The U.S. military has a stockpile of approximately 400,000 tons of excess, obsolete, or unserviceable munitions. About 60,000 tons are added to the stockpile each year. Munitions include projectiles, bombs, rockets, landmines, and missiles. Open burning/open detonation (OB/OD) of these munitions has been a common disposal practice for decades, although it has decreased significantly since 2011. OB/OD is relatively quick, procedurally straightforward, and inexpensive. However, the downside of OB and OD is that they release contaminants from the operation directly into the environment. Over time, a number of technology alternatives to OB/OD have become available and more are in research and development. Alternative technologies generally involve some type of contained destruction of the energetic materials, including contained burning or contained detonation as well as contained methods that forego combustion or detonation. Alternatives for the Demilitarization of Conventional Munitions reviews the current conventional munitions demilitarization stockpile and analyzes existing and emerging disposal, treatment, and reuse technologies. This report identifies and evaluates any barriers to full-scale deployment of alternatives to OB/OD or non-closed loop incineration/combustion, and provides recommendations to overcome such barriers.
The U.S. military has a stockpile of approximately 400,000 tons of excess, obsolete, or unserviceable munitions. About 60,000 tons are added to the stockpile each year. Munitions include projectiles, bombs, rockets, landmines, and missiles. Open burning/open detonation (OB/OD) of these munitions has been a common disposal practice for decades, although it has decreased significantly since 2011. OB/OD is relatively quick, procedurally straightforward, and inexpensive. However, the downside of OB and OD is that they release contaminants from the operation directly into the environment. Over time, a number of technology alternatives to OB/OD have become available and more are in research and development. Alternative technologies generally involve some type of contained destruction of the energetic materials, including contained burning or contained detonation as well as contained methods that forego combustion or detonation. Alternatives for the Demilitarization of Conventional Munitions reviews the current conventional munitions demilitarization stockpile and analyzes existing and emerging disposal, treatment, and reuse technologies. This report identifies and evaluates any barriers to full-scale deployment of alternatives to OB/OD or non-closed loop incineration/combustion, and provides recommendations to overcome such barriers.
This report examines seven disposal technologies being considered by the U.S. government as alternative methods to the process of incineration for destroying mortars, rockets, land mines, and other weapons that contain chemical warfare agents, such as mustard gas. These weapons are considered especially dangerous because they contain both chemical warfare agent and explosive materials in an assembled package that must be disassembled for destruction. The study identifies the strengths and weaknesses and advantages and disadvantages of each technology and assesses their potential for full-scale implementation.
The Program Manager for Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment (PMACWA) of the Department of Defense (DOD) requested the National Research Council (NRC) to assess the engineering design studies (EDSs) developed by Parsons/Honeywell and General Atomics for a chemical demilitarization facility to completely dispose of the assembled chemical weapons at the Pueblo Chemical Depot in Pueblo, Colorado. To accomplish the task, the NRC formed the Committee on Review and Evaluation of Alternative Technologies for Demilitarization of Assembled Chemical Weapons: Phase II (ACW II Committee). This report presents the results of the committee's scientific and technical assessment, which will assist the Office of the Secretary of Defense in selecting the technology package for destroying the chemical munitions at Pueblo. The committee evaluated the engineering design packages proposed by the technology providers and the associated experimental studies that were performed to validate unproven unit operations. A significant part of the testing program involved expanding the technology base for the hydrolysis of energetic materials associated with assembled weapons. This process was a concern expressed by the Committee on Review and Evaluation of Alternative Technologies for Demilitarization of Assembled Chemical Weapons (ACW I Committee) in its original report in 1999 (NRC, 1999). The present study took place as the experimental studies were in progress. In some cases, tests for some of the supporting unit operations were not completed in time for the committee to incorporate results into its evaluation. In those cases, the committee identified and discussed potential problem areas in these operations. Based on its expertise and its aggressive data-gathering activities, the committee was able to conduct a comprehensive review of the test data that had been completed for the overall system design. This report summarizes the study.
As the result of disposal practices from the early to mid-twentieth century, approximately 250 sites in 40 states, the District of Columbia, and 3 territories are known or suspected to have buried chemical warfare materiel (CWM). Much of this CWM is likely to occur in the form of small finds that necessitate the continuation of the Army's capability to transport treatment systems to disposal locations for destruction. Of greatest concern for the future are sites in residential areas and large sites on legacy military installations. The Army mission regarding the remediation of recovered chemical warfare materiel (RCWM) is turning into a program much larger than the existing munition and hazardous substance cleanup programs. The Army asked the Nation Research Council (NRC) to examine this evolving mission in part because this change is significant and becoming even more prominent as the stockpile destruction is nearing completion. One focus in this report is the current and future status of the Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Project (NSCMP), which now plays a central role in the remediation of recovered chemical warfare materiel and which reports to the Chemical Materials Agency. Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel also reviews current supporting technologies for cleanup of CWM sites and surveys organizations involved with remediation of suspected CWM disposal sites to determine current practices and coordination. In this report, potential deficiencies in operational areas based on the review of current supporting technologies for cleanup of CWM sites and develop options for targeted research and development efforts to mitigate potential problem areas are identified.
The Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant (BGCAPP) is under construction near Richmond, Kentucky, two dispose of one of the two remaining stockpiles of chemical munitions in the United States. The stockpile that BGCAPP will dispose of is stored at the Blue Grass Army Depot (BGAD). BGCAPP is a tenant activity on BGAD. The stockpile stored at BGAD consists of mustard agent loaded in projectiles, and the nerve agents GB and VX loaded into projectiles and M55 rockets. BGCAPP will process the rockets by cutting them, still in their shipping and firing tube (SFT), between the warhead and motor sections of the rocket. The warhead will be processed through BGCAPP. The separated rocket motors that have been monitored for chemical agent and cleared for transportation outside of BGCAPP, the subject of this report, will be disposed of outside of BGCAPP. Any motors found to be contaminated with chemical agent will be processed through BGCAPP and are not addressed in this report. Disposal Options for the Rocket Motors From Nerve Agent Rockets Stored at Blue Grass Army Depot addresses safety in handling the separated rocket motors with special attention to the electrical ignition system, the need for adequate storage space for the motors in order to maintain the planned disposal rate at BGCAPP, thermal and chemical disposal technologies, and on-site and off-site disposal options. On-site is defined as disposal on BGAD, and off-site is defined as disposal by a commercial or government facility outside of BGAD.
The U.S. Army Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program was established with the goal of destroying the nation's stockpile of lethal unitary chemical weapons. Since 1990 the U.S. Army has been testing a baseline incineration technology on Johnston Island in the southern Pacific Ocean. Under the planned disposal program, this baseline technology will be imported in the mid to late 1990s to continental United States disposal facilities; construction will include eight stockpile storage sites. In early 1992 the Committee on Alternative Chemical Demilitarization Technologies was formed by the National Research Council to investigate potential alternatives to the baseline technology. This book, the result of its investigation, addresses the use of alternative destruction technologies to replace, partly or wholly, or to be used in addition to the baseline technology. The book considers principal technologies that might be applied to the disposal program, strategies that might be used to manage the stockpile, and combinations of technologies that might be employed.
The U.S. Army Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program was established with the goal of destroying the nation's stockpile of lethal unitary chemical weapons. Since 1990 the U.S. Army has been testing a baseline incineration technology on Johnston Island in the southern Pacific Ocean. Under the planned disposal program, this baseline technology will be imported in the mid to late 1990s to continental United States disposal facilities; construction will include eight stockpile storage sites. In early 1992 the Committee on Alternative Chemical Demilitarization Technologies was formed by the National Research Council to investigate potential alternatives to the baseline technology. This book, the result of its investigation, addresses the use of alternative destruction technologies to replace, partly or wholly, or to be used in addition to the baseline technology. The book considers principal technologies that might be applied to the disposal program, strategies that might be used to manage the stockpile, and combinations of technologies that might be employed.
In 1996, the U.S. Congress enacted two laws, Public Law 104-201 (authorization legislation) and Public Law 104-208 (appropriation legislation), mandating that the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) conduct an assessment of alternative technologies to the baseline incineration process for the demilitarization of assembled chemical munitions. The PMACWA had previously requested that the National Research Council (NRC) perform and publish an independent evaluation of the seven technologies packages that had been selected during earlier phases of the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment (ACWA) program and deliver a report by September 1, 1999. However, to meet that deadline, the NRC Committee on Review and Evaluation of Alternative Technologies for Demilitarization of Assembled Chemical Weapons (ACW Committee) had to terminate its data-gathering activities on March 15, 1999, prior to the completion of demonstration tests. In September 1999, the PMACWA requested that the ACW Committee examine the reports of the demonstration tests and determine if the results changed the committee's original findings, recommendations, and comments. Evaluation of Demonstration Test Results of Alternative Technologies for Demilitarization of Assembled Chemical Weapons documents the committee's reassessment of the findings and recommendations in the original report, Review and Evaluation of Alternative Technologies for Demilitarization of Assembled Chemical Weapons.
This report examines seven disposal technologies being considered by the U.S. government as alternative methods to the process of incineration for destroying mortars, rockets, land mines, and other weapons that contain chemical warfare agents, such as mustard gas. These weapons are considered especially dangerous because they contain both chemical warfare agent and explosive materials in an assembled package that must be disassembled for destruction. The study identifies the strengths and weaknesses and advantages and disadvantages of each technology and assesses their potential for full-scale implementation.
In 1996, the U.S. Congress enacted two laws, Public Law 104-201 (authorization legislation) and Public Law 104-208 (appropriation legislation), mandating that the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) conduct an assessment of alternative technologies to the baseline incineration process for the demilitarization of assembled chemical munitions. The PMACWA had previously requested that the National Research Council (NRC) perform and publish an independent evaluation of the seven technologies packages that had been selected during earlier phases of the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment (ACWA) program and deliver a report by September 1, 1999. However, to meet that deadline, the NRC Committee on Review and Evaluation of Alternative Technologies for Demilitarization of Assembled Chemical Weapons (ACW Committee) had to terminate its data-gathering activities on March 15, 1999, prior to the completion of demonstration tests. In September 1999, the PMACWA requested that the ACW Committee examine the reports of the demonstration tests and determine if the results changed the committee's original findings, recommendations, and comments. Evaluation of Demonstration Test Results of Alternative Technologies for Demilitarization of Assembled Chemical Weapons documents the committee's reassessment of the findings and recommendations in the original report, Review and Evaluation of Alternative Technologies for Demilitarization of Assembled Chemical Weapons.
By direction of Congress, the U.S. Department of Defense's (DoD's) program manager for the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment (PMACWA) asked the National Research Council (NRC) Committee on Review and Evaluation of Alternative Technologies for Demilitarization of Assembled Chemical Weapons: Phase II (the ACW II committee) to conduct an independent scientific and technical assessment of three alternative technologies (referred to as Demo II) under consideration for the destruction of assembled chemical weapons at U.S. chemical weapons storage sites. The three technologies are AEA Technologies Corporation's (AEA's) electrochemical oxidation process; the transpiring-wall supercritical water oxidation and gasphase chemical reduction processes of Foster Wheeler/Eco Logic/Kvaerner (FW/EL/K); and Teledyne-Commodore's solvated electron process. Each of these technologies represents an alternative to incineration for the complete destruction of chemical agents and associated energetic materials. The demonstration tests were approved by the PMACWA after an initial assessment of each technology. The results of that initial assessment were reviewed by an earlier NRC committee, the Committee on Review and Evaluation of Alternative Technologies for Demilitarization of Assembled Chemical Weapons (the ACW I committee). For the present review, the committee conducted an indepth examination of each technology provider's data, analyses, and demonstration test results for the critical components tested. This review report supplements the ACW I report and considers the demonstration performance of the Demo II candidate technologies and their readiness for advancement to pilot-scale implementation. Because testing in these areas is ongoing, the committee decided to cut short its fact-finding efforts for input to this report as of March 30, 2001.
The Program Manager for Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment (PMACWA) of the Department of Defense (DOD) requested the National Research Council (NRC) to assess the engineering design studies (EDSs) developed by Parsons/Honeywell and General Atomics for a chemical demilitarization facility to completely dispose of the assembled chemical weapons at the Pueblo Chemical Depot in Pueblo, Colorado. To accomplish the task, the NRC formed the Committee on Review and Evaluation of Alternative Technologies for Demilitarization of Assembled Chemical Weapons: Phase II (ACW II Committee). This report presents the results of the committee's scientific and technical assessment, which will assist the Office of the Secretary of Defense in selecting the technology package for destroying the chemical munitions at Pueblo. The committee evaluated the engineering design packages proposed by the technology providers and the associated experimental studies that were performed to validate unproven unit operations. A significant part of the testing program involved expanding the technology base for the hydrolysis of energetic materials associated with assembled weapons. This process was a concern expressed by the Committee on Review and Evaluation of Alternative Technologies for Demilitarization of Assembled Chemical Weapons (ACW I Committee) in its original report in 1999 (NRC, 1999). The present study took place as the experimental studies were in progress. In some cases, tests for some of the supporting unit operations were not completed in time for the committee to incorporate results into its evaluation. In those cases, the committee identified and discussed potential problem areas in these operations. Based on its expertise and its aggressive data-gathering activities, the committee was able to conduct a comprehensive review of the test data that had been completed for the overall system design. This report summarizes the study.
The U.S. Army is in the process of destroying the nation's stockpile of aging chemical weapons stored at eight locations in the continental United States and on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific. Originally, incineration was chosen for the destruction of these stores, but this method has met with public opposition, and Congress directed the Army to develop alternative technologies for destroying the stockpiles in Pueblo, CO and Richmond, KY. To assist the Army in this process, the NRC was asked to evaluate the engineering design study of the three Blue Grass candidates. This book presents an analysis of various issues pertaining to the proposed engineering design package for the Blue Grass facility.
The Army's ability to meet public and congressional demands to destroy expeditiously all of the U.S. declared chemical weapons would be enhanced by the selection and acquisition of appropriate explosive destruction technologies (EDTs) to augment the main technologies to be used to destroy the chemical weapons currently at the Blue Grass Army Depot (BGAD) in Kentucky and the Pueblo Chemical Depot (PCD) in Colorado. The Army is considering four EDTs for the destruction of chemical weapons: three from private sector vendors, and a fourth, Army-developed explosive destruction system (EDS). This book updates earlier evaluations of these technologies, as well as any other viable detonation technologies, based on several considerations including process maturity, process efficacy, process throughput, process safety, public and regulatory acceptability, and secondary waste issues, among others. It also provides detailed information on each of the requirements at BGAD and PCD and rates each of the existing suitable EDTs plus the Army's EDS with respect to how well it satisfies these requirements.
This will help us customize your experience to showcase the most relevant content to your age group
Please select from below
Login
Not registered?
Sign up
Already registered?
Success – Your message will goes here
We'd love to hear from you!
Thank you for visiting our website. Would you like to provide feedback on how we could improve your experience?
This site does not use any third party cookies with one exception — it uses cookies from Google to deliver its services and to analyze traffic.Learn More.