail. This book makes five recommendations that together form a gold standard for conduct of reviews and if implemented and rigorously managed by Air Force and DOD acquisition executives can increase review effectiveness and efficiency. The bottom line is to help program managers successfully execute their programs.
The Department of Defense (DOD) spends over $300 billion each year to develop, produce, field and sustain weapons systems (the U.S. Air Force over $100 billion per year). DOD and Air Force acquisitions programs often experience large cost overruns and schedule delays leading to a loss in confidence in the defense acquisition system and the people who work in it. Part of the DOD and Air Force response to these problems has been to increase the number of program and technical reviews that acquisition programs must undergo. This book looks specifically at the reviews that U.S. Air Force acquisition programs are required to undergo and poses a key question: Can changes in the number, content, or sequence of reviews help Air Force program managers more successfully execute their programs? This book concludes that, unless they do it better than they are now, Air Force and DOD attempts to address poor acquisition program performance with additional reviews will fail. This book makes five recommendations that together form a gold standard for conduct of reviews and if implemented and rigorously managed by Air Force and DOD acquisition executives can increase review effectiveness and efficiency. The bottom line is to help program managers successfully execute their programs.
The Department of Defense (DOD) spends over $300 billion each year to develop, produce, field and sustain weapons systems (the U.S. Air Force over $100 billion per year). DOD and Air Force acquisitions programs often experience large cost overruns and schedule delays leading to a loss in confidence in the defense acquisition system and the people who work in it. Part of the DOD and Air Force response to these problems has been to increase the number of program and technical reviews that acquisition programs must undergo. This book looks specifically at the reviews that U.S. Air Force acquisition programs are required to undergo and poses a key question: Can changes in the number, content, or sequence of reviews help Air Force program managers more successfully execute their programs? This book concludes that, unless they do it better than they are now, Air Force and DOD attempts to address poor acquisition program performance with additional reviews will fail. This book makes five recommendations that together form a gold standard for conduct of reviews and if implemented and rigorously managed by Air Force and DOD acquisition executives can increase review effectiveness and efficiency. The bottom line is to help program managers successfully execute their programs.
Cost and schedule growth is a problem experienced by many types of projects in many fields of endeavor. Based on prior studies of cost growth in NASA and Department of Defense projects, this book identifies specific causes of cost growth associated with NASA Earth and space science missions and provides guidance on how NASA can overcome these specific problems. The recommendations in this book focus on changes in NASA policies that would directly reduce or eliminate the cost growth of Earth and space science missions. Large cost growth is a concern for Earth and space science missions, and it can be a concern for other missions as well. If the cost growth is large enough, it can create liquidity problems for NASA's Science Mission Directorate that in turn cause cost profile changes and development delays that amplify the overall cost growth for other concurrent and/or pending missions. Addressing cost growth through the allocation of artificially high reserves is an inefficient use of resources because it unnecessarily diminishes the portfolio of planned flights. The most efficient use of resources is to establish realistic budgets and reserves and effective management processes that maximize the likelihood that mission costs will not exceed reserves. NASA is already taking action to reduce cost growth; additional steps, as recommended herein, will help improve NASA's mission planning process and achieve the goal of ensuring frequent mission opportunities for NASA Earth and space science.
The U.S. Air Force has experienced many acquisition program failures - cost overruns, schedule delays, system performance problems, and sustainability concerns - over program lifetimes. A key contributing factor is the lack of sufficient technical knowledge within the Air Force concerning the systems being acquired to ensure success. To examine this issue, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition requested that the Air Force Studies Board of the National Research Council undertake a workshop to identify the essential elements of the technical baseline - data and information to establish, trade-off, verify, change, accept, and sustain functional capabilities, design characteristics, affordability, schedule, and quantified performance parameters at the chosen level of the system hierarchy - that would benefit from realignment under Air Force or government ownership, and the value to the Air Force of regaining ownership under its design capture process of the future. Over the course of three workshops from November 2014 through January 2015, presenters and participants identified the barriers that must be addressed for the Air Force to regain technical baseline control to include workforce, policy and process, funding, culture, contracts, and other factors and provided a terms of reference for a possible follow-on study to explore the issues and make recommendations required to implement and institutionalize the technical baseline concept. Owning the Technical Baseline for Acquisition Programs in the U.S. Air Force summarizes the presentations and discussion of the three workshops.
Overall Air Force weapon system sustainment (WSS) costs are growing at more than 4 percent per year, while budgets have remained essentially flat. The cost growth is due partly to aging of the aircraft fleet, and partly to the cost of supporting higher-performance aircraft and new capabilities provided by more complex and sophisticated systems, such as the latest intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. Furthermore, the expectation for the foreseeable future is that sustainment budgets are likely to decrease, so that the gap between budgets and sustainment needs will likely continue to grow wider. Most observers accept that the Air Force will have to adopt new approaches to WSS if it is going to address this problem and remain capable of carrying out its missions. In this context, the original intent of this 3-day workshop was to focus on ways that science and technology (S&T) could help the Air Force reduce sustainment costs. However, as the workshop evolved, the discussions focused more and more on Air Force leadership, management authority, and culture as the more critical factors that need to change in order to solve sustainment problems. Many participants felt that while S&T investments could certainly help-particularly if applied in the early stages ("to the left") of the product life cycle-adopting a transformational management approach that defines the user-driven goals of the enterprise, empowers people to achieve them, and holds them accountable, down to the shop level. Several workshop participants urged Air Force leaders to start the process now, even though it will take years to percolate down through the entire organization. These sustainment concerns are not new and have been studied extensively, including recent reports from the National Research Council's Air Force Studies Board and the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board.
The development and application of technology has been an essential part of U.S. airpower, leading to a century of air supremacy. But that developmental path has rarely been straight, and it has never been smooth. Only the extraordinary efforts of exceptional leadership - in the Air Forces and the wider Department of Defense, in science and in industry - have made the triumphs of military airpower possible. Development Planning provides recommendations to improve development planning for near-term acquisition projects, concepts not quite ready for acquisition, corporate strategic plans, and training of acquisition personnel. This report reviews past uses of development planning by the Air Force, and offers an organizational construct that will help the Air Force across its core functions. Developmental planning, used properly by experienced practitioners, can provide the Air Force leadership with a tool to answer the critical question, Over the next 20 years in 5-year increments, what capability gaps will the Air Force have that must be filled? Development planning will also provide for development of the workforce skills needed to think strategically and to defectively define and close the capability gap. This report describes what development planning could be and should be for the Air Force.
On June 15, 2011, the Air Force Space Command established a new vision, mission, and set of goals to ensure continued U.S. dominance in space and cyberspace mission areas. Subsequently, and in coordination with the Air Force Research Laboratory, the Space and Missile Systems Center, and the 14th and 24th Air Forces, the Air Force Space Command identified four long-term science and technology (S&T) challenges critical to meeting these goals. One of these challenges is to provide full-spectrum launch capability at dramatically lower cost, and a reusable booster system (RBS) has been proposed as an approach to meet this challenge. The Air Force Space Command asked the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board of the National Research Council to conduct an independent review and assessment of the RBS concept prior to considering a continuation of RBS-related activities within the Air Force Research Laboratory portfolio and before initiating a more extensive RBS development program. The committee for the Reusable Booster System: Review and Assessment was formed in response to that request and charged with reviewing and assessing the criteria and assumptions used in the current RBS plans, the cost model methodologies used to fame [frame?] the RBS business case, and the technical maturity and development plans of key elements critical to RBS implementation. The committee consisted of experts not connected with current RBS activities who have significant expertise in launch vehicle design and operation, research and technology development and implementation, space system operations, and cost analysis. The committee solicited and received input on the Air Force launch requirements, the baseline RBS concept, cost models and assessment, and technology readiness. The committee also received input from industry associated with RBS concept, industry independent of the RBS concept, and propulsion system providers which is summarized in Reusable Booster System: Review and Assessment.
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities have expanded situation awareness for U.S. forces, provided for more precise combat effects, and enabled better decision making both during conflicts and in peacetime, and reliance on ISR capabilities is expected to increase in the future. ISR capabilities are critical to 3 of the 12 Service Core Functions of the U.S. Air Force: namely, Global Integrated ISR (GIISR) and the ISR components of Cyberspace Superiority and Space Superiority, and contribute to all others. In response to a request from the Air Force for ISR and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Science, Technology, and Engineering, the National Research Council formed the Committee on Examination of the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Capability Planning and Analysis (CP&A) Process. In this report, the committee reviews the current approach to the Air Force corporate planning and programming process for ISR capability generation; examines carious analytical methods, processes, and models for large-scale, complex domains like ISR; and identifies the best practices for the Air Force. In Capability Planning and Analysis to Optimize Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Investments, the current approach is analyzed and the best practices for the Air Force corporate planning and programming processed for ISR are recommended. This report also recommends improvements and changes to existing analytical tools, methods, roles and responsibilities, and organization and management that would be required to ensure the Air Force corporate planning and programming process for ISR is successful in addressing all Joint, National, and Coalition partner's needs.
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