Includes over 30 maps and illustrations This monograph forms part of the Indochina Monograph series written by senior military personnel from the former Army of the Republic of Vietnam who served against the northern communist invasion. Pacification is the military, political, economic, and social process of establishing or re-establishing local government responsive to and involving the participation of the people. It includes the provision of sustained, credible territorial security, the destruction of the enemy’s underground government, the assertion or re-assertion of political control and involvement of the people in government, and the initiation of economic and social activity capable of self-sustenance and expansion. Defined as such, pacification is a broad and complex strategic concept which encompasses many fields of national endeavor. As a program implemented jointly with the U.S. military effort in South Vietnam, pacification appears to have involved every American serviceman and civilian who served there, many of whom indeed participated in conceiving the idea and helping put it to work. In the attempt to present every relevant aspect of the GVN pacification effort, I have mostly relied on my personal experience as one of the many architects who helped draw part of the blueprint and oversaw its progress, and complemented it by conducting interviews with responsible officials and studying available documentation.
This monograph forms part of the Indochina Monograph series written by senior military personnel from the former Army of the Republic of Vietnam who served against the northern communist invasion. During the Vietnam conflict, the long and destructive war, Communist subversion, an unstable economy, several changes in government and the extended presence of Free World Military Forces combined to accentuate the basic weaknesses of South Vietnamese society: divisiveness and infighting. To evaluate the effect that South Vietnamese society had on the conduct of the war, this monograph seeks to present the Vietnamese point of view on the joint U.S.-RVN efforts to build a strong and viable South Vietnam, the impact of U.S. aid and the American presence on the South Vietnamese society, the most significant social problems that South Vietnam faced during and as a result of the war, and finally the viability of the U.S.-supported regime and its leadership. To provide this in-depth analysis we, the authors, have drawn primarily on our own experience as major witnesses of South Vietnam’s politico-social tragedy and participants in the war effort. Constructed from the combined vantage points of our positions, one in the field and exposed to the rural scene and the other in the very heart of the urban mainstream, this work thoroughly reflects the insider’s viewpoint and intimate knowledge of South Vietnamese political and social life.
Includes over 50 maps and illustrations This monograph forms part of the Indochina Monograph series written by senior military personnel from the former Army of the Republic of Vietnam who served against the northern communist invasion. “For several years Cambodia, under the leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, had condoned the use of part of its territory by the Vietnamese Communists for infiltration routes and logistic bases. These bases supported enemy activities in South Vietnam’s Military Regions 3 and 4 and a significant part of Military Region 2 but were protected because of Cambodia’s declared neutrality. However, the change in government on 18 March 1970 provided South Vietnam and the United States the opportunity to neutralize and disrupt much of the enemy logistic system across the border. Sanctioned by the new Cambodian government and approved by the Presidents of the Republic of Vietnam and the United States, South Vietnamese and U.S. forces launched combined operations into Cambodia’s border area from 30 April to 30 June 1970. As the Assistant Chief of Staff J3 of the Joint General Staff, RVNAF, I participated in the combined planning for these historic operations with military representatives from Cambodia and the United States and then monitored the operations constantly for the Chairman JGS. In conducting my analysis I have relied on my personal involvement and observations as J3 and interviews with former members of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.” -Author’s Introduction.
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