By the end of 2009, more than 60 percent of the global chemical weapons stockpile declared by signatories to the Chemical Weapons Convention will have been destroyed, and of the 184 signatories, only three countries will possess chemical weapons-the United States, Russia, and Libya. In the United States, destruction of the chemical weapons stockpile began in 1990, when Congress mandated that the Army and its contractors destroy the stockpile while ensuring maximum safety for workers, the public, and the environment. The destruction program has proceeded without serious exposure of any worker or member of the public to chemical agents, and risk to the public from a storage incident involving the aging stockpile has been reduced by more than 90 percent from what it was at the time destruction began on Johnston Island and in the continental United States. At this time, safety at chemical agent disposal facilities is far better than the national average for all industries. Even so, the Army and its contractors are desirous of further improvement. To this end, the Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) asked the NRC to assist by reviewing CMA's existing safety and environmental metrics and making recommendations on which additional metrics might be developed to further improve its safety and environmental programs.
The Department of Defense, through the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives program, is currently in the process of constructing two full-scale pilot plants at the Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado and the Blue Grass Army Depot in Kentucky to destroy the last two remaining inventories of chemical weapons in the U.S. stockpile. These two storage sites together account for about 10 percent of the original U.S. chemical agent stockpile that is in the process of being destroyed in accordance with the international Chemical Weapons Convention treaty. Unlike their predecessors, these facilities will use neutralization technologies to destroy agents contained within rockets, projectiles, and mortar rounds, requiring the use of specially designed equipment. As part of its focus on safe operation of the planned facilities, the Program Manager for Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives asked the National Research Council (NRC) to conduct a study to offer guidance on the application of process safety metrics at the Pueblo Chemical Depot and Blue Grass Army Depot. Process safety is a disciplined framework for managing the integrity of operating systems, processes and personnel handling hazardous substances, and operations by applying good design principles, engineering, and operating practices. Process Safety Metrics at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants discusses the use of leading and lagging process safety metrics that could provide feedback on the effectiveness of controls to mitigate risks and minimize consequences of potential incidents. The book makes several recommendations that will facilitate the development and application of process safety metrics at both sites.
By the end of 2009, more than 60 percent of the global chemical weapons stockpile declared by signatories to the Chemical Weapons Convention will have been destroyed, and of the 184 signatories, only three countries will possess chemical weapons-the United States, Russia, and Libya. In the United States, destruction of the chemical weapons stockpile began in 1990, when Congress mandated that the Army and its contractors destroy the stockpile while ensuring maximum safety for workers, the public, and the environment. The destruction program has proceeded without serious exposure of any worker or member of the public to chemical agents, and risk to the public from a storage incident involving the aging stockpile has been reduced by more than 90 percent from what it was at the time destruction began on Johnston Island and in the continental United States. At this time, safety at chemical agent disposal facilities is far better than the national average for all industries. Even so, the Army and its contractors are desirous of further improvement. To this end, the Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) asked the NRC to assist by reviewing CMA's existing safety and environmental metrics and making recommendations on which additional metrics might be developed to further improve its safety and environmental programs.
A large number of chemicals are used on land at shore facilities, in the air in combat and reconnaissance aircraft, on seas around the world in surface vessels, and in submarine vessels by the navy and marine corps. Although the chemicals used are for the large part harmless, there is a significant amount of chemicals in use that can be health hazards during specific exposure circumstances. The Navy Environmental Health Center (NEHC) is primarily tasked with assessing these hazards. The NEHC completes its tasks by reviewing toxicological and related data and preparing health-hazard assessments (HHAs) for the different chemicals. Since the NEHC is continually asked to develop these HHAs, the National Research Council (NRC) was asked to assess independently the validity and effectiveness of NEHC's HHA process, in order to determine whether the process as implemented provides the Navy with the best, comprehensive, and defensible evaluations of health hazards and to identify any elements that might require improvement. The task was assigned to the Board on Environmental Studies and Toxicology's Committee on Toxicology's (COT's) Subcommittee on Toxicological hazard and Risk Assessment. Review of the U.S. Navy Environmental Health Center's Health-Hazard Assessment Process presents the subcommittee's report. The report is the work of expertise in general toxicology, inhalation toxicology, epidemiology, neurotoxicology, immunotoxicology, reproductive and developmental toxicology, pharmacology, medicine, risk assessment, and biostatistics. It is based on its review of documents provided by NEHC, presentations by NEHC personnel, and site visits to NEHC in Norfolk, Virginia and an aircraft carrier in San Diego, California.
It is the unique mission of the Health Hazard Evaluation Program within the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to respond to requests to investigate potential occupational health hazards. In contrast to other NIOSH programs, the Health Hazard Evaluation Program is not primarily a research program. Rather, it investigates and provides advice to workplaces in response to requests from employers, employees and their representatives, and federal agencies. The National Research Council was charged with evaluating the NIOSH Health Hazard Evaluation Program and determining whether program activities resulted in improvements in workplace practices and decreases in hazardous exposures that cause occupational illnesses. The program was found to play a key role in addressing existing widespread or emerging occupational health issues. This book makes several recommendations that could improve a very strong program including more systematic use of surveillance data to facilitate priority setting, and greater interaction with a broader array of workers, industries, and other government agencies.
There is growing concern about the possible use of toxic industrial chemicals or other hazardous chemicals by those seeking to perpetrate acts of terrorism. The U.S. Chemical Security Engagement Program (CSP), funded by the U.S. Department of State and run by Sandia National Laboratories, seeks to develop and facilitate cooperative international activities that promote best practices in chemical security and safe management of toxic chemicals, including: Partnering with host governments, chemical professionals, and industry to assess and fill gaps in chemical security abroad. Providing technical expertise and training to improve best practices in security and safety among chemical professionals and industry. Increasing transparency and accountability for dangerous chemical materials, expertise, and technologies. Providing opportunities for collaboration with the international professional chemical community. The Department of State called on the National Academies to assist in the CSP's efforts to promote chemical safety and security in developing countries.
The Department of Defense, through the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives program, is currently in the process of constructing two full-scale pilot plants at the Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado and the Blue Grass Army Depot in Kentucky to destroy the last two remaining inventories of chemical weapons in the U.S. stockpile. These two storage sites together account for about 10 percent of the original U.S. chemical agent stockpile that is in the process of being destroyed in accordance with the international Chemical Weapons Convention treaty. Unlike their predecessors, these facilities will use neutralization technologies to destroy agents contained within rockets, projectiles, and mortar rounds, requiring the use of specially designed equipment. As part of its focus on safe operation of the planned facilities, the Program Manager for Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives asked the National Research Council (NRC) to conduct a study to offer guidance on the application of process safety metrics at the Pueblo Chemical Depot and Blue Grass Army Depot. Process safety is a disciplined framework for managing the integrity of operating systems, processes and personnel handling hazardous substances, and operations by applying good design principles, engineering, and operating practices. Process Safety Metrics at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants discusses the use of leading and lagging process safety metrics that could provide feedback on the effectiveness of controls to mitigate risks and minimize consequences of potential incidents. The book makes several recommendations that will facilitate the development and application of process safety metrics at both sites.
Toxicity testing in laboratory animals provides much of the information used by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to assess the hazards and risks associated with exposure to environmental agents that might harm public health or the environment. The data are used to establish maximum acceptable concentrations of environmental agents in drinking water, set permissible limits of exposure of workers, define labeling requirements, establish tolerances for pesticides residues on food, and set other kinds of limits on the basis of risk assessment. Because the number of regulations that require toxicity testing is growing, EPA called for a comprehensive review of established and emerging toxicity-testing methods and strategies. This interim report reviews current toxicity-testing methods and strategies and near-term improvements in toxicity-testing approaches proposed by EPA and others. It identifies several recurring themes and questions in the various reports reviewed. The final report will present a long-range vision and strategic plan to advance the practices of toxicity testing and human health assessment of environmental contaminants.
The use of hazardous chemicals such as methyl isocyanate can be a significant concern to the residents of communities adjacent to chemical facilities, but is often an integral part of the chemical manufacturing process. In order to ensure that chemical manufacturing takes place in a manner that is safe for workers, members of the local community, and the environment, the philosophy of inherently safer processing can be used to identify opportunities to eliminate or reduce the hazards associated with chemical processing. However, the concepts of inherently safer process analysis have not yet been adopted in all chemical manufacturing plants. The Use and Storage of Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) at Bayer CropScience presents a possible framework to help plant managers choose between alternative processing options-considering factors such as environmental impact and product yield as well as safety- to develop a chemical manufacturing system. In 2008, an explosion at the Bayer CropScience chemical production plant in Institute, West Virginia, resulted in the deaths of two employees, a fire within the production unit, and extensive damage to nearby structures. The accident drew renewed attention to the fact that the Bayer facility manufactured and stores methyl isocyanate, or MIC - a volatile, highly toxic chemical used in the production of carbamate pesticides and the agent responsible for thousands of death in Bhopal, India, in 1984. In the Institute accident, debris from the blast hit the shield surrounding a MIC storage tank, and although the container was not damaged, an investigation by the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board found that the debris could have struck a relief valve vent pipe and cause the release of MIC to the atmosphere. The Board's investigation also highlighted a number of weaknesses in the Bayer facility's emergency response systems. In light of these concerns, the Board requested the National Research Council convene a committee of independent experts to write a report that examines the use and storage of MIC at the Bayer facility. The Use and Storage of Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) at Bayer CropScience also evaluates the analyses on alternative production methods for MIC and carbamate pesticides preformed by Bayer and the previous owners of the facility.
Risk assessments are often used by the federal government to estimate the risk the public may face from such things as exposure to a chemical or the potential failure of an engineered structure, and they underlie many regulatory decisions. Last January, the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a draft bulletin for all federal agencies, which included a new definition of risk assessment and proposed standards aimed at improving federal risk assessments. This National Research Council report, written at the request of OMB, evaluates the draft bulletin and supports its overall goals of improving the quality of risk assessments. However, the report concludes that the draft bulletin is "fundamentally flawed" from a scientific and technical standpoint and should be withdrawn. Problems include an overly broad definition of risk assessment in conflict with long-established concepts and practices, and an overly narrow definition of adverse health effects-one that considers only clinically apparent effects to be adverse, ignoring other biological changes that could lead to health effects. The report also criticizes the draft bulletin for focusing mainly on human health risk assessments while neglecting assessments of technology and engineered structures.
In 1991, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) asked the National Research Council (NRC) to provide technical guidance for establishing community emergency exposure levels for extremely hazardous substances (EHSs) pursuant to the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986. As a result the NRC published Guidelines for Developing Community Emergency Exposure Levels for Hazardous Substances in 1993 and Standing Operating Procedures for Developing Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Hazardous Substances in 2001; providing updated procedures, methods, and other guidelines used by the National Advisory Committee (NAC) on Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs) for hazardous substances for assessing acute adverse health effects. Stemming from this report the NAC has developed AEGLs for at least 270 EHSs. There are currently three AEGLs: AEGL-1, AEGL-2, and AEGL-3. AEGL-1 is the airborne concentration of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population could experience notable discomfort, irritation, or certain asymptomatic nonsensory effects. These effects are not disabling and are transient and reversible once exposure is stopped. AEGL-2 is the airborne concentration (of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population could experience irreversible, long-lasting adverse health effects or an impaired ability to escape. AEGL-3 is the airborne concentration of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population could experience life threatening health effects or death. On April 22-24 2013, the NRC-established Committee on Acute Exposure Guideline Levels 2013 met to review AEGL documents approved by the NAC. The committee members were selected for their expertise in toxicology, medicine, industrial hygiene, biostatistics, and risk assessment. Twenty-second Interim Report of the Committee on Acute Exposure Guideline Levels presents a review of AEGLs for various chemicals including acrylonitrile, halogen fluorides, tellurium hexafluoride, and thionyl chloride.
Trichloroethylene (TCE) is a solvent that is used as a degreasing agent, a chemical intermediate in refrigerant manufacture, and a component of spot removers and adhesives. It is produced in mass quantities but creates dangerous vapors and is an environmental contaminant at many industrial and government facilities, including facilities run by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). It is important to determine the safe occupational exposure level (OEL) for the solvent in order to protect the health of workers who are exposed to its vapors. However, there are concerns that the current occupational standards insufficiently protect workers from these health threats. Review of DOD's Approach to Deriving an Occupational Exposure Level for Trichloroethylene makes recommendations to improve the DoD's approach to developing an OEL for TCE, strengthen transparency of the process, and improve confidence in the final OEL value. This report reviews the DoD's approach using a literature review, evidence synthesis based on weight of evidence [WOE], point-of-departure derivation, physiologically based pharmacokinetic modeling, extrapolation tools, and explores other elements of the process of deriving an OEL for TCE. It examines scientific approaches to developing exposure values and cancer risk levels, defining the scope of the problem, and improving hazard identification.
This book responds to a request by the director of the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) for the National Research Council to examine and evaluate the ongoing planning for closure of the four currently operational baseline incineration chemical agent disposal facilities and the closure of a related testing facility. The book evaluates the closure planning process as well as some aspects of closure operations that are taking place while the facilities are still disposing of agent. These facilities are located in Anniston, Alabama; Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Tooele, Utah; and Umatilla, Oregon. They are designated by the acronyms ANCDF, PBCDF, TOCDF, and UMCDF, respectively. Although the facilities all use the same technology and are in many ways identical, each has a particular set of challenges.
The regulation of potentially hazardous substances has become a controversial issue. This volume evaluates past efforts to develop and use risk assessment guidelines, reviews the experience of regulatory agencies with different administrative arrangements for risk assessment, and evaluates various proposals to modify procedures. The book's conclusions and recommendations can be applied across the entire field of environmental health.
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