This work shows students how leaders translate their personal interests and ambitions into actions of the state and, thus, demonstrates how international and domestic politics are inextricably linked. It covers topics such as power, the causes of war and international affairs.
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is a master of game theory, which is a fancy label for a simple idea: People compete, and they always do what they think is in their own best interest. Bueno de Mesquita uses game theory and its insights into human behavior to predict and even engineer political, financial, and personal events. His forecasts, which have been employed by everyone from the CIA to major business firms, have an amazing 90 percent accuracy rate, and in this dazzling and revelatory book he shares his startling methods and lets you play along in a range of high-stakes negotiations and conflicts. Revealing the origins of game theory and the advances made by John Nash, the Nobel Prize—winning scientist perhaps best known from A Beautiful Mind, Bueno de Mesquita details the controversial and cold-eyed system of calculation that he has since created, one that allows individuals to think strategically about what their opponents want, how much they want it, and how they might react to every move. From there, Bueno de Mesquita games such events as the North Korean disarmament talks and the Middle East peace process and recalls, among other cases, how he correctly predicted which corporate clients of the Arthur Andersen accounting firm were most likely engaged in fraudulent activity (hint: one of them started with an E). And looking as ever to the future, Bueno de Mesquita also demonstrates how game theory can provide successful strategies to combat both global warming (instead of relying on empty regulations, make nations compete in technology) and terror (figure out exactly how much U.S. aid will make Pakistan fight the Taliban). But as Bueno de Mesquita shows, game theory isn’t just for saving the world. It can help you in your own life, whether you want to succeed in a lawsuit (lawyers argue too much the merits of the case and question too little the motives of their opponents), elect the CEO of your company (change the system of voting on your board to be more advantageous to your candidate), or even buy a car (start by knowing exactly what you want, call every dealer in a fifty-mile radius, and negotiate only over the phone). Savvy, provocative, and shockingly effective, The Predictioneer’s Game will change how you understand the world and manage your future. Life’s a game, and how you play is whether you win or lose.
The authors of this ambitious book address a fundamental political question: why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned out of office while those who preside over corruption, war, and misery endure? Considering this political puzzle, they also answer the related economic question of why some countries experience successful economic development and others do not. The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy. They also extend the model to explain the consequences of war on political survival. Throughout the book, they provide illustrations from history, ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France, and test the model against statistics gathered from cross-national data. The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language, reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes. They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically.
A groundbreaking new theory of the real rules of politics: leaders do whatever keeps them in power, regardless of the national interest. As featured on the viral video Rules for Rulers, which has been viewed over 3 million times. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith's canonical book on political science turned conventional wisdom on its head. They started from a single assertion: Leaders do whatever keeps them in power. They don't care about the "national interest"-or even their subjects-unless they have to. This clever and accessible book shows that democracy is essentially just a convenient fiction. Governments do not differ in kind but only in the number of essential supporters, or backs that need scratching. The size of this group determines almost everything about politics: what leaders can get away with, and the quality of life or misery under them. The picture the authors paint is not pretty. But it just may be the truth, which is a good starting point for anyone seeking to improve human governance.
What happened to Ebenezer Scrooge after the night he was visited by the three spirits? When we left Ebenezer Scrooge at the end of A Christmas Carol, he appeared to be a man transformed. But did he sincerely repent and earn admission to heaven? The Trial of Ebenezer Scrooge, written in Dickensian style and with tongue firmly lodged in cheek, follows Scrooge through the Court of Heavenly Justice, where his soul's fate is to be determined. In this courtroom drama, using frequent flashbacks, the author uncovers startling evidence, much of it directly from Dickens's classic, that reveals Scrooge to have lived a saintly life before being confronted by three Christmas ghosts. Evidence mounts that Mr. Scrooge struck a Faustian bargain with the Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come, a deal to extend his own mortality in exchange for yielding his soul as a tool for the forces of darkness to infiltrate heaven. Readers will enjoy the remaking of some of Dickens's best-known characters. Tiny Tim emerges as a villain, while little Eppie, borrowed from George Eliot's Silas Marner, is Scrooge's protector and source of salvation. This new novel provides the much-needed redemption of Ebenezer Scrooge's reputation and offers a welcome departure from the standard saccharine fare at Christmastime. Dickens buffs will have a merry time trying to find where Dickens's voice ends and the author's begins. All readers will puzzle over how we could have so misjudged Ebenezer Scrooge, or whether we judged Scrooge aright from the start.
To predict likely policy developments around the world over the next thirty years, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita uses game theoretic models as described in Predicting Politics. The tools used in this book have found wide application in business and in the development of significant American foreign policy initiatives over the years. The author uses data from 1948 to show the ability of models to predict the end of the Cold War. He then turns to data from 1980 for about one hundred countries and simulates future states of the world, especially with regard to further democratization. In the process he shows strong evidence that the burst of democratization that occurred at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s was predictable based on replicable data known in 1980. While delving into rather gloomy predictions about likely developments in Russia and China's domestic affairs, he offers a novel explanation for the failure of Russia to attract more investment and to achieve the higher growth rates commonly associated with democratic government. Although Russia is certainly more democratic in an absolute sense today than it was in 1980, it has fallen farther behind the rest of the world in terms of democratization and so lacks the comparative advantages of property rights, rule of law, and transparent governance that are essential for attracting investment. Bueno de Mesquita shows how policy situations and game theoretical analyses can explain the past, illuminate the present and forecast future events. At the same time he provides the tools necessary for others to create their own rigorous estimates of future foreign policies.
DIVIn this landmark work, two leading theorists of international relations analyze the strategies designed to avoid international conflict. Using a combination of game theory, statistical analysis, and detailed case histories, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman evaluate the conditions that promote negotiation, the status quo, capitulation, acquiescence, and war. The authors assess two competing theories on the role that domestic politics plays in foreign policy choices: one states that national decision makers are constrained only by the exigencies of the international system, and the other views leaders as additionally constrained by domestic political considerations. Finding the second theory to be more consistent with historical events, they use it to examine enduring puzzles such as why democracies do not appear to fight one another, whether balance of power or power preponderance promotes peaceful resolution of disputes, and what conditions are necessary and sufficient for nations to cooperate with one another. They conclude by speculating about the implications of their theory for foreign policy strategies in the post-Cold War world./div
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita can predict the future. From international terrorism to corporate fraud, from climate change to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita has been predicting the future for decades. Using Game Theory (a theory based on the rationale that everyone acts in their own self-interest) he can foretell and even engineer events. His forecasts, for everyone from the CIA to major international companies, have an extraordinary 90% success rate. In this fascinating and immensely readable book he explains how you can use Game Theory to your own advantage - to win a legal dispute, advance your career and even get the best possible price for your car. Prediction will change your understanding of the world - both now and in the future.
Offers predictions for Hong Kong as its sovereignty and administrative responsibilities transfer from the United Kingdom to mainland China on July 1, 1997
It's striking how many of the presidents Americans venerate--Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and John F. Kennedy, to name a few--oversaw some of the republic's bloodiest years. Perhaps it's because they looked out for important political causes. Or maybe they just looked out for themselves. This revealing and entertaining book puts some of America's greatest leaders under the microscope, showing how their calls for war, usually remembered as brave and noble, were in fact selfish and convenient. In every case, our presidents chose personal gain over national interest while loudly evoking justice and freedom. The result is an eye-opening retelling of American history, and a call for reforms that may make the future better. In this book, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith show that even leaders who proclaim the loftiest of intentions have concerns and motives that are far less pure than we might like. You'll never look at politics the same way again"--
* Bruce Bueno de Mesquita can predict the future. He is a master of game theory, a rather fancy name for a simple idea: when people compete with each other they always do what they think is in their own best interest. Bueno de Mesquita uses game theory to foretell - and even engineer - political, financial and personal events. In fact, Bueno de Mesquita's forecasts, for everyone from the CIA to major companies, have an astonishing ninety per cent success rate. In this startling and revelatory book he describes his methods and allows us to play along. * Bueno de Mesquita explores the origins of game theory as formulated by John Nash, the Nobel Prize-winner who became the subject of the film A Beautiful Mind. He has developed Nash's ideas to create a rigorous and pragmatic system of calculation that enables us to think strategically about what our opponents want, how much they want it, and how they might react to our every move. * Bueno de Mesquita applies his methods to many of the most pressing issues of our day. He advises how best to contain the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea. He shows how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might be resolved. He explains how corporate fraud can be anticipated and prevented. He addresses climate change and international terrorism: their likely evolution and our most effective response. * But, as Bueno de Mesquita makes clear, game theory isn't just for saving the world. It can also help in your own life - to succeed in a legal dispute, to advance your career or that of a colleague, and even to buy a car at the lowest possible price. * Shrewd, provocative and original, Predictioneer will change your understanding of the world - both now and in the future. If life's a game, then Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is the one essential member of your team.
The Strategy of Campaigning explores the political careers of Ronald Reagan and Boris Yeltsin, two of the most galvanizing and often controversial political figures of our time. Both men overcame defeat early in their political careers and rose to the highest elected offices in their respective countries. The authors demonstrate how and why Reagan and Yeltsin succeeded in their political aspirations, despite—or perhaps because of—their apparent “policy extremism”: that is, their advocacy of policy positions far from the mainstream. The book analyzes the viability of policy extremism as a political strategy that enables candidates to forge new coalitions and outflank conventional political allegiances. Kiron K. Skinner is Associate Professor of International Relations and Political Science at Carnegie Mellon University, a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and a member of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel and the National Security Education Board. Serhiy Kudelia is Lecturer of Politics at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Ukraine and advisor to Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is Julius Silver Professor and Director of the Alexander Hamilton Center for Political Economy at New York University and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. Condoleezza Rice is on a leave of absence from Stanford University, where she was a Professor of Political Science and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. She is currently serving as U.S. Secretary of State.
Hegemony and Democracy is constructed around the question of whether hegemony is sustainable, especially when the hegemon is a democratic state. The book draws on earlier publications over Bruce Russett’s long career and features new chapters that show the continuing relevance of his scholarship. In examining hegemony during and after the Cold War, it addresses: The importance of domestic politics in the formulation of foreign policy; The benefits and costs of seeking security through military power at the expense of expanding networks of shared national and transnational institutions; The incentives of other states to bandwagon with a strong but unthreatening hegemon and 'free-ride' on benefits it may provide rather than to balance against a powerful hegemon. The degree to which hegemony and democracy undermine or support each other. By applying theories of collective action and foreign policy, Russett explores the development of American hegemony and the prospects for a democratic hegemon to retain its influence during the coming decades. This collection is an essential volume for students and scholars of International Relations, American Politics, and US Foreign Policy.
Offers a general theory of war and international conflict, looks at specific modern military confrontations, and dispels some common misconceptions about war
By illuminating the conflict-resolving mechanisms inherent in the relationships between democracies, Bruce Russett explains one of the most promising developments of the modern international system: the striking fact that the democracies that it comprises have almost never fought each other.
This book, originally published in 1975, presents a theory of behaviour in coalitions and presents an application of the theory to Indian political party coalitions. The major findings of the study are (a) the size of political parties is unimportant when important benefits are distributed in coalitions; (b) behaviour that combines a moderate degree of cooperation and competition with one's allies leads to a much greater political success than either highly competitive or highly cooperative behaviour; and (c) political parties with leaders whose personalities can be characterised as having a high need to achieve enjoy much greater electoral success than parties whose leaders are relatively low in need for achievement. The book is important because the theory is able to explain long term and short term consequences of coalitions; it presents a careful analysis of political party behaviour in India and it combines elements of positive political theory, empirical political science and psychology in explaining coalition behaviour.
This pathbreaking book illuminates the politics of issue resolution within the European Community with evaluations and comparisons of competing models of decision making across twenty-two policy issues. Written by American and Dutch scholars, the book will be of great interest to students of comparative politics, public policy analysts, mathematic modelers, and all those concerned with the development of the European Community. One set of models explored in this volume - the expected utility model - treats politics as a conflictual activity, while the other, the exchange or log rolling model, emphasizes the cooperative nature of political processes. The alternative approaches model decision making in fundamentally different ways and make very different predictions about how issues in the European Community will be resolved. To facilitate direct comparison of their predictive and explanatory value, the models in this volume are based on the same variables: the potential control of actors over outcomes, the salience of the issues for the actors, and the outcomes preferred by the actors. The contributors test their models in the context of sixteen issues already resolved by the Council of Ministers and six issues currently under consideration, providing the reader with considerable knowledge about the controversies surrounding European Community policy on such topics as automobile emissions, nuclear radiation norms, air transport liberalization, and the European banking system. They conclude that the conflictual model and the cooperative model are less competitive and more complementary than has been thought, and they explain in detail how the models can be fruitfully combined.
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