Non-lethal weapons (NLWs) are designed to minimize fatalities and other undesired collateral damage when used. Events of the last few years including the attack on the USS Cole have raised ideas about the role NLWs can play in enhancing support to naval forces. In particular to what extent and in what areas should Department of the Navy (DoN) -sponsored science and technology (S&T) provide a research base for developing NLW capabilities? To assist with this question and to evaluate the current NLWs program, the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) and the Office of Naval Research (ONR) requested the National Research Council perform an assessment of NLWs science and technology. The report presents the results of that assessment. It discusses promising NLW S&T areas, development accomplishments and concerns about NLW, and series of recommendations about future NLW development and application.
Non-lethal weapons (NLWs) are designed to minimize fatalities and other undesired collateral damage when used. Events of the last few years including the attack on the USS Cole have raised ideas about the role NLWs can play in enhancing support to naval forces. In particular to what extent and in what areas should Department of the Navy (DoN) -sponsored science and technology (S&T) provide a research base for developing NLW capabilities? To assist with this question and to evaluate the current NLWs program, the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) and the Office of Naval Research (ONR) requested the National Research Council perform an assessment of NLWs science and technology. The report presents the results of that assessment. It discusses promising NLW S&T areas, development accomplishments and concerns about NLW, and series of recommendations about future NLW development and application.
The Office of Naval Research (ONR) funds research across a broad range of scientific and engineering disciplines in support of the Navy and Marine Corps. To ensure that its investments are serving those ends and are of high quality, ONR requires each of its departments to undergo annual review. Since 1999, the Naval Expeditionary Warfare Department of ONR has requested that the NRC conduct these reviews. This report presents the results of the second review of the Marine Corps Science and Technology program. The first review was conducted in 2000. The 2003 assessment examines the overall Marine Corps S&T program, the littoral combat future naval capability, the core thrusts of the program, and basic research activities.
The control of arms by means of non-proliferation and disarmament is one of the most important aims of Government foreign policy. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical and biological - poses a grave threat to UK and global security. This report was prompted by recent developments relating to nuclear weapons but also examines wider issues. The Committee examine: the Government's approach to non-proliferation and the institutional and policy issues relevant to the UK, the EU, NATO and the United States; nuclear weapons including the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and nuclear disarmament; biological and chemical weapons; ballistic missiles and missile defence; terrorism and physical security; and conventional weapons. Finally the report assesses the Government's overall strategy, which is characterised by a commitment to a rules-based international system.
The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) is the nation's primary resource for advancing scientific research, development, and evaluation on crime and crime control and the administration of justice in the United States. Headed by a presidentially appointed director, it is one of the major units in the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) of the U.S. Department of Justice. Under its authorizing legislation, NIJ awards grants and contracts to a variety of public and private organizations and individuals. At the request of NIJ, Strengthening the National Institute of Justice assesses the operations and quality of the full range of its programs. These include social science research, science and technology research and development, capacity building, and technology assistance. The book concludes that a federal research institute such as NIJ is vital to the nation's continuing efforts to control crime and administer justice. No other federal, state, local, or private organization can do what NIJ was created to do. Forty years ago, Congress envisioned a science agency dedicated to building knowledge to support crime prevention and control by developing a wide range of techniques for dealing with individual offenders, identifying injustices and biases in the administration of justice, and supporting more basic and operational research on crime and the criminal justice system and the involvement of the community in crime control efforts. As the embodiment of that vision, NIJ has accomplished a great deal. It has succeeded in developing a body of knowledge on such important topics as hot spots policing, violence against women, the role of firearms and drugs in crime, drug courts, and forensic DNA analysis. It has helped build the crime and justice research infrastructure. It has also widely disseminated the results of its research programs to help guide practice and policy. But its efforts have been severely hampered by a lack of independence, authority, and discretionary resources to carry out its mission.
In January-February 2005, the National Academies Committee on Counterterrorism Challenges for Russia and the United States and the Russian Academy of Sciences Standing Committee on Counterterrorism held a workshop on urban terrorism in Washington, D.C. Prior to the workshop, three working groups convened to focus on the topics of energy systems vulnerabilities, transportation systems vulnerabilities, and cyberterrorism issues. The working groups met with local experts and first responders, prepared reports, and presented their findings at the workshop. Other workshop papers focused on various organizations' integrated response to acts of urban terrorism, recent acts of terrorism, radiological terrorism, biological terrorism, cyberterrorism, and the roots of terrorism.
This review of the Science and Technology (S&T) program of the Office of Naval Research's (ONR's) Expeditionary Warfare Operations Technology Division, Code 353, comes at a time of considerable change in the Marine Corps and in ONR, which are currently in the midst of significant transitions. The Marine Corps is making plans to equip and train for engaging in a new style of warfare known as Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) and for performing a wide variety of missions in urban settings, ranging from humanitarian assistance to combat and mixes of these suggested by the term three-block war. During 1999, ONR assumed management of that portion of the Marine Corps S&T program that had not been assigned several years earlier to the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL). In 2002, control of most of ONR's advanced development funding (6.3), and of much of its exploratory development funding (6.2), will move from ONR's line divisions, of which Code 353 is one of many, to 12 new program offices, each dedicated to demonstrating technologies for future naval capabilities (FNCs). Given these changes, it is not surprising that some of the projects inherited recently by ONR, and assessed by the Committee for the Review of ONR's Marine Corps Science and Technology Program under the auspices of the Naval Studies Board of the National Research Council, differed from the customary ONR project and were more akin to preacquisition or acquisition support than to S&T. It is also not surprising that Code 353 could not articulate its plans for future investments clearly and concisely, given the current uncertainty about the content of and funding level for FNCs. The Marine Corps S&T program supports the five imperatives for technology advancement that the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) has identified as prerequisites for the transition to OMFTS: maneuver, firepower, logistics, training and education, and command and control. The committee supports investment in these areas and, in the report's discussions and recommendations, follows the five imperatives.
Conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) is a military option under consideration by the U.S. Department of Defense. This book, the final report from the National Research Council’s Committee on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability, analyzes proposed CPGS systems and evaluates the potential role CPGS could play in U.S. defense. U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike provides near-, mid-, and long-term recommendations for possible CPGS development, addressing the following questions: Does the United States need CPGS capabilities? What are the alternative CPGS systems, and how effective are they likely to be if proposed capabilities are achieved? What would be the implications of alternative CPGS systems for stability, doctrine, decision making, and operations? What nuclear ambiguity concerns arise from CPGS, and how might they be mitigated? What arms control issues arise with CPGS systems, and how might they be resolved? Should the United States proceed with research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) of the Conventional Trident Modification (CTM) program5 and, ultimately, with CTM production and deployment? Should the United States proceed with the development and testing of alternative CPGS systems beyond CTM?
During the last decade, national and international scientific organizations have become increasingly engaged in considering how to respond to the biosecurity implications of developments in the life sciences and in assessing trends in science and technology (S&T) relevant to biological and chemical weapons nonproliferation. The latest example is an international workshop, Trends in Science and Technology Relevant to the Biological Weapons Convention, held October 31 - November 3, 2010 at the Institute of Biophysics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing. Life Sciences and Related Fields summarizes the workshop, plenary, and breakout discussion sessions held during this convention. Given the immense diversity of current research and development, the report is only able to provide an overview of the areas of science and technology the committee believes are potentially relevant to the future of the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC), although there is an effort to identify areas that seemed particularly ripe for further exploration and analysis. The report offers findings and conclusions organized around three fundamental and frequently cited trends in S&T that affect the scope and operation of the convention: The rapid pace of change in the life sciences and related fields; The increasing diffusion of life sciences research capacity and its applications, both internationally and beyond traditional research institutions; and The extent to which additional scientific and technical disciplines beyond biology are increasingly involved in life sciences research. The report does not make recommendations about policy options to respond to the implications of the identified trends. The choice of such responses rests with the 164 States Parties to the Convention, who must take into account multiple factors beyond the project's focus on the state of the science.
The Office of Naval Research (ONR) contracted with the Naval Studies Board (NSB) of the National Research Council (NRC) to establish a committee to review ONR's Air and Surface Weapons Technology (ASWT) program. The committee convened on May 14 and 15, 2002, and reviewed more than 20 science and technology (S&T) efforts that were presented as constituting the ASWT program. The committee then met separately on May 16, 2002, to formulate its findings and recommendations. This report represents the consensus views of the committee and is based on the information presented prior to and at the review, as well as on the committee members' accumulated experience and expertise in military operations, systems, and technologies.
The Office of Naval Research (ONR) contracted with the Naval Studies Board (NSB) of the National Research Council (NRC) to establish a committee to review ONR's Aircraft Technology Program (ATP). The committee convened on May 15 and 16, 2001, and reviewed some 28 science and technology (S&T) efforts that were presented as constituting the ATP. The committee met separately on May 17, 2001, to formulate its findings and recommendations. This report represents the consensus opinion of the committee and is based on the information presented at the review. The ONR ATP resides within the Strike Technology Division (Code 351) of the Naval Expeditionary Warfare Science and Technology Department (Code 35). In 2001 the ATP is funded at $55.0 million, which is approximately 60 percent of the Strike Technology Division budget. The ATP S&T 2001 budget is further divided into the following categories: (1) 6.1 basic research at $4.3 million, (2) 6.2 exploratory development at $18.1 million, and (3) 6.3 advanced development, including technology demonstrations, at $32.5 million. However, the ATP will be in major transition beginning in FY02. Starting in FY02, all of the 6.3 funding and one-half of the 6.2 funding at the ONR will be dedicated to 12 major program areas referred to as Future Naval Capabilities (FNCs). The purpose of the FNCs is to focus advanced technology development at ONR on naval force capabilities that have been identified as high priority for the future by a cross-functional group of naval operators, naval development and support organizations, and ONR program managers. Plans have been made to integrate several of the Code 351 programs reviewed into FNCs. The ATP was presented to the committee in six thrust areas: integrated avionics, propulsion and power, air vehicle technology, unmanned aerial vehicles/unmanned combat air vehicles (UAVs/UCAVs), survivability, and special aviation projects. Several projects were presented within each thrust area. The committee organized this report in response to these thrust areas, and in several of these areas it also suggests new S&T topics for consideration for the future ATP. The findings and recommendations of the committee are summarized in this report.
The U.S. military does not believe its soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines should be engaged in combat with adversaries on a "level playing field." Our combat individuals enter engagements to win. To that end, the United States has used its technical prowess and industrial capability to develop decisive weapons that overmatch those of potential enemies. In its current engagement-what has been identified as an "era of persistent conflict"- the nation's most important weapon is the dismounted soldier operating in small units. Today's soldier must be prepared to contend with both regular and irregular adversaries. Results in Iraq and Afghanistan show that, while the U.S. soldier is a formidable fighter, the contemporary suite of equipment and support does not afford the same high degree of overmatch capability exhibited by large weapons platforms-yet it is the soldier who ultimately will play the decisive role in restoring stability. Making the Soldier Decisive on Future Battlefields establishes the technical requirements for overmatch capability for dismounted soldiers operating individually or in small units. It prescribes technological and organizational capabilities needed to make the dismounted soldier a decisive weapon in a changing, uncertain, and complex future environment and provides the Army with 15 recommendations on how to focus its efforts to enable the soldier and tactical small unit (TSU) to achieve overmatch.
This book examines potential technologies for replacing antipersonnel landmines by 2006, the U.S. target date for signing an international treaty banning these weapons. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines emphasizes the role that technology can play to allow certain weapons to be used more selectively, reducing the danger to uninvolved civilians while improving the effectiveness of the U.S. military. Landmines are an important weapon in the U.S. military's arsenal but the persistent variety can cause unintended casualties, to both civilians and friendly forces. New technologies could replace some, but not all, of the U.S. military's antipersonnel landmines by 2006. In the period following 2006, emerging technologies might eliminate the landmine totally, while retaining the necessary functionalities that today's mines provide to the military.
The summary version of Emerging and Readily Available Technologies and National Security distills the findings and recommendations of the complete report into a a booklet format. The full report is available here.
Vulnerabilities abound in U.S. society. The openness and efficiency of our key infrastructures â€" transportation, information and telecommunications systems, health systems, the electric power grid, emergency response units, food and water supplies, and others â€" make them susceptible to terrorist attacks. Making the Nation Safer discusses technical approaches to mitigating these vulnerabilities. A broad range of topics are covered in this book, including: Nuclear and radiological threats, such as improvised nuclear devices and "dirty bombs;" Bioterrorism, medical research, agricultural systems and public health; Toxic chemicals and explosive materials; Information technology, such as communications systems, data management, cyber attacks, and identification and authentication systems; Energy systems, such as the electrical power grid and oil and natural gas systems; Transportation systems; Cities and fixed infrastructures, such as buildings, emergency operations centers, and tunnels; The response of people to terrorism, such as how quality of life and morale of the population can be a target of terrorists and how people respond to terrorist attacks; and Linked infrastructures, i.e. the vulnerabilities that result from the interdependencies of key systems. In each of these areas, there are recommendations on how to immediately apply existing knowledge and technology to make the nation safer and on starting research and development programs that could produce innovations that will strengthen key systems and protect us against future threats. The book also discusses issues affecting the government's ability to carry out the necessary science and engineering programs and the important role of industry, universities, and states, counties, and cities in homeland security efforts. A long term commitment to homeland security is necessary to make the nation safer, and this book lays out a roadmap of how science and engineering can assist in countering terrorism.
Shortly after the events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Army asked the National Research Council (NRC) for a series of reports on how science and technology could assist the Army meet its Homeland defense obligations. The first report, Science and Technology for Army Homeland Securityâ€"Report 1, presented a survey of a road range of technologies and recommended applying Future Force technologies to homeland security wherever possible. In particular, the report noted that the Army should play a major role in providing emergency command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities and that the technology and architecture needed for homeland security C4ISR was compatible with that of the Army's Future Force. This second report focuses on C4ISR and how it can facilitate the Army's efforts to assist the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and emergency responders meet a catastrophic event.
In a brief report, the Home Affairs Committee highlights areas of concern in the supply of Tasers to police forces in England and Wales including the issue of having a monopoly distributor of Tasers. This monopoly supplier had their authority revoked after one of the directors of the company gave an 'unauthorised' Taser to police for use in the hunt for Raoul Moat. Following the revocation of the authority, the Home Affairs Committee held an urgent evidence session in response to suggestions that some police forces were due to run out of Taser stock. During the course of the evidence session, the Committee discovered that a new company had been awarded the authority to supply Tasers to police forces in England and Wales. The Committee expressed concern over a number of issues, including: that police forces in England and Wales were close to running out of Taser cartridges following the revocation of the authority of the original company; that there appeared to be widespread confusion about the parameters of the authority to supply Tasers. Not only did the company distribute an ’unauthorised' Taser to Northumbria Police, it had previously sold the same make of Taser to the National Police Improvement Agency; that the new holder of the authority to supply Tasers to police forces in England and Wales is extensively linked to the former distributor, the new company consisting of more or less identical personnel operating in the same premises with a near-duplicate website and also concern about the adequacy of a monopoly supplier business model in police procurement and urges the Home Office to examine other options in order to encourage competition and ensure that potential monopoly profits are not given to a particular company or group of individuals.
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