Top down spillovers of sovereign default risk can have serious consequences for the private sector in emerging markets. This paper analyzes the effects of these spillovers using firm-level data from 31 emerging market economies. We assess how sovereign risk affects corporate access to international capital markets, in the form of external credit (loans and bond issuances) and equity issuances. The study first analyzes the impact of sovereign debt crises during the 1980s and 1990s. It goes on to examine the 1993 to 2007 period, using additional measures of sovereign risk-sovereign bond spreads and sovereign ratings-as explanatory variables. Overall, we find that sovereign default risk is a crucial determinant of private sector access to capital, be it external debt or equity. We also find that crisis resolution patterns matter and that defaults towards private creditors have stronger adverse consequences than defaults to official creditors.
This paper provides a comprehensive survey of pertinent issues on sovereign debt restructurings, based on a newly constructed database. This is the first complete dataset of sovereign restructuring cases, covering the six decades from 1950–2010; it includes 186 debt exchanges with foreign banks and bondholders, and 447 bilateral debt agreements with the Paris Club. We present new stylized facts on the outcome and process of debt restructurings, including on the size of haircuts, creditor participation, and legal aspects. In addition, the paper summarizes the relevant empirical literature, analyzes recent restructuring episodes, and discusses ongoing debates on crisis resolution mechanisms, credit default swaps, and the role of collective action clauses.
This paper proposes a new empirical measure of cooperative versus conflictual crisis resolution following sovereign default and debt distress. The index of government coerciveness is presented as a proxy for excusable versus inexcusable default behaviour and used to evaluate the costs of default for the domestic private sector, in particular its access to international debt markets. Our findings indicate that unilateral, aggressive sovereign debt policies lead to a strong decline in corporate access to external finance (loans and bond issuance). We conclude that coercive government actions towards external creditors can have strong signalling effects with negative spillovers on domestic firms. "Good faith" debt renegotiations may be crucial to minimize the domestic costs of sovereign defaults.
The Eurozone crisis which started in spring 2010 as a Greek budget crisis has alerted Europeans that the issue of defaulting sovereigns is not one reserved just for the poor and poorest countries on this globe. The crisis painfully amplified that developed countries, too, might be hit by this phenomenon. To be sure, this insight is far from novel - the history of defaulting states reaches back into history for at least two millennia. And yet, lawyers have surprisingly abstained more or less completely from discussing this subject and developing possible solutions. Beginning with the Argentina crisis in 2001, this neglect began to vanish to a certain degree and this movement got some momentum in 2010 by the Eurozone crisis. The present book collects contributions from authors most of whom have participated in a conference on this issue in January 2012 at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. The presentations, thus, provide a unique overview of the present discussion both from an economic and legal perspective.
This book introduces the fundamental monetary law problems of cross-border economic activity and the solutions thereto in international monetary law, and in EU law. After decades of having been neglected by legal scholars, international and European monetary law has attracted increasing attention in recent years. With the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), a full-fledged monetary union between sovereign States has been established for the first time in history. Its construction is primarily a work of law, with the Treaties on European Union (TEU) and on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) together with a number of protocols forming the constitutional basis. Yet, European monetary Integration has never taken place in isolation from international developments. Moreover, international monetary law, namely the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has always played a role - initially as the external monetary addition to the internal market project, after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System in the 1970s as one of the major driving forces for monetary Integration within the EU. On a fundamental basis, international and European monetary law address the same principled problems of monetary cooperation: how to proceed with financial transactions cross-border where no global currency exists. The present work describes the different approaches and relations and interplay between the two legal regimes.
Top down spillovers of sovereign default risk can have serious consequences for the private sector in emerging markets. This paper analyzes the effects of these spillovers using firm-level data from 31 emerging market economies. We assess how sovereign risk affects corporate access to international capital markets, in the form of external credit (loans and bond issuances) and equity issuances. The study first analyzes the impact of sovereign debt crises during the 1980s and 1990s. It goes on to examine the 1993 to 2007 period, using additional measures of sovereign risk-sovereign bond spreads and sovereign ratings-as explanatory variables. Overall, we find that sovereign default risk is a crucial determinant of private sector access to capital, be it external debt or equity. We also find that crisis resolution patterns matter and that defaults towards private creditors have stronger adverse consequences than defaults to official creditors.
This paper proposes a new empirical measure of cooperative versus conflictual crisis resolution following sovereign default and debt distress. The index of government coerciveness is presented as a proxy for excusable versus inexcusable default behaviour and used to evaluate the costs of default for the domestic private sector, in particular its access to international debt markets. Our findings indicate that unilateral, aggressive sovereign debt policies lead to a strong decline in corporate access to external finance (loans and bond issuance). We conclude that coercive government actions towards external creditors can have strong signalling effects with negative spillovers on domestic firms. "Good faith" debt renegotiations may be crucial to minimize the domestic costs of sovereign defaults.
This paper provides a comprehensive survey of pertinent issues on sovereign debt restructurings, based on a newly constructed database. This is the first complete dataset of sovereign restructuring cases, covering the six decades from 1950–2010; it includes 186 debt exchanges with foreign banks and bondholders, and 447 bilateral debt agreements with the Paris Club. We present new stylized facts on the outcome and process of debt restructurings, including on the size of haircuts, creditor participation, and legal aspects. In addition, the paper summarizes the relevant empirical literature, analyzes recent restructuring episodes, and discusses ongoing debates on crisis resolution mechanisms, credit default swaps, and the role of collective action clauses.
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