The IMF, with the Bank for International Settlements and the Financial Stability Board, has been at the forefront of discussions on reform of the global financial system to reduce the possibility of future crises, as well as to limit the consequences if they do occur. The policy choices are both urgent and challenging, and are complicated by the relationship between sovereign debt and risks to the banking sector. Building a More Resilient Financial Sector describes the key elements of the reform agenda, including tighter regulation and more effective supervision; greater transparency to strengthen market discipline and limit incentives for risk taking; coherent mechanisms for resolution of failed institutions; and effective safety nets to limit the impact on the financial system of institutions viewed as "too big to fail." Finally, the book takes a look ahead at how the financial system is likely to be shaped by the efforts of policymakers and the private sector response.
This paper tests empirically the proposition that bank fragility is determined by bank-specific factors, macroeconomic conditions and potential contagion effects. The methodology allows for the variables that determine bank failure to differ from those that influence banks’ time to failure (or survival rate). Based on the indicators of fragility of individual banks, we construct an index of fragility for the banking system. The framework is applied to the Mexican financial crisis beginning in 1994. In the case of Mexico, bank-specific variables as well as contagion effects explain the likelihood of bank failure, while macroeconomic variables largely determine the timing of failure.
In recent decades, a wide range of countries have experienced banking problems. Their approaches to systemic bank restructuring have varied substantially. This paper analyzes a representative sample of 24 countries and provides a summary of policies judged to be successful. The sample countries were ranked by relative progress in resolving banking sector problems. Based on this ranking, the paper examines the effectiveness of institutional and regulatory measures, assesses the impact of accompanying macroeconomic policies, and examines the extent to which particular restructuring instruments contributed to success. Special emphasis is given to the role of the central bank.
This paper analyzes the different channels through which financial variables and financial sector reform can affect economic growth and efficiency, using panel data for 40 countries which reformed their financial systems. Financial sector reform is hypothesized to affect economic growth and efficiency through three main channels: the real interest rate representing the interest cost of capital, the volume of intermediation, and financial sector efficiency. The results indicate that financial reforms have structural effects; that financial variables and reforms are important determinants of economic performance; that the impact depends on whether countries did or did not face a financial crisis; and that the “quality” of financial sector reform matters.
This paper estimates a speculative attack model of currency crises in an attempt to identify the roles of macroeconomic fundamentals and speculative market pressures in the recent crisis, as well as earlier devaluations in adjustable fixed exchange rate systems in the European currency markets. For a sample of five countries, including Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Norway, and Sweden, our empirical analyses show that both economic fundamentals and speculative factors have a significant influence on the probability of devaluations. The recent experience in the European foreign exchange markets suggests that the latest realignments are mainly the result of foreign exchange market tensions amidst the growing conflict between the needs of the domestic economies and the policies needed to maintain fixed exchange rates. Our results confirm that regardless of the source of the deterioration in economic conditions, market participants perceived the existing parities of the currencies in these five countries as inconsistent with their underlying economic fundamentals, thus effectively bringing about either a realignment or a modification of the exchange arrangement.
The SDN elaborates the case for, and the design of, a banking union for the euro area. It discusses the benefits and costs of a banking union, presents a steady state view of the banking union, elaborates difficult transition issues, and briefly discusses broader EU issues. As such, it assesses current plans and provides advice. It is accompanied by three background technical notes that analyze in depth the various elements of the banking union: a single supervisory framework; a single resolution and common safety net; and urgent issues related to repair of weak banks in Europe.
This paper estimates a disequilibrium model of credit supply and demand to evaluate whether there was a credit crunch in Finland following the banking crisis of 1991-92. Empirical analysis suggests that the marked reduction in bank lending was mainly in reaction to a cyclical decline in credit demand, likely exacerbated by the high level of indebtedness of the borrowers. It also appears that banks became less willing to supply credit during periods associated with a deterioration in asset quality, and reduced profits due to declining regulatory protection from competition, and a need to increase capital adequacy levels.
The U.S., the U.K., and more recently, the E.U., have proposed policy measures directly targeting complexity and business structures of banks. Unlike other, price-based reforms (e.g., Basel 3 and G-SIFI surcharges), these proposals have been developed unilaterally with material differences in scope, design and implementation schedules. This may exacerbate cross-border regulatory arbitrage and put a further burden on consolidated supervision and cross-border resolution. This paper provides an analysis of the potential implications of implementing different structural policy measures. It proposes a pragmatic and coordinated approach to development of these policies to reduce risk of regulatory arbitrage and minimize unintended consequences. In doing so, it also aims to identify a set of common policy measures that countries could adopt to re-scope bank business models and corporate structures.
This study examines the banking crises in Finland, Norway and Sweden, which took place in the early 1990s, and draws some policy conclusions from their experiences. One key conclusion is that factors in addition to business cycle effects explain the Nordic countries financial problems. Although the timing of the deregulation in all three countries coincided with a strongly expansionary macroeconomic momentum, the main reasons for the banking crises were the delayed policy responses, the structural characteristics of the financial systems, and the banks inadequate internal risk-management controls.
This paper estimates a speculative attack model of currency crises in order to identify the role of economic fundamentals and any early warning signals of a potential currency crisis. The data from the Mexican economy was used to illustrate the model. Based on the results, a deterioration in fundamentals appears to have generated high one-step-ahead probabilities for the regime changes during the sample period 1982-1994. Particularly, increases in inflation differentials, appreciations of the real exchange rate, foreign reserve losses, expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, and increases in the share of short-term foreign currency debt appear to have contributed to the market pressures and regime changes in that period.
Credibility is the bedrock of any crisis stress test. The use of stress tests to manage systemic risk was introduced by the U.S. authorities in 2009 in the form of the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program. Since then, supervisory authorities in other jurisdictions have also conducted similar exercises. In some of those cases, the design and implementation of certainelements of the framework have been criticized for their lack of credibility. This paper proposes a set of guidelines for constructing an effective crisis stress test. It combines financial markets impact studies of previous exercises with relevant case study information gleaned from those experiences to identify the key elements and to formulate their appropriate design. Pertinent concepts, issues and nuances particular to crisis stress testing are also discussed. The findings may be useful for country authorities seeking to include stress tests in their crisis management arsenal, as well as for the design of crisis programs.
The IMF, with the Bank for International Settlements and the Financial Stability Board, has been at the forefront of discussions on reform of the global financial system to reduce the possibility of future crises, as well as to limit the consequences if they do occur. The policy choices are both urgent and challenging, and are complicated by the relationship between sovereign debt and risks to the banking sector. Building a More Resilient Financial Sector describes the key elements of the reform agenda, including tighter regulation and more effective supervision; greater transparency to strengthen market discipline and limit incentives for risk taking; coherent mechanisms for resolution of failed institutions; and effective safety nets to limit the impact on the financial system of institutions viewed as "too big to fail." Finally, the book takes a look ahead at how the financial system is likely to be shaped by the efforts of policymakers and the private sector response.
The SDN elaborates the case for, and the design of, a banking union for the euro area. It discusses the benefits and costs of a banking union, presents a steady state view of the banking union, elaborates difficult transition issues, and briefly discusses broader EU issues. As such, it assesses current plans and provides advice. It is accompanied by three background technical notes that analyze in depth the various elements of the banking union: a single supervisory framework; a single resolution and common safety net; and urgent issues related to repair of weak banks in Europe.
This paper tests empirically the proposition that bank fragility is determined by bank-specific factors, macroeconomic conditions and potential contagion effects. The methodology allows for the variables that determine bank failure to differ from those that influence banks’ time to failure (or survival rate). Based on the indicators of fragility of individual banks, we construct an index of fragility for the banking system. The framework is applied to the Mexican financial crisis beginning in 1994. In the case of Mexico, bank-specific variables as well as contagion effects explain the likelihood of bank failure, while macroeconomic variables largely determine the timing of failure.
This paper analyzes the different channels through which financial variables and financial sector reform can affect economic growth and efficiency, using panel data for 40 countries which reformed their financial systems. Financial sector reform is hypothesized to affect economic growth and efficiency through three main channels: the real interest rate representing the interest cost of capital, the volume of intermediation, and financial sector efficiency. The results indicate that financial reforms have structural effects; that financial variables and reforms are important determinants of economic performance; that the impact depends on whether countries did or did not face a financial crisis; and that the “quality” of financial sector reform matters.
This paper estimates a speculative attack model of currency crises in an attempt to identify the roles of macroeconomic fundamentals and speculative market pressures in the recent crisis, as well as earlier devaluations in adjustable fixed exchange rate systems in the European currency markets. For a sample of five countries, including Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Norway, and Sweden, our empirical analyses show that both economic fundamentals and speculative factors have a significant influence on the probability of devaluations. The recent experience in the European foreign exchange markets suggests that the latest realignments are mainly the result of foreign exchange market tensions amidst the growing conflict between the needs of the domestic economies and the policies needed to maintain fixed exchange rates. Our results confirm that regardless of the source of the deterioration in economic conditions, market participants perceived the existing parities of the currencies in these five countries as inconsistent with their underlying economic fundamentals, thus effectively bringing about either a realignment or a modification of the exchange arrangement.
Credibility is the bedrock of any crisis stress test. The use of stress tests to manage systemic risk was introduced by the U.S. authorities in 2009 in the form of the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program. Since then, supervisory authorities in other jurisdictions have also conducted similar exercises. In some of those cases, the design and implementation of certainelements of the framework have been criticized for their lack of credibility. This paper proposes a set of guidelines for constructing an effective crisis stress test. It combines financial markets impact studies of previous exercises with relevant case study information gleaned from those experiences to identify the key elements and to formulate their appropriate design. Pertinent concepts, issues and nuances particular to crisis stress testing are also discussed. The findings may be useful for country authorities seeking to include stress tests in their crisis management arsenal, as well as for the design of crisis programs.
This paper estimates a speculative attack model of currency crises in order to identify the role of economic fundamentals and any early warning signals of a potential currency crisis. The data from the Mexican economy was used to illustrate the model. Based on the results, a deterioration in fundamentals appears to have generated high one-step-ahead probabilities for the regime changes during the sample period 1982-1994. Particularly, increases in inflation differentials, appreciations of the real exchange rate, foreign reserve losses, expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, and increases in the share of short-term foreign currency debt appear to have contributed to the market pressures and regime changes in that period.
This paper estimates a disequilibrium model of credit supply and demand to evaluate whether there was a credit crunch in Finland following the banking crisis of 1991-92. Empirical analysis suggests that the marked reduction in bank lending was mainly in reaction to a cyclical decline in credit demand, likely exacerbated by the high level of indebtedness of the borrowers. It also appears that banks became less willing to supply credit during periods associated with a deterioration in asset quality, and reduced profits due to declining regulatory protection from competition, and a need to increase capital adequacy levels.
This study examines the banking crises in Finland, Norway and Sweden, which took place in the early 1990s, and draws some policy conclusions from their experiences. One key conclusion is that factors in addition to business cycle effects explain the Nordic countries financial problems. Although the timing of the deregulation in all three countries coincided with a strongly expansionary macroeconomic momentum, the main reasons for the banking crises were the delayed policy responses, the structural characteristics of the financial systems, and the banks inadequate internal risk-management controls.
In recent decades, a wide range of countries have experienced banking problems. Their approaches to systemic bank restructuring have varied substantially. This paper analyzes a representative sample of 24 countries and provides a summary of policies judged to be successful. The sample countries were ranked by relative progress in resolving banking sector problems. Based on this ranking, the paper examines the effectiveness of institutional and regulatory measures, assesses the impact of accompanying macroeconomic policies, and examines the extent to which particular restructuring instruments contributed to success. Special emphasis is given to the role of the central bank.
The U.S., the U.K., and more recently, the E.U., have proposed policy measures directly targeting complexity and business structures of banks. Unlike other, price-based reforms (e.g., Basel 3 and G-SIFI surcharges), these proposals have been developed unilaterally with material differences in scope, design and implementation schedules. This may exacerbate cross-border regulatory arbitrage and put a further burden on consolidated supervision and cross-border resolution. This paper provides an analysis of the potential implications of implementing different structural policy measures. It proposes a pragmatic and coordinated approach to development of these policies to reduce risk of regulatory arbitrage and minimize unintended consequences. In doing so, it also aims to identify a set of common policy measures that countries could adopt to re-scope bank business models and corporate structures.
This paper examines episodes of the banking system distress and crisis in a large sample of countries. The empirical results identify several macroeconomic and financial variables as useful leading indicators. The main macroeconomic indicators were of limited value in predicting the Asian crises; the best warning signs were proxies for the vulnerability of the banking and corporate sector. Full-blown banking crises are shown to be more associated with external developments, and domestic variables are the main leading indicators of severe but contained banking distress.
This study examines the banking crises in Finland, Norway and Sweden, which took place in the early 1990s, and draws some policy conclusions from their experiences. One key conclusion is that factors in addition to business cycle effects explain the Nordic countries' financial problems. Although the timing of the deregulation in all three countries coincided with a strongly expansionary macroeconomic momentum, the main reasons for the banking crises were the delayed policy responses, the structural characteristics of the financial systems, and the banks' inadequate internal risk-management controls.
This will help us customize your experience to showcase the most relevant content to your age group
Please select from below
Login
Not registered?
Sign up
Already registered?
Success – Your message will goes here
We'd love to hear from you!
Thank you for visiting our website. Would you like to provide feedback on how we could improve your experience?
This site does not use any third party cookies with one exception — it uses cookies from Google to deliver its services and to analyze traffic.Learn More.