A comprehensive review of U.S. Intelligence. The result of a 12 month study; testimony was taken from 84 witnesses and an additional 200 people were interviewed. Covers: the role of intelligence; the need for policy guidelines; the need for a coordinated response to global crime; the CIA; improving intelligence analysis; military intelligence; space reconnaissance and the management of technical collection; international cooperation; cost of intelligence; accountability and oversight, and more. Evolution of the U.S. intelligence community, an historical overview.
On the brink of war, and in front of the whole world, the United States government asserted that Saddam Hussein had reconstituted his nuclear weapons program, had biological weapons and mobile biological weapon production facilities, and had stockpiled and was producing chemical weapons. All of this was based on the assessments of the U.S. Intelligence Community; not one bit of it could be confirmed when the war was over. While the intelligence services of many other nations also thought that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, it was the United States that put its credibility on the line, making this one of the most public—and most damaging—intelligence failures in recent American history. This failure was in large part the result of analytical shortcomings; intelligence analysts were too wedded to their assumptions about Saddam's intentions. But it was also a failure on the part of those who collect intelligence. In the end, those agencies collected precious little intelligence for the analysts, and much of what they did collect was either worthless or misleading. Finally, it was a failure to communicate effectively with policymakers; the Intelligence Community didn't adequately explain just how little good intelligence it had—or how much its assessments were driven by assumptions and inferences rather than concrete evidence. This report offers our conclusions on what needs to be done. We begin by describing the results of our case studies and the lessons they teach about the Intelligence Community's current capabilities and weaknesses. We then offer our recommendations for reform based upon those lessons. First, our main tasks were to find out how the Intelligence Community erred in Iraq and to recommend changes to avoid such errors in the future. We recommend substantial changes, and we believe deeply that such changes are necessary. Second, no matter how much we improve the Intelligence Community, weapons of mass destruction will continue to pose an enormous threat. Intelligence will always be imperfect and, as history persuades us, surprise can never be completely prevented. Finally, we emphasize two points about the scope of this Commission's charter. First, we were not asked to determine whether Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction; our mission is to investigate the reasons why the Intelligence Community's pre-war assessments were so different from what the Iraq Survey Group found after the war. Second, we were not authorized to investigate how policymakers used the intelligence assessments they received from the Intelligence Community. This unclassified report is derived from classified report that was delivered to the President on March 31, 2005. We endeavored to write our classified report in a manner that allowed as much of its content as possible to be released in this unclassified report. Because our man-date required us to review, and reach conclusions from, some of the more sensitive information in the possession of the United States Government, there was some information that we simply could not release in our unclassified report. Where the unclassified report omits substantive information that appears in the classified report, we make reference to the omission and, where possible, offer a general description of the omitted material. We also note here that there are two chapters of our classified report that we could not include at all in our unclassified version. First, our classified report contained a chapter addressing the United States' intelligence capabilities with respect to two countries of proliferation concern, Iran and North Korea. Regrettably, even generalized statements about the state of the Intelligence Community's understanding of these countries are classified, and so we could not include our findings in this area in our unclassified report. Second, our classified report includes a short chapter on covert action which also is too sensitive to include in an unclassified format.
After our examination of the new strategic environment of the next quarter century (Phase I) and of a strategy to address it (Phase II), this Commission concludes that significant changes must be made in the structures and processes of the U.S. national security apparatus. Our institutional base is in decline and must be rebuilt. Otherwise, the United States risks losing its global influence and critical leadership role. We offer recommendations for organizational change in five key areas: ensuring the security of the American homeland; recapitalizing America's strengths in science and education; redesigning key institutions of the Executive Branch; overhauling the U.S. government's military and civilian personnel systems; and reorganizing Congress's role in national security affairs"--P. xiii.
A comprehensive review of U.S. Intelligence. The result of a 12 month study; testimony was taken from 84 witnesses and an additional 200 people were interviewed. Covers: the role of intelligence; the need for policy guidelines; the need for a coordinated response to global crime; the CIA; improving intelligence analysis; military intelligence; space reconnaissance and the management of technical collection; international cooperation; cost of intelligence; accountability and oversight, and more. Evolution of the U.S. intelligence community, an historical overview.
It has, improbably, been called uncommonly lucid, even riveting by The New York Times, and it was a finalist for the 2004 National Book Awards nonfiction honor. It is a literally chilling read, especially in its minute-by-minute description of the events of the morning of 9/11 inside the Twin Towers.It is The 9/11 Commission Report, which was, before its publication, perhaps one of the most anticipated government reports of all time, and has been since an unlikely bestseller. The official statement by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States-which was instituted in late 2002 and chaired by former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean-it details what went wrong on that day (such as intelligence failures), what went right (the heroic response of emergency services and self-organizing civilians), and how to avert similar future attacks.Highlighting evidence from the day, from airport surveillance footage of the terrorists to phone calls from the doomed flights, and offering details that have otherwise gone unheard, this is an astonishing firsthand document of contemporary history. While controversial in parts-it has been criticized for failing to include testimony from key individuals, and it completely omits any mention of the mysterious collapse of WTC 7-it is nevertheless an essential record of one of the most transformational events of modern times.
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