Planning for an influenza pandemic, whether it occurs in the near or distant future, will need to take into account many constantly evolving factors. The Institute of Medicine (IOM) Committee on Implementation of Antiviral Medication Strategies for an Influenza Pandemic was asked by the Department of Health and Human Services, (DHHS) to consider best practices and policies for providing antiviral treatment and prophylaxis during a pandemic event. The committee's report, entitled Antivirals for Pandemic Influenza: Guidance on Developing a Distribution and Dispensing Program, calls for a national and public process of creating an ethical framework for antiviral use within the context of uncertainty and scarcity. It is unclear whether antivirals will work against a pandemic strain as well as they work against seasonal influenza. Also, government stockpiles may not be sufficient for all possible uses in part because antivirals are costly and public health agencies must invest in other important activities, including other medical resources for pandemic influenza. Furthermore, the report identifies the lack of a science-based advisory body to guide decision making during the pandemic, including guidance on all dimensions of antiviral dispensing (for example, prioritization, drug safety, and antiviral resistance). The report also acknowledges the need for diverse methods and sites of dispensing, and discusses their advantages and disadvantages.
Planning for an influenza pandemic, whether it occurs in the near or distant future, will need to take into account many constantly evolving factors. The Institute of Medicine (IOM) Committee on Implementation of Antiviral Medication Strategies for an Influenza Pandemic was asked by the Department of Health and Human Services, (DHHS) to consider best practices and policies for providing antiviral treatment and prophylaxis during a pandemic event. The committee's report, entitled Antivirals for Pandemic Influenza: Guidance on Developing a Distribution and Dispensing Program, calls for a national and public process of creating an ethical framework for antiviral use within the context of uncertainty and scarcity. It is unclear whether antivirals will work against a pandemic strain as well as they work against seasonal influenza. Also, government stockpiles may not be sufficient for all possible uses in part because antivirals are costly and public health agencies must invest in other important activities, including other medical resources for pandemic influenza. Furthermore, the report identifies the lack of a science-based advisory body to guide decision making during the pandemic, including guidance on all dimensions of antiviral dispensing (for example, prioritization, drug safety, and antiviral resistance). The report also acknowledges the need for diverse methods and sites of dispensing, and discusses their advantages and disadvantages.
The original purpose of the inquiry was to revisit issues raised in the earlier report "Pandemic Influenza" (4th report, session 2005-06, HL Paper 88, ISBN 9780104007723) published in December 2005. Whereas the initial focus was on the spread of the avian flu virus H5N1 as one of the most likely causes of the next pandemic, the outbreak of swine flu in Mexico in March 2009 and its rapid global spread means the world is now in the midst of an H1N1 pandemic. Following the swine flu outbreak, the Committee shifted the focus of attention to UK preparedness in terms of the Government's response to the emerging pandemic and subsequent events. The report commends the steps that the Government has taken to prepare for the pandemic. These include entering into advance purchase agreements which will enable the UK to purchase up to 132 million doses of pandemic-specific vaccine "sufficient for everybody in the UK when it becomes available", stockpiling antivirals to enable treatment of 50 per cent of the population (the Government's 'worst case scenario') and ensuring that there are sufficient antiviral collection points to cover the population in each Primary Care Trust. The Committee has concerns about the longer-term planning, the delay in operation of the National Pandemic Flu Service, and critical care and surge capacity. The report also covers advice to high risk groups and recommends a national reference point, for use by general practitioners, from which they can request advice on the treatment of high-risk groups.
This will help us customize your experience to showcase the most relevant content to your age group
Please select from below
Login
Not registered?
Sign up
Already registered?
Success – Your message will goes here
We'd love to hear from you!
Thank you for visiting our website. Would you like to provide feedback on how we could improve your experience?
This site does not use any third party cookies with one exception — it uses cookies from Google to deliver its services and to analyze traffic.Learn More.