If technology is an undeniable catalyst for progress, then energy is its inevitable basic food. It is no coincidence that since the industrial revolution, economic growth has been fuelled first by coal, then by oil & gas. Although energy intensity reserves are still sizeable in emerging economies and the technological catalyst can partially dematerialize growth, it is unrealistic to separate growth from its basic food. And, even if the “fossil energies share” (oil/gas/coal) will lose a few percent to nuclear and renewable energies over the next decades, all the indicators point to a world mix in which the fossil energy share will still top 75% by 2035. Driven by growth in emerging countries, the demand for oil and gas will continue to grow steadily. Even if there are enough oil and gas reserves to see us through the next three decades, will the industry be able to exploit and produce new resources that are increasingly complex to develop at a sufficient rate and which are often located in politically unstable countries? Not to mention the added challenge of the growing numbers of stakeholders who are increasingly insistent on industrial safety, environment and societal issues? In particular, will non-conventional resources, whose production growth could defer the oil & gas peaks by several decades, be able to withstand political and environmental lobbies? The evolution of oil & gas landscape over the past few years reveals a disturbing increase in the time required to develop large new fields and an accelerated decline of the production base due to the ageing of most of the mature-field facilities. This book aims to analyze all the critical factors (technical, political, economic, social and human) that could potentially accelerate or delay the maintenance and redevelopment of mature producing fields as well as the discovery and development of new conventional and unconventional resources. Insofar as in 2035, oil and gas still account for more than half of the world primary energy consumption, the appropriate management of these critical factors is crucial to ensuring, at least in the medium term, the ”Grail of Growth”. However, the hope of achieving the 450 ppm targets of Copenhagen has been shattered – bad news for the human population which is becoming more concerned with ensuring its short-term growth than with its long-term survival. Our energy future is not set in stone. Contents : 1. The food of growth. 2. Limiting the decline of the basement. 3. The increasing complexity of new developments. 4. Reaching excellence in safety. 5. Obtaining an environmental and social license to operate. 6. The “Energy” of the “Energy”. 7. Our energy future is not set in stone.
In the space of six years, the united States have reduced their dependence on oil by a third and have become almost self-sufficient in terms of gas supply. This “shale oil and gas revolution”, a sudden and unexpected earthquake in the energy world, enabled the US to become one of the most competitive countries in the world. Exporting this revolution could double the world gas reserves and boost those of oil by 20%. Outside North America, the main reservoirs are thought to be in China, Russia and Argentina. In the medium term, this new state of affairs will have major geopolitical consequences, fundamentally altering oil, gas and coal imports. While US imports from the Persian Gulf rapidly dwindle, those of China and India will significantly increase and as the United States becomes a gas exporter, Russia will have to find alternative markets. Although it is not ranked in the “top 10”, Europe is thought to have vast resources. Yet for the realization of a major European project, a number of geological (are European source rocks as high quality as their US counterparts?), economic (will Europe be able to develop its resources at an acceptable cost?) and societal barriers will have to be overcome. On a densely-populated, urban continent, hydraulic fracturing, water supply, microseisms and surface impact represent a battery of “threats” for the stakeholders. Changing this perception will require both pedagogy and transparency regarding the local communities. This has to be a win/win situation and not a case of give and take. In this work, written in the form of 20 questions for non-specialists, Philippe Charlez and Pascal Baylocq give you the answers to “everything you always wanted to know about shale oil and gas but never dared to ask".
In the space of six years, the united States have reduced their dependence on oil by a third and have become almost self-sufficient in terms of gas supply. This “shale oil and gas revolution”, a sudden and unexpected earthquake in the energy world, enabled the US to become one of the most competitive countries in the world. Exporting this revolution could double the world gas reserves and boost those of oil by 20%. Outside North America, the main reservoirs are thought to be in China, Russia and Argentina. In the medium term, this new state of affairs will have major geopolitical consequences, fundamentally altering oil, gas and coal imports. While US imports from the Persian Gulf rapidly dwindle, those of China and India will significantly increase and as the United States becomes a gas exporter, Russia will have to find alternative markets. Although it is not ranked in the “top 10”, Europe is thought to have vast resources. Yet for the realization of a major European project, a number of geological (are European source rocks as high quality as their US counterparts?), economic (will Europe be able to develop its resources at an acceptable cost?) and societal barriers will have to be overcome. On a densely-populated, urban continent, hydraulic fracturing, water supply, microseisms and surface impact represent a battery of “threats” for the stakeholders. Changing this perception will require both pedagogy and transparency regarding the local communities. This has to be a win/win situation and not a case of give and take. In this work, written in the form of 20 questions for non-specialists, Philippe Charlez and Pascal Baylocq give you the answers to “everything you always wanted to know about shale oil and gas but never dared to ask".
If technology is an undeniable catalyst for progress, then energy is its inevitable basic food. It is no coincidence that since the industrial revolution, economic growth has been fuelled first by coal, then by oil & gas. Although energy intensity reserves are still sizeable in emerging economies and the technological catalyst can partially dematerialize growth, it is unrealistic to separate growth from its basic food. And, even if the “fossil energies share” (oil/gas/coal) will lose a few percent to nuclear and renewable energies over the next decades, all the indicators point to a world mix in which the fossil energy share will still top 75% by 2035. Driven by growth in emerging countries, the demand for oil and gas will continue to grow steadily. Even if there are enough oil and gas reserves to see us through the next three decades, will the industry be able to exploit and produce new resources that are increasingly complex to develop at a sufficient rate and which are often located in politically unstable countries? Not to mention the added challenge of the growing numbers of stakeholders who are increasingly insistent on industrial safety, environment and societal issues? In particular, will non-conventional resources, whose production growth could defer the oil & gas peaks by several decades, be able to withstand political and environmental lobbies? The evolution of oil & gas landscape over the past few years reveals a disturbing increase in the time required to develop large new fields and an accelerated decline of the production base due to the ageing of most of the mature-field facilities. This book aims to analyze all the critical factors (technical, political, economic, social and human) that could potentially accelerate or delay the maintenance and redevelopment of mature producing fields as well as the discovery and development of new conventional and unconventional resources. Insofar as in 2035, oil and gas still account for more than half of the world primary energy consumption, the appropriate management of these critical factors is crucial to ensuring, at least in the medium term, the ”Grail of Growth”. However, the hope of achieving the 450 ppm targets of Copenhagen has been shattered – bad news for the human population which is becoming more concerned with ensuring its short-term growth than with its long-term survival. Our energy future is not set in stone. Contents : 1. The food of growth. 2. Limiting the decline of the basement. 3. The increasing complexity of new developments. 4. Reaching excellence in safety. 5. Obtaining an environmental and social license to operate. 6. The “Energy” of the “Energy”. 7. Our energy future is not set in stone.
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