An elected judiciary is virtually unique to the American experience and creates a paradox in a representative democracy. Elected judges take an oath to uphold the law impartially, which calls upon them to swear off the influence of the very constituencies they must cultivate in order to attain and retain judicial office. This paradox has given rise to perennially shrill and unproductive binary arguments over the merits and demerits of elected and appointed judiciaries, which this project seeks to transcend and reimagine. In Who Is to Judge?, judicial politics expert Charles Gardner Geyh exposes and explains the overstatements of both sides in the judicial selection debate. When those exaggerations are understood as such, it becomes possible to search for common ground and its limits. Ultimately, this search leads Geyh to conclude that, while appointive systems are a preferable default, no one system of selection is best for all jurisdictions at all times.
In recent decades, the American judiciary has undergone a political transformation that jeopardizes the rule of law paradigm that the courts have embraced for centuries. Courting Peril describes that transformation, explores its implications, and proposes a new way of thinking about the courts and their oversight.
An elected judiciary is virtually unique to the American experience and creates a paradox in a representative democracy. Elected judges take an oath to uphold the law impartially, which calls upon them to swear off the influence of the very constituencies they must cultivate in order to attain and retain judicial office. This paradox has given rise to perennially shrill and unproductive binary arguments over the merits and demerits of elected and appointed judiciaries, which this project seeks to transcend and reimagine. In Who Is to Judge?, judicial politics expert Charles Gardner Geyh exposes and explains the overstatements of both sides in the judicial selection debate. When those exaggerations are understood as such, it becomes possible to search for common ground and its limits. Ultimately, this search leads Geyh to conclude that, while appointive systems are a preferable default, no one system of selection is best for all jurisdictions at all times.
The rule of law paradigm has long operated on the premise that independent judges disregard extralegal influences and impartially uphold the law. A political transformation several generations in the making, however, has imperiled this premise. Social science learning, the lessons of which have been widely internalized by court critics and the general public, has shown that judicial decision-making is subject to ideological and other extralegal influences. In recent decades, challenges to the assumptions underlying the rule of law paradigm have proliferated across a growing array of venues, as critics agitate for greater political control of judges and courts. With the future of the rule of law paradigm in jeopardy, this book proposes a new way of looking at how the role of the American judiciary should be conceptualized and regulated. This new, "legal culture paradigm" defends the need for an independent judiciary that is acculturated to take law seriously but is subject to political and other extralegal influences. The book argues that these extralegal influences cannot be eliminated but can be managed, by balancing the needs for judicial independence and accountability across competing perspectives, to the end of enabling judges to follow the "law" (less rigidly conceived), respect established legal process, and administer justice.
This volume offers perspectives from political scientists, legal scholars, and practicing judges as they seek to answer the question of how much law actually has to do with judicial behavior and decision-making, and what it means for society at large.
This is quite simply the best study of judicial independence that I have ever read; it is erudite, historically aware, and politically astute." ---Malcolm M. Feeley, Claire Sanders Clements Dean's Professor, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkeley "Professor Geyh has written a wise and timely book that is informed by the author's broad and deep experience working with the judicial and legislative branches, by the insights of law, history and political science, and by an appreciation of theory and common sense." ---Stephen B. Burbank, David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania Law School With Congress threatening to "go nuclear" over judicial appointments, and lawmakers accusing judges of being "arrogant, out of control, and unaccountable," many pundits see a dim future for the autonomy of America's courts. But do we really understand the balance between judicial independence and Congress's desire to limit judicial reach? Charles Geyh's When Courts and Congress Collide is the most sweeping study of this question to date, and an unprecedented analysis of the relationship between Congress and our federal courts. Efforts to check the power of the courts have come and gone throughout American history, from the Jeffersonian Congress's struggle to undo the work of the Federalists, to FDR's campaign to pack the Supreme Court, to the epic Senate battles over the Bork and Thomas nominations. If legislators were solely concerned with curbing the courts, Geyh suggests, they would use direct means, such as impeaching uncooperative judges, gerrymandering their jurisdictions, stripping the bench's oversight powers, or slashing judicial budgets. Yet, while Congress has long been willing to influence judicial decision-making indirectly by blocking the appointments of ideologically unacceptable nominees, it has, with only rare exceptions, resisted employing more direct methods of control. When Courts and Congress Collide is the first work to demonstrate that this balance is governed by a "dynamic equilibrium": a constant give-and-take between Congress's desire to control the judiciary and its respect for historical norms of judicial independence. It is this dynamic equilibrium, Geyh says, rather than what the Supreme Court or the Constitution says about the separation of powers, that defines the limits of the judiciary's independence. When Courts and Congress Collide is a groundbreaking work, requiring all of us to consider whether we are on the verge of radically disrupting our historic balance of governance. Charles Gardner Geyh is Professor of Law and Charles L. Whistler Faculty Fellow at Indiana University at Bloomington. He has served as director of the American Judicature Society's Center for Judicial Independence, reporter to the American Bar Association Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence, and counsel to the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives.
The second edition of this work provides an overview of the history of judicial disqualification. It substantially revises and expands on the first edition, and analyzes the case law, both with a focus on substantive disqualification, and procedural requirements. Featured are updated cases of applicable statutory law, a revised organizational structure and new material. The ethical dimension is governed by Cannon 3C of the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges. On the other hand, the procedural dimension is governed by four sections in Title 28 of the United States Code (USC/U.S. Code). Related products: U.S. Code series can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/united-states-code Ethics & Code of Conduct collection is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/ethics-code-conduct More products produced by the Judicial Branch & Federal Courts can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/agency/judicial-branch-federal-courts
With experience as both a trial and appellate judge, Charles Benjamin Schudson knows the burdens on judges. With engaging candor, he takes readers behind the bench to probe judicial minds analyzing actual trials and sentencings—of abortion protesters, murderers, sex predators, white supremacists, and others. He takes us into chambers to hear judges forging appellate decisions about life and death, multimillion-dollar damages, and priceless civil rights. And, most significantly, he exposes the financial, political, personal, and professional pressures that threaten judicial ethics and independence. As political attacks on judges increase, Schudson calls for reforms to protect judicial independence and for vigilance to ensure justice for all. Independence Corrupted is invaluable for students and scholars, lawyers and judges, and all citizens concerned about the future of America's courts.
The third edition of Election Law in the American Political System pivots to place front and center the profound challenges to American democracy posed by the emergence of a political environment in which repeated, partisan attempts to undermine longstanding democratic processes have become a new norm of political contestation. Like prior editions, it offers an easy to teach, student-friendly, intellectually rich casebook with comprehensive coverage of the legal rules and doctrines that shape democratic participation in the 21st century American political system. New to the Third Edition: Addresses the perils currently facing American democracy including democratic backsliding, authoritarianism, and election denialism Contextualizes the problem of democratic backsliding as a global phenomenon Provides important intellectual framework and scaffolding by explaining the joint pathologies of illiberalism and populism and how they affect American democracy Updated caselaw with partisan gerrymandering: Rucho v. Common Cause; the Voting Rights Act: Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee; racial gerrymandering: Cooper v. Harris; and political speech: Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky Professors and students will benefit from: Organization that tracks the lifecycle of the democratic process from distribution of the franchise to processes and relationships of representation and through parties, candidate selection, campaign speech and spending, to electoral administration. Multidisciplinary coverage of theories of voting behavior, alternative electoral systems, evolution of judicial review of democratic processes, and developments concerning the advent of “fake news” in election campaigns. Comprehensive coverage of developments in partisan gerrymandering, the Voting Rights Act, judicial campaigning, campaign finance, and electoral administration. A focus on the current problems facing American democracy. A rich set of theoretical materials to help facilitate teaching and engagement of doctrine Well-organized and self-contained units that allow professors to cover topics in the depth and breadth they prefer. Clear, concise, and informative notes to help focus student attention on the issues that are relevant.
This is quite simply the best study of judicial independence that I have ever read; it is erudite, historically aware, and politically astute." ---Malcolm M. Feeley, Claire Sanders Clements Dean's Professor, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkeley "Professor Geyh has written a wise and timely book that is informed by the author's broad and deep experience working with the judicial and legislative branches, by the insights of law, history and political science, and by an appreciation of theory and common sense." ---Stephen B. Burbank, David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania Law School With Congress threatening to "go nuclear" over judicial appointments, and lawmakers accusing judges of being "arrogant, out of control, and unaccountable," many pundits see a dim future for the autonomy of America's courts. But do we really understand the balance between judicial independence and Congress's desire to limit judicial reach? Charles Geyh's When Courts and Congress Collide is the most sweeping study of this question to date, and an unprecedented analysis of the relationship between Congress and our federal courts. Efforts to check the power of the courts have come and gone throughout American history, from the Jeffersonian Congress's struggle to undo the work of the Federalists, to FDR's campaign to pack the Supreme Court, to the epic Senate battles over the Bork and Thomas nominations. If legislators were solely concerned with curbing the courts, Geyh suggests, they would use direct means, such as impeaching uncooperative judges, gerrymandering their jurisdictions, stripping the bench's oversight powers, or slashing judicial budgets. Yet, while Congress has long been willing to influence judicial decision-making indirectly by blocking the appointments of ideologically unacceptable nominees, it has, with only rare exceptions, resisted employing more direct methods of control. When Courts and Congress Collide is the first work to demonstrate that this balance is governed by a "dynamic equilibrium": a constant give-and-take between Congress's desire to control the judiciary and its respect for historical norms of judicial independence. It is this dynamic equilibrium, Geyh says, rather than what the Supreme Court or the Constitution says about the separation of powers, that defines the limits of the judiciary's independence. When Courts and Congress Collide is a groundbreaking work, requiring all of us to consider whether we are on the verge of radically disrupting our historic balance of governance. Charles Gardner Geyh is Professor of Law and Charles L. Whistler Faculty Fellow at Indiana University at Bloomington. He has served as director of the American Judicature Society's Center for Judicial Independence, reporter to the American Bar Association Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence, and counsel to the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives.
The second edition of this work provides an overview of the history of judicial disqualification. It substantially revises and expands on the first edition, and analyzes the case law, both with a focus on substantive disqualification, and procedural requirements. Featured are updated cases of applicable statutory law, a revised organizational structure and new material. The ethical dimension is governed by Cannon 3C of the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges. On the other hand, the procedural dimension is governed by four sections in Title 28 of the United States Code (USC/U.S. Code). Related products: U.S. Code series can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/united-states-code Ethics & Code of Conduct collection is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/ethics-code-conduct More products produced by the Judicial Branch & Federal Courts can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/agency/judicial-branch-federal-courts
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