General Cao Van Vien describes the final collapse of the South Vietnamese forces in 1975 following the military U.S. withdrawl. “General Cao Van Vien was the last chairman of the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff. For almost ten years he worked closely with other senior Vietnamese officers and civilian leaders and dealt with U.S. military and civilian representatives in Saigon. General Vien is therefore particularly well qualified to give an account of the final years from a South Vietnamese standpoint. “This is one of a series of monographs written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodian, Laotian, and South Vietnamese armed forces.” Includes over 20 maps, tables and illustrations.
General Cao Van Vien was the last chairman of the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff. For almost ten years he worked closely with other senior Vietnamese officers and civilian leaders and dealt with U.S. military and civilian representatives in Saigon. General Vien is therefore particularly well qualified to give an account of the final years from a South Vietnamese standpoint.
This monograph forms part of the Indochina Monograph series written by senior military personnel from the former Army of the Republic of Vietnam who served against the northern communist invasion. War and politics posed many challenges to South Vietnam’s military leadership. Unlike his counterpart in some countries, the Vietnamese military commander was not simply a leader of men in combat. Depending on the level of command, he had to play his part in national politics, be himself a grass roots politician, or engage in political warfare. To achieve success, he was often expected to possess several qualities not always required of a professional military leader. The requirements of leadership, therefore, sometimes transcended the conventional framework of accepted rules and principles. Given these requirements and the fallibility of human nature, it had not always been easy to evaluate the total performance of our leadership. The dilemma we faced was that while professional competence during actual combat was a critical criteria, we could not tolerate deliberate aberrations in moral and social codes. In my analysis of the successes and failures of our leadership, I have endeavored to be fair and objective. If I seem to be laudatory of some officers while critical of others, it is not my intention to embarrass any individual. Performance has been the sole basis for all of my evaluations.
This monograph forms part of the Indochina Monograph series written by senior military personnel from the former Army of the Republic of Vietnam who served against the northern communist invasion. “The Vietnam War was an unusual and complex experience. Directed and sustained by Communist North Vietnam under the label of national liberation, it combined the elements of insurgency and conventional warfare. It began with guerrilla tactics but developed into and concluded with open invasion. Basically, however, it remained an ideological conflict whose ultimate outcome depended on popular participation and support. The requirements to fight this war were multiple and challenging. Counterinsurgency demanded that we mobilize our resources to strengthen the regime, protect the people and obtain their allegiance, root out the enemy infrastructure, and extend our armed forces to maintain security over the national territory. All this had to be done in the midst of mounting political dissent and social divisiveness. To meet the threat of large-scale conventional attacks, we had to contend with enemy sanctuaries in neighboring countries, the inhospitable terrain of our extensive borders, and uninterrupted infiltration. However, our efforts were greatly restrained by limited forces and prevailing policies. To analyze critically the chain of events which shaped the final outcome of the war in order to learn from our failures and successes, we have drawn primarily on our first-hand knowledge of major events and our personal involvement in the conduct of war efforts. We hope that in addressing the Salient points raised in all previous monographs of this series with fresh insights, our work will be able to provide a critical, comprehensive view of the war experience on the South Vietnam side.”-Author’s Preface.
Nguyen Cao Ky served as South Vietnam's prime minister and its vice president during the years of the Vietnam War's escalation, and of subsequent criticism of the war from the U. S. His memoir provides an insider's look at the disputes and corruption within the government of South Vietnam and the diplomatic struggles with the U. S. during this time. Ky, who was also a military pilot and held the rank of marshal, gives insight into the South Vietnamese military as well, criticizing inaccurate reporting on the war and drawing attention to stories that journalists avoided. Assessing the U. S. ambassadors Bunker and Martin and the role played by foreign aid, Nguyen paint an eye-opening picture of how American politics and elections had a profound effect upon U. S. allies.
Includes over 30 maps and illustrations This monograph forms part of the Indochina Monograph series written by senior military personnel from the former Army of the Republic of Vietnam who served against the northern communist invasion. “The United States advisory mission in South Vietnam encompassed many fields of endeavor and affected almost every level of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. It was a demanding exercise of professional duties and a unique human experience for the American adviser who had not only to struggle with problems of environment and culture differences and face the complexities and hazards of the war, but also devote his time and energy to supplement our Vietnamese experience with US Army professionalism. The total effort by US advisers contributed directly and immeasurably to the development and modernization of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. To the Vietnamese officers and men who benefited from his expertise and experience, the US adviser was both a mentor and a Samaritan. Regardless of his level of assignment or branch of service, he could be subsumed by a common trait: a sincere desire to help and devotion to those he advised. Whatever his approach to advisory duties, he always performed with dedication and competence. For nearly two decades, these qualities were the hallmark of the US adviser in South Vietnam. To analyze and evaluate the United States advisory experience in its entirety is not an easy task. It cannot be accomplished thoroughly and effectively by a single author since there were several types of advisers representing different areas of specialty but all dedicated to a common goal. Therefore, each member of the Control Group for the Indochina Refugee Authored Monograph Program has made a significant contribution as we presented the Vietnamese point of view.”-Author’s preface.
The history of the Vietnam War has rarely been told from the Vietnamese perspective-and never by a leader of that country. In Buddha's Child, Nguyen Cao Ky reveals the remarkable story of his tumultuous tenure as Premier of South Vietnam, and offers unprecedented insight into the war's beginning, escalation, and heartbreaking end. A thirty-four year old pilot and Air Force commander, known for his fighter-pilot's moustache, flowing lavender scarf and his reputation as a ladies' man, Ky in 1965 agreed to lead South Vietnam after a series of coups had dangerously destabilized the nation. Ky's task was to unite a country riven by political, ethnic, and religious factions and undermined by corruption. With little experience in governing and none in international affairs, and while continuing to fly combat missions over Vietnam, Ky plunged into a war to save his homeland. He served as premier until 1967, continued to be active in the war after his resignation, and finally left Vietnam in 1975 during the fall of Saigon. Buddha's Child offers Ky's perspective on the crucial events and memorable images of the Vietnam War: the coup against and execution of President Diem; the self-immolation by the Buddhist monk, and the radical Buddhists' attempt to topple Ky's government; the bloody and pivotal Tet Offensive; the shooting of a Vietcong prisoner, captured in one of the war's most notorious photographs; the Paris Peace talks that sold out South Vietnam; and the last, desperate days of Saigon. In frank language, Ky discusses his own successes and failures as a leader and dramatically relates the progress of the war as it unfolded on the ground and behind the scenes-including anecdotes about Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, William Westmoreland, Henry Cabot Lodge, William Colby, Henry Kissinger, and many others. Buddha's Child is a revelatory, fascinating account of a nation at war by a most unusual man.
General Cao Van Vien describes the final collapse of the South Vietnamese forces in 1975 following the military U.S. withdrawl. “General Cao Van Vien was the last chairman of the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff. For almost ten years he worked closely with other senior Vietnamese officers and civilian leaders and dealt with U.S. military and civilian representatives in Saigon. General Vien is therefore particularly well qualified to give an account of the final years from a South Vietnamese standpoint. “This is one of a series of monographs written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodian, Laotian, and South Vietnamese armed forces.” Includes over 20 maps, tables and illustrations.
This monograph forms part of the Indochina Monograph series written by senior military personnel from the former Army of the Republic of Vietnam who served against the northern communist invasion. “The Vietnam War was an unusual and complex experience. Directed and sustained by Communist North Vietnam under the label of national liberation, it combined the elements of insurgency and conventional warfare. It began with guerrilla tactics but developed into and concluded with open invasion. Basically, however, it remained an ideological conflict whose ultimate outcome depended on popular participation and support. The requirements to fight this war were multiple and challenging. Counterinsurgency demanded that we mobilize our resources to strengthen the regime, protect the people and obtain their allegiance, root out the enemy infrastructure, and extend our armed forces to maintain security over the national territory. All this had to be done in the midst of mounting political dissent and social divisiveness. To meet the threat of large-scale conventional attacks, we had to contend with enemy sanctuaries in neighboring countries, the inhospitable terrain of our extensive borders, and uninterrupted infiltration. However, our efforts were greatly restrained by limited forces and prevailing policies. To analyze critically the chain of events which shaped the final outcome of the war in order to learn from our failures and successes, we have drawn primarily on our first-hand knowledge of major events and our personal involvement in the conduct of war efforts. We hope that in addressing the Salient points raised in all previous monographs of this series with fresh insights, our work will be able to provide a critical, comprehensive view of the war experience on the South Vietnam side.”-Author’s Preface.
Originally published in 1980. This is a volume in the hard-to-find "Indochina Monographs" series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Volumes in the series were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodia, Laotian and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina.
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