Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities is a study to advise the Department of the Navy regarding its transition strategy to achieve a network-centric naval force through technology application. This report discusses the technical underpinnings needed for a transition to networkcentric forces and capabilities.
Owing to the expansion of network-centric operating concepts across the Department of Defense (DOD) and the growing threat to information and cybersecurity from lone actors, groups of like-minded actors, nation-states, and malicious insiders, information assurance is an area of significant and growing importance and concern. Because of the forward positioning of both the Navy's afloat and the Marine Corps expeditionary forces, IA issues for naval forces are exacerbated, and are tightly linked to operational success. Broad-based IA success is viewed by the NRC's Committee on Information Assurance for Network-Centric Naval Forces as providing a central underpinning to the DOD's network-centric operational concept and the Department of the Navy's (DON's) FORCEnet operational vision. Accordingly, this report provides a view and analysis of information assurance in the context of naval 'mission assurance'.
Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities is a study to advise the Department of the Navy regarding its transition strategy to achieve a network-centric naval force through technology application. This report discusses the technical underpinnings needed for a transition to networkcentric forces and capabilities.
Owing to the expansion of network-centric operating concepts across the Department of Defense (DOD) and the growing threat to information and cybersecurity from lone actors, groups of like-minded actors, nation-states, and malicious insiders, information assurance is an area of significant and growing importance and concern. Because of the forward positioning of both the Navy's afloat and the Marine Corps expeditionary forces, IA issues for naval forces are exacerbated, and are tightly linked to operational success. Broad-based IA success is viewed by the NRC's Committee on Information Assurance for Network-Centric Naval Forces as providing a central underpinning to the DOD's network-centric operational concept and the Department of the Navy's (DON's) FORCEnet operational vision. Accordingly, this report provides a view and analysis of information assurance in the context of naval 'mission assurance'.
The Department of Defense is in the process of transforming the nation's armed forces to meet the military challenges of the 21st century. Currently, the opportunity exists to carry out experiments at individual and joint service levels to facilitate this transformation. Experimentation, which involves a spectrum of activities including analyses, war games, modeling and simulation, small focused experiments, and large field events among other things, provides the means to enhance naval and joint force development. To assist the Navy in this effort, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) asked the National Research Council (NRC) to conduct a study to examine the role of experimentation in building future naval forces to operate in the joint environment. The NRC formed the Committee for the Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces to perform the study.
FORCEnet is currently defined as the operational construct and architectural framework for naval warfare in the information age that integrates warriors, sensors, networks, command and control, platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed, combat force that is scalable across all levels of conflict from seabed to space and sea to land. Although this definition views FORCEnet as the operational construct and the architectural framework for the entire transformed Navy, some have viewed FORCEnet merely as an information network and the associated FORCEnet architecture merely as an information systems architecture. FORCEnet Implementation Strategy provides advice regarding both the adequacy of this definition and the actions required to implement FORCEnet.
The Navy has put forth a new construct for its strike forces that enables more effective forward deterrence and rapid response. A key aspect of this construct is the need for flexible, adaptive command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. To assist development of this capability, the Navy asked the NRC to examine C4ISR for carrier, expeditionary, and strike and missile defense strike groups, and for expeditionary strike forces. This report provides an assessment of C4ISR capabilities for each type of strike group; recommendations for C4ISR architecture for use in major combat operations; promising technology trends; and an examination of organizational improvements that can enable the recommended architecture.
The growth of the terrorism threat to the nation's security has created significant strategic challenges for U.S. armed forces in fighting this global war on terrorism (GWOT). For the Navy, the challenges have centered on developing maritime capabilities to prosecute the GWOT as far forward as possible. To assist the Navy's planning in this area, the former Chief of Naval Operations requested the NRC to conduct an assessment of the adequacy of and prospects for improving the role of Naval Forces in the GWOT. The study developed a defense-in-depth framework as the organizing principle for the report. The report contains information as described in 5 U.S.C. 552(b) and therefore could not be released to the public in its entirety. The public version consists of an executive summary that presents an assessment of the transformation of naval forces for addressing the GWOT; a brief description of the defense-in-depth framework; and a list of findings and major recommendations.
Accurate and timely environmental information can provide a tactical advantage to U.S. naval forces during warfare. This report analyzes the current environmental information system used by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps and recommends ways to address uncertainty and leverage network-centric operating principles to enhance the value of environmental information.
The Department of Defense (DOD) is committed to transforming the nation's armed forces to meet the military challenges of the future. One approach to achieving this transformation is by leveraging advances in science and technology. New technologies and innovations are integral to today's military actions, and associated changes have rippled through all aspects of operations, highlighting the need for changes in policies related to military personnel. At the request of the Force Chief of Naval Operations, the NRC reviewed the military manpower and personnel policies and studies currently underway in the DOD and developed an implementation strategy for the Department of the Navy's future military manpower and personnel needs. This book presents an introduction to current personnel policies of and concerns facing the Naval forces; an assessment of demographic, technological, and other forces affecting future personnel needs and availability; a summary and assessment of previous studies; an examination of the role of research tools in implementing personnel policy change; and an analysis of obstacles to and strategies for transforming the Naval forces.
U.S. naval forces must be prepared to respond to a broad array of threats. Of increasing importance are those from chemical and biological warfare (CW and BW). To help review its current state of preparedness, the Chief of Naval Operations asked the National Research Council (NRC) to assess the U.S. Navy's defense capabilities against CW and BW threats. In particular to what extent are they being developed to enable naval forces to sense and analyze quickly the presence of chemical and biological agents, withstand or avoid exposure to such agents, deal with contamination under a broad spectrum of operational conditions, and over what period will these capabilities be realized. This report presents the results of that assessment. It provides an overview of the potential threats, and an evaluation of the Navy's operations, non-medical programs, and medical countermeasures designed to confront those threats. The report also presents a series of general and specific findings and recommendations based on these assessments.
Naval Analytical Capabilities assesses current Department of Defense initiatives and the Department of the Navy's progress in transitioning from a requirements-based to a capabilities-based organization. The report also provides recommendations aimed at improving the organizational structure of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations to best position the Chief of Naval Operations to fulfill his Title 10 (U.S. Code on Armed Forces) responsibilities. This report addresses key elements of capabilities-based planning, examines Navy analytical processes, and recommends an approach to making improvements.
From a military operational standpoint, surprise is an event or capability that could affect the outcome of a mission or campaign for which preparations are not in place. By definition, it is not possible to truly anticipate surprise. It is only possible to prevent it (in the sense of minimizing the number of possible surprises by appropriate planning), to create systems that are resilient to an adversary's unexpected actions, or to rapidly and effectively respond when surprised. Responding to Capability Surprise examines the issues surrounding capability surprise, both operational and technical, facing the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. This report selects a few surprises from across a continuum of surprises, from disruptive technologies, to intelligence-inferred capability developments, to operational deployments, and assesses what the Naval Forces are doing (and could do) about them while being mindful of future budgetary declines. The report then examines which processes are in place or could be in place in the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard to address such surprises. Today's U.S. naval forces continue to face a wide range of potential threats in the indefinite future and for this reason must continue to balance and meet their force structure needs. The recommendations of Responding to Capability Surprise will help to ensure more responsive, more resilient, and more adaptive behavior across the organization from the most senior leadership to the individual sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen.
The military is currently attempting to develop itself into a force capable of networkcentric operations. While this effort has highlighted the military's dependence on interacting networks, it has also shown that there is a huge gap between what we need to know about networks and our fundamental knowledge about network behavior. This gap makes the military vision of NCO problematic. To help address this problem, the Army asked the NRC to find out whether identifying and funding a new field of "network science" could help close this gap. This report presents an examination of networks andthe military, an analysis of the promise, content, and challenges of network science, and an assessment of approaches to creating value from network science.
In response to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the National Research Council appointed a committee operating under the auspices of the Naval Studies Board to study the national security implications of climate change for U.S. naval forces. In conducting this study, the committee found that even the most moderate current trends in climate, if continued, will present new national security challenges for the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. While the timing, degree, and consequences of future climate change impacts remain uncertain, many changes are already underway in regions around the world, such as in the Arctic, and call for action by U.S. naval leadership in response. The terms of reference (TOR) directed that the study be based on Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) scenarios and other peer-reviewed assessment. Therefore, the committee did not address the science of climate change or challenge the scenarios on which the committee's findings and recommendations are based. National Security Implications of Climate Change for U.S. Naval Forces addresses both the near- and long-term implications for U.S. naval forces in each of the four areas of the TOR, and provides corresponding findings and recommendations. This report and its conclusions are organized around six discussion areas-all presented within the context of a changing climate.
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) have been used in military operations for more than 60 years, with torpedoes, cruise missiles, satellites, and target drones being early examples.1 They have also been widely used in the civilian sector-for example, in the disposal of explosives, for work and measurement in radioactive environments, by various offshore industries for both creating and maintaining undersea facilities, for atmospheric and undersea research, and by industry in automated and robotic manufacturing. Recent military experiences with AVs have consistently demonstrated their value in a wide range of missions, and anticipated developments of AVs hold promise for increasingly significant roles in future naval operations. Advances in AV capabilities are enabled (and limited) by progress in the technologies of computing and robotics, navigation, communications and networking, power sources and propulsion, and materials. Autonomous Vehicles in Support of Naval Operations is a forward-looking discussion of the naval operational environment and vision for the Navy and Marine Corps and of naval mission needs and potential applications and limitations of AVs. This report considers the potential of AVs for naval operations, operational needs and technology issues, and opportunities for improved operations.
Presents "the committee's findings and recommendations, at this stage of the study, under the following four key topics, which are embedded in the terms of reference: (1) naval capabilities and potential climate-change-related operational issues globally, together with the closely related matter of the role of allied partnerships in regard to such global operational issues; (2) climate change impacts on global naval installations; (3) naval capabilities and potential climate-change-related operational issues in the Arctic; and (4) climate-change-related technical issues impacting naval operations, particularly in the Arctic"--Page 3.
The U.S. military has committed to a strategy of network-centric warfare. As a result, the Army has become increasingly interested in the critical role of network science. To a significant extent, this interest was stimulated by an earlier NRC report, Network Science. To build on that book, the Army asked the NRC to conduct a study to define advanced operating models and architectures for future Army laboratories and centers focused on network science, technologies, and experimentation (NSTE). The challenges resulting from base realignment and closure (BRAC) relocations of Army research, development, and engineering resourcesâ€"as they affected the NSTE programâ€"were also to be a focus of the study. This book provides a discussion of what NSTE is needed by the Army; an examination of the NSTE currently carried out by the Army; an assessment of needed infrastructure resources for Army NSTE; and an analysis of goals, models, and alternatives for an NSTE center.
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