The repeal of Britain's Corn Laws in 1846, one of the most important economic policy decisions of the 19th century, has long intrigued and puzzled political scientists, historians, and economists. This book examines the interacting forces that brought about the abrupt beginning of Britain's free-trade empire.
In recent decades, we have seen an explosion in expectations for greater accountability of public policymaking. But, as accountability has increased, trust in governments and politicians has fallen. By focusing on the heart of public accountability—the reason-giving by policymakers for their policy decisions (i.e. deliberative accountability)—this work offers an empirical route for understanding why more accountability may not always deliver more public trust. The focus is on the British Parliament, where both the Treasury Select Committee and the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee hold hearings on monetary policy, financial stability, and fiscal policy. The intent in these hearings is to challenge policymakers to explain their decisions, and thus the dialogue is expected to be deliberative. But how do we judge the quality of this deliberative accountability? Three metrics are explored and measured: respect, non-partisanship, and reciprocity. The approach is multi-method, including (1) quantitative text analysis to gauge the verbatim transcripts in committee hearings; (2) qualitative coding combined with an experimental design to gauge the role of nonverbal communication in the hearings; and (3) interviews with the MPs, peers, central bankers, and Treasury officials who participated in the hearings. The first method measures the content of 'what' was said, the second examines 'how' the words and arguments were expressed, and the third provides a more reflective 'why' component by asking participants to explain their motivations. This merging of the 'what', the 'how', and the 'why' offers a novel template for studying both accountability and deliberation.
American monetary policy is formulated by the Federal Reserve and overseen by Congress. Both policy making and oversight are deliberative processes, although the effect of this deliberation has been difficult to quantify. In this book, Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey provides a systematic examination of deliberation on monetary policy from 1976 to 2008 by the Federal Reserve's Open Market Committee (FOMC) and House and Senate banking committees. Her innovative account employs automated textual analysis software to study the verbatim transcripts of FOMC meetings and congressional hearings; these empirical data are supplemented and supported by in-depth interviews with participants in these deliberations. The automated textual analysis measures the characteristic words, phrases, and arguments of committee members; the interviews offer a way to gauge the extent to which the empirical findings accord with the participants' personal experiences --
American monetary policy is formulated by the Federal Reserve and overseen by Congress. Both policy making and oversight are deliberative processes, although the effect of this deliberation has been difficult to quantify. In this book, Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey provides a systematic examination of deliberation on monetary policy from 1976 to 2008 by the Federal Reserve's Open Market Committee (FOMC) and House and Senate banking committees. Her innovative account employs automated textual analysis software to study the verbatim transcripts of FOMC meetings and congressional hearings; these empirical data are supplemented and supported by in-depth interviews with participants in these deliberations. The automated textual analysis measures the characteristic words, phrases, and arguments of committee members; the interviews offer a way to gauge the extent to which the empirical findings accord with the participants' personal experiences --
In recent decades, we have seen an explosion in expectations for greater accountability of public policymaking. But, as accountability has increased, trust in governments and politicians has fallen. By focusing on the heart of public accountability--the reason-giving by policymakers for their policy decisions (i.e. deliberative accountability)--this work offers an empirical route for understanding why more accountability may not always deliver more public trust. The focus is on the British Parliament, where both the Treasury Select Committee and the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee hold hearings on monetary policy, financial stability, and fiscal policy. The intent in these hearings is to challenge policymakers to explain their decisions, and thus the dialogue is expected to be deliberative. But how do we judge the quality of this deliberative accountability? Three metrics are explored and measured: respect, non-partisanship, and reciprocity. The approach is multi-method, including (1) quantitative text analysis to gauge the verbatim transcripts in committee hearings; (2) qualitative coding combined with an experimental design to gauge the role of nonverbal communication in the hearings; and (3) interviews with the MPs, peers, central bankers, and Treasury officials who participated in the hearings. The first method measures the content of 'what' was said, the second examines 'how' the words and arguments were expressed, and the third provides a more reflective 'why' component by asking participants to explain their motivations. This merging of the 'what', the 'how', and the 'why' offers a novel template for studying both accountability and deliberation.
This monograph traces the emergence and evolution of the LSE Government Department from 1895 to 2020, focusing on the personalities that guided the development of the Department, the social and political contexts the Department existed within, its research agenda and course structure, and the location of the Department in British politics. It also charts the evolution of the discipline of political science in Britain itself. The volume is divided chronologically into four chapters, each covering roughly similar time periods in the Department’s history and focuses on the events that shaped it: personalities, events, and location. Key themes are the development of political science in Britain, the impact of location on the LSE Government Department, the professionalisation of academia in Britain, and the microcosm the Department presents of British political life during each time period. The conflicts between progressive and conservative forces are a recurring theme which helps link the internal dynamics of the Department with the wider social and political contexts that occurred from the beginning of the School to its 125th anniversary. The volume uses detailed archival research, particularly in the early chapters, as well as over thirty interviews with a range of individuals with unique perspectives on the Department. These include current and former faculty and students (ranging from academics such as Christopher Hood, Anne Phillips and Tony Travers, to graduates who have subsequently become politicians—such as Anneliese Dodds, former UK Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Kennedy Stewart and Michael Fougere, both mayors in Canada), as well as others with strong links to the Department, such as Meghnad (Baron) Desai, and Professors Tim Besley and Nick Barr. This monograph offers a wealth of insights on the history of political science not only at the LSE, but in British academia more broadly. It speaks to a wide historical and social science audience concerned with Fabian and socialist history, the history of politics and education, and the development of British political science. Of course, it also offers appeal to more immediate audiences, such as prospective and current students, alumni, and others throughout the wider LSE community. As a history of the LSE, as well as of the development of British higher education, it serves as both a specific case study and a general representative of wider trends within universities during the twentieth and early twentieth-first centuries. A unique feature of this monograph is that it represents the collective efforts of students from the LSE Government Department (including undergraduate, MSc and PhD), who worked under the leadership of Professor Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (Head of Government Department) and Dr Gordon Bannerman (British Historian). This collaboration has enabled a rich array of perspectives on the history of the Department but has also brought the monograph to life with personal ties to the Department itself.
The repeal of Britain's Corn Laws in 1846, one of the most important economic policy decisions of the 19th century, has long intrigued and puzzled political scientists, historians, and economists. This book examines the interacting forces that brought about the abrupt beginning of Britain's free-trade empire.
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