Since the 1970s, developing countries have experienced two notable trends: the rise of new democratic regimes and the rush to free trade. These joint trends have led some to argue that democracy and free-trade go hand in hand in the developing world, each supporting the other. Mukherjee argues that trade politics in developing countries resists such easy categorization. Instead, his book offers an innovative theoretical framework identifying the specific economic conditions and democratic institutions that influence trade policy in developing countries. He focuses particularly on the changing domestic political interactions among parties, party leaders, and labor and capital in developing nations. He draws upon large time-series datasets as well as cross-national survey data analysis to test hypotheses. Then, looking more closely at Brazil, India, Indonesia, and South Africa, he also provides comparative case-study evidence, such as within-country data on trade barriers and campaign contributions. The most comprehensive treatment of the subject to date, "Democracy and Trade Policy in Developing Countries" will be essential reading for scholars and policymakers alike, not only for the understanding it provides for trading strategies now, but for what it reveals about the prospects for international economic cooperation in the future.
The power granted to the courts, both in a nation’s constitution and in practice, reveals much about the willingness of the legislative and executive branches to accept restraints on their own powers. For this reason, an independent judiciary is considered an indication of a nation’s level of democracy. Vineeta Yadav and Bumba Mukherjee use a data set covering 159 developing countries, along with comparative case studies of Brazil and Indonesia, to identify the political conditions under which de jure independence is established. They find that the willingness of political elites to grant the courts authority to review the actions of the other branches of government depends on the capacity of the legislature and expectations regarding the judiciary’s assertiveness. Moving next to de facto independence, Yadav and Mukherjee bring together data from 103 democracies in the developing world, complemented by case studies of Brazil, India, and Indonesia. Honing in on the effects of electoral institutions, the authors find that, when faced with short time horizons, governments that operate in personal vote electoral systems are likely to increase de facto judicial independence whereas governments in party-centered systems are likely to reduce it.
Since the 1970s, developing countries have experienced two notable trends: the rise of new democratic regimes and the rush to free trade. These joint trends have led some to argue that democracy and free-trade go hand in hand in the developing world, each supporting the other. Mukherjee argues that trade politics in developing countries resists such easy categorization. Instead, his book offers an innovative theoretical framework identifying the specific economic conditions and democratic institutions that influence trade policy in developing countries. He focuses particularly on the changing domestic political interactions among parties, party leaders, and labor and capital in developing nations. He draws upon large time-series datasets as well as cross-national survey data analysis to test hypotheses. Then, looking more closely at Brazil, India, Indonesia, and South Africa, he also provides comparative case-study evidence, such as within-country data on trade barriers and campaign contributions. The most comprehensive treatment of the subject to date, "Democracy and Trade Policy in Developing Countries" will be essential reading for scholars and policymakers alike, not only for the understanding it provides for trading strategies now, but for what it reveals about the prospects for international economic cooperation in the future.
The power granted to the courts, both in a nation’s constitution and in practice, reveals much about the willingness of the legislative and executive branches to accept restraints on their own powers. For this reason, an independent judiciary is considered an indication of a nation’s level of democracy. Vineeta Yadav and Bumba Mukherjee use a data set covering 159 developing countries, along with comparative case studies of Brazil and Indonesia, to identify the political conditions under which de jure independence is established. They find that the willingness of political elites to grant the courts authority to review the actions of the other branches of government depends on the capacity of the legislature and expectations regarding the judiciary’s assertiveness. Moving next to de facto independence, Yadav and Mukherjee bring together data from 103 democracies in the developing world, complemented by case studies of Brazil, India, and Indonesia. Honing in on the effects of electoral institutions, the authors find that, when faced with short time horizons, governments that operate in personal vote electoral systems are likely to increase de facto judicial independence whereas governments in party-centered systems are likely to reduce it.
When and why are right-wing populist parties electorally successful in developing democracies? What are the economic consequences of their electoral success? This book presents an original theoretical framework that is grounded in the socio-economic characteristics of developing countries to answer these questions and provides evidence for its theo
This will help us customize your experience to showcase the most relevant content to your age group
Please select from below
Login
Not registered?
Sign up
Already registered?
Success – Your message will goes here
We'd love to hear from you!
Thank you for visiting our website. Would you like to provide feedback on how we could improve your experience?
This site does not use any third party cookies with one exception — it uses cookies from Google to deliver its services and to analyze traffic.Learn More.