The rise of emerging powers is eclipsing not just the preeminence of the West, but also its ideological dominance. The twenty-first century will not belong to America, China, Asia, or anyone else. It will be no one's world. Charles Kupchan spells out how to capitalize on the coming diversity to fashion a consensus between the West and the rising rest.
The United States is in the midst of a bruising debate about its role in the world. Not since the interwar era have Americans been so divided over the scope and nature of their engagement abroad. President Donald Trump's America First approach to foreign policy certainly amplified the controversy. His isolationist, unilateralist, protectionist, and anti-immigrant proclivities marked a sharp break with the brand of internationalism that the country had embraced since World War II. But Trump's election was a symptom as much as a cause of the nation's rethink of its approach to the world. Decades of war in the Middle East with little to show for it, rising inequality and the hollowing out of the nation's manufacturing sector, political paralysis over how to fix a dysfunctional immigration policy--these and other trends have been causing Americans to ask legitimate questions about whether U.S. grand strategy has been working to their benefit. Adding to the urgent and passionate nature of this conversation is China's rise and the threat it poses to the liberal international order that took shape during the era of the West's material and ideological dominance. Isolationism speaks directly to this unfolding debate over the future of the nation's engagement with the world. It does so primarily by looking back, by probing America's isolationist past. Although most Americans know little about it, the United States in fact has an impressive isolationist pedigree. In his Farewell Address of 1796, President George Washington set the young nation on a clear course: "It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world." The isolationist impulse embraced by Washington and the other Founders guided the nation for much of its history prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941"--
Refuting the conventional wisdom that the end of the Cold War cleared the way for an era of peace and prosperity led solely by the United States, Charles A. Kupchan contends that the next challenge to America’s might is fast emerging. It comes not from the Islamic world or an ascendant China, but from an integrating Europe that is rising as a counterweight to the United States. Decades of strategic partnership across the Atlantic are giving way to renewed geopolitical competition. The waning of U.S. primacy will be expedited by America’s own ambivalence about remaining the globe’s guardian and by the impact of the digital age on the country’s politics and its role in the world. By deftly mining the lessons of history to cast light on the present and future, Kupchan explains how America and the world should prepare for the more complex, more unstable road ahead.
Refuting the conventional wisdom that the end of the Cold War cleared the way for an era of peace and prosperity led solely by the United States, Charles A. Kupchan contends that the next challenge to America’s might is fast emerging. It comes not from the Islamic world or an ascendant China, but from an integrating Europe that is rising as a counterweight to the United States. Decades of strategic partnership across the Atlantic are giving way to renewed geopolitical competition. The waning of U.S. primacy will be expedited by America’s own ambivalence about remaining the globe’s guardian and by the impact of the digital age on the country’s politics and its role in the world. By deftly mining the lessons of history to cast light on the present and future, Kupchan explains how America and the world should prepare for the more complex, more unstable road ahead.
For decades, dealing with the Middle East has proved to be a very divisive issue for the United States and Europe. During the Cold War, heated transatlantic disputes emerged over a host of issues including the Suez Canal, the Palestine–Israel conflict and the containment of Iran. Nonetheless, these differences did not significantly impair transatlantic relations due to the solidarity engendered by the Soviet threat in Europe. With the demise of the Soviet Union, common tasks in Europe no longer overshadow differences in other regions. The United States and Europe follow different approaches on the question of democratization in the Middle East. This difference is rooted in the respective political cultures on each side of the Atlantic. The United States’ appetite for democratization may be awakened by powerful strains of idealism, but it is also limited by powerful strains of isolationism—on one level, the US would prefer to stand aloof from the world, avoiding the dangers and compromises that come with engagement. American politics is not suited to the slow pace of incremental change, the sullying tasks of nation-building and the ambiguities of governing foreign cultures and understanding their practices. No such isolationism pushes Europe toward quick solutions. Indeed, Europe generally prefers slow and incremental movement toward democracy. Europeans favor engaging target states rather than isolating them, bringing about a gradual political transition rather than an abrupt change of regime. Just as it took generations for liberal democracy to take firm root in Western Europe, the EU is patient in its goal of exporting its model to the south and east. Despite the long history of transatlantic tension over the Middle East, some signs of potential convergence have recently emerged. Although the situation in Iraq remains unstable and uncertain, both sides of the Atlantic seem ready to put behind them the open acrimony that surrounded the war; and on Iran, the EU-3 (the United Kingdom, France and Germany) and Washington have been working in unison since early 2005. However, despite recent examples of convergence, considerable transatlantic differences over the Middle East promise to persist, becoming more and less pronounced in step with adverse and positive developments in the region. That these differences are rooted in contrasting historical experiences, political cultures and political systems makes it likely that disagreements over Middle East policy, as in the past, will remain a key source of transatlantic tension in the future.
The first book to tell the full story of American isolationism, from the founding era through the Trump presidency. In his Farewell Address of 1796, President George Washington admonished the young nation "to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world." Isolationism thereafter became one of the most influential political trends in American history. From the founding era until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States shunned strategic commitments abroad, making only brief detours during the Spanish-American War and World War I. Amid World War II and the Cold War, Americans abandoned isolationism; they tried to run the world rather than run away from it. But isolationism is making a comeback as Americans tire of foreign entanglement. In this definitive and magisterial analysis-the first book to tell the fascinating story of isolationism across the arc of American history-Charles Kupchan explores the enduring connection between the isolationist impulse and the American experience. He also refurbishes isolationism's reputation, arguing that it constituted dangerous delusion during the 1930s, but afforded the nation clear strategic advantages during its ascent. Kupchan traces isolationism's staying power to the ideology of American exceptionalism. Strategic detachment from the outside world was to protect the nation's unique experiment in liberty, which America would then share with others through the power of example. Since 1941, the United States has taken a much more interventionist approach to changing the world. But it has overreached, prompting Americans to rediscover the allure of nonentanglement and an America First foreign policy. The United States is hardly destined to return to isolationism, yet a strategic pullback is inevitable. Americans now need to find the middle ground between doing too much and doing too little.
How nations move from war to peace Is the world destined to suffer endless cycles of conflict and war? Can rival nations become partners and establish a lasting and stable peace? How Enemies Become Friends provides a bold and innovative account of how nations escape geopolitical competition and replace hostility with friendship. Through compelling analysis and rich historical examples that span the globe and range from the thirteenth century through the present, foreign policy expert Charles Kupchan explores how adversaries can transform enmity into amity—and he exposes prevalent myths about the causes of peace. Kupchan contends that diplomatic engagement with rivals, far from being appeasement, is critical to rapprochement between adversaries. Diplomacy, not economic interdependence, is the currency of peace; concessions and strategic accommodation promote the mutual trust needed to build an international society. The nature of regimes matters much less than commonly thought: countries, including the United States, should deal with other states based on their foreign policy behavior rather than on whether they are democracies. Kupchan demonstrates that similar social orders and similar ethnicities, races, or religions help nations achieve stable peace. He considers many historical successes and failures, including the onset of friendship between the United States and Great Britain in the early twentieth century, the Concert of Europe, which preserved peace after 1815 but collapsed following revolutions in 1848, and the remarkably close partnership of the Soviet Union and China in the 1950s, which descended into open rivalry by the 1960s. In a world where conflict among nations seems inescapable, How Enemies Become Friends offers critical insights for building lasting peace.
The world is on the cusp of a global turn. Between 1500 and 1800, the West sprinted ahead of other centers of power in Asia and the Middle East. Europe and the United States have dominated the world since. But today the West's preeminence is slipping away as China, India, Brazil and other emerging powers rise. Although most strategists recognize that the dominance of the West is on the wane, they are confident that its founding ideas--democracy, capitalism, and secular nationalism--will continue to spread, ensuring that the Western order will outlast its primacy. In No One's World, Charles A. Kupchan boldly challenges this view, arguing that the world is headed for political and ideological diversity; emerging powers will neither defer to the West's lead nor converge toward the Western way. The ascent of the West was the product of social and economic conditions unique to Europe and the United States. As other regions now rise, they are following their own paths to modernity and embracing their own conceptions of domestic and international order. Kupchan contends that the Western order will not be displaced by a new great power or dominant political model. The twenty-first century will not belong to America, China, Asia, or anyone else. It will be no one's world. For the first time in history, an interdependent world will be without a center of gravity or global guardian. More than simply diagnosing what lies ahead, Kupchan provides a detailed strategy for striking a bargain between the West and the rising rest by fashioning a new consensus on issues of legitimacy, sovereignty, and governance. Thoughtful, provocative, sweeping in scope, this work is nothing less than a global guidebook for the 21st century.
This book discusses trans-border ethnic populations in the former Soviet Union in a broader conceptual context, highlighting the importance of diaspora issues both for post-Sovietologists and for scholars of comparative politics and international relations in general.
The Future of NATO looks at the conceptual and theoretical approaches that underlie the question of enlarging NATO's membership and the consequences of enlargement on international relations. It examines the policies of some of NATO's leading member states - including Canada, which has recently begun a two-year term on the security council - and deals with the issue of enlargement from the point of view of the East European candidates, focusing on Russia and its opposition to the current process. Contributors include Andràs Balogh (Loràn Eötvös University), Martin Bourgeois, Charles-Philippe David (UQAM), André P. Donneur (UQAM), David G. Haglund (Queen's), Philippe Hébert (Montréal), Stanislav J. Kirschbaum (Glendon College), Richard L. Kugler (RAND, National Defence University), David Law (Queen's), Paul Létourneau (Montréal), Jacques Lévesque (UQAM), Gale Mattox (U.S. Naval Academy), Marie-Claude Plantin (Lumière Lyon 2), Sergei Plekhanov (York), Jane M.O. Sharp (Kings College, London).
Charles Doran examines why Canadian unity is important, what drives Quebec separatism in the American view, and the nature of the historical era that has shaped and conditioned secessionist impulse.
Democracies often go to war but almost never against each other. Indeed, "the democratic peace" has become a catchphrase among scholars and even U.S. Presidents. But why do democracies avoid fighting each other? Reliable Partners offers the first systematic and definitive explanation. Examining decades of research and speculation on the subject and testing this against the history of relations between democracies over the last two centuries, Charles Lipson concludes that constitutional democracies have a "contracting advantage"--a unique ability to settle conflicts with each other by durable agreements. In so doing he forcefully counters realist claims that a regime's character is irrelevant to war and peace. Lipson argues that because democracies are confident their bargains will stick, they can negotiate effective settlements with each other rather than incur the great costs of war. Why are democracies more reliable partners? Because their politics are uniquely open to outside scrutiny and facilitate long-term commitments. They cannot easily bluff, deceive, or launch surprise attacks. While this transparency weakens their bargaining position, it also makes their promises more credible--and more durable, for democracies are generally stable. Their leaders are constrained by constitutional rules, independent officials, and the political costs of abandoning public commitments. All this allows for solid bargains between democracies. When democracies contemplate breaking their agreements, their open debate gives partners advance notice and a chance to protect themselves. Hence agreements among democracies are less risky than those with nondemocratic states. Setting rigorous analysis in friendly, vigorous prose, Reliable Partners resolves longstanding questions about the democratic peace and highlights important new findings about democracies in world politics, from rivalries to alliances. Above all, it shows conclusively that democracies are uniquely adapted to seal enduring bargains with each other and thus avoid the blight of war.
Peace and Conflict Studies sets the standard for an accessible introduction, a comprehensive exploration, and analysis of 21st-century world events – including updated coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Middle East, the Social Justice movements within the US, and Global Climate Change. The text examines current conflicts, explores the important aspects of positive peace, individual violence, nationalism, and terrorism, provides numerous visual aids, questions for further study, and suggested readings, and furnishes a comprehensive range of material to enlighten and enrich future discussion and encourage further academic pursuit. With a broad and authoritative scope, this introductory text chronicles a plethora of important global topics from pre-history to the present.
Man-made textile fibers are frequently encountered as trace evidence in criminal investigations. This study examined the effects of burial in soil on the biodeterioration of synthetic textile fibers such as cellulose acetate, nylon, polyesters and acrylics. Cellulose acetate fibers began to show signs of decomposition within two months after burial in common garden topsoil and were completely degraded within four to nine months. It was found that severely decomposed cellulose acetate fibers could be identified by pyrolysis-gas liquid chromatography even when other methods such as polarized light microscopy and dispersion staining failed. The solubility behavior of the cellulose acetate fibers also was altered. The other types of fibers showed no detectable alteration at the end of the twelve-month study. REFERENCES American Association of Textile Chemists and Colorists (1971). AATCC Technical Manual, AATCC, Triangle Park, NC. Cook, R., and Paterson, M.D. (1978). New techniques for the identifi- tion of microscopic samples of textile fibers by infrared spectroscopy. Forensic Sci. Int., 12, 237-243. DeForest, P.R., Geansslen, R.E., and Lee, H.C. (1983). Forensic Science: An Introduction to Criminalistics, McGraw-Hill Book Company, NY. Federal Bureau of Investigation (1978). Solubility schemes by generic class. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, DC. Fong, W. (1982). Rapid microscopic identification of synthetic fibers in a single liquid mount. ~ Forensic Sci., 27, 257-263.
The war for the liberation of Kuwait following the Iraqi invasion in 1990 rekindled the international community's geopolitical interest in the Gulf and helped define a new regional order. This book analyzes the political, strategic, and economic dimensions of the second Gulf War, with particular focus on military aspects. An international roster of experts treats issues of strategy, weapons technology, arms transfers, and the impact on the Arab state system. Of special interest is the exploration of the implications of the war for Japan, Germany, Russia, and Europe.
This volume provides a broadly comparative and historical re-examination of the fundamental strategic dilemmas that confront the Western world in the Persian Gulf region. This systematic study of how the West has defined and dealt with its security interests in this region reveals three central strategic dilemmas: strategy versus capability, globalism versus regionalism, and unilateralism versus collectivism. The first part of the book focuses on US policy with particular emphasis on the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The author explains why there has been a persistent gap between American perceptions of the Middle East and the political and strategic realities of the region. The second part of the book examines the frustrated efforts of NATO members to form a cooperative response to their collective interests in the region.
This volume provides a broadly comparative and historical re-examination of the fundamental strategic dilemmas that confront the Western world in the Persian Gulf region. This systematic study of how the West has defined and dealt with its security interests in this region reveals three central strategic dilemmas: strategy versus capability, globalism versus regionalism, and unilateralism versus collectivism. The first part of the book focuses on US policy with particular emphasis on the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The author explains why there has been a persistent gap between American perceptions of the Middle East and the political and strategic realities of the region. The second part of the book examines the frustrated efforts of NATO members to form a cooperative response to their collective interests in the region.
Why do some violent conflicts endure across the centuries, while others become dimly remembered ancient struggles among forgotten peoples? Is nationalism really the powerful force that it appeared to be in the 1990s? This wide-ranging work examines the conceptual intersection of nationalist ideology, social violence, and the political transformation of Europe and Eurasia over the last two decades. The end of communism seemed to usher in a period of radical change-an era of "extreme politics" that pitted nations, ethnic groups, and violent entrepreneurs against one another, from the wars in the Balkans and Caucasus to the apparent upsurge in nationalist mobilization throughout the region. But the last twenty years have also illustrated the incredible diversity of political life after the end of one-party rule. Extreme Politics engages with themes from the micropolitics of social violence, to the history of nationalism studies, to the nature of demographic change in Eurasia. Published twenty years since the collapse of communism, Extreme Politics charts the end of "Eastern Europe" as a place and chronicles the ongoing revolution in the scholarly study of the post-communist world.
The author examines the roles of the small and professional armed forces of Australia and Canada, by comparing their historical experiences with expeditionary land forces.
How to Write a BA Thesis is the only book that directly addresses the needs of undergraduate students writing a major paper. This book offers step-by-step advice on how to move from early ideas to finished paper. It covers choosing a topic, selecting an advisor, writing a proposal, conducting research, developing an argument, writing and editing the thesis, and making through a defense. Lipson also acknowledges the challenges that arise when tackling such a project, and he offers advice for breaking through writer’s block and juggling school-life demands. This is a must-read for anyone writing a BA thesis, or for anyone who advises these students.
Analyses of the War in Afghanistan frequently mention the declining or shaky domestic support for the conflict in the United States and among several U.S. allies. This paper dates the beginning of this decline back to the resurgence of the Taliban in 2005-06 and suggests that the deteriorating course of the war on the ground in Afghanistan itself along with mounting casualties is the key reason behind this drop in domestic support for the war.
With sweeping changes in the Soviet Union and East Europe having shaken core assumptions of U.S. defense policy, it is time to reassess basic questions of American nuclear strategy and force requirements. In a comprehensive analysis of these issues, Charles Glaser argues that even before the recent easing of tension with the Soviet Union, the United States should have revised its nuclear strategy, rejecting deterrent threats that require the ability to destroy Soviet nuclear forces and forgoing entirely efforts to limit damage if all-out nuclear war occurs. Changes in the Soviet Union, suggests Glaser, may be best viewed as creating an opportunity to make revisions that are more than twenty years overdue. Glaser's provocative work is organized in three parts. "The Questions behind the Questions" evaluates the basic factual and theoretical disputes that underlie disagreements about U.S. nuclear weapons policy. "Alternative Nuclear Worlds" compares "mutual assured destruction capabilities" (MAD)--a world in which both superpowers' societies are highly vulnerable to nuclear retaliation--to the basic alternatives: mutual perfect defenses, U.S. superiority, and nuclear disarmament. Would any basic alternatives be preferable to MAD? Drawing on the earlier sections of the book, "Decisions in MAD" addresses key choices facing American decision makers. Originally published in 1990. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
The report notes that in the near term nuclear weapons will remain a fundamental element of U.S. national security. For this reason it emphasizes the importance of maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable deterrent nuclear force and makes recommendations on this front. The report also offers measures to advance important goals such as preventing nuclear terrorism and bolstering the nuclear nonproliferation regime--Foreword.
This Task Force report comprehensively reviews the situation on the peninsula as well as the options for U.S. policy. It provides a valuable ranking of U.S. interests, and calls for a firm commitment from the Obama administration to seek denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, backed by a combination of sanctions, incentives, and sustained political pressure, in addition to increased efforts to contain proliferation. It notes that China's participation in this effort is vital. Indeed, the report makes clear that any hope of North Korea's dismantling its nuclear program rests on China's willingness to take a strong stance. For denuclearization to proceed, China must acknowledge that the long-term hazard of a nuclear Korea is more perilous to it and the region than the short-term risk of instability. The report also recognizes that robust relations between Washington and its allies in the region, Japan and South Korea, must underpin any efforts to deal with the North Korean problem. It looks as well at regime change and scenarios that could lead to reunification of the peninsula. At the same time that the Task Force emphasizes the danger and urgency of North Korea's behavior, it recognizes and applauds the beneficial U.S. relationship with South Korea, which has proved to be a valuable economic and strategic partner. In this vein, the Task Force advocates continued close coordination with Seoul and urges prompt congressional passage of the U.S.-South Korea free trade agreement.
India now matters to U.S. interests in virtually every dimension. This CFR-sponsored Independent Task Force report, directed by Alyssa Ayres, assesses the current situation in India and the U.S.-India relationship, and suggests a new model for partnership with a rising India.
The common images of Korea view the peninsula as a long-standing battleground for outside powers and the Cold War's last divided state. But, Korea's location at the very center of Northeast Asia gives it a pivotal role in the economic integration of the region and the dynamic development of its more powerful neighbors. A great wave of economic expansion, driven first by the Japanese miracle and then by the ascent of China, has made South Korea - an economic powerhouse in its own right - the hub of the region once again, a natural corridor for railroads and energy pipelines linking Asiatic Russia to China and Japan. And, over the horizon, an opening of North Korea, with multilateral support, would add another major push toward regional integration. Illuminating the role of the Korean peninsula in three modern historical periods, the eminent international contributors to this volume offer a fresh and stimulating appraisal of Korea as the key to the coalescence of a broad, open Northeast Asian regionalism in the twenty-fifth century.
It was logical to expect that the European Economic and Monetary Union would lead ineluctably to an autonomous European defense; the very size of the European Union seems to demand it. The EU eventually will reach the point where its economic and demographic weight will far exceed that of the United States. Can it not be expected too that the EU will seek to make this weight felt internationally? Cogan tracks the halting creation of an independent European military structure, a third way between national armies and ATO, since the Iron Curtain's fall. With the Cold War's end and subsequent western engagements in Central and Eastern Europe, it is no longer a question of whether NATO and the EU compare; they now must relate. They have to coordinate their planning and force postures so as to avoid duplication of resources and efforts. Although NATO's integrated command structure theoretically was an anomaly with the end of the Cold War, it nevertheless turned out to be the case in Bosnia, and later Kosovo, that nothing was possible until the Americans intervened. The virtue of integrated command -- American participation and know-how -- was once again seen as crucially important, despite the increasingly anachronistic deficit of sovereignty for Western Europe in defense matters. In the long run, Europe's economic power must be balanced by its military and diplomatic might.
Great Powers and World Order encourages critical thinking about the nature of world order by presenting the historical information and theoretical concepts needed to make projections about the global future. Charles W. Kegley and Gregory Raymond ask students to compare retrospective cases and formulate their own hypotheses about not only the causes of war, but also the consequences of peace settlements. Historical case studies open a window to see what strategies for constructing world order were tried before, why one course of action was chosen over another, and how things turned out. By moving back and forth in each case study between history and theory, rather than treating them as separate topics, the authors hope to situate the assumptions, causal claims, and policy prescriptions of different schools of thought within the temporal domains in which they took root, giving the reader a better sense of why policy makers embraced a particular view of world order instead of an alternative vision.
Within the realist school of international relations, a prevailing view holds that the anarchic structure of the international system invariably forces the great powers to seek security at one another's expense, dooming even peaceful nations to an unrelenting struggle for power and dominance. Rational Theory of International Politics offers a more nuanced alternative to this view, one that provides answers to the most fundamental and pressing questions of international relations. Why do states sometimes compete and wage war while at other times they cooperate and pursue peace? Does competition reflect pressures generated by the anarchic international system or rather states' own expansionist goals? Are the United States and China on a collision course to war, or is continued coexistence possible? Is peace in the Middle East even feasible? Charles Glaser puts forward a major new theory of international politics that identifies three kinds of variables that influence a state's strategy: the state's motives, specifically whether it is motivated by security concerns or "greed"; material variables, which determine its military capabilities; and information variables, most importantly what the state knows about its adversary's motives. Rational Theory of International Politics demonstrates that variation in motives can be key to the choice of strategy; that the international environment sometimes favors cooperation over competition; and that information variables can be as important as material variables in determining the strategy a state should choose.
A “brilliant” examination of American complacency and how it puts the nation’s—and the world’s—security at risk (The Wall Street Journal). The ancient Greeks hard-wired a tragic sensibility into their culture. By looking disaster squarely in the face, by understanding just how badly things could spiral out of control, they sought to create a communal sense of responsibility and courage—to spur citizens and their leaders to take the difficult actions necessary to avert such a fate. Today, after more than seventy years of great-power peace and a quarter-century of unrivaled global leadership, Americans have lost their sense of tragedy. They have forgotten that the descent into violence and war has been all too common throughout human history. This amnesia has become most pronounced just as Americans and the global order they created are coming under graver threat than at any time in decades. In a forceful argument that brims with historical sensibility and policy insights, two distinguished historians argue that a tragic sensibility is necessary if America and its allies are to address the dangers that menace the international order today. Tragedy may be commonplace, Brands and Edel argue, but it is not inevitable—so long as we regain an appreciation of the world’s tragic nature before it is too late. “Literate and lucid—sure to interest to readers of Fukuyama, Huntington, and similar authors as well as students of modern realpolitik.” —Kirkus Reviews
“The international world of states and their modern system is a literary realm,” writes Charles Hill in this powerful work on the practice of international relations. “It is where the greatest issues of the human condition are played out.” A distinguished lifelong diplomat and educator, Hill aims to revive the ancient tradition of statecraft as practiced by humane and broadly educated men and women. Through lucid and compelling discussions of classic literary works from Homer to Rushdie, Grand Strategies represents a merger of literature and international relations, inspired by the conviction that “a grand strategist . . . needs to be immersed in classic texts from Sun Tzu to Thucydides to George Kennan, to gain real-world experience through internships in the realms of statecraft, and to bring this learning and experience to bear on contemporary issues.” This fascinating and engaging introduction to the basic concepts of the international order not only defines what it is to build a civil society through diplomacy, justice, and lawful governance but also describes how these ideas emerge from and reflect human nature.
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