This book presents a comprehensive mathematical theory that explains precisely what information flow is, how it can be assessed quantitatively – so bringing precise meaning to the intuition that certain information leaks are small enough to be tolerated – and how systems can be constructed that achieve rigorous, quantitative information-flow guarantees in those terms. It addresses the fundamental challenge that functional and practical requirements frequently conflict with the goal of preserving confidentiality, making perfect security unattainable. Topics include: a systematic presentation of how unwanted information flow, i.e., "leaks", can be quantified in operationally significant ways and then bounded, both with respect to estimated benefit for an attacking adversary and by comparisons between alternative implementations; a detailed study of capacity, refinement, and Dalenius leakage, supporting robust leakage assessments; a unification of information-theoretic channels and information-leaking sequential programs within the same framework; and a collection of case studies, showing how the theory can be applied to interesting realistic scenarios. The text is unified, self-contained and comprehensive, accessible to students and researchers with some knowledge of discrete probability and undergraduate mathematics, and contains exercises to facilitate its use as a course textbook.
This book presents the refereed proceedings of the Second International Eurospace - Ada-Europe Symposium, held in Frankfurt, Germany, in October 1995. The 37 selected revised papers are organized in sections on Ada 95: the future, safety, language, applications, distribution, methods and tools, design methods, life cycle, real-time, and methods. Many significant features of the new Ada 95 version, officially issued in February 1995, are addressed. Besides Ada-specific problems, general software engineering aspects are also presented.
This book presents a comprehensive mathematical theory that explains precisely what information flow is, how it can be assessed quantitatively – so bringing precise meaning to the intuition that certain information leaks are small enough to be tolerated – and how systems can be constructed that achieve rigorous, quantitative information-flow guarantees in those terms. It addresses the fundamental challenge that functional and practical requirements frequently conflict with the goal of preserving confidentiality, making perfect security unattainable. Topics include: a systematic presentation of how unwanted information flow, i.e., "leaks", can be quantified in operationally significant ways and then bounded, both with respect to estimated benefit for an attacking adversary and by comparisons between alternative implementations; a detailed study of capacity, refinement, and Dalenius leakage, supporting robust leakage assessments; a unification of information-theoretic channels and information-leaking sequential programs within the same framework; and a collection of case studies, showing how the theory can be applied to interesting realistic scenarios. The text is unified, self-contained and comprehensive, accessible to students and researchers with some knowledge of discrete probability and undergraduate mathematics, and contains exercises to facilitate its use as a course textbook.
This volume contains the proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2000) held in State College, Pennsylvania, USA, during 22-25 August 2000. The purpose of the CONCUR conferences is to bring together researchers, developers, and students in order to advance the theory of concurrency and promote its applications. Interest in this topic is continuously growing, as a consequence of the importance and ubiquity of concurrent systems and their - plications, and of the scienti?c relevance of their foundations. The scope covers all areas of semantics, logics, and veri?cation techniques for concurrent systems. Topics include concurrency related aspects of: models of computation, semantic domains, process algebras, Petri nets, event structures, real-time systems, hybrid systems, decidability, model-checking, veri?cation techniques, re?nement te- niques, term and graph rewriting, distributed programming, logic constraint p- gramming, object-oriented programming, typing systems and algorithms, case studies, tools, and environments for programming and veri?cation. The ?rst two CONCUR conferences were held in Amsterdam (NL) in 1990 and 1991. The following ones in Stony Brook (USA), Hildesheim (D), Uppsala (S), Philadelphia (USA), Pisa (I), Warsaw (PL), Nice (F), and Eindhoven (NL). The proceedings have appeared in Springer LNCS, as Volumes 458, 527, 630, 715, 836, 962, 1119, 1243, 1466, and 1664.
In recent years, the growing popularity of mobile devices equipped with GPS chips, in combination with the increasing availability of wireless data connections, has led to an incremental rise in the use of Location-Based Services (LBSs), namely applications in which a user obtains, typically in real-time, a service related to his current location. The growing popularity of location-based services, allowing for the collection of vast amounts of information regarding users' location, has started raising serious privacy concerns. Methods for Location Privacy: A Comparative Overview examines the various kinds of privacy breaches that may arise due to the use of LBSs, and considers and compares some of the mechanisms and the metrics that have been proposed to protect user privacy, focusing in particular on a comparison between probabilistic spatial obfuscation techniques.
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