Charles W. Calomiris's Books

U.S. Bank Deregulation in Historical Perspective

By: Charles W. Calomiris

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U.S. Bank Deregulation in Historical Perspective

By: Charles W. Calomiris

This book shows how deregulation is transforming the size, structure, and geographic range of U.S. banks, the scope of banking services, and the nature of bank-customer relationships. Over the past two decades the characteristics that had made American banks different from other banks throughout the world--a fragmented geographical structure of the industry, which restricted the scale of banks and their ability to compete with one another, and strict limits on the kinds of products and services commercial banks could offer--virtually have been eliminated. Understanding the origins and persistence of the unique banking regulations that defined U.S. banking for over a century lends an important perspective on the economic and political causes and consequences of the current process of deregulation.

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Page Count

392

Publisher

Cambridge University Press

Published Date

ISBN 10

0521028388

ISBN 13

9780521028387

The Postmodern Bank Safety Net

Lessons from Developed and Developing Economies

By: Charles W. Calomiris

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The Postmodern Bank Safety Net

Lessons from Developed and Developing Economies

By: Charles W. Calomiris

Federal deposit insurance may be "the single most destabilizing influence in the financial system," says economist Charles W. Calomiris in a new study published by AEI. Market discipline provides a better bank safety net than government insurance, he concludes. The Postmodern Bank Safety Net: Lessons from Developed and Developing Economies shows how government deposit insurance subsidizes the risks taken by banks. Weak banks deliberately and sometimes with impunity take on greater risks than they can afford. Undue risk-taking would not be tolerated were private market discipline brought to bear on banks, Calomiris argues. Market discipline would place the regulatory burden on sophisticated market participants with their own money at stake-a bank would survive only if it had investors, and those investors would be willing to risk their money only if they were able to evaluate the bank's risk. Currently, banks that hide loan losses can avoid paying increased deposit insurance costs. At the same time, Calomiris says, government regulators lack strong incentive to determine the true risk characteristics of bank assets-government regulators do not have their own money at stake and they face political pressure to maintain the credit supply. The results can be calamitous. In the 1970s and 1980s the Farm Credit System was increasingly willing to lend against questionable collateral while private banks withdrew from the market as lending risk increased. The system failed, gripping U.S. farmers in a debt crisis. Similarly, the savings and loan failures and the oil-related bank collapses in Texas and Oklahoma of the 19080s can be attributed to the failure of the bank safety net. And Chile, Mexico, and Japan have suffered financial collapses because their governments protected banks from self-inflicted losses.

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Publisher

American Enterprise Institute

Published Date

ISBN 10

0844771007

ISBN 13

9780844771007

Fragile by Design

The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit

By: Charles W. Calomiris,Stephen Haber

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Fragile by Design

The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit

By: Charles W. Calomiris,Stephen Haber

Why stable banking systems are so rare Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries—but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents. Calomiris and Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why they endure, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues. Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation.

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Page Count

584

Publisher

Princeton University Press

Published Date

ISBN 10

0691168350

ISBN 13

9780691168357

Book's by Charles W. Calomiris

U.S. Bank Deregulation in Historical Perspective

U.S. Bank Deregulation in Historical Perspective

The Postmodern Bank Safety Net

The Postmodern Bank Safety Net

Fragile by Design

Fragile by Design

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