This report addresses consequences of current and proposed restrictions on international contacts by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) national laboratories and explores methods of best serving national security through positive new scientific advances facilitated by international communication among scientists, through scientific contacts to further non-proliferation, and through careful protection of crucial classified information from foreign espionage. The report summarizes a symposium that examined: the role of the DOE's national laboratories in national security and the contributions by foreign laboratories and scientists, proposals for amending security policies of the weapons laboratories in regard to contact with foreign laboratories and scientists, and the risks and benefits of scientific openness in this context. Finally, the report reviews current policies and proposals designed to enhance security at the weapons laboratories, primarily those related to restrictions on foreign contacts by DOE scientists.
In a world where advanced knowledge is widespread and low-cost labor is readily available, U.S. advantages in the marketplace and in science and technology have begun to erode. A comprehensive and coordinated federal effort is urgently needed to bolster U.S. competitiveness and pre-eminence in these areas. This congressionally requested report by a pre-eminent committee makes four recommendations along with 20 implementation actions that federal policy-makers should take to create high-quality jobs and focus new science and technology efforts on meeting the nation's needs, especially in the area of clean, affordable energy: 1) Increase America's talent pool by vastly improving K-12 mathematics and science education; 2) Sustain and strengthen the nation's commitment to long-term basic research; 3) Develop, recruit, and retain top students, scientists, and engineers from both the U.S. and abroad; and 4) Ensure that the United States is the premier place in the world for innovation. Some actions will involve changing existing laws, while others will require financial support that would come from reallocating existing budgets or increasing them. Rising Above the Gathering Storm will be of great interest to federal and state government agencies, educators and schools, public decision makers, research sponsors, regulatory analysts, and scholars.
The U.S. national security export controls systemâ€"which was instituted to impede Soviet acquisition of high technology from the Westâ€"is both necessary and appropriate. Balancing the National Interest provides a thorough analysis of this controls system, examining the current system of laws, regulations, international agreements, and organizations that control the international transfer of technology through industrial channels. Foreign Affairs calls it "the best on the subject to have been published in the 40 years that the United States has exercised controls on exports that might add to Soviet power.
This report addresses consequences of current and proposed restrictions on international contacts by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) national laboratories and explores methods of best serving national security through positive new scientific advances facilitated by international communication among scientists, through scientific contacts to further non-proliferation, and through careful protection of crucial classified information from foreign espionage. The report summarizes a symposium that examined: the role of the DOE's national laboratories in national security and the contributions by foreign laboratories and scientists, proposals for amending security policies of the weapons laboratories in regard to contact with foreign laboratories and scientists, and the risks and benefits of scientific openness in this context. Finally, the report reviews current policies and proposals designed to enhance security at the weapons laboratories, primarily those related to restrictions on foreign contacts by DOE scientists.
The national security controls that regulate access to and export of science and technology are broken. As currently structured, many of these controls undermine our national and homeland security and stifle American engagement in the global economy, and in science and technology. These unintended consequences arise from policies that were crafted for an earlier era. In the name of maintaining superiority, the U.S. now runs the risk of becoming less secure, less competitive and less prosperous. Beyond "Fortress America" provides an account of the costs associated with building walls that hamper our access to global science and technology that dampen our economic potential. The book also makes recommendations to reform the export control process, ensure scientific and technological competitiveness, and improve the non-immigrant visa system that regulates entry into the United States of foreign science and engineering students, scholars, and professionals. Beyond "Fortress America" contains vital information and action items for the President and policy makers that will affect the United States' ability to compete globally. Interested parties-including military personnel, engineers, scientists, professionals, industrialists, and scholars-will find this book a valuable tool for stemming a serious decline affecting broad areas of the nation's security and economy.
This report is the proceedings of a 2003 symposium on "Electronic Scientific, Technical, and Medical Journal Publishing and Its Implications," which brought together experts in STM publishing, both producers and users of these publications, to: (1) identify the recent technical changes in publishing, and other factors, that influence the decisions of journal publishers to produce journals electronically; (2) identify the needs of the scientific, engineering, and medical community as users of journals, whether electronic or printed; (3) discuss the responses of not-for-profit and commercial STM publishers and of other stakeholders in the STM community to the opportunities and challenges posed by the shift to electronic publishing; and (4) examine the spectrum of proposals that has been put forth to respond to the needs of users as the publishing industry shifts to electronic information production and dissemination.
In recent years much has happened to justify an examination of biological research in light of national security concerns. The destructive application of biotechnology research includes activities such as spreading common pathogens or transforming them into even more lethal forms. Policymakers and the scientific community at large must put forth a vigorous and immediate response to this challenge. This new book by the National Research Council recommends that the government expand existing regulations and rely on self-governance by scientists rather than adopt intrusive new policies. One key recommendation of the report is that the government should not attempt to regulate scientific publishing but should trust scientists and journals to screen their papers for security risks, a task some journals have already taken up. With biological information and tools widely distributed, regulating only U.S. researchers would have little effect. A new International Forum on Biosecurity should encourage the adoption of similar measures around the world. Seven types of risky studies would require approval by the Institutional Biosafety Committees that already oversee recombinant DNA research at some 400 U.S. institutions. These "experiments of concern" include making an infectious agent more lethal and rendering vaccines powerless.
In January-February 2005, the National Academies Committee on Counterterrorism Challenges for Russia and the United States and the Russian Academy of Sciences Standing Committee on Counterterrorism held a workshop on urban terrorism in Washington, D.C. Prior to the workshop, three working groups convened to focus on the topics of energy systems vulnerabilities, transportation systems vulnerabilities, and cyberterrorism issues. The working groups met with local experts and first responders, prepared reports, and presented their findings at the workshop. Other workshop papers focused on various organizations' integrated response to acts of urban terrorism, recent acts of terrorism, radiological terrorism, biological terrorism, cyberterrorism, and the roots of terrorism.
Recognizing that a capacity to innovate and commercialize new high-technology products is increasingly a key for the economic growth in the environment of tighter environmental and resource constraints, governments around the world have taken active steps to strengthen their national innovation systems. These steps underscore the belief of these governments that the rising costs and risks associated with new potentially high-payoff technologies, their spillover or externality-generating effects and the growing global competition, require national R&D programs to support the innovations by new and existing high-technology firms within their borders. The National Research Council's Board on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy (STEP) has embarked on a study of selected foreign innovation programs in comparison with major U.S. programs. The "21st Century Innovation Systems for the United States and Japan: Lessons from a Decade of Change" symposium reviewed government programs and initiatives to support the development of small- and medium-sized enterprises, government-university- industry collaboration and consortia, and the impact of the intellectual property regime on innovation. This book brings together the papers presented at the conference and provides a historical context of the issues discussed at the symposium.
Based on a series of regional meetings on university campuses with officials from the national security community and academic research institutions, this report identifies specific actions that should be taken to maintain a thriving scientific research environment in an era of heightened security concerns. Actions include maintaining the open exchange of scientific information, fostering a productive environment for international scholars in the U.S., reexamining federal definitions of sensitive but unclassified research, and reviewing policies on deemed export controls. The federal government should establish a standing entity, preferably a Science and Security Commission, that would review policies regarding the exchange of information and the participation of foreign-born scientists and students in research.
Terrorism and the measures needed to prevent terrorist attacks pose a central policy challenge for the U.S. To meet this unprecedented challenge, the U.S. has great technological assets. What is needed are mechanisms to help the government draw on these strengths in a timely and effective fashion. To do so, the government needs to reach out to university researchers, national laboratories, small, high-tech businesses and leading corporations. One of the most effective ways to do this is through public-private partnerships. To link the lessons of the National Academies study on "Government-Industry Partnerships" to this critical national interest, the Academy organized a conference to bring the lessons of its analysis to bear on the war on terror. By encouraging policy attention to examples of effective public-private partnerships (in particular, the need for clear goals and regular assessments), this report contributes to a better understanding of the potential partnerships to bring new security-enhancing technologies and equipment to the market in a cost-effective and timely manner.
Openness and sharing of information are fundamental to the progress of science and to the effective functioning of the research enterprise. The advent of scientific journals in the 17th century helped power the Scientific Revolution by allowing researchers to communicate across time and space, using the technologies of that era to generate reliable knowledge more quickly and efficiently. Harnessing today's stunning, ongoing advances in information technologies, the global research enterprise and its stakeholders are moving toward a new open science ecosystem. Open science aims to ensure the free availability and usability of scholarly publications, the data that result from scholarly research, and the methodologies, including code or algorithms, that were used to generate those data. Open Science by Design is aimed at overcoming barriers and moving toward open science as the default approach across the research enterprise. This report explores specific examples of open science and discusses a range of challenges, focusing on stakeholder perspectives. It is meant to provide guidance to the research enterprise and its stakeholders as they build strategies for achieving open science and take the next steps.
The military, political, and economic preeminence of the United States during the post-World War II era is based to a substantial degree on its superior rate of achievement in science and technology, as well as on its capacity to translate these achievements into products and processes that contribute to economic prosperity and the national defense. The success of the U.S. scientific enterprise has been facilitated by many factors, important among them the opportunity for American scientists and engineers to pursue their research-and to communicate with each other-in a free and open environment. During the last two administrations, however, concern has arisen that the characteristically open U.S. scientific community has served as one of the channels through which critical information and know-how are flowing to the Soviet Union and to other potential adversary countries; openness in science is thus perceived to present short-term national security risks in addition to its longer-term national security benefits in improved U.S. military technology. The Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security was asked to examine the various aspects of the application of controls to scientific communication and to suggest how to balance competing national objectives so as to best serve the general welfare. The Panel held three two-day meetings in Washington at which it was briefed by representatives of the departments of Defense, State, and Commerce, and by representatives of the intelligence community, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. The Panel also heard presentations by members of the research community and by university representatives. In addition to these briefings, the Rand Corporation prepared an independent analysis of the transfer of sensitive technology from the United States to the Soviet Union. To determine the views of scientists and administrators at major research universities, the Panel asked a group of faculty members and administrative officials at Cornell University to prepare a paper incorporating their own views and those of counterparts at other universities. The main thrust of the Panel's findings is completely reflected in this document. However, the Panel has also produced a classified version of the subpanel report based on the secret intelligence information it was given; this statement is available at the Academy to those with the appropriate security clearance.
Preservation of and open access to digital scientific resources are essential to global research, yet the challenges in storing and maintaining access to these collections are substantial. China faces major hurdles in this regard. A workshop held in June 2004 in Beijing convened scientific information managers, digital archiving experts, national science policy and funding officials, and representatives of development organizations to explore the scientific and technical, legal and policy, institutional and economic, and management aspects of creating sustainable and accessible archives of digital health and environmental data in China.
New legal approaches, such as the European Union's 1996 Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases, and other legal initiatives now being considered in the United States at the federal and state level, are threatening to compromise public access to scientific and technical data available through computerized databases. Lawmakers are struggling to strike an appropriate balance between the rights of database rights holders, who are concerned about possible commercial misappropriation of their products, and public-interest users of the data such as researchers, educators, and libraries. A Question of Balance examines this balancing act. The committee concludes that because database rights holders already enjoy significant legal, technical, and market-based protections, the need for statutory protection has not been sufficiently substantiated. Nevertheless, although the committee opposes the creation of any strong new protective measures, it recognizes that some additional limits against wholesale misappropriation of databases may be necessary. In particular, a new, properly scoped and focused U.S. statute might provide a reasonable alternative to the European Union's highly protectionistic database directive. Such legislation could then serve as a legal model for an international treaty in this area. The book recommends a number of guiding principles for such possible legislation, as well as related policy actions for the administration.
This symposium, which was held on March 10-11, 2003, at UNESCO headquarters in Paris, brought together policy experts and managers from the government and academic sectors in both developed and developing countries to (1) describe the role, value, and limits that the public domain and open access to digital data and information have in the context of international research; (2) identify and analyze the various legal, economic, and technological pressures on the public domain in digital data and information, and their potential effects on international research; and (3) review the existing and proposed approaches for preserving and promoting the public domain and open access to scientific and technical data and information on a global basis, with particular attention to the needs of developing countries.
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